How far can polite diplomacy and coolheadeness get the CSA?

[Skallagrim]

An offline conversation about the old chestnut of AH ("could the South have won the Civil War?") prompted me to suggest that the most viable strategy for Confederate success would be to be as reasonable as possible. Painting the North as the aggressor is the only way to maintain as much foreign support (both inside the Union and in uninvolved countries) as they possibly can. This is not to say that I think the South absolutely cannot win the war (meaning: 'at least a significant part of the CSA is recognised as independent post-war') through an alternate course of the war. I just consider that outcome to be rather unlikely, considering the overwhelming power of the North. In light of the fact that maximising outside support and encouraging outside opposition to the Union is only going to be good for the CSA, I really think that a policy to that end would be the wisest move.

My question is: how much would it help?

The scenario is very simple, although not very likely in itself. This is more of a "suppose they had done this" discussion, and I am fully aware that the chances of it happening are slim. (As such, posts aiming to derail the thread into debating the likelihood of the premise are neither needed nor appreciated.) Let us take the premise that the CSA deliberately sets out to be as reasonable as possible, actively aiming to prevent armed hostility if possible. This entails:

-- Publicly offering to pay the Southern states' share of the USA's public debt, the exact sum to be negotiated during a confederence to that end (possibly with foreign powers as neutral mediators to come up with a reasonable figure).

-- Publicly offering to fully compensate the USA for any and all federal installations present within the seceded states at full value without any haggling or complaining.

-- Actively and publicly renouncing any claims to any southern state that does not voluntarily secede, nor any claims to any territories of the USA.

-- Publicly calling for an avoidance of any armed conflict, urging any grievance to be resolved through negotiation (if need be with foreign mediation).

-- Publicly announcing that any US serviceman to surrender to the CSA in the context of federal installations being given up will be granted safe passage to the border, unmolested.

-- Publicly announcing that all materials present in such installations may be removed and taken along by such evacuating personnel; even offering civil contracters paid for by the CSA to help in returning Union property to the Union.

-- Highly publicising the above offers, thus ensuring that everyone in both the Union and the rest of the Western world knows about these positions.

-- At all costs keeping complete lunatics like Robert Barnwell Rhett out of any position of power, and ensuring that he can't publicise his crap either (if need be by shoving him down a flight of stairs). As such coming across as at least sane and normal to any foreign observers.

-- Avoiding the accentuation of slavery in any dealings with foreign powers; instead purely stressing the right to shape one's own national destiny as the important issue at stake. Likewise avoiding any foreign policy based on threatening foreign powers by the possibility of witholding cotton from the global market. Instead offering highly, highly preferential trading rights to any foreign power that recognised the CSA. And of course stressing that any Union blockade would be a violation of foreign nations' rights as well...

-- Instead of attacking Fort Sumter, merely keeping up its blockade and waiting for the fort's supplies to run out (which will happen in a matter of weeks, forcing its occupants to surrender).

-- Basically under no circumstances what-so-ever being the aggressor, and instead just waiting for the North to move.


This strategy, as far as I can tell, forces Lincoln to very obviously play the part of the aggressor. The one disagreement is the legality of secession. On every other conceivable point, the South is being as gracious as anyone could possibly be. Consider that before the attack on Fort Sumter, public opinion even in the North was very divided on the legality of a coercive war. Many held secession to be perfectly legal-- and although everyone knows I agree with that, whether that's accurate doesn't have to be discussed here: what matters is that short of the OTL attack on Fort Sumter, Lincoln's sole casus belli will be "I want to coerce these unwilling states back into the Union by force".

There will be many people up North who won't consider that a good enough reason. The South can again play up the comparisons the USA's declaration of independence, stating (accurately) that their secession is just as legal (or illegal, if you will) as that of Washington, Jefferson, Adams and all the other Founding Fathers.

How would this proceed? What would Lincoln do? He can basically pursue war directly, or offer to start negotiations.


OPTION ONE
If Lincoln does pursue a war under these circumstances, we may freely assume that Virginia, Arkansas, North Carolina and Tennessee will secede and join the CSA.

Will any other states (Missouri? Kentucky? Maryland?) be moved to secession under these circumstances? I personally doubt it very much, although they might move to refuse participation in "mister Lincoln's war", which would then no doubt cause Lincoln to order Federal take-over of those states, which might cause more foreign animosity (and conversely more sympathy for the South).

In any case, assume for the scenario that even if Lincoln does outright start a war, the CSA will still stick to all of the above, with the additional policies of:

-- Publicly offering plebiscites to be held in the most Unionist regions of Kentucky and Virginia (essentially the region that became West Virginia and the bordering region of Kentucky), on the condition that the USA similarly allows a plebiscite in the Indian Territory.

-- Calling for foreign mediation and/or intervention in this war of aggression being waged against them.


OPTION TWO
If Lincoln instead calls for negotiations instead, assume that the CSA is completely open to this, with its one immutable demand being that it gets recognised as an independent nation and will indeed end up being treated as such when negotiations conclude.



Which is more likely: war or negotiations? And which of the two is more likely to result in Southern success?

Consider that if negotiations get started, and with no attack on Fort Sumter, Virginia, Arkansas, North Carolina and Tennessee are still Union states. They'll be pushing for recognition of the CSA. They'll have a voice in Congress, in any negotiations, and in any future presidential election. That might push things over the edge, and result in the Union basically just accepting Southern independence in return for (very) preferential trading rights and provided the CSA pays through the nose in the public debt and compensation-for-federal-property departments.

Regarding the option of war, the CSA is not fundamentally stronger than in OTL, but presumably enjoys wider public support in the Union and in Europe. Any attempt by Lincoln to basically just straight-up re-conquer the South would, conversely, face considerably more opposition both at home and abroad. Any attempt to do so may well result in a peace candidate being elected in '64... which is a horizon the CSA can reach alive. This is further bolstered by the fact a way smarter Confederate foreign policy may well mean that European powers (though not likely to actively fight on the South's behalf) may choose to put pressure on Lincoln to come to the negotiating table. Under these circumstances, if the South lasts long enough for Lincoln to be voted out of office, foreign recognition is probably a given. At that point, the war is over (because foreign powers will not accept being blockaded when they want to trade with a country they have recognised).


Anyway, this is what I suggested as the best policy the CSA could have followed, and I think it would have yielded the greatest chance of winning them independence. Mind you, I'm not saying it will definitely succeed. I just think it would offer them the best possible shot at it. Basically, if I got dropped in late 1860 and my one job was to try and secure Confederate independence, this is what I'd do. (Actually, assuming I'd have absolute power, I would just abolish slavery at once, which would get abolitionism-minded Britain to recognise me and back me up, which would in turn ensure my success and make my actions moral to boot-- but while my premise of calm diplomacy is just highly, highly unlikely - what with shouty Southern fire-eaters and all - the premise of getting the fledgling CSA to give up slavery is just plain ASB. Therefore, we'll go with my diplomacy premise here.)

What do you think? How far could this 'peace strategy' have gotten the CSA?

 

[Thoresby]

I certainly think it would have been a lot more effective though I'm not sure it would have worked because as much as the CSA leadership and it's apologists talk about things other than slavery it really was about slavery and that's always going to be a PR nightmare.

 

[Skallagrim]

I certainly think it would have been a lot more effective though I'm not sure it would have worked because as much as the CSA leadership and it's apologists talk about things other than slavery it really was about slavery and that's always going to be a PR nightmare.

True, although the key difference with OTL would be an active policy to downplay it, and also keeping the madmen like Rhett from carrying out 'clandestine foreign relations'. The complete idiot actually sent bombastic essays to British government officials expounding upon the many virtues of slavery. Government officials who were morally opposed to slavery, even! So pushing Rhett down a flight of stairs (worth doing regardless of any other consideration, by the way) and fervently down-playing slavery as a factor of importance would at least help.

I think the economic aspect (offering a really sweet deal instead of blustering about 'King Cotton') would actually be the more important foreign policy aspect, really. Britain really didn't appreciate being told that they needed the South. Britain didn't appreciate it to such an extent that it set up its own alternative cotton production in Egypt and India (which was, at the time, not at all profitable) instead of just telling the Union piss off with its puny blockade (which would have been cheaper and quicker).

Foreign policy-wise, the CSA in OTL did everything wrong.

 

[Bayou57]

An offline conversation about the old chestnut of AH ("could the South have won the Civil War?") prompted me to suggest that the most viable strategy for Confederate success would be to be as reasonable as possible. Painting the North as the aggressor is the only way to maintain as much foreign support (both inside the Union and in uninvolved countries) as they possibly can. This is not to say that I think the South absolutely cannot win the war (meaning: 'at least a significant part of the CSA is recognised as independent post-war') through an alternate course of the war. I just consider that outcome to be rather unlikely, considering the overwhelming power of the North. In light of the fact that maximising outside support and encouraging outside opposition to the Union is only going to be good for the CSA, I really think that a policy to that end would be the wisest move.

My question is: how much would it help?

The scenario is very simple, although not very likely in itself. This is more of a "suppose they had done this" discussion, and I am fully aware that the chances of it happening are slim. (As such, posts aiming to derail the thread into debating the likelihood of the premise are neither needed nor appreciated.) Let us take the premise that the CSA deliberately sets out to be as reasonable as possible, actively aiming to prevent armed hostility if possible. This entails:

-- Publicly offering to pay the Southern states' share of the USA's public debt, the exact sum to be negotiated during a confederence to that end (possibly with foreign powers as neutral mediators to come up with a reasonable figure).

-- Publicly offering to fully compensate the USA for any and all federal installations present within the seceded states at full value without any haggling or complaining.

-- Actively and publicly renouncing any claims to any southern state that does not voluntarily secede, nor any claims to any territories of the USA.

-- Publicly calling for an avoidance of any armed conflict, urging any grievance to be resolved through negotiation (if need be with foreign mediation).

-- Publicly announcing that any US serviceman to surrender to the CSA in the context of federal installations being given up will be granted safe passage to the border, unmolested.

-- Publicly announcing that all materials present in such installations may be removed and taken along by such evacuating personnel; even offering civil contracters paid for by the CSA to help in returning Union property to the Union.

-- Highly publicising the above offers, thus ensuring that everyone in both the Union and the rest of the Western world knows about these positions.

-- At all costs keeping complete lunatics like Robert Barnwell Rhett out of any position of power, and ensuring that he can't publicise his crap either (if need be by shoving him down a flight of stairs). As such coming across as at least sane and normal to any foreign observers.

-- Avoiding the accentuation of slavery in any dealings with foreign powers; instead purely stressing the right to shape one's own national destiny as the important issue at stake. Likewise avoiding any foreign policy based on threatening foreign powers by the possibility of witholding cotton from the global market. Instead offering highly, highly preferential trading rights to any foreign power that recognised the CSA. And of course stressing that any Union blockade would be a violation of foreign nations' rights as well...

-- Instead of attacking Fort Sumter, merely keeping up its blockade and waiting for the fort's supplies to run out (which will happen in a matter of weeks, forcing its occupants to surrender).

-- Basically under no circumstances what-so-ever being the aggressor, and instead just waiting for the North to move.


This strategy, as far as I can tell, forces Lincoln to very obviously play the part of the aggressor. The one disagreement is the legality of secession. On every other conceivable point, the South is being as gracious as anyone could possibly be. Consider that before the attack on Fort Sumter, public opinion even in the North was very divided on the legality of a coercive war. Many held secession to be perfectly legal-- and although everyone knows I agree with that, whether that's accurate doesn't have to be discussed here: what matters is that short of the OTL attack on Fort Sumter, Lincoln's sole casus belli will be "I want to coerce these unwilling states back into the Union by force".

There will be many people up North who won't consider that a good enough reason. The South can again play up the comparisons the USA's declaration of independence, stating (accurately) that their secession is just as legal (or illegal, if you will) as that of Washington, Jefferson, Adams and all the other Founding Fathers.

How would this proceed? What would Lincoln do? He can basically pursue war directly, or offer to start negotiations.


OPTION ONE
If Lincoln does pursue a war under these circumstances, we may freely assume that Virginia, Arkansas, North Carolina and Tennessee will secede and join the CSA.

Will any other states (Missouri? Kentucky? Maryland?) be moved to secession under these circumstances? I personally doubt it very much, although they might move to refuse participation in "mister Lincoln's war", which would then no doubt cause Lincoln to order Federal take-over of those states, which might cause more foreign animosity (and conversely more sympathy for the South).

In any case, assume for the scenario that even if Lincoln does outright start a war, the CSA will still stick to all of the above, with the additional policies of:

-- Publicly offering plebiscites to be held in the most Unionist regions of Kentucky and Virginia (essentially the region that became West Virginia and the bordering region of Kentucky), on the condition that the USA similarly allows a plebiscite in the Indian Territory.

-- Calling for foreign mediation and/or intervention in this war of aggression being waged against them.


OPTION TWO
If Lincoln instead calls for negotiations instead, assume that the CSA is completely open to this, with its one immutable demand being that it gets recognised as an independent nation and will indeed end up being treated as such when negotiations conclude.



Which is more likely: war or negotiations? And which of the two is more likely to result in Southern success?

Consider that if negotiations get started, and with no attack on Fort Sumter, Virginia, Arkansas, North Carolina and Tennessee are still Union states. They'll be pushing for recognition of the CSA. They'll have a voice in Congress, in any negotiations, and in any future presidential election. That might push things over the edge, and result in the Union basically just accepting Southern independence in return for (very) preferential trading rights and provided the CSA pays through the nose in the public debt and compensation-for-federal-property departments.

Regarding the option of war, the CSA is not fundamentally stronger than in OTL, but presumably enjoys wider public support in the Union and in Europe. Any attempt by Lincoln to basically just straight-up re-conquer the South would, conversely, face considerably more opposition both at home and abroad. Any attempt to do so may well result in a peace candidate being elected in '64... which is a horizon the CSA can reach alive. This is further bolstered by the fact a way smarter Confederate foreign policy may well mean that European powers (though not likely to actively fight on the South's behalf) may choose to put pressure on Lincoln to come to the negotiating table. Under these circumstances, if the South lasts long enough for Lincoln to be voted out of office, foreign recognition is probably a given. At that point, the war is over (because foreign powers will not accept being blockaded when they want to trade with a country they have recognised).


Anyway, this is what I suggested as the best policy the CSA could have followed, and I think it would have yielded the greatest chance of winning them independence. Mind you, I'm not saying it will definitely succeed. I just think it would offer them the best possible shot at it. Basically, if I got dropped in late 1860 and my one job was to try and secure Confederate independence, this is what I'd do. (Actually, assuming I'd have absolute power, I would just abolish slavery at once, which would get abolitionism-minded Britain to recognise me and back me up, which would in turn ensure my success and make my actions moral to boot-- but while my premise of calm diplomacy is just highly, highly unlikely - what with shouty Southern fire-eaters and all - the premise of getting the fledgling CSA to give up slavery is just plain ASB. Therefore, we'll go with my diplomacy premise here.)

What do you think? How far could this 'peace strategy' have gotten the CSA?

 

[FillyofDelphi]

My question is; how does such a policy play out domestically among the hot-headed secessionists within the population, state governments, ect.? How does the government in Montgomery plan on enforcing such a level of control in order to get the still fairly disorganized rebellion to act under such strict restrictions on good behavior? Assuming they try and (almost certainly) fail, than you've expressed your impotency to your own people and that promises you make internationally can't be trusted.

 

[Bayou57]

For many Confederates politicians, the goal was "as little government as possible." (Little has changed in Southern politics.) Why carry a heavy tax burden?

As late as 1864, some Confederates still believed that a military victory - or some kind of stalemate - was still possible. Military operations cost money, but they also seem honorable. How many nations have purchased their independence without bloodshed?
Yes, I know that it's a sad comment. Tragic but true. Raising taxes to new heights wasn't a popular strategy to propose in Richmond before 1865, and in that year conventional politics no longer mattered.

Before 1865, the Confederate government might have offered to sell all slaves to the Northern government. Three conditions: The North buys all of the slaves, the North agrees to care for all of the former slaves, and independence will be granted to any state that wishes to leave the union. Humanitarians from foreign nations will be asked to supervise the process.

A very radical idea, although, in some ways, it's similar to the process that was used to liberate the slaves in the British empire.

How could the North raise the money? Probably a combination of taxes, the sale of Western lands, and charity.

If Lincoln had rejected the proposal in 1862-63, what would he have said to the British and to other Europeans? (What would he have said to Northern voters?)

 

[Max Sinister]

Sounds sane, but I have the impression that for this, the CSA statesmen would have to forget who they are.

 

[Corjomc]

May a negotiated exit of Southern states then lead to a "Race for the West"?

Leading to Bloody Arizona, Bloody Utah, Bloody New Mexico, etc.

 

[SsgtC]

Either course is still going to lead to war. Lincoln, or any President for that matter, cannot afford to set a precedent that Secession is legal. It would weaken the Federal Government to the point of impotence. Anytime legislation was proposed that a state didn't like, they could simply threaten to (or actually) secede until they got their way. You may as well not have a Federal Government at that point. To me, I think the war goes largely as in OTL. While nations like the UK or France may be morally supportive, they won't officially recognize the CSA. Doing so causes far too many internal problems for them (Ireland, India and other colonies for the UK, Algeria and others for France).

 

[FillyofDelphi]

For many Confederates politicians, the goal was "as little government as possible." (Little has changed in Southern politics.) Why carry a heavy tax burden?

As late as 1864, some Confederates still believed that a military victory - or some kind of stalemate - was still possible. Military operations cost money, but they also seem honorable. How many nations have purchased their independence without bloodshed?
Yes, I know that it's a sad comment. Tragic but true. Raising taxes to new heights wasn't a popular strategy to propose in Richmond before 1865, and in that year conventional politics no longer mattered.

Before 1865, the Confederate government might have offered to sell all slaves to the Northern government. Three conditions: The North buys all of the slaves, the North agrees to care for all of the former slaves, and independence will be granted to any state that wishes to leave the union. Humanitarians from foreign nations will be asked to supervise the process.

A very radical idea, although, in some ways, it's similar to the process that was used to liberate the slaves in the British empire.

How could the North raise the money? Probably a combination of taxes, the sale of Western lands, and charity.

If Lincoln had rejected the proposal in 1862-63, what would he have said to the British and to other Europeans? (What would he have said to Northern voters?)

The same thing he would have told them IRL: Indeed, rejecting the proposal probably would only BOOST his popularity compared to historically, because he's saving a MASSIVE financial burden and keeping out millions of potential competitive job-seekers from Northern industry to avoid making a statement on a moral principal most Americans don't share anways. To say the majority of Northerners were for abolution is madness: what they were against was excessive government intrusion on a scale not before seen for the sake of enforcing slavery that largely fell on them (Fugitive Slave Act and the rights it gave to slave catchers and law enforcement, put Federal judges in charge over matters that were previously state affairs, use of violence and corrupt processes to make new territories in the West into slave states that would "muscle out" Free Labor/small farmers, the undermining of democracy for "sectional/minority section of society rights" arguements that oddly enough only ever seemed to apply to that "peculiar institution", ect.) and the idea of defending the idea of the Constitution and government of, by, and for the people against a great challange of being broken up by what they say as a "slavocracy" autocratic government at a time Republicanism was failing left and right in Europe.

Further, the Confederate government dosen't own all the slaves and would face mass resistance if they tried to confiscate them all. Not to mention the Southern economy post-agreement would... tank. Just collapse on a scale unforseen as a 1/3 of the labor pool vanishes in a puff of smoke just as a massive flow of new money floods the market, and the main industry (cash crops) collapses.

 

[Galba Otho Vitelius]

This is exactly what they should have done and if Lincoln's aim was to reconquer the Deep South it would have put him in a bind. Another thing the CSA could have done, though this was obviously unlikely, was to for the other five states to simply exclude South Carolina from the CSA. The Confederacy would be formed without South Carolina, and if South Carolina joined they would have to get their fire-eaters under control lest they do something idiotic and start a war.

 

[piratedude]

I really don't see the south getting independence peacefully.
Lincoln wasn't a war-hawk, contrary to how some in his day and ours would like to see him. If you gave him a negotiating table he'd break the chair as he rushed to sit down.

However, he's not going to allow the south to break away, and by putting it in the realm of laws and negotiations the south can only prolong the inevitable. The legal grounds for indivual states to secession is shaky at best (proposing a inverse procedure from Art 4, sect 3 of the constitution might convince someone, though it likely needs to be made an amendment first), and the provisional government they created in February '61 was in blatant violation of the constitution (art 1, sect 10). Lincoln could, if he wanted to, supply fort Sumter supplied by ship, the first batch that Lincoln sent arrived the day before the rebels open fired plus if it looks like it's going to draw out a long time, they could covertly smuggle men out, and leave a skeleton crew.

A foreign mediator I could see, but it won't look non-biased if they're British, or French for that matter. So that basically leaves Russia as the only big power with no bias due to economic ties (a united Germany is just a glimmer in Bismarck's eye at this point).

 

[Wendell]

The CSA existed precisely because southern leaders were not interested in being cool-headed.

 

[Anarch King of Dipsodes]

Let us take the premise that the CSA deliberately sets out to be as reasonable as possible, actively aiming to prevent armed hostility if possible. This entails...

A collection of actions irrelevant to the fundamental question: can a state government rescind the jurisdiction of the Federal government over its territory?

-- Instead of attacking Fort Sumter, merely keeping up its blockade and waiting for the fort's supplies to run out (which will happen in a matter of weeks, forcing its occupants to surrender).

That avoids provoking the North. However, the Federal government still holds Fort Pickens in Florida, which can't be starved out. (Also Fort Jefferson in the Dry Tortugas, west of Florida, but that one could be ignored.)

This strategy, as far as I can tell, forces Lincoln to very obviously play the part of the aggressor.

You tell wrong. Lincoln doesn't have to fire a shot, at least not for a while.

The one disagreement is the legality of secession. On every other conceivable point, the South is being as gracious as anyone could possibly be. Consider that before the attack on Fort Sumter, public opinion even in the North was very divided on the legality of a coercive war. Many held secession to be perfectly legal-- and although everyone knows I agree with that, whether that's accurate doesn't have to be discussed here: what matters is that short of the OTL attack on Fort Sumter, Lincoln's sole casus belli will be "I want to coerce these unwilling states back into the Union by force".

There were a lot of people who were antsy about initiating a war to enforce Union, but almost no one in the North who accepted the legal argument for secession. No Republicans, and no Douglas Democrats. Lincoln's position was that the secession declarations were of no legal effect. Therefore, it was his constitutional duty to enforce the laws of the United States in its entire territory, including the so-called seceding states, and to put down, by force if necessary, any resistance to such enforcement.

The South can again play up the comparisons the USA's declaration of independence, stating (accurately) that their secession is just as legal (or illegal, if you will) as that of Washington, Jefferson, Adams and all the other Founding Fathers.

In a sense you are right. "Confederate" of secession, and the armed interference with the U.S. government which resulted, was illegal. So was the Declaration of Independence, and the armed resistance to British authority which resulted. However, the DoI was issued on the basis of the moral right of "the people" to overthrow the government when it becomes oppressive. The DoI listed 27 categories of oppression inflicted by King George. The secessionists of 1860 could not point to a single concrete action (the seven Deep South states declared secession before Lincoln even took office).

This was sufficiently obvious that Southerners made very little effort to equate secession with the DoI. Instead they insisted that secession was legal.

What would Lincoln do? He can basically pursue war directly, or offer to start negotiations.

First, Lincoln would not negotiate under any circumstances, unless it was to arrange the terms by which secession would be rescinded.

Second, Lincoln would not initiate war until he was good and ready, and then if possible in a way that would force the rebels to start the shooting.

Third, if the crisis "hung fire" in the condition of March 1861, Lincoln would devote considerable effort to building up the Union element in the Border States and Upper South, and to cementing the status of those states as US states - in particular, by appointing new Federal officials for those states: US Attorneys, Customs collectors, postmasters. This would be his obvious duty as the new President, and he would be careful to appoint highly regarded local men.

This would put a great strain on the Confederate government and on secessionists in those states. If they don't Do Something, Lincoln will have all those states securely tied to the Union. And in fact the Confederates and secessionists were planning to Do Something. In Virginia, former governor Wise, tired of waiting for the state convention to act, fomented a conspiracy to have the Virginia militia seize the Harpers Ferry Arsenal and the Navy Yard in Norfolk. In Missouri, Governor Jackson plotted to have the state militia seize the Arsenal in Saint Louis, using cannon secretly provided by the CSA.

There are other questions. Lincoln proposed to have the Navy collect customs duties at sea, off Southern ports. This would maintain Federal authority, but avoid direct clashes with "Confederate" forces, unless they sailed out to attack the U.S. ships.

Then there was the question of men living in the South who did not accept the validity of secession, and were still US citizens by their own lights. If the "Confederate" government molested such men, and they appealed to the Federal government for protection... For instance, Federal troops land in south Texas, and link up with the Unionist German immigrant settlers of the region. They provide arms and authority to the German-Texans to form a Unionist militia; if the CSA moves to suppress them, they are initiating war against US ciitizens.

-- Publicly offering plebiscites to be held in the most Unionist regions of Kentucky and Virginia (essentially the region that became West Virginia and the bordering region of Kentucky), on the condition that the USA similarly allows a plebiscite in the Indian Territory.

Why only those states? There were Unionist areas in east Tennessee and south Texas. Is secession to be a county-by-county process? That entirely abandons the doctrine of state sovereignty which was absolutely fundamental to the secessionists.

How far could this 'peace strategy' have gotten the CSA?

Not far at all. Lincoln was too cunning.

 

[Skallagrim]

Sounds sane, but I have the impression that for this, the CSA statesmen would have to forget who they are.

The CSA existed precisely because southern leaders were not interested in being cool-headed.

Certainly correct as per OTL, but these responses do miss the point of the thread. I do not aim, for once, to discuss what is likely, but purely and exclusively what the smartest course of action would have been (to achieve the aim of gaining independence).

As such, given that express goal, my question is not "what would they have done", but "what should they have done". The OP outlines my own ideas on the matter, and I'm seeking input to test the limits of those ideas. It's more a theoretical exercise than realistic scenario.


--

May a negotiated exit of Southern states then lead to a "Race for the West"?

Leading to Bloody Arizona, Bloody Utah, Bloody New Mexico, etc.

Under certain conditions-- possible, at least for Arizona and New Mexico. Under the ones I gave, not so much. In order to come across as reasonable and unassuming as possible, I'm quite sure the South would have to give up all claims to the New Mexico Territory (an area that was never going to be prime 'slave country' anyway).


--

This is exactly what they should have done and if Lincoln's aim was to reconquer the Deep South it would have put him in a bind. Another thing the CSA could have done, though this was obviously unlikely, was to for the other five states to simply exclude South Carolina from the CSA. The Confederacy would be formed without South Carolina, and if South Carolina joined they would have to get their fire-eaters under control lest they do something idiotic and start a war.

While it would make for a very interesting scenario (the cradle of the secession movement, excluded from the CSA!), I agree with you that it's very unlikely. Frankly, I think it would be very difficult to keep the fire-eaters in check, but I'm just assuming that it happens for the sake of exploring my theoretical strategy.


--

Either course is still going to lead to war. Lincoln, or any President for that matter, cannot afford to set a precedent that Secession is legal. It would weaken the Federal Government to the point of impotence. Anytime legislation was proposed that a state didn't like, they could simply threaten to (or actually) secede until they got their way. You may as well not have a Federal Government at that point.

I really don't see the south getting independence peacefully.
Lincoln wasn't a war-hawk, contrary to how some in his day and ours would like to see him. If you gave him a negotiating table he'd break the chair as he rushed to sit down.

Interesting contrast here. The very act of opening negotiations sets a precedent that secession, even if not recognised per se, is a tool that can be used to force concessions. I'm fairly sure Lincoln, aware of that, would be wary indeed. On the other hand, I agree that Lincoln wasn't a 'war hawk' as such. He'd support certain constitutional protections of slavery in return for making secession explicitly illegal. (That's not an assuption, by the way, that's an OTL suggestion he was willing to back, albeit with clenched teeth.)

To say Lincoln would "break the chair as he rushed to sit down" at a negotiating table, however, is certainly overstating matters....

Anyway, since the premise is that independence is non-negotiable for the CSA, I do agree that Lincoln would choose war over recognising that. Thing is, Lincoln isn't a dictator, and Congress might (eventually come to) disagree.


--

To me, I think the war goes largely as in OTL. While nations like the UK or France may be morally supportive, they won't officially recognize the CSA. Doing so causes far too many internal problems for them (Ireland, India and other colonies for the UK, Algeria and others for France).

I suspect you're somewhat understating the effect of intense foreign and domestic criticism of a war carried out under the ATL circumstances I proposed, although I agree that foreign powers won't actually recognise the CSA until and unless Lincoln is defeated in the election of '64 (which I do think could happen, under the circumstances). Offers to mediate might also be made, which Licoln would almost certainly want to reject (because it would recognise that the conflict isn't an internal US matter). That rejection would paint him as more of the 'bad guy' in foreign eyes, I think.


--

A foreign mediator I could see, but it won't look non-biased if they're British, or French for that matter. So that basically leaves Russia as the only big power with no bias due to economic ties (a united Germany is just a glimmer in Bismarck's eye at this point).

I doubt Russia would be interested. Britain and France, I suspect, might be far more open to it (due to the South being more cool-headed in its attitude and making a far better offer to potential allies). As wrote above, though, Lincoln would probably reject those offers. Mostly because allowing foreign mediation recognised the conflict as international in nature-- not something he'd want. Again, though, Congress might (eventually come to) feel differently, and Lincoln is not an all-powerful dictator. Congress could eventually force him to accept mediation.


--

However, [Lincoln]'s not going to allow the south to break away, and by putting it in the realm of laws and negotiations the south can only prolong the inevitable. The legal grounds for indivual states to secession is shaky at best (proposing a inverse procedure from Art 4, sect 3 of the constitution might convince someone, though it likely needs to be made an amendment first),

For once, this is not the matter I want to discuss. It's commonly known that I very vehemently believe that secession is a moral right of all peoples for any reason what-so-ever, and that any law to the contrary is void (and tyrannical to boot)-- so debating this manner with me is not going to get you anywhere at all.

(That said, the most common ground for arguing secession was/is lawful in the USA is the Tenth Amendment, combined with the fact that the Constitution doesn't forbid it explicitly. After all, the Tenth Amendment tells us that anything not explicitly delegated to the federal government or forbidden to the states is by definition the prerogative of the states... I don't really see the need to draw reverse procedures into it. But again: that means little to me. If the Consitution explicitly forbade secession, I'd consider that article to be null and void anyway.)

and the provisional government they created in February '61 was in blatant violation of the constitution (art 1, sect 10).

Again, not what's being discussed, but do note the intrinsic flaw in this argument: art 1, sect 10 only applies to states within the Union. The Southern states had seceded, so the Constitution no longer applied as of that moment. To make the foriming of this new compact illegal, you first have to prove secession is itself illegal. You can't use the forming of the compact as an argument against secession, beause that's inverse logic. Not a sound argument, then, even from a purely legalist perspective.


--


Lincoln could, if he wanted to, supply fort Sumter supplied by ship, the first batch that Lincoln sent arrived the day before the rebels open fired plus if it looks like it's going to draw out a long time, they could covertly smuggle men out, and leave a skeleton crew.[/QUOTE]

I think this is a lot harder than you're making it sound. South Carolina had scuttled ships at the harbour's entrance, making it difficult if not impossible to enter for many vessels. The CSA held strong artillery positions by the time the fort was actually fired upon in OTL (obviously, they used those position to fire upon the fort). Any ship trying to reach Fort Sumter would be in a lot of trouble. The potential for such attempts to backfire on Lincoln would be pretty major. While unwilling to recognise secession, under the circumstances where the South was offering to pay for the forts etc., a situation where Lincoln pre-emptively casts aside negotiation in favour of trying to bust into Charleston Harbour would be a disaster for him if it fails. He was desperately trying to get the South to attack in OTL, knowing it would be good propaganda. I don't see him taking the risk of being seen as the one who started the war if he can reasonably avoid it.

Smuggling men out, by the way, would be unneeded if the CSA has already offered to let anyone leave freely whenever they wish. Leaving a skeleton crew makes no sense in context, since the men present were already a skeleton crew, pretty much.


--

A collection of actions irrelevant to the fundamental question: can a state government rescind the jurisdiction of the Federal government over its territory?

No, that's not the actual question here. That would be a question that'd have to be answered in the ATL (just as it had to be in OTL), but it's not fundamentally what matters here. What matters is whether the attempt can succeed, regardless of its perceived legality.

Again, I iterate that I believe secession is always legal (because I hold all laws forbidding it to be void), but still that doesn't matter. Whatever is ethical, we may assume that the American colonies in 1776 were acting illegaly under British law. Did this stop the USA from being recognised? No. Because they won. And not because they utterly defeated Britain (which was hardly defeated when the war ended) but because the war became to costly to make it worth it for Britain.

For this reason, the vast majority of Constitutional scholars maintain that the legality of secession under US law was only really decided at Appomattox Court House on April 9, 1865.

So the real question is whether the CSA can foster circumstances under which pursuing the war (further) becomes to costly for the USA. Costly in money, in public support for the administration, in foreign relations...

That avoids provoking the North. However, the Federal government still holds Fort Pickens in Florida, which can't be starved out. (Also Fort Jefferson in the Dry Tortugas, west of Florida, but that one could be ignored.)

Fort Sumter was the big risk for hot-headed South Carolinians doing something rash. The goal was to avoid that. Fort Pickens remains an issue, but can be left to stew until other matters are resolved. Consider that the goal would be to preferably negotiate, rather than fight. The Southern goal here is to be as reasonable as possible, and wait for the North to either negotiate (thus at least postponing war, and ideally avoiding it) to outright attack (thus making the North the aggressor, which I think would grealy harm stympathy for the war among the Northern populace and in Europe).

You tell wrong. Lincoln doesn't have to fire a shot, at least not for a while.

A statement, but not backed by any reasoning. What are you trying to say?

-- Lincoln will just wait? Good for the South: every day consolidates the status quo reality of the CSA being de facto independent. The longer Lincoln waits, the less likely any attempt to launch a war of reconquest later will be to find broad support.

-- Lincoln will negotiate? Good for the South: it's what they actively want in this ATL. Negotiations carry an implicit recognition of the CSA as an entity, and if the South is eminently reasonable, Northern support for a later war will (again) dwindle.

There were a lot of people who were antsy about initiating a war to enforce Union, but almost no one in the North who accepted the legal argument for secession. No Republicans, and no Douglas Democrats. Lincoln's position was that the secession declarations were of no legal effect. Therefore, it was his constitutional duty to enforce the laws of the United States in its entire territory, including the so-called seceding states, and to put down, by force if necessary, any resistance to such enforcement.

That was Lincoln's position. Your description of the popular sentiment, however, is decidely wrong. The legality of secession was hazy to a lot of people, and opposition to the war didn't just come from nowhere. Only when Lincoln's (cleverly) got the hot-heads to fire the first shot did he manage a brilliant propaganda coup, painting the South as the agressor and galvanising the cause of war.

Until such a moment, Lincoln is president of a Union that still includes the entire Upper South, with a population that is rather opposed to rash action, with not insubstantial elements actually reasoning that the South may be in the right. The idea that all Northerners believed in Lincoln's interpretation of the Constitution from the very outset is patently absurd. A great deal of ink was spilled debating the intricacies of the matter in countless vehement opinion pieces, before even a single drop of blood was spilled. Only when the blood began spilling did the two blocks - North and South - consolidate far more firmly around the opinions of their respective leaders.

Without the attack of Fort Sumter, that blood remains unspilled for the moment. The days of ink and indecision drag on at least a bit longer. The question is: what does Lincoln do, faced with that? You have stated that "he doesn't have to fire a shot" (yet). I have argued that any alternative will also strengthen the South. So how would he deal with this bind, assuming that the Southern strategy is explicitly to not be goaded into firing the first shot?

In a sense you are right. "Confederate" of secession, and the armed interference with the U.S. government which resulted, was illegal. So was the Declaration of Independence, and the armed resistance to British authority which resulted. However, the DoI was issued on the basis of the moral right of "the people" to overthrow the government when it becomes oppressive. The DoI listed 27 categories of oppression inflicted by King George. The secessionists of 1860 could not point to a single concrete action (the seven Deep South states declared secession before Lincoln even took office).

This was sufficiently obvious that Southerners made very little effort to equate secession with the DoI. Instead they insisted that secession was legal.

Your opinion is clear. On this particular question, I evidently care little for it-- holding as I do the diametrically opposed opinion that secession is never illegal. Your presumption that the self-determination of peoples requires grounds that must adhere to certain standards is one I simply reject. "Because we want to" is reason enough, and to me, will always be utterly valid. I'll be quite willing to discuss the ethical basis of my position on this matter elsewhere, but I will not do it here. For the sake of this thread, let it just be clear that any attempt to convince me that secession is in any way illegal is pointless.

First, Lincoln would not negotiate under any circumstances, unless it was to arrange the terms by which secession would be rescinded.

An interesting position, considering he was willing to engage in unofficial 'talks' that held no such preceding conditions in OTL. That is not to say he will be willing to accept secession, nor that he would recignise the CSA (in OTL, he only recognised the state governments as separate entities, acting in conjunction, but never as a joint entity, and never as entities existing outside the Union).

The idea that he'll refuse to enter into talks at all, however, is clearly belied by his willingness to talk in OTL.

Second, Lincoln would not initiate war until he was good and ready, and then if possible in a way that would force the rebels to start the shooting.

We may safely assume, given the entire premise, that the South in this scenario will under no circumstance fire first. That being exactly what I'd wish to avoid, if being in their position.

Third, if the crisis "hung fire" in the condition of March 1861, Lincoln would devote considerable effort to building up the Union element in the Border States and Upper South, and to cementing the status of those states as US states - in particular, by appointing new Federal officials for those states: US Attorneys, Customs collectors, postmasters. This would be his obvious duty as the new President, and he would be careful to appoint highly regarded local men.

This would put a great strain on the Confederate government and on secessionists in those states. If they don't Do Something, Lincoln will have all those states securely tied to the Union. And in fact the Confederates and secessionists were planning to Do Something. In Virginia, former governor Wise, tired of waiting for the state convention to act, fomented a conspiracy to have the Virginia militia seize the Harpers Ferry Arsenal and the Navy Yard in Norfolk. In Missouri, Governor Jackson plotted to have the state militia seize the Arsenal in Saint Louis, using cannon secretly provided by the CSA.

We may assume that the CSA will not be providing cannon, or indeed any support to such actions. In fact, the CSA would publicly denounce such plans and advise against them. Yes, this would ensure those Upper South states wouldn't be in a position to join the CSA later. Also yes, this will foster considerable antipathy to Lincoln in the Upper South. You speak of 'highly regarded local men'? It'll be tricky to find those, if the other qualification is 'will support federal supremacy in all matters'. You can appoint loyal and well-regarded men opposed to secession, but they still won't be likely to support war (or even the idea of allowing armies to march through the Upper South).

Also, attempts by Lincoln to force his will on states will only serve to strengthen the South's case. "See? He is a tyrant!" So he can't go overboard by overstepping his mandate. You paint Lincoln almost as a sort of super-man, but you seem to forget that his position initially was precarious. He wasn't that free to move drastically. Not until after Fort Sumter. The fact that the South fired that first shot played a huge role, but so did the fact that the CSA now came to border on Washington DC. Neither is the case here. Lincoln's position is going to be far more precarious than in OTL, and a wait-and-see policy will only drag that out. Acceptance of the status quo is a real risk, but acting rashly is, too.

He's in far more of a bind that you seem to think. Which is of course the precise point of the strategy I have suggested here. In OTL, he crafted it so that the CSA acted, to it's detriment. Simply not taking that bait is by definition to Lincoln's detriment, compared to OTL.

There are other questions. Lincoln proposed to have the Navy collect customs duties at sea, off Southern ports. This would maintain Federal authority, but avoid direct clashes with "Confederate" forces, unless they sailed out to attack the U.S. ships.

An irritant to be sure, but again... why not wait it out? Pay those customs duties, but call it piracy on the high seas, object in writing every time, and vocally complain to foreign powers. Keep offering those really sweet deals, and hope that Britain will be enticed to eventually just refuse to pay US customs when sailing to Southern ports. At that point, the USA has effectively lost.

Even barring that, just wait. As long as you pay (even when protesting), Lincoln will never get backing for a full blockade, let alone an invasion. This will only strengthen calls for a negotiated solution in the North. That's good. That's great. How long until your independence is just a de facto reality that people won't be willing to go to war over anymore? And then, you can start refusing to pay those "customs duties" (which you maintain are acts of piracy). If you've been running your own show for years, without an actual war, there won't be support in the North for reconquest. Conversely, by that time, you'll no doubt get diplomatic backing from Europe.

Then there was the question of men living in the South who did not accept the validity of secession, and were still US citizens by their own lights. If the "Confederate" government molested such men, and they appealed to the Federal government for protection... For instance, Federal troops land in south Texas, and link up with the Unionist German immigrant settlers of the region. They provide arms and authority to the German-Texans to form a Unionist militia; if the CSA moves to suppress them, they are initiating war against US ciitizens.

First you say there are virtually no sympathisers for the South up North, but now you make it seem as if countless men in the South secretly wanted to rejoin the North. Bit of a skewed double standard there, I do suspect.

Yes, there were certainly Unionists in the South. But you're not thinking very logically about how Lincoln should handle this issue. Your suggestion is:

1. The USA invades the CSA
2. The CSA attempts to repel this invasion.
3. The CSA is initiating this conflict.

It doesn't work like that. Lincoln can't just land troops, because that would make him the one initiating the conflict. that's not what he wanted, because he knew damn well it would damage his case severely.

I seriously get a vibe that you think of Lincoln as a super-cunning guy who somehow could get away with every ploy under any circumstance. He was crafty, sure, but his OTL strategy relied squarely on exploiting the South's hot-headed stupidity. My whole premise is to have the South act cool-headed instead. That's not very likely in itself, I'll happily admit, but serves here purely to explore what would have happened in that event. Well, the answer sure isn't going to be "Lincoln just lands troops in Texas and totally gets away with that, suffering no averse reaction to this action at all".

Why only those states? There were Unionist areas in east Tennessee and south Texas. Is secession to be a county-by-county process? That entirely abandons the doctrine of state sovereignty which was absolutely fundamental to the secessionists.

I'm stating, for the sake of a theoretical exercise, the policy I would advise. Personally, I offered the mentioned areas because they had the strongest Unionist base. That said, any negotiations could certainly involve an offer of plebiscites in East Tennessee and a part of Texas. Why not? The basis for the legality of secession is either natural law (in which case the boundaries of states, drawn by mere morals, are of no consequence to validity-- that would be my personal view) or they derive legally from the Tenth Amendment, which says "reserved to the states or to the people".

So, sure. Let the people hold pleibiscites in the obvious Unionist strongholds. I could live without those places, and it would make me even more eminently reasonable to any outside viewer. I would ash if Lincoln would be willing to allow similar pleibiscites in the Upper South. His certain unwillingness to do so would confirm my more reasonable and tolerant position.

In essence, the basis of my whole strategy here is to make the old slogan "all we want is to be left alone" completely true. It's harder to argue with something that reasonable than some people seem to believe-- especvially so in a time when federal power was far, far less overwhelming than it became later on in OTL.

Not far at all. Lincoln was too cunning.

Yeah, so you say. While I'm far from calling Lincoln a fool, he wasn't as infallible as you seem to think, nor was his position anywhere near as secure as you implicitly portray it to be. I really do think he'd have considerable trouble coming up with a really solid strategy if the South had just played it all polite and cool-headed. All your grievances are gone, except "they don't want to be members of my club anymore". Sending an army on those grounds makes you... well, makes you George III.

 

[Roger II]

I suppose if we're having Lincoln act as cunning and clever as possible, there are...options for him and congress:

1) try and make it clear that federal law is still active in the seceded states. Announce if possible that special provision will be made for cases originated in seceded states can be heard in X federal court.

2) Advise that federal taxes will still be owed pending a resolution of the status of the Southern States, but that they will under no circumstances be collected by force.

3) If possible, any individual leaving for the Union and any state re-entering the Union would (this may or may not be constitutional) be granted some kind of remittance on said taxes.

4) Tie secession efforts up as long as possible in negotiations, litigation, etc. Draw out said negotiations while giving as much play to unionist voices as possible. Drive as much doubt about whether or not secession will go through, if someone leaks that a bunch of crazy fireaters dragged us into this play that up. This way, it's more likely that banks will ask questions about loans, governments will question recognition, individuals will wonder if they should up sticks or demand that secession not go through after all.

 

[Skallagrim]

I suppose if we're having Lincoln act as cunning and clever as possible, there are...options for him and congress:

1) try and make it clear that federal law is still active in the seceded states. Announce if possible that special provision will be made for cases originated in seceded states can be heard in X federal court.

2) Advise that federal taxes will still be owed pending a resolution of the status of the Southern States, but that they will under no circumstances be collected by force.

3) If possible, any individual leaving for the Union and any state re-entering the Union would (this may or may not be constitutional) be granted some kind of remittance on said taxes.

4) Tie secession efforts up as long as possible in negotiations, litigation, etc. Draw out said negotiations while giving as much play to unionist voices as possible. Drive as much doubt about whether or not secession will go through, if someone leaks that a bunch of crazy fireaters dragged us into this play that up. This way, it's more likely that banks will ask questions about loans, governments will question recognition, individuals will wonder if they should up sticks or demand that secession not go through after all.

These are cool-headed answers to a cool-headed South. The options would certainly be worth considering. My main question would be about the fact that all of this does rely on the South eventually being pulled back in... somehow. No matter how enticing you make it, I doubt that'll fly without active coercion. The South literally got offered everything they really wanted (slavery enshirned in the Constitution with un-alterable eternity clause)... and they rejected it. There is certainly some wiggle room there, due to the hypotheticaol nature of my premise: if the South is suddenly all cool-headed, why not accept a deal like that and be done with it? My premise, however, is that they want to be independent no matter what, and are cool-headed in that context and with that express goal. Not a realistic premise, I'll admit once more-- but raised purely to test my suggested strategy.

This brings us to the alligator in the room (or however that saying goes): the South is staying out, so getting them back in requires initiating armed force. The above suggestions will ultimately not help, I think. Mainly because the South will just be "waiting it out", and eventually - when it becomes clear they're not coming back - it'll be rather late to plausibly launch a war. Point by point:


1) try and make it clear that federal law is still active in the seceded states. Announce if possible that special provision will be made for cases originated in seceded states can be heard in X federal court.

The South will just ignore this. It'll only have any averse effect if they do return to the Union. That makes it a reason not to come back. Otherwise it's kind of like Britain saying that British law still applies to the USA: something that they did... and which became meaningless when the USA became permanently independent.


2) Advise that federal taxes will still be owed pending a resolution of the status of the Southern States, but that they will under no circumstances be collected by force.

Again: just wait it out. It only becomes relevant if the CSA does ever rejoin the USA. If not, it becomes an empty claim, because in such circumstances, it is typically decided after the fact that any taxes owed are only owed up to the point in time when the corresponding services were still granted. Since the CSA stopped using Federal services as of secession, and offers to return or compensate for any Federal property, those 'owed taxes' will just become void if the CSA does become independent for good-- and everyone will know that.


3) If possible, any individual leaving for the Union and any state re-entering the Union would (this may or may not be constitutional) be granted some kind of remittance on said taxes.

Tax exemptions can be made for individuals and other entities based on coulance. This is done in OTL, and I don't see how it's unconstitutional. I can see how this might tempt Unonists to relocate up North... but wouldn't that actually just strengthen the proponenrs of independence in the CSA? It's not likely to tempt states back into the Union. Offers to that end were made in OTL that were far more crucial to Southern states than 'mere' taxes (namely: states were offered exemption from the Emancipation Declaration if they exited the CSA and re-joined the Union voluntarily before a certin dead-line). Nobody took the offer in OTL, so I doubt it's going to work in this ATL.


4) Tie secession efforts up as long as possible in negotiations, litigation, etc. Draw out said negotiations while giving as much play to unionist voices as possible. Drive as much doubt about whether or not secession will go through, if someone leaks that a bunch of crazy fireaters dragged us into this play that up. This way, it's more likely that banks will ask questions about loans, governments will question recognition, individuals will wonder if they should up sticks or demand that secession not go through after all.

This is the soundest suggestion. In an unsure situation, make people doubt the other side. Always smart. On the other hand, my reponse (as hypothetical head honcho of the CSA) would be to at once offer CSA government guarantees on all such outstanding matters... on the provision that the CSA is first recognised as independent. That way, upholding the fait accompli (secession) will actually offer the most security to private parties about any financial issue.

Giving voice to Unionists, in an age before instant mass communication, will mostly mean either hear-say (easily denied and no doubt contered by equally abundant propaganda about Northerners opposed to "Lincoln's War") or direct interviews with/about Southerners who've already gone North. That last bit can strengthen the South's argument: "the Unionists, by leaving our Confederacy, have only accentuated the division of our two distinct peoples-- reunion is impossible, and their actions prove they, too, know this in their hearts". (That last bit can be milked easily, by the way, by generously offering to buy up the property of any Unionist who wants to head North. Makes you look sympathetic and gets rid of a potential fifth column.)


Anyway, that would be my response to such strategies. The longer it drags out, the more likely it will be that the status quo of Southern independence just gets accepted eventually. To avoid that, aggressive war would really be the only recourse. That, naturally, would have its own draw-backs.

 

[cmakk1012]

I have an idea for a really cunning Lincoln:

So secession is argued to be the will of the majority of people. Suppose Lincoln dallies, delays, and lengthens the negotiations with the South while he works with politicians in Washington on a hat trick—an Emancipation Proclamation applied to the states in negotiation. I’ll admit this would be an incredibly hypocritical and realpolitik move, but Lincoln could then argue that the slaves should have the right to decide whether to leave the Union or not as well. Obviously the South would never agree to this—there’s no way they’ve emancipated the slaves this early on, and there’s no way they’d support the Confederacy if they did have a say.

This would still require the North to be aggressors, but they’d be aggressors based on the right of self-determination, undermining the political arguments of the Confederacy. How would the South respond to this, especially since Britain would likely side with the North in this scenario?

 

[Vuu]

The best possible solution would be to do something that makes the UK (and Mexico preferably) attack the USA simultaneously. They're very abolitionist though, so they need to do it from this angle: "The USA are an expansionist state that aims to threaten world balance, we want to abolish slavery as well but gradually so we don't ruin our economy, and they want to ruin us as we are culturally different than the North so they can consolidate and further invade their neighbors"

 

[Roger II]

First of all, I disagree-I think secession can be legal but not unreservedly(ie. there should be a basic standard to uphold-the Scottish independence referendum and the Velvet Divorce would be good models-in the case of a legitimate democratic government, which the US was in 1860 to the closest standard known an reasonable I think at the time, and there should be guarantees of basic human rights and civil liberties to the inhabitants of the seceding territory, maybe even the right of those resident at the time who so desire to retain dual passports, etc) and its' dubious to me that the southern US secession really fits that. That said, I will respond

1) point taken, although if Lincoln was cunning, evil, and willing to throw slaves under the bus(unlikely IMO) he could bring up the fugitive slave act and point out that well, if they are seceded then they won't surely claim that they have the right to demand extradition(or that they have to negotiate separately and after independence is recognized for extradition rights) and if they demand return under the fugitive slave act then surely they're agreeing that they're still in the US. Also, the point was less to actually get the south on board but to get the north and other states noticing that they intend to contest the South's decision.

2) Point taken.

3) I think this works best in conjunction with 4-if you're uncertain about secession and you don't know that it's really going to happen, you're opening yourself up to risk versus just going for the tax break. This probably may or may not get states on board but it can still create capital flight that undermines the south.

4) Points taken to an extent, but again, Lincoln can just point out that if he agrees to that he's giving away the farm-how does he know that this won't just blow up in his face.