AHC: 1935-42 Luftwaffe 'sanity options'
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thaddeus
Donor
thought the radial engines were in surplus while they struggled to meet demand for diesels? (or your point the range of the diesels?) they were also building DO-24 in Netherlands so that might have been looked at as advantage to reduce strain on German industry.
Wimble Toot
Banned
The Axis would cut it up for scrap and recycle the aluminium.
The Luftwaffe put the R-3350 engines in the He177, where they too would catch fire.
The B-29 is what the He177 would be, if you threw billions of dollars and hundreds of technicians at it.
Plenty.
Though, we're back at square 1, namely - what to use to bomb British and Soviet factories, refineries etc, that are 700-1000 km away from the frontline/Calais?
Nothing. German combat doctrine relied on close support aircraft, and many people here say that Germany simply couldn't produce everything required for a successful strategic bombing force. Superchargers for escort fighters, reliable engines for heavy bombers... Plus Wever, the main strategic bomber proponent, is dead. I'm not an engineering expert, but the best use of all that raw material would be to mass produce a heavily armored, reliable ground attack aircraft that is designed to carry whatever weapons can be imagined- torpedoes, rockets, bombs, cannons... Would be excellent if it could efficiently operate at night, but I'm not sure if that was possible to set-up in the 40-s.
So, if production is out, then what about tactics?
The impression I get with the use of the Luftwaffe is that the Germans started the war with a doctrine whereby the air forces were concentrated on one front for one specific purpose, and other fronts were stripped ruthlessly. The use of interior lines, taking advantage of the inherent mobility of aircraft. This was done, first for Poland, then for France, then for the Battle of Britain, in each case the Luftwaffe massing most of its forces and striking with all its strength against one opponent for one objective. It worked twice, failed once.
After the Battle of Britain, the period of concentration ended. The Luftwaffe gets parcelled out on multiple fronts - France, Norway, home defense, the Med, Russia. It gets bogged down everywhere, for muddled or little effect anywhere, never again using the early war tactics of ruthless concentration on one objective, at the expense of stripping almost everything away from the other fronts.
The impression I get with the use of the Luftwaffe is that the Germans started the war with a doctrine whereby the air forces were concentrated on one front for one specific purpose, and other fronts were stripped ruthlessly. The use of interior lines, taking advantage of the inherent mobility of aircraft. This was done, first for Poland, then for France, then for the Battle of Britain, in each case the Luftwaffe massing most of its forces and striking with all its strength against one opponent for one objective. It worked twice, failed once.
After the Battle of Britain, the period of concentration ended. The Luftwaffe gets parcelled out on multiple fronts - France, Norway, home defense, the Med, Russia. It gets bogged down everywhere, for muddled or little effect anywhere, never again using the early war tactics of ruthless concentration on one objective, at the expense of stripping almost everything away from the other fronts.
According to the spreadsheet I made from Vajda & Dancey Page 146 the Germans built 1,146 He177s. If the limiting factor is engines then one He177 (4 engines coupled in pairs) = 4 single-engine Fw190. So that's 4,584 Fw190s for the same resources.
The 1,146 He177s were made up of 166 in 1942, 415 in 1943 and 565 in 1944. If my exchange rate is correct that works out as 664 extra Fw190s in 1942, 1,660 in 1943 and 2,260 in 1944.
Actual Fw190 production in those years was 1,918 in 1942, 3,354 Fw190s and 11,767 in 1944. Grand total 17,039.
Vajda & Dancey claim that Udet cancelled the DB603 engine, but development was re-started later. They claim that had development not been halted the Luftwaffe could have had aircraft powered by that engine in the Battle of Britain. Was their claim correct?
If it is true the Luftwaffe could have had introduced the He177B in the same time period that the British were putting the Halifax, Manchester and Stirling into service. Gunston claimed that the He274 could have been started at the same time as the He177 and wrote that it was fortunate for Britain that it was not.
Wimble Toot
Banned
Exactly - the September 1940-May 1941 Blitz's effect on British industrial production was close to zero - the attacks on Clydebank, Hull and Southampton did the most damage to output
The RAF would have total air dominance over the UK by 1942, anyway, which only high-speed tip-and-run bombers could penetrate.
Operation Steinbock in 1944 was an object lesson in destroying the bomber aircraft you need to attack an invasion fleet with.
I've also read that the original Ju 88 would have been a potent and fast bomber, but Udet's meddling and dive bombing fetish caused the performance to suffer. Maybe the BoB could have gone better for Germans with unmodified Ju 88-s?
Wimble Toot
Banned
The German aero industry (notoriously inefficient) concluded that four engine bomber production would consume near six times the manpower and materials needed for one single engined fighter. They therefore imagined the British and Americans would have build fewer fighters to build more bombers.
They also concluded that any bomber escort fighter would be a 'barn door', as vulnerable to single engine fighters as the bombers themselves.
7,377 Lancasters, 6,177 Halifax, 2,383 Stirlings, 749 Sunderlands, 18,482 Liberators, 12,731 Fortresses, 3,970 Superfortresses and 118 Dominators later they concluded after defeat that they were wrong.
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Are you saying, in other words, that the Germans could have built 6,876 Fw190s instead of 1,146 He177s?
thaddeus
Donor
my view the "power system" joining of two DB engines would prove too tempting NOT to utilize for SOME aircraft, the LW would be fortunate if it was used in HE-119 or other specialty aircraft never meant to be produced in 1,000(s) with resulting savings in engines and materials used for HE-177.
marathag
Banned
I've often thought that any other engine company besides Wright would have worked the bugs out of that engine better.
As it was, Dodge was responsible for most of the reliability gains on their redesigns, as well as mass production improvements
Wimble Toot
Banned
Well, if all the V2s ever built = 24,000 Bf109Gs that's entirely possible - I personally would say 5000-6000 more Fw190s on top the c.20000 they actually built.
In 1937-42, Germany produced much more strategic bombers (He 111, Do 17) that tactical bombers (Ju 87). Every German engine for military aircraft featured supercharger. Reliability of bomber engines was no worse that what others have had. A heavily armored attack aircraft will not be able to bring Britain into negotiation table, let alone the Soviets.
Deleted member 1487
The Ju87 wasn't even technically intended as a tactical/CAS aircraft, rather a precision bomber for use against operational and even strategic targets near the German border. And I don't know anyone that would call the Do17 a strategic bomber...
Not by itself, but in conjunction with other weapons it could have an impact.
Are you referring to terror bombing? Studies have shown that it had too little impact on actual morale, and that Allied bombing campaigns failed to completely cripple German production. It is doubtful Germany could do this to Great Britain.