Japanese Carriers at Guadalcanal

A damn good post. You get it.
TY. Given your own clear understanding of the complexities (& on some of these issues, it obviously exceeds mine), that's high praise.:)
Nimitz did have some blind spots and faults that hurt the war effort a bit.
He did, but in his defense, AFAICT, his only bias was against minelaying, & that may be a former submariner's dislike & concern, more than a solid reason.

My sense of Nimitz is, he was flexible enough to take a better option, if offered; if somebody had proposed using Hypo to surveil IJN harbors, coupled with mining or not, he might just have said, "Do it" & freed up English's boats for other duty: the need (or desire) for surveillance trumped using them on the firing line; he couldn't afford surprises. If Hypo could have (reliably) kept him from being surprised (& if he'd have trusted Hypo to do it, which is another issue, after 7/12)...
I firmly agree that if he (and the rest of the Navy establishment) had paid more attention to mine warfare, as hard as it is to do, the subs would have been far more effective. It will take a year or so before the boats have the mines and the training and can employ the proper laying procedures, but that brings the kill rates and effective blockade a full year earlier than patrolling in killboxes did.
Unquestionably. I'm of the view mining could have stopped IJN offensive operations entire: mine the approaches, keep them mined, & shoot the minesweepers at need. (IJN minesweeping was so bad, that wouldn't have been a high priority need, either.;)) The inability of IJN to sortie shuts down ops, even if convoys get through (unless they're willing to risk "own goal" mining losses;)).

If that results in Sub Force losses, so be it. (Hard as that is for me to say.) There's a war on; some losses are going to happen. IMO, they're less than what obtain OTL, not least from the war being longer than it has to be: that, by itself, might save six or eight boats lost in '45 (including Trigger, which might end up butterflying away one of Ned Beach's better books:eek:).
I also agree that the subs were the left handed stepchildren and should have had maybe 5% more resources thrown at them.
IMO, they did okay as it was. I'd have retired the S-boats a bit sooner & freed the crews, & maintenance people, but that takes boats off the firing line... Ramping up the build rate prewar so you get even a couple of dozen more fleet boats would have cured that, but...

Beyond that, it's more a matter of training & equipment, &...command failure, I guess. Whose call was it to leave boats in Oz? Nimitz's? If so, it was the biggest mistake he made in the war; basing them in Hawaii would have done more good than any other one thing he could do (including fixing the torpedoes, believe it or not).
I would suggest that Buord killed at least six (possibly ten) USN boats by not fixing reported simple problems such as broaching fish, circle runs, noise short circuits and excessive magnetic signature in US boats.
Some of that you have to lay on BuC&R (BuShips)... For the torpedos alone, I count maybe 4 (possibly 6 or 7, including some unknowns, & counting Tang).
Like most tools (see subs comments) if the person using a B-17 in naval warfare does not understand that one has to get down to low altitude and make one's pass over the ship in a beam attack (especially a carrier) and WALK the bombs in (Battle of the Bismark Sea), then one will accomplish nothing. Is it hard on the bombers? Yes. Will casualties be high? Yes. (50%) But will a Japanese flattop or two be dedecked and rendered helpless? YES. Worth it. It is do or die; Torpedo 8 had no chance at all. Those B-17s, in navy aviator hands, would have stood a much better chance.
I will agree with that completely. And given how tough an opponent the Japanese found the B-17, I don't think the losses needed be 50%. Might be? Yes.
 
A damn good post. You get it. My opinion here on many things is not gospel or set in concrete. I am aware that Nagumo misused his air staff and did not apply his specialized air recon properly (even according to Japanese doctrine. I think he had enough at hand to do the job he was expected to do.)

IJN doctrine was to use land based air and long range seaplanes, and fill in with if B5N2's when necessary. Short ranged seaplanes were no good because US carrier strike aircraft outranged their search range. In exceptional circumstances different practices could arise. At Coral Sea when Hara was ordered to pursue the Yorktown he had too few strike aircraft for searching, so he used Zero fighters to do so. The E8's you listed were no good because they were too short ranged, as previously explained. Nagumo's habits (not doctrine) were dangerous because he tended to skimp on search even though he had plenty of aircraft.

You also demonstrated to me clearly you understand what others (Glenn) failed to do; which is to show that Nimitz did have some blind spots and faults that hurt the war effort a bit.

My impression is that you have two sets of criteria for evaluating USN performance at Midway; one for the officers you seem to despise (Halsey, Browning, Ring) and another for those you like, (Fletcher). So Browning becomes responsible for Hornet's lack of training while Fletcher bears no responsibility for his error in positioning the carriers too far for his TBD strike range. With Nimitz, the idea he even made mistakes is a bit novel, which makes it interesting in a well-trodden topic.
 
I was taking that to mean for the war at large, which demonstrably Nimitz did make some mistakes in.

You mean like practically dropping leaflets on Okinawa and Iwo Jima in June 1944 not to worry, that the USN was going to give them over a half a year to fortify before sending in the Marines? Sure, Nimitz made some mistakes, but then who doesn't?

I'm referring to Midway and specifically the loss of Yorktown and near disaster that Midway veered towards. In that arena the idea that Nimitz made mistakes that, like Yamamoto, could have come off the rails and caused a reverse disaster - that's not at all common Midway topic. Books like Shattered Sword are to blame for this - they read like exercises in victory disease and playing favorites between USN officers. Was Browning the right man for the job? Maybe not. Would someone else have done better? Maybe, maybe not.
 
You mean like practically dropping leaflets on Okinawa and Iwo Jima in June 1944 not to worry, that the USN was going to give them over a half a year to fortify before sending in the Marines? Sure, Nimitz made some mistakes, but then who doesn't?

I'm referring to Midway and specifically the loss of Yorktown and near disaster that Midway veered towards. In that arena the idea that Nimitz made mistakes that, like Yamamoto, could have come off the rails and caused a reverse disaster - that's not at all common Midway topic. Books like Shattered Sword are to blame for this - they read like exercises in victory disease and playing favorites between USN officers. Was Browning the right man for the job? Maybe not. Would someone else have done better? Maybe, maybe not.

Disagree on your last point, Shattered Sword has its flaws but it does a better job than the vast majority of books on the topic in attempting to explain the US victory in a way that is not a glorified treatise on how the US just plain got ASB level lucky. Crap, look at the titles - Miracle at Midway, Incredible Victory, No Right to Win. Heck there is even a book written by a former chaplain claiming that God Almighty played a role in the battle, https://www.amazon.com/God-Was-Midw...10784686&sr=8-2&keywords=battle+of+midway+god

I have long been of the opinion that the Americans should not only have expected to win at Midway, they should have won bigger than they did (I need to get back to that ATL at some point), and darn near lost it to some very avoidable errors in tactical execution that were overcome by the raw courage of brave pilots, many of whom flew their first and last combat missions on 4 June 1942.
 
Disagree on your last point, Shattered Sword has its flaws but it does a better job than the vast majority of books on the topic in attempting to explain the US victory in a way that is not a glorified treatise on how the US just plain got ASB level lucky. Crap, look at the titles - Miracle at Midway, Incredible Victory, No Right to Win.

Tone 5 flew right over TF-16 at 0630 and missed it due to clouds. That was pure luck.

Shattered Sword details Yamamoto's faults in explicit detail. Very nice. Nagumo gets a pass when he should not have. On the American side, the narrative plays favorites. Too slanted for my tastes - I'll take their critique of Yamamoto, drop their opinion of Nagumo, and look elsewhere for a balanced assessment of other mistakes.

I have long been of the opinion that the Americans should not only have expected to win at Midway, they should have won bigger than they did (I need to get back to that ATL at some point), and darn near lost it to some very avoidable errors in tactical execution that were overcome by the raw courage of brave pilots, many of whom flew their first and last combat missions on 4 June 1942.

Ok, but if Tone 5 had reported two carriers at 0630 because the cloud was elsewhere at that moment, I'm suggesting the BoM would look nothing like what you think it should look like. In terms of tactical execution, any faults at the tactical level on the US side stemmed first from the highest level for failure to provide adequate training and the force structure to achieve the mission assigned. "Tactical execution" problems is what happens when a navy attempts to implement a battle plan with half-trained air groups such as Midway's and Hornet's, and their admiral in command wastes half his best carrier's dive bombers on a goose chase search in the wrong direction.
 
Tone 5 flew right over TF-16 at 0630 and missed it due to clouds. That was pure luck.

Shattered Sword details Yamamoto's faults in explicit detail. Very nice. Nagumo gets a pass when he should not have. On the American side, the narrative plays favorites. Too slanted for my tastes - I'll take their critique of Yamamoto, drop their opinion of Nagumo, and look elsewhere for a balanced assessment of other mistakes.



Ok, but if Tone 5 had reported two carriers at 0630 because the cloud was elsewhere at that moment, I'm suggesting the BoM would look nothing like what you think it should look like. In terms of tactical execution, any faults at the tactical level on the US side stemmed first from the highest level for failure to provide adequate training and the force structure to achieve the mission assigned. "Tactical execution" problems is what happens when a navy attempts to implement a battle plan with half-trained air groups such as Midway's and Hornet's, and their admiral in command wastes half his best carrier's dive bombers on a goose chase search in the wrong direction.

Ok part of the reason Tone 5 was above the clouds was that the Japanese flew at considerably higher altitudes than the Americans (5000 feet vs 1000 feet I believe), in part due to not assigning enough aircraft to search duties as you have pointed out. So it was not all blind luck, you fly higher you increase the odds you encounter more clouds. Plus the Japanese had some luck on their side, Tone 4 made its dog leg earlier (see Craig Symonds' book) for reasons nobody knows (the pilot did not survive the war). Had it made its dog leg at the correct point on its search vector, it doesn't spot the American carriers. That Nagumo decided to recover his Midway strike aircraft first was his choice.

In terms of SS not providing a balanced assessment of American mistakes, the authors admit it is primarily meant to detail the battle from a Japanese perspective. A good account of American mistakes at Midway has yet to be written (Craig Symonds started a little bit), in part because of the treasured myths that have been built up over decades. When that book is written it will probably do very well although I am sure some will be outraged because it will bring some larger than life heroic figures down to size.

I don't have a problem with Parschall and Tully going a bit soft on Nagumo. Too many American accounts make him out to be a complete dunderhead while Yamamoto is treated like some sort of genius, something I have never quite understood.
 
Ok part of the reason Tone 5 was above the clouds was that the Japanese flew at considerably higher altitudes than the Americans (5000 feet vs 1000 feet I believe), in part due to not assigning enough aircraft to search duties as you have pointed out. So it was not all blind luck, you fly higher you increase the odds you encounter more clouds.

We agree then that Nimitz got lucky at 0630 and that the BoM looks very different from historical if he had not. Shattered Sword speculates that Tone 5 was "hotdogging it", but it is speculation; we have no clue one way or the other what altitude Tone 5 was flying and why exactly TF-16 lucked out. The too-small number of search aircraft the IJN used goes back to Nagumo's mistakes. But IJN doctrine allowed Nagumo to use more search aircraft than he did while SS's narrative was that Nagumo was following IJN doctrine. I believe the error with Nagumo on the IJN side was that his command was not being properly supervised or overseen and had become its own little fiefdom - the type of mistake by Yamamoto that Shattered Sword does not go into, even when the narrative does not lack for all sorts of discussion on Yamamoto's errors.

Plus the Japanese had some luck on their side, Tone 4 made its dog leg earlier (see Craig Symonds' book) for reasons nobody knows (the pilot did not survive the war). Had it made its dog leg at the correct point on its search vector, it doesn't spot the American carriers. That Nagumo decided to recover his Midway strike aircraft first was his choice.

Craig Symond's book is a rehash of Shattered Sword and other modern works, with few original insights of its own. The Tone 4 dogleg theory is circumstantial - no one knows how the spot came about. Shattered Sword really pushed hard with it because it allows them to claim Nagumo had not been unlucky that Tone 4 was launched late. But the TF-16 weather report from the morning of the battle stated visibility was 50 miles, meaning Tone 4 did not have to dogleg to see TF-16 if the cloud cover cooperated. That, in turn, suggests that Nagumo did get unlucky with the late launch of Tone 4.

Had Tone 4 not seen TF16 around 0728 it continues on with its route, loops back around, and reports TF-16 and probably TF-17 to Nagumo at maybe 0815-0830. Nagumo in the meantime continues rearming for Midway oblvious. When the 0815 or 0830 Tone 4 report comes in, his strike is getting ready to launch and it cannot now be rearmed - Nagumo will avoid his rearming mistake and be forced to launch his strike at the carriers "as is".

In terms of SS not providing a balanced assessment of American mistakes, the authors admit it is primarily meant to detail the battle from a Japanese perspective.

Right the book is all about Fuchida's "agenda", and setting straight the record on Midway. It just so happens, by coincidence that most of the "myths" of Midway claimed are of a nature that make Nimitz's gamble look less like the flip of a coin and more like a sure thing. Shattered Sword want the reader to conclude that Nimitz's strategy was strategic genius that was almost derailed by the tactical incompetence of the likes of Ring, McClusky, etc. Yet the tactical performance was also reflective of the ad hoc strategy that Nimitz was following that left half his forces poorly trained and equipped and the other half, (Yorktown and Enterprise) in separate task forces with no time to work up together.

A good account of American mistakes at Midway has yet to be written (Craig Symonds started a little bit), in part because of the treasured myths that have been built up over decades.

That's why we're discussing US mistakes here - it's untrodden territory.

I don't have a problem with Parschall and Tully going a bit soft on Nagumo. Too many American accounts make him out to be a complete dunderhead while Yamamoto is treated like some sort of genius, something I have never quite understood.

Parshall and Tully go soft with Nagumo's mistakes because they want to show that Midway was likely to be a US victory even if Yamaguchi or Ozawa were in command. But IJN admirals were not produced by cookie cutter, Yamaguchi and Ozawa were considerably better carrier commanders that would have reacted more energetically than Nagumo.
 
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Without getting into too much detail, as we all played with this scenario several times before, any scenario in which KB launches all or part of it's reserve strike at the US carriers that morning would dramatically alter the battle. I think i said before that i see Tully& Parshall as heavily biased (to say the least) in showing the japanese in the worst possible light, the worse part being that to me at times they were downright disingenous (again a kind word) in trying to steer the facts in their desired direction (like how many fighters Nagumo had, the rearming status and several other things i can't recall now), to my mind serving a rather pitiful nationalistic/exceptionalist creed. To their credit they did actually backtracked on some of their claims, but that's just on a forum. But the book is there and the damage is done, because imo it's not honest historiography. Bottom line is you can't have such a book purpotedly written from the japanese view, by foreigners (in this case americans), at least not by Tully& Parshall. I would trust Lundstrom much more though if he would write something like this himself.

Anyway, fast forwarding the events a bit to the OP, so how do we see these carriers influencing Guadalcanal? With so many available , the japanese can even afford to be somewhat lax, for instance leaving the recently repaired Shokaku to do a bit more training, and only send 5 in the Solomons (Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu, Soryu, Zuikaku) and possibly the Zuiho as well. Given the issue of available planes and pilots all the big carriers will probably have 18-plane squadrons only, but that is still at least 90 Zeros, 90 kanbaku and 90 kanko, plus say a skimpy 18 Zeros and 6 kanko on Zuiho, in total almost 300 planes.

Suppose Zuiho, in the good "tradition" of the CVLs plays the role of bait yet again, the other 5 could likely summarily consign Saratoga and Enterprise to the bottom of the ocean, in OTL they got in serious trouble against just 27 kanbakus and i think 18 Zeros, in this scenario you could easily have 36 Zeros, 54 kanbakus and 36 kankos attacking the US force. And this is just the FIRST attack.

With Big E and Sara gone, what can Wasp do? With it's luck, it probably doesn't survive September either. In my scenario i had Yorktown more heavily damaged in May so it was in repairs until Guadalcanal, so it could be paired with Wasp, but the japanese would call on Shokaku and Junyo as well. Any further carrier battles would have the americans facing odds just as overwhelming (2 vs 6 or 7).
 
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All this is interesting at a academic or theory level. The 'but' is with the relative fleet strengths as proposed in the OP the USN would have passed on the premptive strike at Guadalcanal & prepared to fight a battle for the region further east. OTL the Navy leaders regarded Op Watchtower as a high risk venture & its not very real world to think they would have bothered against worse appearing odds. Assuming the Japanese are still spoiling for a fight that places the possible battle/s either oriented towards New Guninea in the coral Sea, or to he east . There are some strategic & operational differences in both cases for each compared to the Guadalcanal battle.

...
Anyway, fast forwarding the events a bit to the OP, so how do we see these carriers influencing Guadalcanal? With so many available , the japanese can even afford to be somewhat lax, for instance leaving the recently repaired Shokaku to do a bit more training, and only send 5 in the Solomons (Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu, Soryu, Zuikaku) and possibly the Zuiho as well. Given the issue of available planes and pilots all the big carriers will probably have 18-plane squadrons only, but that is still at least 90 Zeros, 90 kanbaku and 90 kanko, plus say a skimpy 18 Zeros and 6 kanko on Zuiho, in total almost 300 planes.

...

The question of how many aircrew remain is more important than the number of operational hulls. OTL the IJN had three remaining in Nov 1942 & the USN barely qualified with one, but lacking replacement crews meant a lot. My take is the IJN would be better off under the possibilities outlined in the OP here.
 
All this is interesting at a academic or theory level. The 'but' is with the relative fleet strengths as proposed in the OP the USN would have passed on the premptive strike at Guadalcanal & prepared to fight a battle for the region further east. OTL the Navy leaders regarded Op Watchtower as a high risk venture & its not very real world to think they would have bothered against worse appearing odds. Assuming the Japanese are still spoiling for a fight that places the possible battle/s either oriented towards New Guninea in the coral Sea, or to he east.
Agreed. IMO, there's a good argument for both, in some sense: MacArthur will demand action in New Guinea (& may start it on his own), while Nimitz is likely to be pushing back at Fiji, instead (providing IJN goes there).
 
Don't disagree there, but the battles & operations will be different as the Japanese have the burden of the offense, further over extension of their range/logistics, and worse base development vs the US/Australians having better defense development.

OTL the Japanese were increasingly constrained by fuel, the additional range to the battle sites aggravates that.
 
Don't disagree there, but the battles & operations will be different as the Japanese have the burden of the offense, further over extension of their range/logistics, and worse base development vs the US/Australians having better defense development.

OTL the Japanese were increasingly constrained by fuel, the additional range to the battle sites aggravates that.
No question of that. And supplies at the more distant island bases are less likely to be replaced, making them easier targets for USN raids.
 
I agree with Carl, in your scenario the US probably doesn't go to Guadalcanal in the first place. The whole mess around Guadalcanal happened in part because both the US and Japan though they could for want of a better away of saying, get away with a half assed commitment because the other party was under invested in that area. That in turn sucked both parties in to an attrition battle that the Japanese were going to lose.
 
Glenn239 - why don't you write a TL on Midway the way you think it should have turned out with both sides fighting it the way you think they should have fought it? You have strong opinions on the issue, you know your stuff, it would go over really well.
 
Glenn239 - why don't you write a TL on Midway the way you think it should have turned out with both sides fighting it the way you think they should have fought it? You have strong opinions on the issue, you know your stuff, it would go over really well.

No time. Right now in my spare time I'm designing a couple wargames - WW1, and WW2 Pacific, both naval, both strategic, both to be playable in 3 hours, or bust.

A couple years back Martin Bennett asked for some checking on his book Wounded Tiger. I wrote an article on Fuchida and SS and Midway for him as background I still have lying around, (his book is about Fuchida's experiences, so Shattered Sword's conclusions were an issue) . I could post that, but it's not alternative history.
 
Yamaguchi and Ozawa were considerably better carrier commanders that would have reacted more energetically than Nagumo.
I presume you mean after the initial USN DB attack. Because AIUI, Kido Butai was under orders to reduce Midway first: it had top priority. So with the KB spotted by PBY before knowing USN CVs were even present, how do you avoid effectively losing (at least) two CVs to Fletcher/Spruance's DBs? Absent the VSs launching on a different schedule... Did I miss something?
 
Given the inability of the Japanese to exercise much control of their CAP I wonder if seven carriers makes the CAP more effective or less vs the attacks from Midway? & Is the KB a easier target for the Nautilus or other submarines?
 
You mean like practically dropping leaflets on Okinawa and Iwo Jima in June 1944 not to worry, that the USN was going to give them over a half a year to fortify before sending in the Marines? Sure, Nimitz made some mistakes, but then who doesn't?

I'm referring to Midway and specifically the loss of Yorktown and near disaster that Midway veered towards. In that arena the idea that Nimitz made mistakes that, like Yamamoto, could have come off the rails and caused a reverse disaster - that's not at all common Midway topic. Books like Shattered Sword are to blame for this - they read like exercises in victory disease and playing favorites between USN officers. Was Browning the right man for the job? Maybe not. Would someone else have done better? Maybe, maybe not.

I think Walter Lord does a pretty good job illustrating the mistakes made by US forces and the differences in quality particularly in terms of training (particularly by the Midway Air Group). I have seen plenty of criticism of Browning from a variety of sources, although most harsh from novels that cover the battle.

The Americans earned their victory at great cost, but luck (hence the 'miracle of Midway') was most certainly on the American side that day because victory occurred in spite of mistakes.

But then rare is the battle were both sides don't make mistakes and errors....
 
I think Walter Lord does a pretty good job illustrating the mistakes made by US forces and the differences in quality particularly in terms of training (particularly by the Midway Air Group). I have seen plenty of criticism of Browning from a variety of sources, although most harsh from novels that cover the battle.

The Americans earned their victory at great cost, but luck (hence the 'miracle of Midway') was most certainly on the American side that day because victory occurred in spite of mistakes.

But then rare is the battle were both sides don't make mistakes and errors....

We need to also keep in mind that Carrier vs. Carrier warfare was new. Midway was the second such battle and the first one had only taken place a month earlier. Yes navies had aircraft carriers for two decades give or take and they had been experimenting and training but Coral Sea and Midway were the first times that carrier fleets went head to head. Obviously mistakes are going to be made by both sides.
 
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