Japanese Carriers at Guadalcanal

[McPherson]

I see no reason the Mark 6 problems wouldn't be solved on the OTL schedule (Sept '43), perhaps sooner with more fired (which is what I was suggesting). I also see no reason to delay any OTL project, like the Mark 28 homer, which OTL entered service in late '44 (IIRC).

Unless the mag/influence feature is removed and the firing pin deformation problem is handled differently (and I see no reason why it would be) 1944 is the earliest we see reliables.

I was thinking of Ryujo & Junyo on a kind of scout/escort mission for the Main Body, freeing cruisers (& their VSs) for Nagumo.

Nagumo already had those cruisers. Can't conjure any more out of thin air. Fighter carriers? Now that might have helped Nagumo; but for a) doctrinally anathema to all offense all the time Japanese, and b) no ship based fighter directors. (Need radar.)

Start at Christie & work down...

Be fair. It was not all Christie. He botched the influence component of the exploder, despite his good faith effort aboard the USS Indianapolis to map the earth's magnetic field to check for influence variances. He warned that it might be a problem and wanted to install a rheostat to adjust for such possible deviations. He was overruled. One size (cheap) fits all flux lines.

Christie was a former project manager on the Mark 6 (or Mark 14), so he's in Leavenworth already, if I have my way. And Uncle Charlie was depressingly trusting BuOrd would fix it on their own...even if he was the officer mainly responsible for getting things fixed, too.

Rear Admiral William D. Leahy, 1927–1931 He's the guy you want in Leavenworth. I would have to send Nimitz up, too.

A shift to minelaying lets BuOrd & NTS off the hook, to some degree, I realize, but it doesn't sacrifice sinkings or put boats at undue hazard from circulars. (Which the Mark 18s suffered, too; recall Tang.) For which design feature somebody deserved court martial & a good, long visit to a windowless cell...

Ever hear of HELL's Bells? Minelaying only introduces a new way to own goal.

By which time the war was as good as lost. Not to mention IJN's reporting/intel collation network was so bad, the info was days, or weeks, out of date by the time it was delivered.

The war in this scenario is somehow extended. Losses could spike. Again.

Now, if the MAD-equipped autogyros ever became more than a nuisance, I'd imagine fleet boats getting something like SLAM (which, TBH, IDK why U-boats never adopted), guided by SAR/beam-riding on periscope radar.

MAD, at least the induction coil type are too large for autogyros. Most likely Nells, Bettys and Emilys

I'm presupposing that's the minimum that obtains, given so large an IJN edge at Midway.

What edge? They were at the short end of the airpower equation going in.

That being true, the idea Nagumo just stops after sinking one USN CV, given he has intact CVs, seems unlikely. Even if he presses his advantage, tho, I don't see him losing more than a couple of his CVs in the "pursuit", which still leaves IJN with four fleet CVs, per OP (more/less).

Hmm. For about six months.

 

[Glenn239]

1. The actual strike radii depends on formatting and how much fuel is burned by each plane type.

No, the strike radius of a TBD with torpedo and F4F escort was 175 miles. The SBD could vary.

That also explains Gray. He did not have the fuels to stick with the Devastators.

Right, after orbiting the Japanese fleet doing nothing for 40 minutes, (ie, 30 minutes after the torpedo bombers he was escorting had been destroyed).

3. About Browning being drunk... Well, Halsey let it slide. Browning was his friend.

I've seen nothing yet that indicates Browning was drinking during the battle.

8. And we ignore that the Saratoga was not battle ready? (I realize Hornet is not either, but that's on Halsey and Mirscher.) Nimitz would have known that fact.

The fact Hornet was not ready is on King and Nimitz, which did not give the carrier the proper training time between March and June 1942. The fact that Saratoga missed the battle is also on King and Nimitz, who seem to both have underestimated just how dangerous the Midway op could be if poor luck were encountered.

9. Someone has to make the operational call for each task force. Where I think both of us talk past each other is that I realize that each task force operated independent of each other. That was American doctrine.

As previously indicated, the shortfalls in TF-16's operations during the morning of the 4th all stemmed from lack of training, which resulted from the commitment of the carriers to secondary missions of little importance such as patrols and base raids, which had sucked up all the possible training time.

 

[McPherson]

No, the strike radius of a TBD with torpedo and F4F escort was 175 miles. The SBD could vary.

Hours aloft at cruise. Range (book quote) means nothing. 10 minutes orbiting the carrier to form up versus an hour.

Right, after orbiting the Japanese fleet doing nothing for 40 minutes, (ie, 30 minutes after the torpedo bombers he was escorting had been destroyed).

See immediately above.

I've seen nothing yet that indicates Browning was drinking during the battle.

Which battle?

t Hornet was not ready is on King and Nimitz, which did not give the carrier the proper training time between March and June 1942. The fact that Saratoga missed the battle is also on King and Nimitz, who seem to both have underestimated just how dangerous the Midway op could be if poor luck were encountered.

Assertion not proven and again here is why. Who is responsible for first line training of the air complements discussed? The guy in Pearl Harbor or Washington or the senior field unit commanders? By law and custom, it is the unit commanders.

As previously indicated, the shortfalls in TF-16's operations during the morning of the 4th all stemmed from lack of training, which resulted from the commitment of the carriers to secondary missions of little importance such as patrols and base raids, which had sucked up all the possible training time.

And in the course of those island strike missions: deck spotting, strike launch, airborne formatting and vector sortie should have been part of the evolution and practiced as a matter of course. Who screwed that opportunity that Nimitz provided up? Guess who was in command of those units and who was his chief of staff?

 

[Glenn239]

1. One realizes that Lexington only brings another 16 VTs and 30-34 VBs to the fight and they could perform as miserably at Midway as they did at Coral Sea?

With Lexington in TF-17 and no Coral Sea Fletcher launches with TF-16 at 0800 and hits Nagumo with 72 (not 30 or 34) dive bombers and about 30 TBD's escorted by about 16 F4F's around 0930. Plus the 29 TBD's of TF-16.

2. Not with the 1st Air Fleet. Someone else has already pointed out these bird farms are too slow. I will add they do not have complete integrated air groups or full air-ops staffs.

The "too slow" argument is not correct. The "integrated air groups" argument is also overblown given that it's a well known fact that IJN carrier air groups were integrated into multi-carrier strike groups after launch; Egusa would be happy to have an additional 18 Junyo D3A1's flying in his formation.

3. Wrong. The Japanese were quite well aware of how vulnerable they were to air attack and the dangers of dispersion of subunits (at least when it came to carriers). They rigidly followed economy and concentration of force principles. Also their solution came after the USN's radically different conclusion as to how to operate carriers.

The IJN 1st Air Fleet was formed in April of 1941 with the tactical assumptions about carrier combat already in existence. The concentration of carriers was to allow the concentration of air units into massed striking groups without needing to make time consuming and difficult over-the-ocean rendezvous between independently operating carriers. Prior to 1st Air Fleet there was a period in which IJN carriers operated independently even while combing their strike groups. This was not as efficient as simply operating all the carriers in one formation.

The Americans were not afraid to fight such concentrations. The USN wanted the Japanese to make that mistake. And the Japanese obliged.

The idea that KB's massed strike doctrine was a 'mistake' is not correct. Where Nagumo's staff erred was being too wedded to mass over speed regardless of tactical circumstances. That is, a tweak, not a re-write.

Nagumo by timeline only dithered about 60 minutes, that is if he dithered at all.

Nagumo was aware of enemy ships at 0740 when Tone 4's followup 4-kana weather report message was received. Nagumo had done nothing about it at 1025, meaning he had failed to act for 2 hours and 45 minutes.

Parshall, Tully and you seem to have ignored CAP cycles, radical maneuvering and Tomanaga's botched and ill timed strike report as all contributing to Nagumo's decisions. around 0900. He cannot be blamed for what he did not know.

Parshall and Tully wrote a book around CAP cycles so can hardly be accused for having "ignored" them. To call Tomonaga's strike report "botched" or "ill-timed" is simply not correct. That Nagumo did nothing at 0900 when he knew he was facing a carrier is on Nagumo.

If the Japanese had a doctrine to smash flight decks and pursue cripples, that was the same doctrine, the RN and USN followed.

Really? Nimitz put Pye's battleships in California because the USN had a doctrine, like the IJN, to use battleships to chase down and mop up the cripples?

Souvenir of the Nile, Nelson imposed on the French. Souvenir of Midway, Spruance imposed on the Japanese. Lucky for the US he did. There were a couple of times that "souvenir" was all that stood between Halsey and defeat in the Solomons. Even Yamamoto carried that scar.

Spruance sank one cruiser in a two-day pursuit at Midway. This caution was well advised but foreshadowed his greatest failure - missing the annihilation the Japanese carriers at Marianas.

4. More a question of timing and circumstance. Saratoga was fresh off a torpedoing and her sandlot batch of flyers were not ready.

Saratoga's torpedo hit was in January and the battle was in June; she missed the battle because Nimitz and King didn't act energetically. Her "sandlot" batch of flyers were leagues better than anything on Midway, so arguments along that line are not very convincing.

Wasp with Sherman has just come off a hectic period of Mediterranean service and needs time to learn the Pacific War.

The fact that Wasp was even in the Med is on King.

 

[Glenn239]

Look at the Pacific hard (see above) and show me where the Japanese can force a fight on their terms?

Given Nimitz's fondness for pinprick base raids, one option for Yamamoto was to base KB with 4-engine seaplanes in the Marshalls and wait for a US carrier raid. Then, deploy these forces to track down, cut off, and destroy the raiders as they tried to return to Pearl Harbor.

 

[Glenn239]

This ignores what Fletcher learned at Coral Sea about Japanese tactics.

I said Fletcher should have committed his 2nd squadron after his northern search came up empty, not before it. Fletcher then compounded his error by making another search in the region where nothing had been detected previously.

One might think Halsey screwed up the island raids along with Browning as training opportunities, (I do.)

Base raids were not in 'training' opportunities. They were long periods at sea without flight operations followed by attacks on fixed-location targets, followed by another long period at sea with no flight operations.

and ROOSEVELT had something to do with the Doolittle Raid which sparked Nimitz's Midway Ambush. Spruance was no fan of the Doolittle Raid, but if the POTUS needs it for national morale, then salute and execute. It worked.

The Hornet's lack of training at Midway was because it was committed to the Doolittle Raid.

 

[Glenn239]

Hours aloft at cruise. Range (book quote) means nothing. 10 minutes orbiting the carrier to form up versus an hour.

The strike radius of the TBD and escort was 175 miles; Fletcher had positioned the carriers too far to the east.

See immediately above.

You stated Gray did not have the fuel to support the attack of VT-8. That statement is factually incorrect. Gray had the fuel to support VT-8 when it attacked at 0930, but did not.

Which battle?

Midway.

Assertion not proven and again here is why. Who is responsible for first line training of the air complements discussed? The guy in Pearl Harbor or Washington or the senior field unit commanders? By law and custom, it is the unit commanders.

Nimitz and King were responsible for the lack of Hornet's air group training. Browning made mistakes. This was because Nimitz had failed to provide proper training for the mission assigned - no time. Only if after adequate training for the mission had been provided and Browning failed would it be all on him. .

 

[McPherson]

You are writing the same assertions over and over and I could tell you over and over that they are wrong.

One more time: book range (radius) means nothing. It is a plane. Real air-ops planning has to measure time aloft expected versus time aloft practical. If Yorktown's strikes can format in 30 minutes (which they did) and Enterprise's aircraft cannot even do that much and still take an hour to get together and fly out on vector, who has the longer ranged planes? Yorktown.

Just one example.

 

[phx1138]

It's not a strategic draw, it's a win.

I knew that, & somehow went from "tactical draw" to "strategic draw"...

Unless the mag/influence feature is removed and the firing pin deformation problem is handled differently (and I see no reason why it would be) 1944 is the earliest we see reliables.

Field mods on the contact pistol were already in place by September. For production models, yeah.

Nagumo already had those cruisers.

From what I've seen, Nagumo was short on VSs, because there were cruisers escorting Yamato instead of covering Nagumo. Pull them.

Be fair. It was not all Christie. He botched the influence component of the exploder, despite his good faith effort aboard the USS Indianapolis to map the earth's magnetic field to check for influence variances. He warned that it might be a problem and wanted to install a rheostat to adjust for such possible deviations. He was overruled. One size (cheap) fits all flux lines.

He then ignored multiple reports from his own skippers in Oz, saying the influence feature worked & there was nothing else. Shoot him & be done with it.

Rear Admiral William D. Leahy, 1927–1931

Posted to sea before development on the Mark 14 began. This names R/A Edgar B. Larimer as the suspect we want.

I would have to send Nimitz up, too.

I don't see it. Bust him to Captain for ignoring the problem, & Lockwood back to L/Cdr or Lt, but...

Ever hear of HELL's Bells? Minelaying only introduces a new way to own goal.

I have. (Lockwood's book was really good.) No USN boat lost on a minelaying mission. The guys hated it, but it wasn't as risky as they thought.

The war in this scenario is somehow extended. Losses could spike. Again.

Well...some of the war is extended. Sub Force is fighting the same enemy on the same field with the same weapons. Why does Sub Force do worse? In fact, with access to less well-covered convoys to Guadalcanal & Fiji, it's possible things go better for Sub Force (as noted upthread). And if Japan is doing better than OTL, who says Nimitz doesn't change priorities on tankers & DDs sooner than OTL? Who says the increased opportunities to hit heavies around Guadalcanal doesn't reveal problems with the Mark 14/Mark 6 sooner? Why must Japan get the breaks? (I'm not saying she got them OTL, because she didn't after Midway; I just mean, sixes at Midway don't mean sixes anywhere else.)

MAD, at least the induction coil type are too large for autogyros. Most likely Nells, Bettys and Emilys

Either way, by the time it's in service, it's too late for Japan.

What edge? They were at the short end of the airpower equation going in.

Starting with more decks? Okay, PBYs give Fletcher better eyes; that's unchanged.

Hmm. For about six months.

I won't argue how long...'cause it could be longer or not, & IMO, it really doesn't matter. So long as you haven't buggered the Sub Force somehow (& you haven't, AFAICT)...

 

[McPherson]

I knew that, & somehow went from "tactical draw" to "strategic draw"...

Field mods on the contact pistol were already in place by September. For production models, yeah.

Hit or miss at the discretion of the user. Not consistent or fleet wide.

From what I've seen, Nagumo was short on VSs, because there were cruisers escorting Yamato instead of covering Nagumo. Pull them.

The specialized seaplane cruisers that were designed to operate as the eyes of First Air Fleet, Nagumo had all that were available at the time.

About Ralph Christie and his sub command stint in SW Pac ...

He then ignored multiple reports from his own skippers in Oz, saying the influence feature worked & there was nothing else. Shoot him & be done with it.

You must have a hate for poor Ralph. In theory it did work and it was masked by the fact that he had dud captains. He may have got cranky in his admiral dotage, but the history I gave you is accurate. He saw a possible problem, tested for it and assumed it was fixed.

Posted to sea before development on the Mark 14 began. This names R/A Edgar B. Larimer as the suspect we want.

But not before the Mark 5/6 influence/contact exploder assembly. We can add Larimer for the hydrostatic valve screw up if you want.

About Nimitz... (sending him to Leavenworth.)

I don't see it. Bust him to Captain for ignoring the problem, & Lockwood back to L/Cdr or Lt, but...

He should have caught it.

I have. (Lockwood's book was really good.) No USN boat lost on a minelaying mission. The guys hated it, but it wasn't as risky as they thought.

It was pure luck.

Well...some of the war is extended. Sub Force is fighting the same enemy on the same field with the same weapons. Why does Sub Force do worse? In fact, with access to less well-covered convoys to Guadalcanal & Fiji, it's possible things go better for Sub Force (as noted upthread). And if Japan is doing better than OTL, who says Nimitz doesn't change priorities on tankers & DDs sooner than OTL? Who says the increased opportunities to hit heavies around Guadalcanal doesn't reveal problems with the Mark 14/Mark 6 sooner? Why must Japan get the breaks? (I'm not saying she got them OTL, because she didn't after Midway; I just mean, sixes at Midway don't mean sixes anywhere else.)

Well argued. I just apply expanding search area geometry, changing Japanese convoy tactics and reach slightly different conclusions. Factor in that US radio intelligence (sigint) remains spotty, that Japanese tech innov will be still there, that Halsey will still screw up and Nimitz can't change what he does not have. Maybe the Mark 15 (destroyer torpedo) or the Mark 13 will arrow at the Mark 14, (there were the same severe problems and THESE the USN noticed right away. Irony), but I don't see that happening.
About MAD.

Either way, by the time it's in service, it's too late for Japan.

Degaussing.

About Japanese vs. American power balances at Midway at the point of contact.

Starting with more decks? Okay, PBYs give Fletcher better eyes; that's unchanged.

233 American carrier based planes vs. 248 Japanese carrier based planes (+16 floatplane recon birds)

The kicker? 127 planes based at Midway (including 17 B-17s and about 25 PBYs) Incidentally, inaccurate Midway recon PBY flight scouting reports drove Spruance crazy and did not help Fletcher much either.

I won't argue how long...'cause it could be longer or not, & IMO, it really doesn't matter. So long as you haven't buggered the Sub Force somehow (& you haven't, AFAICT)...

For want of a nail, the shoe was lost;
For want of the shoe, the horse was lost;
For want of the horse, the rider was lost;
For want of the rider, the battle was lost;
For want of the battle, the kingdom was lost,
And all for the want of a horseshoe nail.

For want of a rheostat... It could have been a much shorter war.

 

[Glenn239]

You are writing the same assertions over and over and I could tell you over and over that they are wrong.

One more time: book range (radius) means nothing. It is a plane. Real air-ops planning has to measure time aloft expected versus time aloft practical. If Yorktown's strikes can format in 30 minutes (which they did) and Enterprise's aircraft cannot even do that much and still take an hour to get together and fly out on vector, who has the longer ranged planes? Yorktown.

Just one example.

As previously discussed, your assertions that Halsey and Browning were exclusively responsible for Hornet's failure is simply not correct. It was Fletcher that positioned the carriers too far to the east - outside the strike radius of his fighters and torpedo bombers. It was on the higher ups that Hornet hadn't receive enough training before the battle. Halsey is not at fault due to not being present in the battle. Browning has some responsibility in that he should have provided base course and point options, but did not.

In terms of the slaughter of the TBD's somehow being Browning's fault, this is also not correct. Browning provided 20 (!) fighters for escort, which were squandered in the case of Hornet due to Ring misallocating them, and in the case of Enterprise due to the failure of the fighters to engage after reaching a position to 'bounce' the low-flying Zero CAP.

 

[McPherson]

QED. Not buying your assertions here, Glenn. I actually know how this stuff works.

 

[Glenn239]

From what I've seen, Nagumo was short on VSs, because there were cruisers escorting Yamato instead of covering Nagumo. Pull them.

Nagumo's 8th Cruiser division had 4 long range scout aircraft while Nagumo's carriers had something like 233 aircraft. For a mission like Midway, more like 30 were required, meaning Ryujo and Zuiho would have fill the gap, or Nagumo's carriers do, or the job doesn't get done.

 

[Glenn239]

QED. Not buying your assertions here, Glenn. I actually know how this stuff works.

Then you'll know that Fletcher's mistake in positioning the carriers too far to the east was even worse than I mentioned, because the prevailing winds from the southeast that morning forced launches steaming away from the Japanese carriers - this had the effect of increasing the range during launch and preventing the carriers from closing the range sufficiently for recovery.

I've long thought Fletcher got a bum deal from Morison and the historians, which Lundstrom corrected with Black Shoe Carrier Admiral. But the pendulum shouldn't go too far the other way. Was Fletcher better than Halsey? I would say so, but not in circumstances where aggression was desirable. Was Fletcher better than Spruance? I would say not.

 

[McPherson]

Nagumo's 8th Cruiser division had 4 long range scout aircraft while Nagumo's carriers had something like 233 aircraft. For a mission like Midway, more like 30 were required, meaning Ryujo and Zuiho would have fill the gap, or Nagumo's carriers do, or the job doesn't get done.

Tone carried 6 and Chikuma carried 4. at Midway. Haruna carried 2+2 (crated) and Kongo carried 2.

I know how this stuff works. Nagumo had 248 strike aircraft available uncrated and broken out of stores as well.

 

[Glenn239]

Tone carried 6 and Chikuma carried 4. at Midway. Haruna carried 2+2 (crated) and Haruna carried 2.

I know how this stuff works.

OOB for 8th Cruiser division and 3rd Bat Division is found on Shattered Sword pg. 451-452. 8th Cru. has 6 E13A1's listed with the notation that probably only 5 were embarked for the operation. All other float planes in the division and in 3rd BAT were type E8N2, which was not a "long range" float plane. (On page 111 is the planned search route, showing Haruna's E8N2 on the #7 line flying 1/2 the distance of the other search aircraft. This is because the E8N2 was a short ranged seaplane - it had a range of less than 500nm while the B5N2 and E13A1 had a range of over 1,000nm.

So no, Nagumo's seaplanes were not adequate, as he only had 5 (one more than I remembered) of the type useful for carrier searches. He required more E13A1's or Zuiho or Ryujo, with their B5N's that could have supplemented scouting. But, more importantly, what was actually required was another commander than Nagumo, such as Ozawa, who better understood carrier warfare.

 

[McPherson]

By US standards and as the Japanese used them (not for artillery spotting); (the Dave; Navy Type 95 Reconnaissance Seaplane Model 1) it was. Doctrine.


Elaborate: this type of aircraft would often precede a Japanese SAG by 30 minutes, scout out an area and drop parachute flares over interesting objects. It could have devastating consequences to those it found. Search time useful aloft... about 4.5 hours. Or if you insist on book radius about 150 miles box leg search pattern.


I know you hate that word, doctrine, but it keeps tripping you up. Do better.

 

[Glenn239]

IJN search aircraft looking for US carriers needed to fly 300nm out, 60nm doglegs, 300nm back, for a total of 660nm. 1,000nm range was handy for a safety factor - 1/3rd of total range as a reserve. The E8N was assigned to fly 150nm out, 40nm dogleg, 150 miles back, or 340nm total of a range of more like 490nm - the same roughly 1/3rd of total range as a reserve. 150nm was not sufficient to search for US carriers because these could strike from as far as 250 or 275nm, if using unescorted SBD's with 500lbs bombs. So, for the mission Nagumo had, there were only a few seaplanes that were actually useful to him. The rest were not. He needed a light carrier, or more seaplanes of the E13A1 variety. A decent search would comprise about 12-18 aircraft, plus more in reserve. Call it 24-30 long range search aircraft. 8th Cru Div gave him 5, plus two more D4Y's with 2nd Car Div.

Nagumo was therefore short dedicated long range search aircraft for the mission, and was unwilling to divert more than two 1st Division B5N2's to the task. This despite having 81 B5N2's and D4Y's available.

 

[phx1138]

Nagumo's 8th Cruiser division had 4 long range scout aircraft while Nagumo's carriers had something like 233 aircraft.

The specialized seaplane cruisers that were designed to operate as the eyes of First Air Fleet, Nagumo had all that were available at the time.

AIUI, unlike USN practise, IJN CVs didn't use DBs as scouts, but relied on VSs from escorts, whence my suggestion. Also, given the record, it's clear Nagumo didn't have enough VSs, whatever the source. (That said, it may be his habit & not a doctrinal issue; 7/12, he sent exactly two VSs over Pearl before the strike...)

For want of a rheostat... It could have been a much shorter war.

IDK if I should start with this, or finish on it, because I agree completely. The rest is details.

Hit or miss at the discretion of the user. Not consistent or fleet wide.

Okay, I'll concede.

You must have a hate for poor Ralph. In theory it did work and it was masked by the fact that he had dud captains.

So did Lockwood. Note the difference in response. And the refusal to deactivate is after Lockwood has made it pretty clear there is a real problem with the Mark 6, skipper problems aside, & after Lockwood has decided to deactivate.

But not before the Mark 5/6 influence/contact exploder assembly. We can add Larimer for the hydrostatic valve screw up if you want.

I'd happily do that.

Nimitz...should have caught it.

IMO, he did what he should have: relied on capable JOs. That English &c bungled it is reason to bust Nimitz down, but not jail him. He was too far "downstream" of the cause of the problem.

It was pure luck.

Maybe.

Well argued.

TY.

I just apply expanding search area geometry, changing Japanese convoy tactics and reach slightly different conclusions. Factor in that US radio intelligence (sigint) remains spotty, that Japanese tech innov will be still there, that Halsey will still screw up and Nimitz can't change what he does not have. Maybe the Mark 15 (destroyer torpedo) or the Mark 13 will arrow at the Mark 14, (there were the same severe problems and THESE the USN noticed right away. Irony), but I don't see that happening.

Sub Force was the Rodney Dangerfield of the Navy: they never got any respect.

As for changed geometry, I'm looking at Luzon/Formosa Strait, Yellow Sea, & Home Waters & thinking, "Geez, let Nimitz learn to read a chart"... You're right, it probably means more dispersion of boats to IJN bases in Fiji/Samoa/Guad & elsewhere. That's not really a bad thing: the long legs out from Oz or Pearl are beyond typical Japanese air cover (unlike most of SWPA). And if Nimitz (or English, or Lockwood) shows half a lick of sense...

Then there's application of Nimitz's desire for close surveillance to mining: use subs to bottle up IJN bases with mines, instead, & track by radio intercept. (Hypo was reading the movement cypher, IIRC.) Yes, I realize that's improbable, given Nimitz's hostility to mining; if English's boats are getting more shots at surviving heavies, or bigger convoys, expenditures of Mark 14s may be so far in excess of production, he may have no choice. (There was pressure even OTL, & that's counting having supplies of Mark 10s from retired S-boats.)

Plus, don't forget, more distant bases means convoys on longer routes, meaning they're more exposed...& OTL poorly escorted (which I see no reason for changing), & IJN ASW (when escort was present) was pretty awful.

As for early fixes, if more surviving IJN heavies offer more Sub Force opportunities (which may be true, but bear in mind how damn hard getting shots at BBs & CVs is), the failures may help reveal the torpedo problems. (That said, if Jacobs' experience {24 December 1941, no less! Yes, I looked it up.} doesn't make you take a good, long, hard look at every part of the torpedo, IDK what would.)

Degaussing.

Which might slightly mask the influence feature problem, which is already so well buried & ignored... I'm not seeing it being a big change. The indifference in Sub Force SOs, & the culture of "no criticism of BuOrd", makes anything Japan does pretty well moot.

233 American carrier based planes vs. 248 Japanese carrier based planes (+16 floatplane recon birds)

The kicker? 127 planes based at Midway (including 17 B-17s and about 25 PBYs) Incidentally, inaccurate Midway recon PBY flight scouting reports drove Spruance crazy and did not help Fletcher much either.

Okay, I'll concede the strength edge; at a glance, it looks bigger. (I wouldn't be paying much for the B-17s, which were lucky to hit ocean...but for recce, yeah.)

 

[McPherson]

A damn good post. You get it. My opinion here on many things is not gospel or set in concrete. I am aware that Nagumo misused his air staff and did not apply his specialized air recon properly (even according to Japanese doctrine. I think he had enough at hand to do the job he was expected to do.) You also demonstrated to me clearly you understand what others (Glenn) failed to do; which is to show that Nimitz did have some blind spots and faults that hurt the war effort a bit. I firmly agree that if he (and the rest of the Navy establishment) had paid more attention to mine warfare, as hard as it is to do, the subs would have been far more effective. It will take a year or so before the boats have the mines and the training and can employ the proper laying procedures, but that brings the kill rates and effective blockade a full year earlier than patrolling in killboxes did.

I also agree that the subs were the left handed stepchildren and should have had maybe 5% more resources thrown at them. As feeble as they were, just look at their results. The metrics (2% of the fleet by weight and numbers using inefficient weapons and tactics) kill ~ 50% of ALL Japanese seagoing tonnage.
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I would suggest that Buord killed at least six (possibly ten) USN boats by not fixing reported simple problems such as broaching fish, circle runs, noise short circuits and excessive magnetic signature in US boats.

PS. Like most tools (see subs comments) if the person using a B-17 in naval warfare does not understand that one has to get down to low altitude and make one's pass over the ship in a beam attack (especially a carrier) and WALK the bombs in (Battle of the Bismark Sea), then one will accomplish nothing. Is it hard on the bombers? Yes. Will casualties be high? Yes. (50%) But will a Japanese flattop or two be dedecked and rendered helpless? YES. Worth it. It is do or die; Torpedo 8 had no chance at all. Those B-17s, in navy aviator hands, would have stood a much better chance.