~ Stormclouds ~
Parte II: Thunder
- Das kleine keuchen -
Keizer Filip I en Johanna "de Getrouwe"
Philip I von Hapsburg was not inactive in addressing Protestantism, but he lacked the necessary respect of those involved in such a difficulty - a respect that was afforded more to his late father, Maximilian. Philip and his son Charles were natives of the Empire, certainly, but such a designation meant very little. The Protestant movement was capitalizing on a key moment in the development of German nationalism, and - while the Hapsburgs were certainly German by origin - following Maximilian's death, Philip and Charles’ Low Country upbringing had rendered the house of Hapsburg suddenly and distinctly Burgundian in character. Apart from the ill repute bred by Philip’s many, poorly-hidden extramarital affairs, this culture gap between Philip and his imperial subordinates subverted many of Philip’s earnest and well-intentioned endeavors to achieve peace and an end to theological strife in the Empire, such as the colloquy Philip organized at Fulda in 1525 - attended by such important figures as Martin Luther, Philip Schwartzerdt, Johann Eck, and Christoph Scheurl, but made somewhat blundering by Philip’s need for a German translator. Other such attempts were undone by mere shortsightedness and a lack of a sense of urgency, such as the follow-up Gotha colloquy in 1527, which Philip inexplicably failed to attend.
While the accession of Philip had been more or less accepted (possibly due to the immense respect held for his father, Maximilian), the candidacy of Philip’s son Charles led a group of imperial princes to attempt to prevent what was seen as a deliberate formation of a hereditary Hapsburg succession and thus a borderline subversion of the Golden Bull of 1356. These princes, led by the elector of Saxony, Johann Frederick, urged the imperial electors to vote with regards to the stability of the Empire - especially regarding the growing rift between the Protestant and Catholic camps. Nevertheless, Charles would be elected after his father’s death in 1531 as Charles V, and the Empire found itself once again under a Hapsburg who had spent nearly his entire life either in a foreign land or on the Empire’s fringe.
A formal protest would be raised later the same year in a letter signed by (among others) Johann III, duke of Kleves, Philip I, landgrave of Hesse, Ernest I, duke of Brunswick-Lüneburg, and, most controversially, Joachim I Nestor and Frederick II, the respective electors Palatine and of Brandenburg, all urging either a new, emergency vote or a change of course when the next election came around. These princes cited the Hapsburg’s connections to Genoese banks and the Fugger family as a concerning indication of bribery and other such corruption surely employed by the Hapsburgs and continuously engendered by them in the highest echelons of the Empire, all of which would be used to ensure an absolutist hereditary monarchy and a more hardline approach to Maximilian’s ambitions of imperial centralization - all at the cost of the imperial princes’ ancient liberties and privileges. Further, the Hapsburgs insistence on grasping outwards - accumulating the crowns of Bohemia and Hungary, incessantly warring with the French, and marrying into the royal families of England and Spain - were similarly declared troubling by these princes, who believed that it demonstrated a lack of concern on the Hapsburgs’ part for imperial affairs, especially considering the lack of action on the Protestant movement. A coalition thus began to form amongst the potentates of the Empire, comprised mostly of Protestants and intent on keeping the Empire German-centered and decentralized. The seriousness of this anti-Hapsburg opposition party was made even more manifest when it named Johann Frederick of Saxony its preferred imperial candidate (although he never outright accepted the honor). Such a choice was telling: Johann Frederick was exactly the kind of equilibrium the anti-Hapsburgs wanted - fully German, first and foremost, and a Catholic but with Protestant (Lutheran) leanings.
However, what was truly needed was not necessarily an Emperor that was of undiluted German stock and innately in tune with the cultural and political climate of Germany, nor one that had an expansive knowledge of all the intricate theological topics relevant to Protestantism and could thus actively and satisfactorily deliberate on them. What was needed was an Emperor that knew he was the Emperor. An Emperor both unafraid to let his authority be felt and savvy enough to know when to hold back. Luckily for the Hapsburgs, Charles would be such an Emperor - and at a time when he would be much needed.
Karl I, II, III, IV, und V von Habsburg, c. 1535
Charles, by the grace of God, Holy Roman Emperor, forever August, King of Germany, Bohemia, Hungary, Croatia, Dalmatia, Slavonia, Rama, and Cumania, Archduke of Lower and Upper Austria, Duke of Burgundy, Brabant, Lorraine, Limburg, Luxembourg, Gelderland, and the Upper and Lower Silesia, Count of Flanders, Habsburg, Artois, Burgundy Palatine, Hainaut, Holland, Zeeland, Namur, Zutphen, Margrave of the Holy Roman Empire, Moravia, and the Upper and Lower Lusatia, Lord of Frisia, the Wendish March, and Mechelen.
- Interlopers, Dissenters, and a Silent War -
The conclusion of the short, but bloody Third Italian War in 1528 gave Charles IX of France time to recover his wits and wait for the next opportunity to strike at the Hapsburgs. Spain remained France’s inevitable geopolitical foe, although the crowns of Spain would be assumed by Charles IX’s nephew Juan Pelayo in 1536. The uncle-nephew dynamic between the two kings would lead to unique occasions of familial courtesy amidst what was to be a tense relationship, such as when Charles IX and his courtesans accompanied Juan Pelayo and his bride, Elisabeth, across southern France in 1538 as the young couple were travelling to visit the French king’s nemesis - who just so happened to be Elizabeth's father - the emperor Charles von Hapsburg.
Charles IX, just like his father, could not decide just what to do about Spain. The Iberian union had created - practically out of thin air - a truly powerful state (or at least the semblance of the beginning of one) on one of France's longest and most contentious borders, yet there had been practically no aggressive activity from this southerly neighbor since 1504. However, the ever-tightening bond between the Avís-Trastámaras and the perfidious Hapsburgs smacked strongly of an anti-French conspiracy of slow encirclement, especially with the English Tudors thrown in the mix and with the Papal States becoming less beholden to the French crown. The monopoly Spain enjoyed over the coasts of Africa and the Americas - with predominance in Asia increasing daily - and over the waters of the further Atlantic also greatly concerned the French court, not to mention left them outraged at the seemingly ludicrous terms of Inter Caetera and jealous for a similar expression of French glory. It was implicitly decided by Charles IX and his advisors that the approach to Spain should be, for the moment, focused on the harassment and gradual undermining of Spain’s weakest points and extremities - with a similar strategy employed against the Hapsburgs and Tudors, focused on the English Channel and the North Sea. Thus, from roughly 1530 to 1542, there was waged what would be known to the French as the “Silent War” - “La Guerre Silencieuse.”
The first illegal and hostile entry of a party of Europeans into the Spanish Americas occurred in late 1530, when a French captain by the name of Gaspard de La Roche and his predominantly French crew were captured by a Castilian patrol off the coast of Jamaica after having spent the previous three months harassing shipping between La Española and Cuba virtually unchecked. Unsure of just what to do with so many intrusive subjects of a foreign king with whom Spain had very tenuous relations, the Castilians jailed them indefinitely and nearly all of the prisoners were wiped out over the course of a few weeks by the conditions of the jail (in tandem with the usual tropical diseases). Gaspard de La Roche was a mere anomaly to his immediate captors, and across the Atlantic - with royal concerns focused on the war in the Mediterranean - such a development passed into the archives relatively unnoticed. However, La Roche was by no means the last of his kind, and the high seas intruders that followed in his wake would be much more numerous, and much more destructive.
Radical Protestantism of the kind espoused by Karlstadter Brethren churches trickled into French ports and cities very gradually since its resurgence in the late 1520s. However, French Protestantism is considered to have truly began with the arrival of Guillaume Farel, who returned to France in 1532 after spending several years in the Holy Roman Empire (Primarily Alsace). Farel had primarily been a follower of Karlstadt until he was won over by many aspects of Meyeran Protestantism following an extensive correspondence with Martin Bucer, although he eventually split with the sect over its strong proto-nationalist German angle. Farel’s sect would become hugely popular amongst marginal communities in the south of France, with high concentrations of followers in Landes (helped in large part by the earlier influx of religious dissidents from Spain) and the Massif Central. The difficulty of the terrain in which they lived had made these plucky and impoverished “Farelards” extremely difficult for their Catholic foes to eradicate or even dislodge, and the indifference of Charles IX practically ensured their survival.
Statue of Guillaume Farel in Mont-de-Marsan
Farel himself spent the majority of his time in Champagne, French Burgundy, and along the Rhône, accompanied by his favored acolyte Antoine Froment and often eluding French religious authorities by crossing over into the Swiss Cantons (where his message was quite popular). However, Farel’s lack of attention to the majority of his followers (the number of converts in the regions most traversed by Farel were minimal) and his gradual shift to a more Meyeran-tinged theology with concessions made for a possible state church in France (and thus a possible compromise with the Catholic establishment) alienated the more hardline Karlstadters amongst his flock - led by the Burgundian Théodore de Bèze - leading to a split in 1535 between the original “Église Réformée,” still known as “les Farelards,” and the new “Confrérie de l'Évangile,” known as “les Dissidents.” De Bèze stood at odds with Farel on the issues of infant baptism (something Farel supported in many cases) and of close alignment with the state - De Bèze being one of the seminal founders of the “monarchomaque” movement, which upheld the necessity of tyrannicide. This early division greatly harmed Protestantism’s heretofore successful growth in France, and would allow the political and social position of French Protestants to be easily undermined in the coming years.
The emergence of Protestantism had quickly led to a parallel emergence of anti-Catholic privateers. Being fed with and embellishing in turn countless tales of the Papist cruelties of the Spaniards both across the sea against the indigenous Americans and in Europe in the form of the mysterious (and quite misunderstood) Inquisition, the Protestant pirates known in Castilian as “lobos de mar” targeted the treasure-laden convoys of the Spanish maritime empire in the name of Christ and true and right religion. Primarily Radical Protestants of the Karlstadter stripe, the lobos de mar were based in Atlantic coastal communities and enforced a rigorous naval discipline as inspired by their similarly rigorous and austere piety. One such privateer was the notorious Gaétan de Sarbazan, a Farelard Protestant from the region of Landes (and one of the first converts recorded from the area) who boasted of having once had all 11 of the island of La Gomera’s Dominican priests hurled off a cliff and into the ocean in 1542, declaring at his trial in 1548 that he had no qualms nor guilt in having done so, as they were all “the Pope’s brood” who were “tyrants dripping with Indio blood.” Many of the authorities in England, the Netherlands, and Scandinavia responsible for these populations turned a blind to such unlawful activities, but by no one were they encouraged more than by Charles IX.
At first, Charles IX simply did not know what to make of Protestantism. He had allegedly intervened in their persecution on multiple occasions before one of his chief ministers presented him with a Farelard flier denouncing the Eucharist, after which he ordered them to be driven out of Paris and imprisoned elsewhere in France if they continued to speak ill of the sacraments. This determined defense of the Church would not be followed up, however, as Charles IX soon thereafter found the Radical Protestants - and their lack of religious qualms in tormenting the Catholics of Spain - very useful. With the raw potential of a Protestant society presented so appealingly, and with a Papacy continuously cozying up to Spain and the Hapsburgs, Charles IX may have toyed with the idea of fully severing the French Church from Rome in a manner akin to Christian III of Denmark, and, while he ultimately thought better of a full split, he would eventually lay the foundations for a comparable system.
Yet such fence sitting only made matters worse for the French monarch. It earned him neither the full cooperation of French Protestants nor any great deal of respect from French Catholics. Matters were made worse for Charles IX by the fact that he only had three legitimate children to his name from his two marriages - all daughters - and was growing too old to sire a son.
A considerable amount of coin was drained from the royal coffers to fill the pockets of imperial electors and add weight to Charles IX’s candidacy for Emperor, all of which was for naught when Charles von Hapsburg took the throne anyway despite mounting opposition. One feels as though Charles IX should have known when to quit, yet he continued to have “Duc de Milan” announced with his other titles (in blatant disregard of his treaty with the Hapsburgs) and often referred to himself in letters to foreign dignitaries as the “Defender of all Christendom.” Charles IX was an able administrator and fearless on the battlefield, but he failed to ever register the harmful extent of his pride or to attend to a few extremely important issues that were deemed too mundane or too complicated, such as the rise of French Protestantism or the still unsure succession. Charles IX would be know to more dissenting elements of French posterity as “Charles le Fier” - Charles the Proud (“Charles le Cordial” to many French Protestants), and his rule would be considered a truly unfortunate way for the main branch of the Valois dynasty to have ended.
Charles IX, le Fier et le Cordial
- Impostato per fallimento-
The death in 1535 of Charles “the Good,” who had been the duke of Savoy since 1504, greatly upset the shaky equilibrium in Northern Italy. Charles was a committed (if a bit strong-armed) French ally and his adherence to this alliance provided a substantial counterweight to the Sforzas in Milan and their Hapsburg supporters (who were now also their in-laws), and the impending accession of his Charles’ 21 year old son, Ludovico, was fraught with difficulties. Apart from his youthful inexperience, Ludovico was also a vocal supporter of Protestant reformers, hosting many of them after they had fled Hapsburg persecution in Switzerland. Although distasteful of the Radical Protestantism of Karlstadt and Farel, Ludovico was an avid reader of Johann Meyer (having “On the Sacramental Order of a Christian Nation” in his personal library) and was known to receive communion in the “Lutheran” manner - that is, in both species, wine and bread. Ludovico was also determined to strengthen relations with the French, possibly hoping to receive a share of the spoils when Charles IX invaded Milan just as his forebears had, but such an invasion was never to occur. It is possible that Ludovico’s decision to re-initiate French involvement in Northern Italy was due to his growing unpopularity amongst his almost universally Catholic subjects and the consequent need for the consistent, friendly presence of French military might. Like so many other young rulers, Ludovico had not quite accumulated the tact that might have put his neighbors more at ease, or at least kept them in the dark as to his intentions.
Despite advice from both the late emperor Maximilian and his grandson, Charles V, to act not so much like a condottiere and more like the imperial prince that he was, Massimiliano, the duke of Milan, began almost immediately to conspire as to how this situation could be manipulated in his favor - with bloodshed if necessary. Ludovico’s younger brother Adriano, promisingly enough, was at the time receiving instruction in a seminary of the Canons Regular, and a decent bribe from the Fuggers and the promise of the Savoyard throne were quite enough to convince him to re-secularize and join the plot against his brother. With a competent pretender in his camp and the powerful Hapsburgs on friendly terms, Massimiliano began imposing enormous tolls along the two duchies’ border and sent occasional harassing parties of soldiers into the Savoyard domain. While these parties more often than not came to blows with Savoyard patrols, it wasn’t until late 1536 that Ludovico ordered his troops to begin pursuing these violent Milanese troublemakers to either capture or kill them. Naturally, such an order resulted in Savoyard companies crossing into Milanese territory and killing Milanese subjects, and once Massimiliano believed enough of said encounters had occurred to grant him an acceptable casus belli, he quickly came trumpeting forth with allegations of Ludovico being the illegitimate progeny of Charles the Good’s wife and the late duke’s brother-in-law, as well as of being a crypto-Protestant who was plotting to assassinate the Spanish Pope Ignatius I on behalf of his puppet master, the king of France, and thus re-establish French dominance in the peninsula. Presenting Adriano as the rightful heir to Charles the Good, Massimiliano commenced his invasion of Savoy and called upon the emperor, Charles V von Hapsburg, to assist in pacifying Savoy and to revoke Ludovico’s ducal title. With the Church entering preparations for a major ecumenical council, there could only be minimal attempts at mediation or at pronouncements concerning the validity of the rumored adulterous and consanguineous union of Ludovico’s suspected parents (which most already treated as a ridiculous and baseless accusation).
Unwilling to tangle with France as of yet due to the continuing difficulties with Protestantism in the Empire and his Hungarian possessions and also keenly mindful of the seriousness of his imperial authority, Charles V made no overtures of direct support to Massimiliano nor of hostility to Ludovico. Hoping to dissuade Venice - another longtime French ally in Italy - from coming to Savoy’s aid and thus adding further chaos, Charles V positioned a sizeable army on the republic’s borders, complete with an outsized contingent of Hungary’s feared mounted troops. In another detente-oriented move, Charles V began buying up huge numbers of the contracts of Swiss mercenaries in order to deprive France of its most reliable source of well-trained heavy infantry in the region. Strangely enough, the much more overt signal given to Venice did not prevent the republic’s invasion of the duchy of Milan in 1539, while the modest attempt to pull the rug out from beneath the feet of the belligerent French seems to have worked, as Charles IX, in a somewhat rare moment of prudence, opted to limit French involvement in Savoy to its existing garrisons and a defense of Ludovico’s claim - possibly out of a hesitancy to throw his full weight into Northern Italy so soon after having agreed to remit his claim to Milan. In this fourth Italian War (often deemed the “Savoyard War”), explicit hostilities were never opened between the French and the Hapsburgs, with most of the diplomatic wrestling and much of the bleeding done by the Italian princes involved. Before 1539, the war was mostly indecisive - more resembling the earlier condottiere free-for-alls than the more direct struggles of the past four Italian Wars - with Florence (ruled now by Ercole, the eldest son of Cesare Borgia and Beatrice d’Este) joined the war on the side of Milan from 1537 to 1539 as a sign of goodwill, and again briefly in 1541. It was in August of 1539 that Charles V, feeling secure knowing that a Church council was fully in session and conscious of France’s reluctance to more fully enter a war when such a council was in session, declared that the Ewiger Landfriede would be upheld and Imperial troops would enter Northern Italy to restore order. Despite the lack of a formal declaration of war, French and Hapsburg troops would encounter one another on the the battlefield on multiple occasions - the bloodiest of which was the battle of Tanaro in 1541, fought almost entirely by French and Hapsburg troops and costing France the life of its Grand Master, Anne de Montmorency.
The Fourth Italian War would end predictably in early 1542 when the sonless Ludovico died of a fever he acquired after meeting with a French embassy in the higher Alpine piedmont to discuss possible full engagement from France and the possible annexation of Savoy as a protectorate. The French had lost their last foothold in Italy and the Hapsburgs had returned territorial integrity to the borders of the Empire. However, matters would continue to grow even more confused for the French with three developments over the course of several months following the close of the last Italian war: in February, Arnaud de Sarre, councillor to Ludovico of Savoy and open Protestant, fled across the French Alps and was granted asylum by the count of Velay, Claude d’Annebault; in March, Guillaume Farel was drowned under mysterious circumstances on the banks of the river Durance near his native city of Gap; and in June, Charles IX’s second wife, Isabel d’Albret, died in childbirth delivering his third and last child, a daughter. The minor victory gained by the Hapsburgs and their allies in Northern Italy would likewise be eclipsed by developments further north, and the powers of Europe could hardly afford to blink before war returned - and this time with much greater intensity.
- Yeni Roma -
The entry of the Portuguese into the Indian Ocean had seriously disrupted numerous ancient trade routes. While the Portuguese only stood to profit from their arrival, the overall transit of goods in the intricate mercantile system of the region dropped dramatically during the first half of the 16th century. This was obviously an unacceptable development for the Mamluks and Safavids, who gathered the majority of their riches from their special position at the crossroads of two formerly severed worlds. Both states funded expensive naval campaigns against the Portuguese in an effort to drive them out, but it would prove rather quickly that both states had underestimated their opponent and overestimated themselves. With its perpetually militarized state and the indomitable skill of the truly unique Afonso de Albuquerque, the Portuguese Estado da Índia achieved several Herculean victories against all comers in a string of naval engagements from the Malabar Coast to the Gulf of Kutch. The Portuguese succeeded in battering their enemies so badly and so repeatedly, in fact, that within a few years of the battle of Chaul, they had not only bottled up the Persian Gulf and Red Sea, but had also cowed the Yemenis and seized the port of Muscat from the Omanis. The very heart of the Muslim world suddenly found itself put to siege.
For the Safavids, their endlessly ambitious Shah, Ismail I, was biting off more than he could chew, with his antagonization of the Portuguese earning him only the destruction of his paltry fleets and the hostile occupation of Ormus, which cut off the Persian gulf and strangled its trade. Secondly, for the Mamluks, their attempt at grand maneuvering in the Indian Ocean and its consequent failure would constitute a death blow. By 1512, when Afonso de Albuquerque had discovered the remnants of the Mamluk fleet at Suways, what he found was pitiful - “hardly a few dhows, and less than a score of smaller vessels.” The Safavids - like the Ottomans - were a young empire and thus were possessed of a similar restless energy and could more easily bounce back, but the Mamluks were not so lucky. Their restricted caste of Circassian elites had exacerbated their alienation from their subjects through generations of corruption and inaction, with the lion’s share of their trade harvested by the entrenched communities of Venetian merchants. Held afloat by the highly developed ports of Syria and the riches of the Nile, the Mamluks had become imposing only in size and longevity, and the rot eating away at their core was now especially visible to the Ottoman sultan Musa, who now began to seriously entertain the idea of completing his late father’s plans. This precipitous decline in the dominance of Islamic merchants in the Indian Ocean and the rebuffed efforts to reclaim it would tip the scales against the Persians and Mamluks in their already tenuous struggle with the Ottoman Turks.
The Portuguese cornering of the Indian Ocean and their circumvention of long-established trade networks did not mesh well with other interested parties as well. The Republic of Venice - its very pilasters of commerce sunk into the continued transmission of eastern luxury goods through the eastern Mediterranean - stood to lose virtually everything, and contributed significantly to the Mamluk and Safavid war effort against the Portuguese In a singular moment of cooperation, Mamluk, Persian, and Italian ships even fought together against a smaller Portuguese fleet off the coast of the city of Chaul in 1509. This conflict of interests between these two Christian powers forced the Ottomans and Spain into an unwitting, ersatz alliance for much of the early 1500s, unconsciously working to undermine one another’s enemies.
O grande e terrível Afonso de Albuquerque
The transfer of Rhodes from the Knights of St John to the Venetians made an Ottoman invasion of the island less likely for the moment, but also weakened Christendom’s forward position against the Turk. The Knights were the inheritors of generations of practical knowledge concerning fortification and frontier defense, and when they handed over Rhodes it was perhaps the most well-defended location on earth. The Venetians maintained the intricate fortifications left behind, but their commercial pursuits made them more interested in a policy of detente towards the Ottomans, which led to Rhodes being undermanned and thus more of a chink in the armor than the redoubtable bastion of crusading privateering it had once been. This worked against the Venetians in the long run, as, despite the many benefits it brought in terms of trade, the Ottomans still considered the Venetian possession of Crete, Cyprus, most of the Aegean and Ionian islands, and now of Rhodes to be a particularly claustrophobic arrangement for them - one which Sultan Musa would refer to as a “silk glove laid softly, yet fixedly, on our throat.” In addition to this, the Venetians had a tendency to tax their Greek subjects mercilessly, and administered their larger Mediterranean possessions in a manner more akin to the plantations of the Americas. On the other hand, the Knights - while they had enforced a semi-feudal system and proselytized their Orthodox subjects more aggressively than the Venetians - were at least respected by the Greeks under their rule, so much so that by the time of the Knights’ departure there were some 1,500 Rhodian Greeks willing to leave their ancestral home to follow them. After all, the Knights were devout, chaste, and singularly dedicated to undermining the Turk - the same Turk that had plundered Constantinople and had laid the pride of the Greeks so low.
Selim and a few of his predecessors had considered seizing the isle of Rhodes from time to time, but disinterest in naval expeditions had ended up convincing them otherwise, and with the Knights of St. John evacuated from the island and replaced by the more tactful Venetians, anti-Turkish piracy in the region had declined greatly. The only active stymie to Ottoman expansion in the Mediterranean came from the Spanish in the Strait of Sicily, end even then it was a conflict by proxy, with the Knights of St. John exchanging blows with Turkish-funded corsairs. Musa I was thus more or less content to let matters in Europe and to the West of his empire sit for the time being, hoping to consolidate his very shaky eastern frontier against the Safavid Persians and the Mamluk Egyptians. Yet the careful neutrality of the Venetians - the result of centuries of tactful bargaining - was rapidly becoming a predicament for them in an arena gearing up for full-fledged holy war.