What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

So, its widely know that Hitler held a rather odd opinions in relation to Britain. Specifically, his belief that some kind of peace deal could be reached with the British once the Continent was secured ( ignoring even recent history demonstrating that Britain was willing to fight fiercely to prevent a continental hegemony arising).
Lets say then that Hitler arrives at a different position in relation to Britain from 1933 onward and orders that serious contingency planning be put in place to deal with Britain in the event that it decides to fight on following a potential defeat of the French.
Realistically, what can Hitler do to maximize preparation for a siege of Britain without prematurely provoking the Anglo-French in the 30s?
 
So, its widely know that Hitler held a rather odd opinions in relation to Britain. Specifically, his belief that some kind of peace deal could be reached with the British once the Continent was secured ( ignoring even recent history demonstrating that Britain was willing to fight fiercely to prevent a continental hegemony arising).
Lets say then that Hitler arrives at a different position in relation to Britain from 1933 onward and orders that serious contingency planning be put in place to deal with Britain in the event that it decides to fight on following a potential defeat of the French.
Realistically, what can Hitler do to maximize preparation for a siege of Britain without prematurely provoking the Anglo-French in the 30s?
The German army is underdeveloped compared to otl and doesn't get lucky when invading France meaning that you refight western front of ww1 before eventually being pushed back.

Also similar to ww1 in that there's a significant German Navy that's not significant enough to beat the Royal Navy.

Also if you increase the Uboatsby 50% but are operating from Norway due to higher travel time you probably have the same time on station as the smaller Uboat force operating from France.
 
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Perkeo

Banned
The unmentionable sea mammal remains unmentionable.

It's bad for the storytelling but it was good for the world: Britain is undefeatable if they decide to call any bluff the Nazis come up with and decide against throwing the towel. Luckily they did.
 

hipper

Banned
The
So, its widely know that Hitler held a rather odd opinions in relation to Britain. Specifically, his belief that some kind of peace deal could be reached with the British once the Continent was secured ( ignoring even recent history demonstrating that Britain was willing to fight fiercely to prevent a continental hegemony arising).
Lets say then that Hitler arrives at a different position in relation to Britain from 1933 onward and orders that serious contingency planning be put in place to deal with Britain in the event that it decides to fight on following a potential defeat of the French.
Realistically, what can Hitler do to maximize preparation for a siege of Britain without prematurely provoking the Anglo-French in the 30s?

It's a risk based approach, if Germany builds battleships the Uk starts building infantry divisions realistically the best thing germany could have done is build more destroyers and light cruisers plus an efficent naval air arm
 
The


It's a risk based approach, if Germany builds battleships the Uk starts building infantry divisions realistically the best thing germany could have done is build more destroyers and light cruisers plus an efficent naval air arm

Could Germany have also produced effective drop tanks for its fighters to increase their range I wonder. Might have helped a bit.
 

hipper

Banned
Could Germany have also produced effective drop tanks for its fighters to increase their range I wonder. Might have helped a bit.

Of course they could, they in fact did. They were used in Spain by the condor legion, the Later 109 E models carried a 70 gallon drop-tank.
The extra range would have been useful in the Battle of Britain, but not decisive.

Bottom line is Germany only made 1800 me109's in 1940 While the UK made almost 600 spitfires and Hurricanes in July 1940
 
The German army is underdeveloped compared to otl and doesn't get lucky when invading France meaning that you refight western front of ww1 before eventually being pushed back.

Also similar to ww1 in that there's a significant German Navy that's not significant enough to beat the Royal Navy.

Also if you increase the Uboatsby 50% but are operating from Norway due to higher travel time you probably have the same time on station as the smaller Uboat force operating from France.


Historically from 1933 to 1939 , the KM got 2 billion RM investment in warship to generate the fleet they got, with another 1 billion in infrastructure & personal costs. By comparison the estimated rearmament costing was ~ 74 billion RM FROM 1933-1939. Costs for the HEER are estimated @ 38+9 billion RM ,while LW cost were about 12+2 billion RM. Another 10 BRM was spent on bases bunkers & barracks.

So broadly speaking the entire KM program was 4% of rearmament costs from 1933-1939 and even if you doubled the KM investment, it would only mean a 4% drop in the spending on all the other programs. Any increase in KM cost to expanded amphibious capability would be a small fraction of that increase ....so maybe 1% drop across the entire rearmament.....Odds are any increase in KM costs would be at the expense of existing programs. In other words no cost increase at all.....therefore no net effect.
 
The UK is not going to sit idly by while the German navy expands. If Germany wants to build a fleet big enough to do anything useful against Britain, it's going to require a ridiculously huge investment. OTL they never came close. Otherwise you get a WWI scenario where the large German battle fleet spends most of the war in port because they can't challenge the even larger British fleet.
 
The UK is not going to sit idly by while the German navy expands. If Germany wants to build a fleet big enough to do anything useful against Britain, it's going to require a ridiculously huge investment. OTL they never came close. Otherwise you get a WWI scenario where the large German battle fleet spends most of the war in port because they can't challenge the even larger British fleet.


fallacy alert: under treaty ; Germany was allowed 35% of commonwealth naval forces.
commonwealth naval forces 1939
CV = 7+5
BB/BC = 15+5
CA/CL = 66+30
DD = 184+ 52
UB = 60 + 22
http://www.worldnavalships.com/forums/showthread.php?t=616
http://navypedia.org/ships/uk/uk_list.htm

NAZI NAVAL FORCES 1939 [35% ALLOWED BY TREATY]
CV = O+1 [2+2]
BB/BC= 2+2 [ 5+ 2]
CA/CL 8+3 [23 + 11]
DD/FF= 22/14+8/17 [64+ 19]
UB 57+59 [21 +8 ]


HAVE 103 & ALLOWED 157.

Nazi have a long long way to go before they are violating any treaty.
 
fallacy alert: under treaty ; Germany was allowed 35% of commonwealth naval forces.
commonwealth naval forces 1939

HAVE 103 & ALLOWED 157.

Nazi have a long long way to go before they are violating any treaty.
Note that I said "a navy big enough to do anything." 35% of the Commonwealth Forces is not going to be enough to accomplish anything decisive against the UK and her allies. And you can expect the British to increase their modernization efforts if it looks at all likely that the Germans are going to come anywhere close to that number (OTL, as you note, they fell far short). That's especially the case since the treaty requires the tonnage to be divided into categories, limiting things like a massive U-boat push in favor of a mixture of various ship types that will, in the event of war, mostly be forced to sit in port for the duration out of fear of the Royal Navy (much like the German High Seas Fleet in the First World War).
 

Greenville

Banned
Germany needs to:

1. Secure the French battleship fleet and mass-produce ones of their own.

2. Don't focus on bombing London for the fear impact which won't work. Instead, begin hitting key infrastructure allowing the nation to feed itself and the radar system defending them. The island needs to be starved into submission under aerial superiority.

3. Construct battleships reverse engineered from those of France which blockade the British Isles and starve it into surrender by blocking convoys from shipping.

4. Serious landing craft needed for an invasion of Britain and not some stolen French boats.
 
Germany needs to:

1. Secure the French battleship fleet and mass-produce ones of their own.

2. Don't focus on bombing London for the fear impact which won't work. Instead, begin hitting key infrastructure allowing the nation to feed itself and the radar system defending them. The island needs to be starved into submission under aerial superiority.

3. Construct battleships reverse engineered from those of France which blockade the British Isles and starve it into surrender by blocking convoys from shipping.

4. Serious landing craft needed for an invasion of Britain and not some stolen French boats.
1. Difficult. The French famously scuttled the remains of their navy (that which the British hadn't already sunk or stolen) after Case Anton; a serious German effort to seize them earlier likely makes that even harder (or worse, causes more of them to intern themselves in Britain, where they eventually join the Free French).

2. Strategic bombing was largely ineffective in forcing Germany to surrender when the Allies tried it; I'm not sure it will be much more successful for the Germans. Especially since fighting over British air space gives advantages to Britain anyway, and German planes don't yet have the range to threaten the entire British Isles.

3. Any battleships laid down after the Fall of France (especially if the Germans have to reverse engineer them from foreign, unfamiliar designs) are going to be completed far too late to matter. Especially since the Allies are going to be ramping up production (including the US, since there's no way a brand-new post-FoF class of German warships is going to be launched before Pearl Harbor), and the Allies are going to start with a fairly massive headstart. The Germans need to expect whatever fleet they have begun building pre-war to be the limit of the major surface combatants they can use during the war (note that Bismarck was laid down in 1936 and not finished until 1940).

4. Useful in theory, but without control of the sea (which they aren't getting, as noted), not particularly practical.
 
the point is that KM naval plans should never be predicated on what the other side does ; but on what the Nazi & KM want to do or achieve.
 
There are two classes of response, I think.

The first is to point out that I'm not sure how this scenario gives you anything remotely related to our World War II at all. Hitler didn't expect to be at war with Britain in 1939. However, if his real plan was to defeat the British Empire, I don't think that would lead him into the same games in eastern Europe, hence no Poland, hence no declaration of war as in real-world history. So it's hard to see how this plays out the way you describe it really.

The second is that given the strategic balance of the mid-1930s, it's fairly hard to see how Hitler could "take Britain seriously" in a way that wouldn't prompt Britain to "take Germany seriously," or at least, more seriously. The British are starting with a massive naval advantage. It's safe to guess they will notice a massive investment in the Kriegsmarine, and it's safe to guess they will realize the intended target.

All of this plus the fact that in our timeline the planned defense of the British Isles itself was hastily scraped together. If the Germans are clearly building their forces with war against Britain in mind, Britain will put more planning into defense, not just offense.

I have never read the actual doctrines the Americans had from later in the war on what to do when planning a major amphibious operation in the face of local naval parity, let alone enemy naval superiority, but I'm guessing this was a fairly serious no-no.

The problem with planning an attack that achieves strategic surprise is, as the term implies, that you actually have to give your enemy some reason not to be concerned. That leaves Germany, in your scenario, going to war pretty much with the army and navy that they have, which leaves us with Sea Lion.
 
Just a Rube said:
4. Useful in theory, but without control of the sea (which they aren't getting, as noted), not particularly practical.

Ah, but if the landing craft are fast enough with large enough fuel tanks, they could be assembled in German ports, race across under cover of darkness, and be headed straight up the Thames to London itself before the Royal Navy realized what was up.

Don't worry, I'll show myself out now.
 
So you have the Germans inventing the Hovercraft in the late 30's, keeping it secret and building 100s of the things in secret to prevent Britain building defences against them. That's the only way to get an invasion force from Germany to London in a single night.
 
Ah, but if the landing craft are fast enough with large enough fuel tanks, they could be assembled in German ports, race across under cover of darkness, and be headed straight up the Thames to London itself before the Royal Navy realized what was up.

Don't worry, I'll show myself out now.


landing craft don't have to be fast. Churchill & first sea lord pound both concluded British navy could not prevent port to port invasion of UK. They differed on the amount landed forces [Churchill stated 100,000 troops , Pound argued twice that amount]. Either way it would be a bloody disaster for UK that could not be reversed by 'cutting off supply lines' or the remnants of the BEF.
 
So the RN and the entire Britsh political and military establishment sit around and quaff the lead paint and do nothing or at least nothing different to OTL? Thats the usual premise of these scenarios.
If Germany builds a bigger conventional fleet from the early-mid thirties onwards, Britain reacts both militarily and then politically when Germany makes a gamble.
Result: Britain and (and thus France) call the German gamble/bluff over x,y,z location and the nazis, or at least Hitler are removed from power by internal German actions.

If Germany builds more submarines, its the same result. British tactical and technical thinking on how to combat U-Boats might have been deminished/misplaced after the war, but the acknowledgement and strategic comprehension of the potential threat was heavy in RN thinking. If Germany is building significant U-Boat numbers, there is only one clear target for their use and there is no way that Britain is just going to ignore that.
 
So, its widely know that Hitler held a rather odd opinions in relation to Britain. Specifically, his belief that some kind of peace deal could be reached with the British once the Continent was secured ( ignoring even recent history demonstrating that Britain was willing to fight fiercely to prevent a continental hegemony arising).
Lets say then that Hitler arrives at a different position in relation to Britain from 1933 onward and orders that serious contingency planning be put in place to deal with Britain in the event that it decides to fight on following a potential defeat of the French.
Realistically, what can Hitler do to maximize preparation for a siege of Britain without prematurely provoking the Anglo-French in the 30s?

He, this have been the major focus of my timelines (see signature) which currently is regarded among the most severely critizised ever on this forum.
It is NOT easy, and there are severe constraints. Not only in actually making the preparation, but also in avoiding the response. In my TL I took the most favorable outcome for Germany everytime to get to the next point in the TL but all these critical decisions have been noted by dutyfull poster so you can see what is in the way.
ONe day with more time I'll reboot it trying with a POD that steers away from the most inexplicable of the decision, but then I am moving from an "in TL" inprobable decisions to a highly selected POD. Its not easy.
One of the Things to realize though is that the German rearmament was indeed rushed, but not very efficient. They ran into bottlenecks which slowed things down before they were solved to a degree. 1934, forex, 1936 steel, 1939 coal and rail/river transport. Solve these issues as they were IOTL, but before they obstruct rearmament and the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe can easily get the extra additional ressources "they have the infrastructure to use" (that is the next bottleneck).

https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...ar”-preparation.350848/page-146#post-13755755
 
Develop a network of agents in various ports with aim to sabotage British Merchant shipping and to provide intelligence on ship movements .

Concentrate on asymmetrical naval warfare. So more Merchant Raiders , and build the proposed class of fast Minelayers .

Take Goering in hand and give more resources to a Long Range Maritime patrol and attack aircraft.

Pre position arms caches in various British colonies then send in agent provocateurs to provoke nationalists , give most fanatical , training and access to arms caches.

Commando raids on Venezuela , Trinidad and Tobago and Middle East to destroy oil infrastructure.

Buy old , laid up Merchant shipping through whatever means possible from 1933....through shell companies if necessary .

Have agents in ports assassinate merchant navy captains and engineers where ever possible once war has commenced where possible use local criminal organisations for this task.

More E boats with bomb proof pens once France falls.

Target coastal convoys

Increase aerial minelaying capacity.

Encourage unionization of Merchant Seamen

Infiltrate british communist party and foment industrial unrest .

Black Propaganda radio stations , more subtle than Lord Haw Haw
 
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