Prologue
15th July 1911
General Victor-Constant Michel, Vice-President of the Supreme War Council, was in a precarious position. The Minister of War, Adolphe Messimy, had strongly advised him to resign three days ago. His rather tempestuous argument with the Colonel Grandmaison, the flamboyant chief of the Third Bureau and a brilliant teacher in the Center for Higher Military Studies, had badly weakened both his position and credibility. The meeting of the Council was scheduled for July the 19th. If Michel wanted to see his plan accepted, he would need support. That’s why he had decided to invite some acquaintances to dinner that evening. The first to arrive was General Augustin Dubail, Chief-of-Staff of the French Army. The man partially shared Michel’s views and was quite courteous. Then came General Joseph Joffre, commander of the Second Corps and a respected member of the War Council. And finally, Grandmaison himself appeared. The charismatic officer was surprised by Michel’s invitation, whose vision about the French army was the exact opposite of his. He was even more surprised by the polite welcome of the Vice-President.
The meal was both copious and delicate and the wine both plentiful and excellent. Soon the atmosphere lost some of its tension and Michel began to guide the conversation towards military matters. He stated right away that it was his firmest belief that, in case of war in the Reich, the German Army would go through Belgium in order to try to encircle the French Army in a vast pincer movement. General Joffre didn’t try to contest that statement but nonetheless claimed that, in case of such of move, the Germans would probably stay East of the river Meuse. He then asserted that the main thrust of the German Army would be against the French borders in Alsace and Moselle, as it was known that the German Army would almost certainly only use its active Army Corps and not the reserve units. The Germans simply hadn’t enough trained troops to perform a large offensive throughout western Belgium. Colonel Grandmaison gave his approval to Joffre’s theory.
At this moment General Michel decided to play his trump card and divulged the contents of a recent report of the Second Bureau ( the Intelligence branch of the Army): the said report established that the German Staff was seriously considering the idea to deploy Reserve Corps in the frontline in case of war. The revelation seemed to confuse Grandmaison a bit, but the man nonetheless claimed that this report was only one among many. Then General Michel asked him the following question: “Can you guarantee me, with the utmost certainty, that the German Army won’t use his reserve units and thus won’t try an attack through Belgium west of the river Sambre?”
Grandmaison answered that he couldn’t provide such a guarantee. A rather lengthy conversation followed and General Dubail finally concluded that the possibility of a German movement west of the river Sambre couldn’t be ignored and that the Army should at least prepare for such a case. Grandmaison then asked two questions: First: what about about a possible offensive against the French borders in the East? Second: in such case, how General Michel intended to find enough men to defend the homeland both in Alsace and Belgium?
General Michel knew that almost everyone in the Supreme War Council was aware of his report delivered to the Minister of War in February. He knew that his idea to amalgamate reserve regiments with active ones, thus creating 30 000 strong Infantry divisions, was received with scepticism at best. That’s why he had secretly chosen to give up this option. He was ready to make concessions to the “Offensive at the utmost” faction in exchange for the acceptation of his plan. As a consequence, he answered that it was never his intention to leave the Eastern border completely defenceless and that he agreed to the idea of limited and carefully designed offensives (as he had accepted the importance of attacking in Lorraine for a long time in the first place). By an astute choice of words, he didn’t describe his plan as a “defensive” one, but as a “counter-offensive” one.
He then proposed his ideas for a future strategy, specifying each time that it was only rough drafts and that he would accept advices to improve them. The conversation went into the late hours of the night and remained courteous, with concessions on both sides.
General Victor-Constant Michel, Vice-President of the Supreme War Council, was in a precarious position. The Minister of War, Adolphe Messimy, had strongly advised him to resign three days ago. His rather tempestuous argument with the Colonel Grandmaison, the flamboyant chief of the Third Bureau and a brilliant teacher in the Center for Higher Military Studies, had badly weakened both his position and credibility. The meeting of the Council was scheduled for July the 19th. If Michel wanted to see his plan accepted, he would need support. That’s why he had decided to invite some acquaintances to dinner that evening. The first to arrive was General Augustin Dubail, Chief-of-Staff of the French Army. The man partially shared Michel’s views and was quite courteous. Then came General Joseph Joffre, commander of the Second Corps and a respected member of the War Council. And finally, Grandmaison himself appeared. The charismatic officer was surprised by Michel’s invitation, whose vision about the French army was the exact opposite of his. He was even more surprised by the polite welcome of the Vice-President.
The meal was both copious and delicate and the wine both plentiful and excellent. Soon the atmosphere lost some of its tension and Michel began to guide the conversation towards military matters. He stated right away that it was his firmest belief that, in case of war in the Reich, the German Army would go through Belgium in order to try to encircle the French Army in a vast pincer movement. General Joffre didn’t try to contest that statement but nonetheless claimed that, in case of such of move, the Germans would probably stay East of the river Meuse. He then asserted that the main thrust of the German Army would be against the French borders in Alsace and Moselle, as it was known that the German Army would almost certainly only use its active Army Corps and not the reserve units. The Germans simply hadn’t enough trained troops to perform a large offensive throughout western Belgium. Colonel Grandmaison gave his approval to Joffre’s theory.
At this moment General Michel decided to play his trump card and divulged the contents of a recent report of the Second Bureau ( the Intelligence branch of the Army): the said report established that the German Staff was seriously considering the idea to deploy Reserve Corps in the frontline in case of war. The revelation seemed to confuse Grandmaison a bit, but the man nonetheless claimed that this report was only one among many. Then General Michel asked him the following question: “Can you guarantee me, with the utmost certainty, that the German Army won’t use his reserve units and thus won’t try an attack through Belgium west of the river Sambre?”
Grandmaison answered that he couldn’t provide such a guarantee. A rather lengthy conversation followed and General Dubail finally concluded that the possibility of a German movement west of the river Sambre couldn’t be ignored and that the Army should at least prepare for such a case. Grandmaison then asked two questions: First: what about about a possible offensive against the French borders in the East? Second: in such case, how General Michel intended to find enough men to defend the homeland both in Alsace and Belgium?
General Michel knew that almost everyone in the Supreme War Council was aware of his report delivered to the Minister of War in February. He knew that his idea to amalgamate reserve regiments with active ones, thus creating 30 000 strong Infantry divisions, was received with scepticism at best. That’s why he had secretly chosen to give up this option. He was ready to make concessions to the “Offensive at the utmost” faction in exchange for the acceptation of his plan. As a consequence, he answered that it was never his intention to leave the Eastern border completely defenceless and that he agreed to the idea of limited and carefully designed offensives (as he had accepted the importance of attacking in Lorraine for a long time in the first place). By an astute choice of words, he didn’t describe his plan as a “defensive” one, but as a “counter-offensive” one.
He then proposed his ideas for a future strategy, specifying each time that it was only rough drafts and that he would accept advices to improve them. The conversation went into the late hours of the night and remained courteous, with concessions on both sides.
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