In general, in fact, by the beginning of the 1980s the Soviet Union was faced with a number of problems that must be solved within the framework of this timeline.
1) Nomenclature
For this it is necessary, first of all, to decide what the Soviet nomenclature is. In fact, the nomenclature (in the sense, of course, political) has two meanings. Firstly, these are the leaders, for the appointment to whose posts coordination with the party bodies was required. The list of similar posts (nomenclature in the "ordinary" meaning) and gave the name to this layer. And secondly, the nomenclature implied the authorities in general - that is, people occupying leading positions above a certain rank. ("That is, the site manager was not considered" nomenclature "yet, but the deputy director of the plant is quite). The recognition of the nomenclature as a boss was so popular that, in fact, all party workers (especially those who were released) were treated by the bosses, although it is clear that, say, the town committee instructor or secretary of the Komsomol cell is not such a big bird.
It can be said that it is precisely in the conditions of mass consciousness. In fact, it works with clean "system" principles - if the average worker or engineer could communicate with the head of the shop manager level, then higher levels of the hierarchy were not available to him. This differed, in essence, from the traditional separation of the elite from the masses in the class society, even if he worked in the same house with the officers, but it was impossible to change the properties of the hierarchical construction of enterprises.
As for party leadership, it was even more difficult with him. Initially, the party was viewed as the most educated and understanding part of the working class, which meant its very high authority. But over time the situation has changed, the level of education is growing and growing. However, the system that was established in the USSR was still based on a high party authority, which became increasingly formal. Observance of this authority (the party can not be mistaken!). High authority with a high degree of uncertainty defends the allocation of party workers in a separate layer. At the same time, the released party-robots were automatically ranked as nomenclature, i.e. "To the authorities", beyond that, they were engaged in leading activities or not.
But is the selection of "superiors", as a separate category, a purely Soviet feature. It's not strange, yes and no. No - because the allocation of managers from the general mass of workers occurred long ago, from the very moment of the formation of modernity. However, officials existed earlier, even in the very first eastern despotism, people who organize and manage, can be identified, but then these functions were mixed with the priestly and the military. Since the formation of modernity and, especially, of the industrial economy, the formation of bureaucracy, as a separate layer, began at an accelerated pace. And, of course, almost immediately there was a criticism of the bureaucracy.
The role of the bureaucracy became even higher when in connection with the complication of production processes, the construction of mass administrative structures began. For those same clerks who worked in this field, the notion of "bosses" became even more important than for industrial workers. In this situation, it is quite possible to talk about the formation in the public consciousness of the image of "bureaucracy" and "officials", close to the Soviet understanding of the "nomenclature".
That is, if we confine ourselves to reflection in the mass consciousness, then the difference between the Soviet and the non-Soviet understanding is not particularly great. The bosses are the authorities, a certain superior force, designed to regulate a person's life, forcing him to do what he does not want to do. But reality, as is known, is always more difficult than reflection.
The fact is that the fact that the bureaucracy under capitalism, as such exists in a complex system of bourgeois society, plays an enormous role, which is inconspicuous for the layman. After all, the notorious "bosses" and notorious "officials" are engaged not in what they want, but only in what the true masters of life demand. That is, the bourgeoisie. That same one, hiding in the shadow of the welfare state. And coming on the scene now, in the period of return to classical capitalism. It is the interests of the owners, single-handed or distributed, mediated by joint-stock companies, who must provide superiors. It is they who are served by a bourgeois state, for clamoring slogans about "common interests" that are carefully watching to ensure that it is the interests of big capital that have been fulfilled in the first place.
And it was this factor that distinguished the Soviet bureaucracy, the very "nomenklatura" from the bureaucracy of Western countries. After all, how high is the position of the leader under capitalism, he is still the executor. The case gets confused, however, by the fact that high-ranking leaders are very often either explicitly or covertly, but are owners / co-owners of enterprises, and necessarily enter the higher spheres of the state elite. But at the same time, their interests as hosts and as leaders are often different, and they should be shared.
As for the Soviet nomenklatura, it was precisely the owners who did not have it. Elimination of private property created an incredible precedent, when the overall management of the economy was not in the interests of any individual or a group of individuals, but in the interests of the whole society. "Wait - say anti-Soviet - but then just everything is simple. The leadership was carried out in the interests of the very nomenclature, which became the real owner of the country. "What is the fallacy of this statement? Well, firstly, there is no special orientation of the nomenclature to ensure only their own lives. In the capitalist or other class world, the entire power of the economy is aimed at ensuring the interests of the ruling classes. We must also understand that the interest of the ruling class, say under capitalism, is not just a well-fed and beautiful life for the bourgeois, but, above all, an increase in capital. It is for this that all feedback mechanisms that ensure the operation of public mechanisms are set up. But if there is no private property, then this is not the case.
Therefore, the nomenclature can not be regarded as a full-fledged replacement of the exploiting classes. Moreover, being in its structure analogous to the capitalist bureaucracy, it simply can not be so. The Soviet state was a state of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and how strange it sounds, was "tuned" to the interests of the bulk of the working people.
But how then to be with the nomenclature? She honestly worked to make the life of a common man better? And where did the special spikes, spetsdachi, apartments, limousines come from? After all, it can not be denied that the Soviet authorities tried to make life for themselves as best as possible. Of course, you can not.
The difference in the standard of living of Soviet superiors and ordinary people was. But it can also be said that the managers of the capitalist world live much better than ordinary people. Even those who are not co-owners of capital. This is the worldwide norm. The fact is that in the modern social structure the skills necessary to occupy a leading position, including education (often required by a prestigious university diploma) are not common, which leads to an increased loss of payment for managers, relative to the rest.
Nomenclature, which is, in fact, an analogue of capitalist managers, is also inherent in such a desire. Every Soviet boss had a considerable temptation to do something to increase his own well-being, instead of taking care of the welfare of the people. Therefore, to the extent possible, he tried to get the notorious spets-Soldering and spetsdachi. But the interests of capital are in the interests of the capitalist leader. They limit the appetites of bureaucrats, directing their energy to the main goal - to ensure profit. The Soviet leader was a Soviet state built on the idea of ensuring the interests of the people. It was precisely this that was to ensure that the representatives of the nomenklatura did not turn into rats who were taking away the property of the whole people. The belief that the state is the nomenclature is meaningless - because it denies the systemic properties of the state and society.
The Soviet state coped with this function also quite successfully. At least until a certain time, the desire of some representatives of the nomenklatura to grab a bigger piece from the common pie was blocked. But as the social system became more complex, this function became less effective. The absence of rigid feedbacks inherent in class systems, the very capital that makes everyone work for the sake of surplus value, gave the nomenklatura greater freedom. And the people whose living standards improved more and more, in general, did not particularly protest the desire of a number of leaders to increase their standard of living. They did not understand that this was only the beginning ...
Therefore, we can say that the nomenclature, as such, still had a desire to increase its welfare (at the expense of others). But this increase had nothing to do with exploitation, as such. On the contrary, it is a universal and, apparently, a systemic defect of the bureaucratic machine in general, inherent in it even under capitalism. But it is deeply secondary to capitalist relations, to the capitalist's desire to increase surplus value. In the USSR, however, under conditions when capitalist relations were liquidated, this secondary property turned out to be very important.
But just like the Western bureaucracy, the Soviet nomenklatura felt the "illegality" of such things. If a Western manager of a high rank always aspires to enter the circle of owners, representatives of the Soviet nomenclature, especially those who saw the main process as their main activity, tried, often unconsciously, to do the same. But since such a process meant the reorganization of the entire social mechanism, the change of the state system, then such a thought was expressed very cautiously. In fact, she meant nothing more than a denial of the Soviet nomenclature itself, as such. Such a paradox not only suppressed the possibility of these representatives acting, but also did not give them the opportunity to formulate the idea of a return to the proprietary society, as a separate concept.
But even more important was the fact that such a paradox showed the extreme instability of the very position of the Soviet nomenklatura. Here we come to the most important. The position of the Soviet nomenclature was very strange. This layer, equivalent to the layer of administrative bureaucracy under capitalism, as mentioned above, did not have its systemic stability, which provides a link with the capitalists for the capitalist bureaucracy.
This power, devoid of property, hung, in fact, in the air. Of course, it could be said that the power was provided by the interests of the whole society, that it was the result of a public consensus. But this also meant that this very power could very easily have been replaced by the change of this very consensus.
Which, of course, happened. The nomenclature was unusually easy to follow the social changes that destroyed it, as a special layer. The ease with which the Soviet state was dismantled is startling. What seemed to be a reinforced concrete, melted like a mirage, so easily that many simply did not believe that it happened. Such an unexpected surrender of the country by the party and Soviet apparatus generated an unusually large body of myths concerning this process, the most popular of which was the myth of the deliberate surrender of socialism.
Of course, very many believe that the Soviet nomenklatura retained its position in capitalist Russia. This is not true. The new Russian state system was built on completely different principles, and the nomenclature as such was outside the elite system. Although a new elite was created mainly from former representatives of the Soviet nomenklatura. But belonging to it did not mean "automatic transition" to "new owners". But most importantly, the clear class structure of the new system meant that the main source of goal-setting had changed now-if the whole people had been considered before, now it was a world of capital, and only capital and its owners could dictate goals for the new state. This gave completely different results.
Now there is no trace of the former weakness. 1993 clearly showed that we are already living in a different world, which is so easy to change as it was in 1991 will not work. Shots from tank guns on the parliament building marked the full stability of capitalism, as well as the fact that the coming Revolution will absolutely not be like 1991.
Thus, the weakness of the nomenklatura, stemming from the fact that it was a capitalist element deprived of reliance on property and capital, in the Soviet country served as the basis for the fact that capitalism was fairly easily restored.
2) Philistinism and Infantilization of the population
Non-alienated labor was trapped in a narrow segment of some defense enterprises, some scientific and educational institutions. In the rest of the society, a "formalization" began, manifested in a certain increase in the number of managers (the very "bureaucratization" with which all Soviet time fought) and the transformation of the country into a "normal industrial state".
In a similar situation, this degeneration of the intelligentsia took place. Moreover, it, honestly, could not fail to happen - due to the dialectical nature of social development. When it is necessary to change the situation, and what was previously progressive, turns into its opposite. This happened: the very layer that otherwise had to become the main "driver" for the country's communization, in the era of "stagnation" turned into something anticommunist. By the way, it is interesting that the realization of the "degeneration" that happened to the intelligentsia led to the country's further movement towards a catastrophic funnel. And specifically - to the emergence of ideas about the harmfulness of higher education, and then, in general, universal education. Moreover, we have not yet reached the end in this process - and we are still waiting for a lot of "fascinating stories".
In the meantime, let us turn to the Soviet intelligentsia. And, in particular, to the conditions in which the latter was in the late Soviet period. Then, when these processes inevitably led to the fact that, the further it was, the less profitable it became to bind oneself to "big systems". (As it was said above, they either found themselves confined to rigid frameworks - or turned into highly alienated, industrial structures.) And it became much more profitable to limit our existence to what is called "a small world": that is, to engage in one's own way of life, Family, friendly relations (and lovers too). But, in no way, do not go to the "big" production processes. This was the same philistinism that the intellectuals themselves preferred ten years ago - but were defeated. (It is absolutely natural - since it is necessary to fight with the cause, not with the investigation, because choosing between the role of "conveyor cog" and "self-satisfied philistine", the majority will choose the second.)
And in general, under existing conditions, petty-bourgeois life turned out to be not only the most convenient in the everyday life - that is, it allowed to realize maximum comfort in life with minimal expenses. But not only. It also allowed some way to involve the higher, cognitive properties of the mind - which is very important for a developed personality. Such a statement may seem strange: after all, philistines initially rely on limited people. But this is true only for the "traditional society" - in which each person is placed in a narrow niche, limited by tough competition. In the USSR, this was not - and a person locked up on life, could afford everything, without wasting the power to take care of his existence. So why should he, as it was before, have to limit his life to the size of a private garden? No, on the contrary, the Soviet petty bourgeois could freely visit museums, exhibitions, theaters - all the more so since all this was very cheap. And buying books became his direct responsibility. (And, often these same books were even read!)
However, even in this case, the petty bourgeois remained a petty bourgeois, since all his attempts at "cultural consumption" remained just consumption, not unlike the consumption of smoked sausage or fashionable jeans. The possibilities to turn all this "spiritual wealth" into something more or less socially useful from him, if they were, then, as a rule, were not used. True, here the imitation of creativity - with minimal costs - was beneficial. It is from here that the "feet of" the "Soviet underground" grow - but here we will not solve this problem. (Much more important is the moment that for the average Soviet intellectual any realization of his intellectual potential at that time inevitably amounted to consumption.) Closure of channels for creation - and, the further, the stronger - with the preservation of rich opportunities for intellectual development, turned out to be fatal for this layer Because in the end it turned out what is, in fact, the "forbidden state" of society: namely, the mass of intellectually developed subjects who believe that the thinner and more refined they consume, the better all the rest.
Also, citizens of the USSR massively turned into hippies. It may seem that it is incorrect to compare them with the hippies: because there it was about a mass but subculture, and then - about the whole mass of the population, even for a certain historical period. However, it should not be forgotten that the notorious hippies were only the most prominent representatives of the prevailing trends in society. That mass withdrawal in personal relationships, enthusiasm for "Eastern practices", "liberation of love" were inherent not only to them, but also to the majority of philistines. That's only instead of LSD and hemp, the latter used alcohol - but treated it in much the same way as the more "advanced" looked at the more "serious substances." Namely - as a way to live, "not steaming", not allowing various kinds of life troubles to spoil your mood and "strain" the mind, which leads to inevitable neuroticism.
But it was precisely this attitude to life that won the masses on the opposite side of the Iron Curtain. Actually, the late Soviet man in the street also quite clearly separated himself from all possible "politics", like his Western colleague. No, of course, the Party, the Komsomol, trade unions formally existed, at last - but participation in these organizations in the 1970s was purely conditional. Instead of the dynamism of the past years, instead of the perception that existed a decade ago as an active participation in the affairs of the country, the notorious "membership" turned into a net collection of contributions and a dull sitting of meetings (with a single thought - when will it end)? Even at that time, even party membership, participation in the Komsomol, and even the trade union, provided a real opportunity for citizens to solve their problems - of course, with the application of forces, sometimes significant. But the citizens decided: "Come on, this!". And they preferred any social activity "withdrawal into oneself." In their family ties, in friendly companies (which at that time turned into a real social phenomenon, similar to the "hippie colonies" in the west), into "art" (not only in creation but also in "consumption"), finally , In "my house" (arrangement of housing, dacha).
In fact, this "intimization" of public activity, this choice of "one's own circle" in the face of common interests, represented the same reaction to "public security" and the problem posed to it of the uselessness of active civic ties. Here, probably, this process looked even more prominent than "there" - for this reason, the formal preservation of powerful civil organizations. However, the most interesting thing is that the solution to this problem - building a less "expensive" and demanding system of interpersonal communication - went roughly along the same path as in the West. Of course, due to the peculiarities of Russian and Soviet culture, it was impossible to realize a "full-fledged" separation of "narrow circles" from the general social space. Just as difficult was the possibility of "expanding consciousness" by taking psychotropic substances. Moreover, rather for cultural reasons, rather than for what else, since to the same hemp in the 1970s the attitude was extremely liberal. It was openly planted for "culinary" or "technical" purposes - but the fact that this plant can be "smoked" was of little interest to anyone. The same can be said for some medications that were practically freely available - only in the second half of the 1980s, drug addiction became a significant problem. Although the "acid", of course, was not. However, "to change consciousness" managed and without acid - by regular consumption of ethyl alcohol in significant quantities ...
So the well-known "hippian triad" - "Sex & Drugs & Rock & Roll" - in the Soviet society of the period of "seventy-seventy" one can find a correspondence. It can be expressed as "love-author's song-alcohol", and it defines the same thing - the rejection of the "big world" and the transition to "private" relations. The person is still social, he is still looking for contacts with the world - but he is not ready to participate in big, global affairs, he is not ready to spend his energy for the sake of "infusion into the collective." Instead, it's the era of small companies, close ties ... Even in production, it's more important to have "your department", "your site" - with members who can talk about life, go on a picnic, etc. - rather than a huge plant, and even more so, a production project for which it exists. There is a transformation of the "general holidays", when the main are not huge demonstrations, and even more so, not the people standing in the stands - and the next banquet. Now everything - from the defense of the dissertation to the surrender of the "object" is accompanied by these very banquets, gradually closing for citizens the true meaning of what is happening. (The main thing is the chain: "overfulfilled plan - received a premium - you can drink", instead of the one that existed before: "built / launched - improved the economy / defense capacity of the country.")
And, of course, the disintegration of this civilian integrity of the USSR into various "intimate circles" was explained by the same reasons as the similar process in the West. Another thing is that this transformation turned out to be even more serious - since "there" all the same the mechanisms for removing the pressure of the lower classes were restrained by the preservation of at least some understanding of the competitive structure of society. "Here" was "reinforced concrete confidence" that the actions of the leaders of the state were originally aimed at improving people's lives. That is why the late Soviet people demonstrated the initial support of all initiatives coming "from above," including even unambiguously destructive (such as the removal of the monopoly of foreign trade or the permission to cash out "non-cash rubles"). Actually, that's why the "man of the stagnation period" "finished" is much worse than the former "children of flowers" and their sympathizers.