The Japanese strike is primarily composed of VTB (Kate) and VB (Val) aircraft which will be vulnerable to both the P-36 and P-40. The outcome of the air battle over Oahu depends on timing of course, and on how many AAF aircraft go after the attack aircraft as opposed to the fighter cover. The First Wave approaches in two separated packages and each of those split again so the Japanese attack aircraft are split (not massed) and were flying low and slow (at cruising speed) on approach to their attack positions. The 45 x A6M are also tasked with the attack on airfields, so each individual strike package does not have the same level of fighter coverage. The outcome will depend on timing and chance, not just the superiority of the A6M over the P-36 and P-40 or pilot training. IIRC the AAF has something like 36 x P-36 and 96 x P-40; depending on how many get into the air and where they meet the strike packages, the Japanese could suffer significant losses in attack aircraft before arriving over an alerted fleet. Genda's attack plan could be significantly degraded with respect to both timing and composition of the strike packages actually arriving over PH; most critically, the torpedo planes. Since Japanese intent was to fight their way through to destroy the US fleet, one can predict both a second and third wave being launched against a defense that is not caught sleeping.
The attrition suffered by the Japanese air groups during the strike on PH will have an impact on any subsequent carrier versus carrier action. The ineffectiveness of the TBD and US torpedoes had no impact on the outcome at Midway, so why would it be critical now? Also remember that the IJN ships are moving East during the day and turn NNW after recovering their strikes; a third wave will force them to stay closer for a longer period of time. The only way to completely avoid Halsey is to run to the West rather than toward their refueling point, which has even more implications.
IMHO this POD (change in command) is fascinating.
The attrition suffered by the Japanese air groups during the strike on PH will have an impact on any subsequent carrier versus carrier action. The ineffectiveness of the TBD and US torpedoes had no impact on the outcome at Midway, so why would it be critical now? Also remember that the IJN ships are moving East during the day and turn NNW after recovering their strikes; a third wave will force them to stay closer for a longer period of time. The only way to completely avoid Halsey is to run to the West rather than toward their refueling point, which has even more implications.
IMHO this POD (change in command) is fascinating.