The Battle at Dawn: The first battle between the United States and Japan December 7-10, 1941

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The Japanese strike is primarily composed of VTB (Kate) and VB (Val) aircraft which will be vulnerable to both the P-36 and P-40. The outcome of the air battle over Oahu depends on timing of course, and on how many AAF aircraft go after the attack aircraft as opposed to the fighter cover. The First Wave approaches in two separated packages and each of those split again so the Japanese attack aircraft are split (not massed) and were flying low and slow (at cruising speed) on approach to their attack positions. The 45 x A6M are also tasked with the attack on airfields, so each individual strike package does not have the same level of fighter coverage. The outcome will depend on timing and chance, not just the superiority of the A6M over the P-36 and P-40 or pilot training. IIRC the AAF has something like 36 x P-36 and 96 x P-40; depending on how many get into the air and where they meet the strike packages, the Japanese could suffer significant losses in attack aircraft before arriving over an alerted fleet. Genda's attack plan could be significantly degraded with respect to both timing and composition of the strike packages actually arriving over PH; most critically, the torpedo planes. Since Japanese intent was to fight their way through to destroy the US fleet, one can predict both a second and third wave being launched against a defense that is not caught sleeping.

The attrition suffered by the Japanese air groups during the strike on PH will have an impact on any subsequent carrier versus carrier action. The ineffectiveness of the TBD and US torpedoes had no impact on the outcome at Midway, so why would it be critical now? Also remember that the IJN ships are moving East during the day and turn NNW after recovering their strikes; a third wave will force them to stay closer for a longer period of time. The only way to completely avoid Halsey is to run to the West rather than toward their refueling point, which has even more implications.

IMHO this POD (change in command) is fascinating.
 
Very interesting so far... watching..


TOC
Galveston Bay..AH..CH_00a - Pearl Harbour Historical footnote
Galveston Bay..AH..CH_00b - Regarding Pilots, Cmdrs, A&SS&Stuff
Galveston Bay..AH..CH_00c - Map & Dispostions
Glenn239.......AH..CH_00d - Fuel Efficiency
Galveston Bay..AH..CH_00e - Kido Butai (First Air Fleet)


Galveston Bay..AH..CH_00a - Prologue
Galveston Bay..AH..CH_01a - The Pacific Fleet moves to Hawaii
Galveston Bay..AH..CH_02a - The Army is found wanting
Galveston Bay..AH..CH_03a - The Japanese Plan
Galveston Bay..AH..CH_04a - Command and Plan changes Sep–Oct 41
Galveston Bay..AH..CH_05a - Warnings and countdown to War
Galveston Bay..AH..CH_06a - December 5, 1941
Galveston Bay..AH..CH_06b - December 6, 1941
Galveston Bay..AH..CH_07a - A Breaking Dawn
Galveston Bay..AH..CH_08a - Call to Battle December 7, 1941
Galveston Bay..AH..CH_09a - TheFirstWave – AirRaidPearlHarbor, thisIsNoDrill
Galveston Bay..AH..CH_10a - Sunrise on Oahu: the Second Wave
Galveston Bay..AH..CH_11a - The Second Lull 0725 Hours - 0800 Hours
Galveston Bay..AH..CH_12a - Pacific Fleet Post Raid
Galveston Bay..AH..CH_13a - American Counterattack December 7 1941
Galveston Bay..AH..CH_13b - Japanese carrier aircraft losses Dec7 41
Galveston Bay..AH..CH_13c - Dispositions of varous groups Dec7 just after midnite
Galveston Bay..AH..CH_14a - December 7 Night – December 8 Evening
Galveston Bay..AH..CH_15a - Radar and Search
Galveston Bay..AH..CH_16a - Steaming toward Battle Midway Pt 1 Dec 9 1941
Galveston Bay..AH..CH_17a - Battle of Kure Atoll December 9 1941
Galveston Bay..AH..CH_18a - Battle of Kure Atoll (part 2)
Galveston Bay..AH..CH_19a - Night Battle of Kure Atoll
Galveston Bay..AH..CH_20a - Battle of Kure Atoll Part 4 Commence FIring!
Galveston Bay..AH..CH_21a - Battle of Kure Atoll Part 4 The Empire Strikes Back & finale
Galveston Bay..AH..CH_22a - The Battle of Midway: Plans and Approach
Galveston Bay..AH..CH_23a - Battle of Midway: Slaughter and Sacrifice at Dawn
Galveston Bay..AH..CH_24a - Battle of Midway: Scratch One Flattop!
Galveston Bay..AH..CH_25a - Battle of Midway: Hammer Blows and Finale
Galveston Bay..AH..CH_26a - The Consequences of the Battle of the Hawaiian Islands



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Though I do not need them the short cuts are very useful for new readers. Thanks for posting them
 
If the escorting fighters go after the peashooters and the P-35s its is bad for the USAAF pilots, but then the the P-40's get to savage the attack aircraft. The peashooters (P-26) had a max speed of about 230 mph, the Kate had a maximum of 235 mph and the Val 240 mph. I expect that carrying a full bomb/torpedo load between weight and drag these numbers for the Kate and Val would be lower. The P-26 had 2x .30 cal and 1x .50 cal machine guns, given the construction of Japanese aircraft and lack of self sealing tanks this would be quite adequate against the Kate and Val. Given that the Zeros are, in this scenario, likely to be outnumbered by the US fighters (P-26 + P-35 + P-40) overall, and depending on how things sort out potentially seriously outnumbered in any one place, the P-26s could inflict a fair amount of damage on the attacking bombers. It is important to remember that a bomber/torpedo aircraft that is trying to escape being shot down is not concentrating on the target and "a miss is as good as a mile". If they keep straight and level on their attack run, then even the P-26 should be able to destroy or damage a fair number of them.

This is not a wank for the P-26, but simply to point out that while it would be hopeless against the Zero, against the Kate and Val it can be successful in either shooting them down or causing them to miss the target. Of course, any Kates and Vals damaged by P-26 (or other fighters or AAA) now have a long flight over water and if they make it back will be out of action for a while and therefore not available for follow up strikes against either land targets or ships.

As I mentioned before, remember that American pilots who bail out can be back in action. Japanese pilots either go down with the plane or if they jump become prisoners. Losing much more aircrew in this scenario begins the decline of Japanese naval aviation much sooner.
 
The torpedo planes going at Battleship Row are essentially running through a nice shooting gallery. I'd expect that, if they try to torpedo the battleships, there will be many casualties from flak. If the fleet's present and alert, there's a lot of lead available.
 
how good are the flak vs actual planes?

Japanese losses versus US flak in 1942, even before the proximity fuse and widespread deployment of the 40 and 20 mm guns on any flat surface the captain of the ship thought he could get away with, run from 30-85% against an alert American task force consisting of 3-4 cruisers and several destroyers. (from Alan Zimm "Attack on Pearl Harbor", also from Hornfischer, Walter Lord, Gordan Prange, Ian Toll, Eric Hammel and James Dunnigan)


The above percentages are against a smaller attack force of course, usually on the order of 15-50 aircraft, but that is an appalling loss rate.

This fleet has a much larger number of guns and while about half are masked to one degree or another, if the US Navy had been alert on that morning it would have been murder. As it as, 5 of the last 7 torpedo planes (literally within 10 minutes of the dropping of the first bomb on Ford Island which opened the attack) where shot down, and Navy flak overall got 20 of the 29 aircraft shot down in spite of the larger gunnery platforms being on fire, sinking, capsized or blasted wreckage. The Japanese commented (found in a number of places) on how quick the response was.

A shooting gallery is not a bad analogy at all. It also makes it a bit easier to understand the decision to use Kamikaze tactics late war as even the well trained crews of 1941-42 were only getting hit rates of 20-40% while undergoing those losses.
 
If the escorting fighters go after the peashooters and the P-35s its is bad for the USAAF pilots, but then the the P-40's get to savage the attack aircraft. The peashooters (P-26) had a max speed of about 230 mph, the Kate had a maximum of 235 mph and the Val 240 mph. I expect that carrying a full bomb/torpedo load between weight and drag these numbers for the Kate and Val would be lower. The P-26 had 2x .30 cal and 1x .50 cal machine guns, given the construction of Japanese aircraft and lack of self sealing tanks this would be quite adequate against the Kate and Val. Given that the Zeros are, in this scenario, likely to be outnumbered by the US fighters (P-26 + P-35 + P-40) overall, and depending on how things sort out potentially seriously outnumbered in any one place, the P-26s could inflict a fair amount of damage on the attacking bombers. It is important to remember that a bomber/torpedo aircraft that is trying to escape being shot down is not concentrating on the target and "a miss is as good as a mile". If they keep straight and level on their attack run, then even the P-26 should be able to destroy or damage a fair number of them.

This is not a wank for the P-26, but simply to point out that while it would be hopeless against the Zero, against the Kate and Val it can be successful in either shooting them down or causing them to miss the target. Of course, any Kates and Vals damaged by P-26 (or other fighters or AAA) now have a long flight over water and if they make it back will be out of action for a while and therefore not available for follow up strikes against either land targets or ships.

As I mentioned before, remember that American pilots who bail out can be back in action. Japanese pilots either go down with the plane or if they jump become prisoners. Losing much more aircrew in this scenario begins the decline of Japanese naval aviation much sooner.

Alan Zimm makes that exact point (regarding the P26 and P35) in his work I keep citing. Martin Caiden talks a bit about the P35 in "Ragged Rugged Warriors" when he discusses the fighting in China. Both are a threat to bombers, so the ideal tactic is to use the P40s against the Zeros, while the slower fighters take on the bombers. Besides if you firewall the P26 engine and it breaks you are simply down one obsolete aircraft that has already been phased out. In the Philippines the Filipino Air Force managed a few kills against bombers, and similar results occurred in China by the Chinese Air Force.
 
I don't have any info estimate of the USN 1941 AAA levels.

Historical Dakka for a USN Carrier TF below 1942; 1944; 1944 w/ VT Fuze

WW2Pacific07_USN_cBattleOfMidway_TTwt_32000Lbs_Min_zpsf98m5027.jpg
WW2Pacific09_USN_cBattleOfPhillipineSeas_TTwt_162000Lbs_Min_zpsaarqrzye.jpg
WW2Pacific11_USN_cLate44_wVTFuze_TTwt_575000Lbs_Min_zpsgv5ldusc.jpg
 
how good are the flak vs actual planes?

Torpedo planes are relatively easy targets for AA fire. IIRC, a couple got shot down by the few guns manned. To attack Battleship Row, they must fly low and slow through the southeast loch...basically a shooting gallery.

Final briefing on the ships of Kido Butai:

"The approach will not be easy. You are required to fly right down this Loch. The targets are heavily armored, so you'll need to use modified torpedoes."

The next day, on the Japanese planes. "They're firing at us!"
"How can they be firing at us if they don't know we're com..."
"IT'S A TRAP!!!"

On board West Virginia, "Now witness the firepower of this fully armed and operational battleship. Fire at will!"

A minute later, elsewhere, "The guns-they've stopped!" <Japanese pilot looks around.>
"Watch for enemy fighters!"
 
I do intend to post a complete bibliography of sources I found most valuable at the end of this... as I mentioned at the start, the Pacific War has been a favorite subject of study for me for more decades than I really like to admit
 
The flak growth from 40-45 is stagering, but specially at the shorter ranges. Guns from 20-40, in all navies, spread over ships faster than mushrooms...

But I read somewhere that, in the immediate prewar, everyone seems to have overestimated the capabilities of the medium range weapons (4"-5") weapons and underestimated the need for shortrange weapons. Not so much as "we need them" but "we need a heck of a lot more". And this took 1-2 years to really start to be fixed.
 
If the escorting fighters go after the peashooters and the P-35s its is bad for the USAAF pilots, but then the the P-40's get to savage the attack aircraft. The peashooters (P-26) had a max speed of about 230 mph, the Kate had a maximum of 235 mph and the Val 240 mph. I expect that carrying a full bomb/torpedo load between weight and drag these numbers for the Kate and Val would be lower. The P-26 had 2x .30 cal and 1x .50 cal machine guns, given the construction of Japanese aircraft and lack of self sealing tanks this would be quite adequate against the Kate and Val. Given that the Zeros are, in this scenario, likely to be outnumbered by the US fighters (P-26 + P-35 + P-40) overall,

As I mentioned before, remember that American pilots who bail out can be back in action. Japanese pilots either go down with the plane or if they jump become prisoners. Losing much more aircrew in this scenario begins the decline of Japanese naval aviation much sooner.

Just a reminder, there should be a dozen Marine Wildcats at Ewa that should be able to tangle with bombers fairly easily as well.

The 45 Japanese Zeros could conceivably be outnumbered 2-1 against a defending fighter force that has had time to get to altitude. Even if they more than hold their own, leakers will get through and more importantly, the airfield suppression missions are going to get thrown out the door as the suppressors are now in a gigantic furball. Finally any moderately damaged American plane has a good chance of landing and getting repaired within a day or two while any damaged Zero has a decent chance of either being a constructive total loss or a complete loss on the way back to the carrier.
 

Driftless

Donor
(snip)
But I read somewhere that, in the immediate prewar, everyone seems to have overestimated the capabilities of the medium range weapons (4"-5") weapons and underestimated the need for shortrange weapons. Not so much as "we need them" but "we need a heck of a lot more". And this took 1-2 years to really start to be fixed.

Is some of the overestimation based on the significant jump in speed of aircraft in the late 30's/early 40's where manual or even tachymetric fire control pointing of the guns became very difficult at close range? Neither human or machine could keep up.
 
The flak growth from 40-45 is stagering, but specially at the shorter ranges. Guns from 20-40, in all navies, spread over ships faster than mushrooms...

But I read somewhere that, in the immediate prewar, everyone seems to have overestimated the capabilities of the medium range weapons (4"-5") weapons and underestimated the need for shortrange weapons. Not so much as "we need them" but "we need a heck of a lot more". And this took 1-2 years to really start to be fixed.

Interesting comment in light of the fact the US arrives at a "just right" choice of the 3" .50 caliber as a result of the Kamikaze experience at the end of the war.

Had never seen quite as dramatic a graphic a presentation as above. Subject for a whole another thread, but I'm not convinced the BB was any more vulnerable or obsolete just by air power alone - if properly protected by the right AA and part of a task force - any ship is vulnerable by itself or in a small group.

A little OT, but another way to look at one side of any NC-SD-Iowa class US battleship from a land combat power perspective is: equivalent of 10 Jagdtigers firing on you at 15-22 round/minute, while moving at 20-35 mph. That defines fearsome.
 
before Taranto (November 1940) Bismarck (May 1941) Pearl Harbor (December 1941) and Force Z (December 1941) the Admirals didn't realize how much damage a aircraft could to to a ship and how hard they were to knock down
 
before Taranto (November 1940) Bismarck (May 1941) Pearl Harbor (December 1941) and Force Z (December 1941) the Admirals didn't realize how much damage a aircraft could to to a ship and how hard they were to knock down
But the first two have already happened by this point.
 
But the first two have already happened by this point.
But reading and commenting about the fallacies of the two combatants in a lecture hall or deckroom is one thing, experiencing the event and suffering the same fate and responding properly in action instead in a plaid peace time footing is another issue.
 
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