Memorias de Nuestros Padres (2.0)
- Thread starter Nanwe
- Start date
So in other words, the only thing they can all agree on is that they should be able to agree on more things?
Well, that's the point really. The UDC is a deeply, deeply divided party, and although the post doesn't mention it (I suppos I'll get it to it at some point in the future), divisions are as much as ideological as they are personal, many currents are personalist factions. But to your point, the UCD clings, in terms of public image, to 3 key things: their anti-communist, Atlanticist profile, their image as 'efficient managers' (López Rodó would be proud) and the heritage/inheritance of the Transition.
Plus there's nothing more political than an incredibly divided party making a political point out of unity.
No, but blaveros were essentially also inside the UCD OTL. If not as clearly as with the PP, as there will be two strands of anti-Catalanist Valencianism in the UCD, the blaveros but little since for the time being their bomb-throwing doesn't help, and Attard's more intellectual opposition to pan-Catalanism. In any case, who says the UCD will have the absolute control of Valencia that the PP had
So, it seems that UCD is as divided and volatile and IOTL.
It's going to be amusing to see Centristes de Catalunya trying to make a deal with CiU with the blaveros fooling around just south...
It's going to be amusing to see Centristes de Catalunya trying to make a deal with CiU with the blaveros fooling around just south...
I'm very glad to see this has back. It's a very great update.
By the way...
By the way...
- what happened with Cristina Cifuentes and Alberto Ruiz-Gallardón (they were the examples of Suarist politicians in your previous version, but both were members of AP long before the OTL implosion of the UCD; they remain in AP if Verstrynge reaches AP's leadership -Verstrynge has always advocated an interventionist economy and establish harsh immigration policies to prevent Spanish workers suffer from competition with immigrants, despite its transition from right to left-)?
- And Javier Arenas will have better luck in Andalusia (if I remember correctly, it is the only major national leader of the PP coming from the UCD in OTL PP's history) or will you choose another regional leader for it, considering that Andalusia will be governed by the PCE from the beginning of its autonomy?
- Will we see a nearly successful attempt to unite the Spanish socialism around the charismatic Felipe Gonzalez and to overcome the PCE, to be sunk soon before some 80s elections by a corruption of some of his closest collaborators, forcing Felipe to retire Andalusia if he wants to touch real government?
Pretty much. I still have to go through the other factions and then the division between party establishment and young turks of the 80s. To be frank, CC-UCD and CiU were ideal coalition partners, and to be honest I don't expect the history of Catalonia to diverge much if at all from the original timeline, so a conservative-nationalist coalition will also exist in the early 80s.
Well, the blaveros were always there
Because Gallardón doesn't really fit the description indeed, at least the more I thought about it, and Cifuentes lacks that certain populist touch, but she could be a Christian democrat or a liberal (more likely) in the UCD. And indeed I still have to figure out what I'll do with AP. With regards to Andalucia, I'm not sure, I don't know too much about Andalucia just yet, but I would imagine it's a possibility.
Who says Felipe won't be minister
Keep it up, Nanwe!
Thanks!
Chapter 2: La cucaña presidencial
With Franco’s death, the future of Spain was open wide. This was not lost on anyone: The opposition become more organised and mobilised, the bunker sought to maintain the regime and the reformists within and around the regime sough to transform it – largely by replacing Arias Navarro with a more adequate successor. Indeed, Arias Navarro had proved himself to be neither what the hardliner that the bunker and El Pardo hoped for nor the reformist that the press had seen in him on February 12th, 1974. Instead, he had proven himself as a man lost in the contradictions between his brutality and his poor approach to politics reigning over several cabinets that were deeply divided between the reformists and the hardliners, both before and after Franco’s death. His real failure would not become apparent, however until early 1976.
That being said, as early as 1975, Juan Carlos had tried to get rid of Arias Navarro right before the death of Franco, but after he was too sick to realise anything. The attempt, known as ‘Operación Lolita’ had been devised by the palatine entourage in Zarzuela, and sought to replace Arias with the young technocrat José María López de Letona [1]. However, Arias refused to give in, arguing that Franco has chosen him for a period of five years, and threatened to resign in the difficult situation of the Caudillo’s twilight while revealing the ‘scandalous’ travels of the General Díez Alegría [2] to Estoril to meet with Juan Carlos’ father, the Count of Barcelona.
Facing such political danger, the King-to-be backtracked and was forced to allow Arias to continue. But Arias, who had a cruel streak [3], took note of the King’s opinion toward him. That changed very little Arias’ opinion of Juan Carlos, which can be described, if one is being nice, as very low. So much in fact that after Franco’s death, Arias failed to symbolically resign, as was the political convention since the Restauración. In exchange, on December 6th, Zarzuela [4] sent a communiqué to the press informing that the King “confirmed Arias in his post”, which is to say that he did not confirm his ministers. This forced the ministers to resign. The new governments would be his undoing.
Three days before that communiqué however, what is perhaps the most event piece of the Transition took place. The President of the Cortes, Rodríguez de Valcárcel [5] term ended on November 25th and as a result, a replacement had to be selected. The Consejo del Reino had to name three candidates from which the King picked. This was largely a formality under Franco, as usually to fill in positions, the counsellors put in the name of Franco’s designation and another two important figures.
In this case, it was pretty much the same. The King has told Arias Navarro that he desired Torcuato Fernández Miranda [6] to be the President of the Cortes and the Consejo del Reino. Arias Navarro, who thought the old professor one of his few real political adversaries, was more than happy to place him there, as the Cortes were compliant to the Government’s will – or could be made to be compliant.
As a result, on the 3rd of December, the Consejo del Reino drafted a list with three names: Torcuato Fernández Miranda, Licinio de la Fuente and Emilio Lamo de Espinosa. Torcuato was chosen President, obviously. [7]
Torcuato became the main ally of the King in the slow process of bringing down Arias, and bringing in democracy. The first evidence is his role in crafting the first government of the monarchy with Arias.
The usefulness and role played by Fernández Miranda in order to put forward the King’s agenda was evident in the composition of the first government of the monarchy. Arias originally expected to be ‘borboneado’ and forced to fight against the King’s attempt to impose his ministers upon him. Nothing farther from the truth. In fact, the Prime Minister was surprised when Fernández Miranda agreed to all of Arias’ proposals with one exception. Fernández Miranda suggested that Adolfo Suárez should be given the post of minister-secretary of the Movement. Arias refused, alleging that the incumbent, José Solís [8] had been appointed by Franco personally and he could not, in good faith, remove him. Instead, a compromise was reached whereby Suárez would take over Solís’ portfolio while Solís would be named Minister of Labour, replacing the reformist Fernando Suárez González [9], who would be designated procurador [10].
The new Arias Navarro thus consisted of what Gregorio Morán classified into four groups: Arias’ rivals, the lightweights, the ‘institution-men’ and the ‘nobodies’.
From left to right: Carlos Arias Navarro (PM), Manuel Fraga, Jose Mª de Areilza and Torcuato Fernández-Miranda
The two main rivals and heavyweights in the cabinet were Manuel Fraga (Interior) and Jose María de Areilza (Foreign Affairs) [11].
The lightweights:
- Alfonso Osorio (Presidency) [12]
- Juan Miguel Villar Mir (Finances)
- Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo (Commerce)
- Virgilio Oñate (Agriculture)
- Rodolfo Martín Villa (Trade Unions)
- Francisco Lozano (Housing)
- Antonio Valdés (Public Works)
- Adolfo Suárez (Secretary of the National Movement)
The ‘institution-men’, who either represented the most important Francoist institution, the Armed Forces, or had such a long political career that they were political dinosaurs, too big to be ignored but too old to be actual rivals to the President.
- Antonio Garrigues Díez-Cañabete (Justice) [13]
- José Solís (Labour)
- Lieutenant-General Fernando de Santiago (Deputy Prime Minister for Military Affairs)
- Lieutenant-General Félix Álvarez-Arenas (Army)
- Admiral Gabriel Pita da Veiga (Navy) [14]
- Lieutenant-General Carlos Franco Iribarnegaray (Air Force).
And lastly, the political nobodies:
- Carlos Robles Piquer (Education) [15]
- Adolfo Martín Gomero (Information and Tourism)
- Carlos Pérez de Bricio (Industry)
Both in terms of age – a large degree of ministers belonged to the last generation of Francoist politicians – and of political leanings – the majority were reformists – the cabinet belonged more to the King than Arias, whom after all was in the minority in his government. In fact, he was largely overshadowed by the Areilza, as the reformist media’s darling and Fraga, known for his reformist pedigree and considerable intellect [16]. Indeed, soon the government would be adrift as Arias sought to at least make it until the end of 1976, if not his five year term (1973-1977).
In that, the President was very wrong. Ever since the King had failed to depose Arias following Franco’s terminal illness in October and November 1975, both the monarch and Torcuato Fernández Miranda had commenced an operation to increase the pressure on the Prime Ministers as well as neutralising him until he was weakened enough that he could be dismissed by the King, as it would eventually happened. This operation took place between late 1975 and the summer of 1976, and can be summed up in four main parts:
The búnker, the Francoist hardliners, had to be neutralised so that they could not use their considerable institutional influence to stop any liberalising moves, like they had done in the period between 1973 and 1975. Obviously Franco was dead so that was one less obstacle. The main one way to obtain this neutralisation was through the change in the operation of the Consejo del Reino under Fernández Miranda. By meeting every 15 days as opposed to only when called to meet, in order to get a new Prime Minister all it had to happen was to time it with the meetings of the Council and don’t allow any time for the hardliners to organise and lobby. Secondly, Torcuato in his role as Speaker of the Francoist Cortes would introduce a new legislative mechanism, the ‘procedimiento de urgencia’, whereby any law the Government presented through this procedure would bypass the commissions – controlled by the hardliners – and of straight to the plenary for a single reading. The plenary was thought to contain a reformist majority, and if not, it could be changed so that it would.
Secondly, the King sought to become a closer figure to the Spanish people, thereby seeking to extricate himself from Franco and his Prime Minister and gaining the legitimacy only public opinion could provide him, as after all, the King lacked the dynastic legitimacy [17]. By bypassing the security detail imposed by the Prime Minister and winking at a democratic future by talking about a constitutional monarchy in Asturias or dabbling in Catalan in Barcelona, the King increased pressure on Arias Navarro. The King would also meet in public with the main figures of the more moderate opposition, like the Christian-democrat Gil Robles or Álvarez de Miranda. Clandestinely however, the King would establish links with the Communist and Socialists through Nicolas Franco, the Caudillo’s nephew.
Lastly, the King would increase the pressure from abroad. As Franco himself once remarked, one had to say things abroad for the foreign press that differed from those that were said inside Spain. But he certainly never intended for that principle to be used to attack the political system, as the King did. On April 1976, Newsweek published an interview with the King where he deemed Arias an “unmitigated disaster”.
In response to the interview, Arias Navarro would jump ahead and announce the nation on television that the plans for political reform were well advanced and he would soon present them to the people. This was false.
In fact and despite the fact that Suárez had proposed an 18-member Mixed Commission [18] for Political Reform, little had been accomplished. Especially due to the Prime Minister himself, who had made it very clear that the only constitutional innovations that he would tolerate were those that did not compromise its Francoist character, that is to say, that he would allow little to nothing.
On top of that, the Commission was deeply divided between opponents of any reform (military ministers, Girón and others), the limited reformists, like Fraga who sought the reform of the institutions into a British-inspired bicameral system with a corporative upper chamber without legalising the PCE or the nationalists and lastly, the defenders of a deep reform, like Areilza, who sought the constitution of a true democracy, legalising all parties.
This was not the only project undertaken at the time to push forward a very timid political liberalisation, it also included a less restrictive – but very restrictive nonetheless – law on public meetings and the right to meet in public and the Law of Political Associations, defended by Suárez before the Cortes and the corresponding change in the Penal Code, which would be defeated on June 9th due to/with the excuse of the news of ETA’s murder of Luis Carlos Albo, the chief of the Movimiento in Basauri, Biscay.
Adolfo who?
But the most important part of these reforms was not so much their scope, given their limitations, the fact that they were being negotiated with Francoist hardliners instead of a democratic opposition says much about that. What mattered was who sold them to the Cortes. That person was Adolfo Suárez, a little-known politician from Ávila, (little) known for having been the political protégé of Fernando Herrero Tejedor [19] and for having built a political career without stepping on anyone or making enemies. Suárez delivered the speech on June 9th that motivated the Francoist Cortes to pass the Political Associations Law.
But before coming to describe Suárez’s important role in the approval of this important reformist piece of legislation, it’s best to go back to 1975 to understand Suárez’s strange rise to the presidency in 1976.
In 1975, Suárez’s political career appeared to be dead when on June 12th 1975, his mentor, Herrero Tejedor died in a car crush after only 100 days in his post. Suárez was his right-hand, the deputy minister-secretary of the Movement. Herrero Tejedor was a politician for the future, a direct competitor of Fraga or Arias Navarro, who had already set up the UDPE [20] – the Unión del Pueblo Español, the main political association within the Movimiento Nacional. Herrero Tejedor had already commenced talks with the moderate opposition by then and considered himself as potential replacement for Arias Navarro before his death.
With his death after only 100 days in office, Suárez had had no capacity to create a network of friends or confidants from which to continue his political career nor to make anything noteworthy. As a result, it seemed like his political career might be over, especially as Herrero Tejedor’s successor dismissed him.
But not all was lost, and thanks to the support of both Don Juan and the future King, Suárez manage to be nominated both ‘Politician of the Month’ in June 1975 by the prestigious magazine, Blanco y Negro and become the coordinator of the UDPE.
In 1976, royal support became once again indispensable as it was thanks to it that he became a minister, occupying the portfolio once held by Herrero Tejedor. By then, Suárez had already found a new mentor in Fernández Miranda. In fact, it can largely be said that Suárez was more Fernández Miranda’s candidate than the King, as the latter, despite liking him, was afraid that Suárez was too duplicitous [21], Fernández Miranda instead thought that to be precisely his greatest asset.
The choice of the candidate was however the result of Suárez’s capacity and ability to manage complicated situations, as proven by his handling of the Sucesos de Vitoria and the Montejurra shooting. Both affairs that should have been handled by the Interior Minister, who was however abroad or the Presidency minister – who was in the funeral of his father-in-law for the former – were instead handled by Suárez.
Vitoria is the traditional capital of the Basque Country, and despite being the least Basque of all the Basque cities, it was nonetheless a hotbed of radicalism, like much of Euskadi. Until the summer of 1976, had experienced considerable worker agitation demanding working, regional and political rights in the shape of a strike that had started in Forjas Alavesas for over 50 days only to become a general strike on March 3rd . During the strike, the leaders of it met in the church of Saint Francis of Assisi [22] from where the police demanded them to exit. As the strikers did not obey, the police forced its way in and in the confusion, they opened fire. The result was a massacre: 5 dead and over a hundred wounded, 45 from gun wounds.
Demonstrators carrying the coffins of the dead Vitoria strikers
The first reaction of Arias – of course – was to seek to impose the state of exception, thereby giving the provincial governor a free hand on imposing order by suspending whatever little rights Spaniards had under the Fuero de los Españoles. Suárez managed however to convince him not to in order to deescalate the situation while micromanaging the situation from Madrid to prevent any further outbreaks of violence by preventing a mass funeral for the dead strikers. Suárez’s capacity to handle such a complicated situation without resorting to the typical Francoist approach of “matar moscas a cañonazos” [23]
Montejurra was another example of Suárez’s sangfroid. During the traditional Carlist celebration of the via Crucis in the mount of Montejurra, the differences between the Titoist socialist followers of Carlos-Hugo de Borbón and the far-right partisans of Sixto de Borbón exploded when, with the likely help of the Guardia Civil, the latter shot two men and injured several defenders of Carlos-Hugo’s dynastic claim as they made their way to the peak of the mountain. Once again, both Osorio and Fraga were absent, and Suárez had to pacify the situation.
But perhaps the important question is that why was Suárez chosen over either Areilza or Fraga. Both men were clearly more intellectually prepared than Suárez and had had more brilliant political careers. However, they also had many enemies whereas Suárez had avoided making them. But perhaps more importantly, Torcuato hoped that Suárez, who had no absolute set political beliefs [24] but was charming and seemingly competent would be easier to mould than either Areilza – too much of a public figure and too linked to Don Juan, hence too liberal – or especially Fraga, whose approach to politics was very academically sound and detailed but he had very clear character flaws in his inability to go beyond his mental paradigms and incapacity to compromise.
Primero de Julio
With a clear candidate and following a campaign of pressure on the President from abroad and within his cabinet, the moment to strike was ready. On July 1st, the King meets with Arias Navarro in the Royal Palace for what the President expected to be a routine session. Instead, the monarch thanked him for his services in a very nervous mood, and before he could dismiss him, Arias resigned.
That afternoon, the Consejo del Reino was to meet, and as a result, there was very little time for the opposition to organise, as the Council had seven days to propose 3 candidates to the King. The government is informed at 8 of Arias’ resignation.
Unlike in the past however, neither the King nor Fernández Miranda make it known to the councillors whom they want to be their real candidate. Instead, the 16 members of the Council first seek to make an ‘ideal profile’ of the next President. In the meantime, Fernández Miranda, alongside Miguel Primo de Rivera [25] work to dismantle the creation of a bloc of Falangist councillors.
The method used to select the three candidates was devised by Fernández Miranda so that only the most innocuous of candidates – like Suárez – would pass the successive selection rounds: Firstly, every councillor writes down 3 candidates. There were 32, which became 30 as the representatives of the Army asked for the officers included to be taken out.
Then, 13 candidates were rejected almost unanimously. The rest required to obtain more positive than negative votes, thereby eliminating another 7 candidates [26]. By the end of the morning of July the 3rd, there are only nine candidates left.
In the last round, every councillor must write down 3 names, and the three names with the most votes would be presented to the King. The three candidates are Federico Silva Muñoz (15 votes), Gregorio López Bravo (13) and Adolfo Suárez (12) were the chosen ones. Silva had almost obtained the unanimous support of the 16 members, but Primo de Rivera voted instead of Álvarez Miranda in order to prevent the potential friction between the monarch and the institution had they supported Silva unanimously and the King chosen a different person. But perhaps more importantly to Suárez was the fact that the 7 members appointed by the head of state all voted the same way, including Suárez. They probably knew where the wind was blowing.
By 14:50, the meeting is over and Torcuato Fernandez-Miranda announced the press that he would be able to give the King what he had asked of him.
By 17:00, Adolfo Suárez, nervously at home, afraid of being ‘borboneado’, receives a phone call from Zarzuela.
[1] López de Letona, whose surname gives away the upper class origin, held the Ministry of Industry between 1969 and 1974, under the monocolor government and the Carrero Blanco cabinets. He was one of the key persons behind the creation of the CEOE.
[2] General Manuel Díez-Alegría. Chief of the CESEDEN (military intelligence agency) and later of the Alto Estado Mayor – the coordinating organism linking the three branches of the Armed Forces during the Francoism). He would be dismissed in 1972 after meeting with Santiago Carrillo in Bucharest. Díez Alegría was perceived as a liberal – insofar as a Francoist officer could be, that is to say that he believed the Army should be entirely professional and apolitical.
[3] Makes sense given that he was known as the butcher of Málaga. He probably used cruelty to mask his lack of political weight.
[4] Zarzuela is the private residence of Juan Carlos I and now his son, and a short hand for the Royal House. The official residence is the Royal Palace in Madrid, however no one has resided there since Manuel Azaña was President of the Republic.
[5] Who, at the time, was dying of cancer.
[6] Fernández Miranda has known the King for at least 20 years, as he had been one of his tutors and professors in his youth, particularly of constitutional law.
[7] I don’t think I have anywhere to put this in the actual description. But Fernández Miranda made for a great President of the Cortes (or Speaker if you will), as despite being a Francoist politician himself, he was obviously rather disgusted by the political class. One noteworthy anecdote took place when he asked, ironically, the Count of Godó, not a nobody, whether he was voting or just passing by (¿Ústed vota o transita?) as he was taking his time in getting to the podium to vote.
[8] José Solís Ruíz was known as ‘la sonrisa del Régimen’ (the Regime’s smile), known for always knowing which the winning side of Francoism’ internecine conflicts was. A Falangist, Solís had led the Movimiento Nacional between 1957 after Arrese’s dismissal until 1969.
[9] No family ties with Adolfo Suárez González however.
[10] Term used to refer to the ‘deputies’ of the Francoist legislature. Franco associated the term diputado with the much maligned liberal-democratic tradition and sough a medieval name, so he picked that used to refer to the delegates to the mediaeval Cortes, Spain’s equivalent of the États-generaux.
[11] José María de Areilza, Count of Rodas and jure uxoris Count of Montrico (the preferred term to refer to him when insulting him) was a Basque ambassador and Foreign Minister. Areilza started his career as a member of Falange in 1934 and a volunteer during the Civil War. Areilza would however walk the road of many Fascists towards liberal democratic positions by the 1960s, when he joined Don Juan’s entourage in Estoril, only to betray him and return to the political mainstream in the 1970s in the last Arias Navarro government. He would create the first Partido Popular (not the OTL one that’s in power), one of the seeds of the UCD.
[12] Alfonso Osorio was an important Christian democrat figure, linked to the Ybarras by marriage and to the Grupo Tácito (Christian-democratic reformist intellectuals) who would help Suárez craft his first government before falling out with him. Osorio was considered the King’s man in the last Arias government.
[13] Father of the two Garrigues-Walker, important UCD ministers belonging to the liberal sector of the party.
[14] Pita da Veiga will have a large role during the Suárez premiership due to his reaction to the legalisation of the PCE during the 1977 Holy Week.
[15] A fraguista.
[16] Chapter 1. The 1966 Ley de Prensa.
[17] At least until Juan Carlos’ father either renounced his rights to the Crown or he died.
[18] Formed by the Government and members of the Consejo del Reino in equal amounts.
[19] Fernando Herrero Tejedor was a Falangist linked to the Opus Dei (something rare and both groups were adversaries) and Suárez’s mentor as well as a political heavyweight in the late 1970s. He and Suárez met when the former was the governor of Salamanca and Suárez was a (mediocre) student of Law whom he hired as his personal secretary.
[20] Originally, UPE was used, until the members realised it was acronym used by Miguel Primo de Rivera’s Unión Patriótica Española, the single party of the dictablanda, 1923-1931. The aim of the UDPE was to transition towards a democratic Spain in which however, the UDPE, by consolidating the post-Francoist vote, would have a similar position to that of the PRI in Mexico, aka hegemony.
[21] «¿Tú crees, Torcuato, que un hombre con tanta doblez es nuestro hombre?» «Por eso mismo, Majestad, por eso mismo.»
[22] Churches and other buildings owned by the Church were the only place were groups larger than 10 people could meet legally under the very restrictive Francoist ‘civil rights’ legislation. As a result, churches became the centre of the worker movement’s leadership.
[23] Killing flies with cannon volleys. I’d say it’s a pretty self-explanatory idiom.
[24] In 1976, Suárez recriminated Fraga for making a too liberal draft of the law of associations, as it would permit their creation outside of the framework of the Movimiento Nacional because it could open the door to the future legalisation of the PCE. In 1977, against the political advice of Torcuato, the King and several ministers, Suárez legalised the PCE.
[25] Nephew of the founder of Falange and a well-known aperturista, but linked by blood to the important Oriol family, two of whom sat in the Council. He convinced them to include a “young man” in the final proposal of 3 candidates.
[26] Fraga (11 against, 5 for), Areilza (idem), Licinio de la Fuente (12 vs. 4), Alfonso Osorio (13 vs. 3), Castiella (14 vs. 2), Fernándo Suárez (idem) and Martínez Esteruelas (10 vs. 6).
With Franco’s death, the future of Spain was open wide. This was not lost on anyone: The opposition become more organised and mobilised, the bunker sought to maintain the regime and the reformists within and around the regime sough to transform it – largely by replacing Arias Navarro with a more adequate successor. Indeed, Arias Navarro had proved himself to be neither what the hardliner that the bunker and El Pardo hoped for nor the reformist that the press had seen in him on February 12th, 1974. Instead, he had proven himself as a man lost in the contradictions between his brutality and his poor approach to politics reigning over several cabinets that were deeply divided between the reformists and the hardliners, both before and after Franco’s death. His real failure would not become apparent, however until early 1976.
That being said, as early as 1975, Juan Carlos had tried to get rid of Arias Navarro right before the death of Franco, but after he was too sick to realise anything. The attempt, known as ‘Operación Lolita’ had been devised by the palatine entourage in Zarzuela, and sought to replace Arias with the young technocrat José María López de Letona [1]. However, Arias refused to give in, arguing that Franco has chosen him for a period of five years, and threatened to resign in the difficult situation of the Caudillo’s twilight while revealing the ‘scandalous’ travels of the General Díez Alegría [2] to Estoril to meet with Juan Carlos’ father, the Count of Barcelona.
Facing such political danger, the King-to-be backtracked and was forced to allow Arias to continue. But Arias, who had a cruel streak [3], took note of the King’s opinion toward him. That changed very little Arias’ opinion of Juan Carlos, which can be described, if one is being nice, as very low. So much in fact that after Franco’s death, Arias failed to symbolically resign, as was the political convention since the Restauración. In exchange, on December 6th, Zarzuela [4] sent a communiqué to the press informing that the King “confirmed Arias in his post”, which is to say that he did not confirm his ministers. This forced the ministers to resign. The new governments would be his undoing.
Three days before that communiqué however, what is perhaps the most event piece of the Transition took place. The President of the Cortes, Rodríguez de Valcárcel [5] term ended on November 25th and as a result, a replacement had to be selected. The Consejo del Reino had to name three candidates from which the King picked. This was largely a formality under Franco, as usually to fill in positions, the counsellors put in the name of Franco’s designation and another two important figures.
In this case, it was pretty much the same. The King has told Arias Navarro that he desired Torcuato Fernández Miranda [6] to be the President of the Cortes and the Consejo del Reino. Arias Navarro, who thought the old professor one of his few real political adversaries, was more than happy to place him there, as the Cortes were compliant to the Government’s will – or could be made to be compliant.
As a result, on the 3rd of December, the Consejo del Reino drafted a list with three names: Torcuato Fernández Miranda, Licinio de la Fuente and Emilio Lamo de Espinosa. Torcuato was chosen President, obviously. [7]
Torcuato became the main ally of the King in the slow process of bringing down Arias, and bringing in democracy. The first evidence is his role in crafting the first government of the monarchy with Arias.
The usefulness and role played by Fernández Miranda in order to put forward the King’s agenda was evident in the composition of the first government of the monarchy. Arias originally expected to be ‘borboneado’ and forced to fight against the King’s attempt to impose his ministers upon him. Nothing farther from the truth. In fact, the Prime Minister was surprised when Fernández Miranda agreed to all of Arias’ proposals with one exception. Fernández Miranda suggested that Adolfo Suárez should be given the post of minister-secretary of the Movement. Arias refused, alleging that the incumbent, José Solís [8] had been appointed by Franco personally and he could not, in good faith, remove him. Instead, a compromise was reached whereby Suárez would take over Solís’ portfolio while Solís would be named Minister of Labour, replacing the reformist Fernando Suárez González [9], who would be designated procurador [10].
The new Arias Navarro thus consisted of what Gregorio Morán classified into four groups: Arias’ rivals, the lightweights, the ‘institution-men’ and the ‘nobodies’.
From left to right: Carlos Arias Navarro (PM), Manuel Fraga, Jose Mª de Areilza and Torcuato Fernández-Miranda
The two main rivals and heavyweights in the cabinet were Manuel Fraga (Interior) and Jose María de Areilza (Foreign Affairs) [11].
The lightweights:
- Alfonso Osorio (Presidency) [12]
- Juan Miguel Villar Mir (Finances)
- Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo (Commerce)
- Virgilio Oñate (Agriculture)
- Rodolfo Martín Villa (Trade Unions)
- Francisco Lozano (Housing)
- Antonio Valdés (Public Works)
- Adolfo Suárez (Secretary of the National Movement)
The ‘institution-men’, who either represented the most important Francoist institution, the Armed Forces, or had such a long political career that they were political dinosaurs, too big to be ignored but too old to be actual rivals to the President.
- Antonio Garrigues Díez-Cañabete (Justice) [13]
- José Solís (Labour)
- Lieutenant-General Fernando de Santiago (Deputy Prime Minister for Military Affairs)
- Lieutenant-General Félix Álvarez-Arenas (Army)
- Admiral Gabriel Pita da Veiga (Navy) [14]
- Lieutenant-General Carlos Franco Iribarnegaray (Air Force).
And lastly, the political nobodies:
- Carlos Robles Piquer (Education) [15]
- Adolfo Martín Gomero (Information and Tourism)
- Carlos Pérez de Bricio (Industry)
Both in terms of age – a large degree of ministers belonged to the last generation of Francoist politicians – and of political leanings – the majority were reformists – the cabinet belonged more to the King than Arias, whom after all was in the minority in his government. In fact, he was largely overshadowed by the Areilza, as the reformist media’s darling and Fraga, known for his reformist pedigree and considerable intellect [16]. Indeed, soon the government would be adrift as Arias sought to at least make it until the end of 1976, if not his five year term (1973-1977).
In that, the President was very wrong. Ever since the King had failed to depose Arias following Franco’s terminal illness in October and November 1975, both the monarch and Torcuato Fernández Miranda had commenced an operation to increase the pressure on the Prime Ministers as well as neutralising him until he was weakened enough that he could be dismissed by the King, as it would eventually happened. This operation took place between late 1975 and the summer of 1976, and can be summed up in four main parts:
The búnker, the Francoist hardliners, had to be neutralised so that they could not use their considerable institutional influence to stop any liberalising moves, like they had done in the period between 1973 and 1975. Obviously Franco was dead so that was one less obstacle. The main one way to obtain this neutralisation was through the change in the operation of the Consejo del Reino under Fernández Miranda. By meeting every 15 days as opposed to only when called to meet, in order to get a new Prime Minister all it had to happen was to time it with the meetings of the Council and don’t allow any time for the hardliners to organise and lobby. Secondly, Torcuato in his role as Speaker of the Francoist Cortes would introduce a new legislative mechanism, the ‘procedimiento de urgencia’, whereby any law the Government presented through this procedure would bypass the commissions – controlled by the hardliners – and of straight to the plenary for a single reading. The plenary was thought to contain a reformist majority, and if not, it could be changed so that it would.
Secondly, the King sought to become a closer figure to the Spanish people, thereby seeking to extricate himself from Franco and his Prime Minister and gaining the legitimacy only public opinion could provide him, as after all, the King lacked the dynastic legitimacy [17]. By bypassing the security detail imposed by the Prime Minister and winking at a democratic future by talking about a constitutional monarchy in Asturias or dabbling in Catalan in Barcelona, the King increased pressure on Arias Navarro. The King would also meet in public with the main figures of the more moderate opposition, like the Christian-democrat Gil Robles or Álvarez de Miranda. Clandestinely however, the King would establish links with the Communist and Socialists through Nicolas Franco, the Caudillo’s nephew.
Lastly, the King would increase the pressure from abroad. As Franco himself once remarked, one had to say things abroad for the foreign press that differed from those that were said inside Spain. But he certainly never intended for that principle to be used to attack the political system, as the King did. On April 1976, Newsweek published an interview with the King where he deemed Arias an “unmitigated disaster”.
In response to the interview, Arias Navarro would jump ahead and announce the nation on television that the plans for political reform were well advanced and he would soon present them to the people. This was false.
In fact and despite the fact that Suárez had proposed an 18-member Mixed Commission [18] for Political Reform, little had been accomplished. Especially due to the Prime Minister himself, who had made it very clear that the only constitutional innovations that he would tolerate were those that did not compromise its Francoist character, that is to say, that he would allow little to nothing.
On top of that, the Commission was deeply divided between opponents of any reform (military ministers, Girón and others), the limited reformists, like Fraga who sought the reform of the institutions into a British-inspired bicameral system with a corporative upper chamber without legalising the PCE or the nationalists and lastly, the defenders of a deep reform, like Areilza, who sought the constitution of a true democracy, legalising all parties.
This was not the only project undertaken at the time to push forward a very timid political liberalisation, it also included a less restrictive – but very restrictive nonetheless – law on public meetings and the right to meet in public and the Law of Political Associations, defended by Suárez before the Cortes and the corresponding change in the Penal Code, which would be defeated on June 9th due to/with the excuse of the news of ETA’s murder of Luis Carlos Albo, the chief of the Movimiento in Basauri, Biscay.
Adolfo who?
But the most important part of these reforms was not so much their scope, given their limitations, the fact that they were being negotiated with Francoist hardliners instead of a democratic opposition says much about that. What mattered was who sold them to the Cortes. That person was Adolfo Suárez, a little-known politician from Ávila, (little) known for having been the political protégé of Fernando Herrero Tejedor [19] and for having built a political career without stepping on anyone or making enemies. Suárez delivered the speech on June 9th that motivated the Francoist Cortes to pass the Political Associations Law.
But before coming to describe Suárez’s important role in the approval of this important reformist piece of legislation, it’s best to go back to 1975 to understand Suárez’s strange rise to the presidency in 1976.
In 1975, Suárez’s political career appeared to be dead when on June 12th 1975, his mentor, Herrero Tejedor died in a car crush after only 100 days in his post. Suárez was his right-hand, the deputy minister-secretary of the Movement. Herrero Tejedor was a politician for the future, a direct competitor of Fraga or Arias Navarro, who had already set up the UDPE [20] – the Unión del Pueblo Español, the main political association within the Movimiento Nacional. Herrero Tejedor had already commenced talks with the moderate opposition by then and considered himself as potential replacement for Arias Navarro before his death.
With his death after only 100 days in office, Suárez had had no capacity to create a network of friends or confidants from which to continue his political career nor to make anything noteworthy. As a result, it seemed like his political career might be over, especially as Herrero Tejedor’s successor dismissed him.
But not all was lost, and thanks to the support of both Don Juan and the future King, Suárez manage to be nominated both ‘Politician of the Month’ in June 1975 by the prestigious magazine, Blanco y Negro and become the coordinator of the UDPE.
In 1976, royal support became once again indispensable as it was thanks to it that he became a minister, occupying the portfolio once held by Herrero Tejedor. By then, Suárez had already found a new mentor in Fernández Miranda. In fact, it can largely be said that Suárez was more Fernández Miranda’s candidate than the King, as the latter, despite liking him, was afraid that Suárez was too duplicitous [21], Fernández Miranda instead thought that to be precisely his greatest asset.
The choice of the candidate was however the result of Suárez’s capacity and ability to manage complicated situations, as proven by his handling of the Sucesos de Vitoria and the Montejurra shooting. Both affairs that should have been handled by the Interior Minister, who was however abroad or the Presidency minister – who was in the funeral of his father-in-law for the former – were instead handled by Suárez.
Vitoria is the traditional capital of the Basque Country, and despite being the least Basque of all the Basque cities, it was nonetheless a hotbed of radicalism, like much of Euskadi. Until the summer of 1976, had experienced considerable worker agitation demanding working, regional and political rights in the shape of a strike that had started in Forjas Alavesas for over 50 days only to become a general strike on March 3rd . During the strike, the leaders of it met in the church of Saint Francis of Assisi [22] from where the police demanded them to exit. As the strikers did not obey, the police forced its way in and in the confusion, they opened fire. The result was a massacre: 5 dead and over a hundred wounded, 45 from gun wounds.
Demonstrators carrying the coffins of the dead Vitoria strikers
The first reaction of Arias – of course – was to seek to impose the state of exception, thereby giving the provincial governor a free hand on imposing order by suspending whatever little rights Spaniards had under the Fuero de los Españoles. Suárez managed however to convince him not to in order to deescalate the situation while micromanaging the situation from Madrid to prevent any further outbreaks of violence by preventing a mass funeral for the dead strikers. Suárez’s capacity to handle such a complicated situation without resorting to the typical Francoist approach of “matar moscas a cañonazos” [23]
Montejurra was another example of Suárez’s sangfroid. During the traditional Carlist celebration of the via Crucis in the mount of Montejurra, the differences between the Titoist socialist followers of Carlos-Hugo de Borbón and the far-right partisans of Sixto de Borbón exploded when, with the likely help of the Guardia Civil, the latter shot two men and injured several defenders of Carlos-Hugo’s dynastic claim as they made their way to the peak of the mountain. Once again, both Osorio and Fraga were absent, and Suárez had to pacify the situation.
But perhaps the important question is that why was Suárez chosen over either Areilza or Fraga. Both men were clearly more intellectually prepared than Suárez and had had more brilliant political careers. However, they also had many enemies whereas Suárez had avoided making them. But perhaps more importantly, Torcuato hoped that Suárez, who had no absolute set political beliefs [24] but was charming and seemingly competent would be easier to mould than either Areilza – too much of a public figure and too linked to Don Juan, hence too liberal – or especially Fraga, whose approach to politics was very academically sound and detailed but he had very clear character flaws in his inability to go beyond his mental paradigms and incapacity to compromise.
Primero de Julio
With a clear candidate and following a campaign of pressure on the President from abroad and within his cabinet, the moment to strike was ready. On July 1st, the King meets with Arias Navarro in the Royal Palace for what the President expected to be a routine session. Instead, the monarch thanked him for his services in a very nervous mood, and before he could dismiss him, Arias resigned.
That afternoon, the Consejo del Reino was to meet, and as a result, there was very little time for the opposition to organise, as the Council had seven days to propose 3 candidates to the King. The government is informed at 8 of Arias’ resignation.
Unlike in the past however, neither the King nor Fernández Miranda make it known to the councillors whom they want to be their real candidate. Instead, the 16 members of the Council first seek to make an ‘ideal profile’ of the next President. In the meantime, Fernández Miranda, alongside Miguel Primo de Rivera [25] work to dismantle the creation of a bloc of Falangist councillors.
The method used to select the three candidates was devised by Fernández Miranda so that only the most innocuous of candidates – like Suárez – would pass the successive selection rounds: Firstly, every councillor writes down 3 candidates. There were 32, which became 30 as the representatives of the Army asked for the officers included to be taken out.
Then, 13 candidates were rejected almost unanimously. The rest required to obtain more positive than negative votes, thereby eliminating another 7 candidates [26]. By the end of the morning of July the 3rd, there are only nine candidates left.
In the last round, every councillor must write down 3 names, and the three names with the most votes would be presented to the King. The three candidates are Federico Silva Muñoz (15 votes), Gregorio López Bravo (13) and Adolfo Suárez (12) were the chosen ones. Silva had almost obtained the unanimous support of the 16 members, but Primo de Rivera voted instead of Álvarez Miranda in order to prevent the potential friction between the monarch and the institution had they supported Silva unanimously and the King chosen a different person. But perhaps more importantly to Suárez was the fact that the 7 members appointed by the head of state all voted the same way, including Suárez. They probably knew where the wind was blowing.
By 14:50, the meeting is over and Torcuato Fernandez-Miranda announced the press that he would be able to give the King what he had asked of him.
By 17:00, Adolfo Suárez, nervously at home, afraid of being ‘borboneado’, receives a phone call from Zarzuela.
***
[1] López de Letona, whose surname gives away the upper class origin, held the Ministry of Industry between 1969 and 1974, under the monocolor government and the Carrero Blanco cabinets. He was one of the key persons behind the creation of the CEOE.
[2] General Manuel Díez-Alegría. Chief of the CESEDEN (military intelligence agency) and later of the Alto Estado Mayor – the coordinating organism linking the three branches of the Armed Forces during the Francoism). He would be dismissed in 1972 after meeting with Santiago Carrillo in Bucharest. Díez Alegría was perceived as a liberal – insofar as a Francoist officer could be, that is to say that he believed the Army should be entirely professional and apolitical.
[3] Makes sense given that he was known as the butcher of Málaga. He probably used cruelty to mask his lack of political weight.
[4] Zarzuela is the private residence of Juan Carlos I and now his son, and a short hand for the Royal House. The official residence is the Royal Palace in Madrid, however no one has resided there since Manuel Azaña was President of the Republic.
[5] Who, at the time, was dying of cancer.
[6] Fernández Miranda has known the King for at least 20 years, as he had been one of his tutors and professors in his youth, particularly of constitutional law.
[7] I don’t think I have anywhere to put this in the actual description. But Fernández Miranda made for a great President of the Cortes (or Speaker if you will), as despite being a Francoist politician himself, he was obviously rather disgusted by the political class. One noteworthy anecdote took place when he asked, ironically, the Count of Godó, not a nobody, whether he was voting or just passing by (¿Ústed vota o transita?) as he was taking his time in getting to the podium to vote.
[8] José Solís Ruíz was known as ‘la sonrisa del Régimen’ (the Regime’s smile), known for always knowing which the winning side of Francoism’ internecine conflicts was. A Falangist, Solís had led the Movimiento Nacional between 1957 after Arrese’s dismissal until 1969.
[9] No family ties with Adolfo Suárez González however.
[10] Term used to refer to the ‘deputies’ of the Francoist legislature. Franco associated the term diputado with the much maligned liberal-democratic tradition and sough a medieval name, so he picked that used to refer to the delegates to the mediaeval Cortes, Spain’s equivalent of the États-generaux.
[11] José María de Areilza, Count of Rodas and jure uxoris Count of Montrico (the preferred term to refer to him when insulting him) was a Basque ambassador and Foreign Minister. Areilza started his career as a member of Falange in 1934 and a volunteer during the Civil War. Areilza would however walk the road of many Fascists towards liberal democratic positions by the 1960s, when he joined Don Juan’s entourage in Estoril, only to betray him and return to the political mainstream in the 1970s in the last Arias Navarro government. He would create the first Partido Popular (not the OTL one that’s in power), one of the seeds of the UCD.
[12] Alfonso Osorio was an important Christian democrat figure, linked to the Ybarras by marriage and to the Grupo Tácito (Christian-democratic reformist intellectuals) who would help Suárez craft his first government before falling out with him. Osorio was considered the King’s man in the last Arias government.
[13] Father of the two Garrigues-Walker, important UCD ministers belonging to the liberal sector of the party.
[14] Pita da Veiga will have a large role during the Suárez premiership due to his reaction to the legalisation of the PCE during the 1977 Holy Week.
[15] A fraguista.
[16] Chapter 1. The 1966 Ley de Prensa.
[17] At least until Juan Carlos’ father either renounced his rights to the Crown or he died.
[18] Formed by the Government and members of the Consejo del Reino in equal amounts.
[19] Fernando Herrero Tejedor was a Falangist linked to the Opus Dei (something rare and both groups were adversaries) and Suárez’s mentor as well as a political heavyweight in the late 1970s. He and Suárez met when the former was the governor of Salamanca and Suárez was a (mediocre) student of Law whom he hired as his personal secretary.
[20] Originally, UPE was used, until the members realised it was acronym used by Miguel Primo de Rivera’s Unión Patriótica Española, the single party of the dictablanda, 1923-1931. The aim of the UDPE was to transition towards a democratic Spain in which however, the UDPE, by consolidating the post-Francoist vote, would have a similar position to that of the PRI in Mexico, aka hegemony.
[21] «¿Tú crees, Torcuato, que un hombre con tanta doblez es nuestro hombre?» «Por eso mismo, Majestad, por eso mismo.»
[22] Churches and other buildings owned by the Church were the only place were groups larger than 10 people could meet legally under the very restrictive Francoist ‘civil rights’ legislation. As a result, churches became the centre of the worker movement’s leadership.
[23] Killing flies with cannon volleys. I’d say it’s a pretty self-explanatory idiom.
[24] In 1976, Suárez recriminated Fraga for making a too liberal draft of the law of associations, as it would permit their creation outside of the framework of the Movimiento Nacional because it could open the door to the future legalisation of the PCE. In 1977, against the political advice of Torcuato, the King and several ministers, Suárez legalised the PCE.
[25] Nephew of the founder of Falange and a well-known aperturista, but linked by blood to the important Oriol family, two of whom sat in the Council. He convinced them to include a “young man” in the final proposal of 3 candidates.
[26] Fraga (11 against, 5 for), Areilza (idem), Licinio de la Fuente (12 vs. 4), Alfonso Osorio (13 vs. 3), Castiella (14 vs. 2), Fernándo Suárez (idem) and Martínez Esteruelas (10 vs. 6).
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I want to post a second world-building update during the weekend (I find those cooler to write than describing OTL history). I can talk more about the factions and frictions of the UCD or do a profile of the centre-periphery axis in Spain, perhaps by focusing on Valencia or Galicia, partly to show the divergences from OTL and partly because there are too damn many gallegos in this forum.
So it seems that Arias Navarro is going to be a nuisance until someone gets him out of the way...
The military ministers are there, so one can guess that "funny" times are on the schedule for the replacement of Arias...
Well, Suárez has managed to go up in the greasy poole. Let's see what he does next...
The military ministers are there, so one can guess that "funny" times are on the schedule for the replacement of Arias...
Well, Suárez has managed to go up in the greasy poole. Let's see what he does next...
Its all OTL actually, next update will contain the first divergences. Thats why im also writing the world building snippets, to make up for that. Next week Ill deal with the opposition. Truth be told, most of the historical patterns will remain similar from the govt. perspective until the Constituent Assembly is formed. The opposition, however ... There will be no platajunta for instance.
To your previous point about Gallardon, researching about AP, I discovered that back in 1981 he was already one of the leading opponents to a coalition with the UCD. Also and that they were called aliancistas instead of populares. So I think he would retain his position in AP and the UCD wouldn't probably have him.
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It's a great update. I hope you write very soon about the situation of the opposition. And one question: the Christian Democrat attempt lead by Joaquin Ruiz Gimenez -former Minister of Education in the 1950s and one of the major benchmarks of Spanish democratization- and Jose Maria Gil Robles -the historical leader of the CEDA, the main right-wing party during the Second Republic- will be integrated into the UCD before the first elections?
One thing to keep in mind: before joining the last Francoist government with an alive Franco as the minister-secretary general of the National Movement, Fernando Herrero Tejedor was the prosecutor of the Supreme Court to investigate the assassination of President Luis Carrero Blanco. A few months after the assassination, he wrote a secret report only to Franco's eyes, which seemed to gather reliable information on the participation of other organizations in the murder by ETA -it was hinted in his speech published in the Spanish press during the inauguration of the judicial year-. His death in a strange car accident was questioned by Adolfo Suarez himself, according to the son of the deceased (later a known journalist, Luis Herrero) by the writing in one of his books, as Suarez assured him that his father had been murdered.
One thing to keep in mind: before joining the last Francoist government with an alive Franco as the minister-secretary general of the National Movement, Fernando Herrero Tejedor was the prosecutor of the Supreme Court to investigate the assassination of President Luis Carrero Blanco. A few months after the assassination, he wrote a secret report only to Franco's eyes, which seemed to gather reliable information on the participation of other organizations in the murder by ETA -it was hinted in his speech published in the Spanish press during the inauguration of the judicial year-. His death in a strange car accident was questioned by Adolfo Suarez himself, according to the son of the deceased (later a known journalist, Luis Herrero) by the writing in one of his books, as Suarez assured him that his father had been murdered.
I'm not sure. Suárez did want to include them because he thought it'd be useful, and unlike Areilza, Ruíz Gímenez was too honourable to try and depose him or cast a shadown on him and Gil Robles was too much a political dinosaur. I haven't really found any clear reasons as to why they couldn't reach an agreement.
Indeed. I should probably include it in his mini-description, because apparently the reason for getting the ministerial post was precisely that report. Franco was quite impressed by it.
Gregorio Morán does hint at that, because Herrero was the only minister to ever die in a car accident. But to be honest, any car accident is strange and largely fortuitous, so I personally doubt he was assassinated. The Francoist political class did not murder each other - spy each other and hate each other for sure, but not kill them (besides politically I mean). The opposition had no incentive and I can't think of any motive or interested party.
If I remember correctly, who said that phrase about he would be able to give the King what he had asked of him was Torcuato Fernández-Miranda, not Fernando Álvarez de Miranda.
PS: If you are looking for a good website on the Spanish historical election results, I recommend you Historia Electoral -it also includes simulations of election results with other electoral laws-.
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Centre-periphery cleavage in Spanish politics: Café para todos
Modern-day Spain cannot be understood without the double dimension of its political system. Spanish parties are not only divided on the basis of socio-economic management (left-right), but also, on the basis of the so-called territorial question, that is on the organisation of the State. This debate obviously originated during the early 20th century, following the national conscience crisis that resulted from the defeat in the Spanish-American War of 1898.
However, with the exception of the PNV-EAJ and partially that of ERC [1], the modern-day political entities and cleavage is the by-product of the 1950s and 1960s intellectual rebirth of nationalism and regionalism and its legitimisation by its opposition to Francoism, combined with the appearance of pseudo-regionalists movements within the Francoist Regime during the tardofranquismo, although these movements usually became the more autonomist wings of the UCD.
The juxtaposition of both the socio-economic and the territorial cleavage in Spain has resulted, depending on the territory, on various different situations at the autonomic level. Although generally there are three main situations: 1) The two cleavages are combined along the left-right axis. As a result, the Spanish centre and right are more centralist whereas the left is more favourable to devolution or outright auto-determination. This is the case of the national political landscape, as well as in the non-historical communities and Galicia; 2) The cleavages criss-cross resulting in the division of both the nationalist and the Spanish parties into two blocs, left-right, resulting in a multi-party system with both nationalist and Spanish left and right. This is the case of Catalonia, and lastly; 3) an alternative political cleavage where the Spanish parties have a much reduced role and this is instead supplanted by a double cleavage between autonomist right and left and radical nationalist left, as is the case in the Basque Country [2].
Red: Regions without regionalist/nationalist party presence. Orange: Minor (<15%) regionalist presence. Light orange: Considerable regionalist/nationalist presence
Beyond that, the Spanish political landscape at the autonomic level is also marked by the existence of a series of smaller regional parties that usually fail to obtain representation in the Spanish parliament. These are the Navarrese UPN, the Valencian URV and the Galician moderate nationalists of the PG on the centre and the right. On the left, there are equally several minor regionalist parties, such as the PSG in Galicia, Cantabria’s PRC and the Canarian nationalists linked to the UPC. Furthermore, some of the various members of the national socialist federation, the FPS contain autonomist forces such as the PSPV, the Balearic federation, the Catalan CSC or EIA in the Basque Country [3]
The role played by these nationalist forces in the political evolution of Spain is best exemplified by their support to the main Spanish forces, whether the UCD or, after the 1990s the PDI, in exchange of concessions in terms of further autonomy or funding for their autonomous regions. This role as supporters of the government is best exemplified by the role played by the moderate Catalan nationalists of the PDC, who even participated as ministers in the late 1980s in UCD governments. This can be considered part of the historical tradition of conservative Catalan nationalism in line with the participation of the Lliga in the Spanish governments of the early 20th century.
A similar role, albeit more limited, has been exercised by the PNV, which has supported UCD and PDI budgets and governments in confidence motions, although it has never taken part of any governments, unlike its Catalan counterpart.
Catalonia
As previously mentioned, Catalonia stands out from the rest of Spain as while the Spanish parties’ regional branches, Centristes de Catalunya, CSC [4] and the PSUC play an important role – unlike in Euskadi – in the regional parliament, they are but a part of a more complicated political landscape, as within the right as well as the left, there are also Catalan nationalists on both the left (ERC) and right (PDC and UDC). Given the fragmentation of the political system, multi-party governments are commonplace, although the basis for their formation varies depending on whether socio-economic or cultural factors play a larger role at the time of a given election. If it is former, then the more commonplace coalition is between the centrists and the Catalan nationalists of the centre-right, the centrist PDC and the conservative UDC, or on the left between the autonomist socialists of the CSC and the PSUC.
Hypothetically, if or when cultural polarisation increases, such as in the matter of certain laws, then a coalition between Catalan nationalists – ERC, PDC, UDC and potentially CSC – forms against the ‘Spanish’ parties: Centristes, PSUC, PSOE-C and Solidaritat Catalana [5]. Nevertheless, this configuration has never determined the formation of a government, as the amount of ideological differences amongst the parties would make the creation of such government highly unlikely or only the result of a deep fracture in Catalan politics and society.
Euskadi
If Catalonia reflects the co-existence of both the national and regional parties divided both by cultural self-identification and socio-economic issues, Euskadi instead represents a considerably more extreme case, as here the national issue, due to the presence of the terrorist group ETA has resulted in the subordination of the Spanish parties to the regional ones also along the socio-economic axis. As a result, AP and the PCE/PDI are practically non-existent and UCD has a limited presence, largely reduced to Álava. The situation of the socialist parties is a bit more complex. The PSOE has a degree of support superior to the national average thanks to its social base amongst the maketos [6], the Spanish-speaking industrial working class living on the east side of the estuary of Bilbao.
Instead, the political landscape of Euskadi is instead dominated by the centre-right Basque Nationalist Party (PNV-EAJ), the radical left-wing Herri Batasuna, a coalition supported by ETA, and EIA [7], an autonomist, centre-left nationalist party formed from the remnants of ETApm as well as the Basquists from the PCE-EPK , followings its implosion by 1980. EIA is a part of the socialist coalition FPS in Madrid, however.
The role of the PNV and to a lesser degree of EIA, as legitimising actors for the Spanish constitutional order and delegitimising actors with regards to the political violence in the Basque Country has meant that both parties are treated by the Spanish government as privileged actors. As a result, the PNV is largely hegemonic, thanks to the support it has received in the past from either EIA, the PSOE or even UCD at times, given the nature of the radical abertzales as the second largest party in Euskadi.
[1] The original 1930s ERC was the result of the merger of non-nationalist left-liberal elements that were not actively anti-Catalanist like Lerroux’s PRR and of left-wing Catalan nationalists, which by merging became a centre-left soft-nationalist party. The OTL and TTL party is one that tried to run under that platform in 1977 and 1979 and failed miserably and became a secessionist centre-left party, hence essentially only maintaining the name, not the ideological continuity.
[2] On the autonomist centre-left, you have EIA, which absorbed the Communist section of the PCE in the Basque Country and is linked to the FPS. On the autonomist right, the PNV. As for the radical left, the ETAm-linked groups emerging from KAS, chiefly Batasuna.
[3] All part of the FPS, a centre-left coalition formed around Tierno Galván’s PS.
[4] Convergència Socialista de Catalunya. A part of FPS in Madrid.
[5] The aliancista brand in Catalonia.
[6] Term used to refer to the Spanish-speaking immigrants that arrived to the Basque Country – and Biscay specifically – from other parts of the country to work on the steel or ship industries starting in the late 19th century.
[7] Euskal Iraultzarako Alderdia (Partido para la Revolución Vasca). Party for the Basque Revolution.
Modern-day Spain cannot be understood without the double dimension of its political system. Spanish parties are not only divided on the basis of socio-economic management (left-right), but also, on the basis of the so-called territorial question, that is on the organisation of the State. This debate obviously originated during the early 20th century, following the national conscience crisis that resulted from the defeat in the Spanish-American War of 1898.
However, with the exception of the PNV-EAJ and partially that of ERC [1], the modern-day political entities and cleavage is the by-product of the 1950s and 1960s intellectual rebirth of nationalism and regionalism and its legitimisation by its opposition to Francoism, combined with the appearance of pseudo-regionalists movements within the Francoist Regime during the tardofranquismo, although these movements usually became the more autonomist wings of the UCD.
The juxtaposition of both the socio-economic and the territorial cleavage in Spain has resulted, depending on the territory, on various different situations at the autonomic level. Although generally there are three main situations: 1) The two cleavages are combined along the left-right axis. As a result, the Spanish centre and right are more centralist whereas the left is more favourable to devolution or outright auto-determination. This is the case of the national political landscape, as well as in the non-historical communities and Galicia; 2) The cleavages criss-cross resulting in the division of both the nationalist and the Spanish parties into two blocs, left-right, resulting in a multi-party system with both nationalist and Spanish left and right. This is the case of Catalonia, and lastly; 3) an alternative political cleavage where the Spanish parties have a much reduced role and this is instead supplanted by a double cleavage between autonomist right and left and radical nationalist left, as is the case in the Basque Country [2].
Red: Regions without regionalist/nationalist party presence. Orange: Minor (<15%) regionalist presence. Light orange: Considerable regionalist/nationalist presence
Beyond that, the Spanish political landscape at the autonomic level is also marked by the existence of a series of smaller regional parties that usually fail to obtain representation in the Spanish parliament. These are the Navarrese UPN, the Valencian URV and the Galician moderate nationalists of the PG on the centre and the right. On the left, there are equally several minor regionalist parties, such as the PSG in Galicia, Cantabria’s PRC and the Canarian nationalists linked to the UPC. Furthermore, some of the various members of the national socialist federation, the FPS contain autonomist forces such as the PSPV, the Balearic federation, the Catalan CSC or EIA in the Basque Country [3]
The role played by these nationalist forces in the political evolution of Spain is best exemplified by their support to the main Spanish forces, whether the UCD or, after the 1990s the PDI, in exchange of concessions in terms of further autonomy or funding for their autonomous regions. This role as supporters of the government is best exemplified by the role played by the moderate Catalan nationalists of the PDC, who even participated as ministers in the late 1980s in UCD governments. This can be considered part of the historical tradition of conservative Catalan nationalism in line with the participation of the Lliga in the Spanish governments of the early 20th century.
A similar role, albeit more limited, has been exercised by the PNV, which has supported UCD and PDI budgets and governments in confidence motions, although it has never taken part of any governments, unlike its Catalan counterpart.
Catalonia
As previously mentioned, Catalonia stands out from the rest of Spain as while the Spanish parties’ regional branches, Centristes de Catalunya, CSC [4] and the PSUC play an important role – unlike in Euskadi – in the regional parliament, they are but a part of a more complicated political landscape, as within the right as well as the left, there are also Catalan nationalists on both the left (ERC) and right (PDC and UDC). Given the fragmentation of the political system, multi-party governments are commonplace, although the basis for their formation varies depending on whether socio-economic or cultural factors play a larger role at the time of a given election. If it is former, then the more commonplace coalition is between the centrists and the Catalan nationalists of the centre-right, the centrist PDC and the conservative UDC, or on the left between the autonomist socialists of the CSC and the PSUC.
Hypothetically, if or when cultural polarisation increases, such as in the matter of certain laws, then a coalition between Catalan nationalists – ERC, PDC, UDC and potentially CSC – forms against the ‘Spanish’ parties: Centristes, PSUC, PSOE-C and Solidaritat Catalana [5]. Nevertheless, this configuration has never determined the formation of a government, as the amount of ideological differences amongst the parties would make the creation of such government highly unlikely or only the result of a deep fracture in Catalan politics and society.
Euskadi
If Catalonia reflects the co-existence of both the national and regional parties divided both by cultural self-identification and socio-economic issues, Euskadi instead represents a considerably more extreme case, as here the national issue, due to the presence of the terrorist group ETA has resulted in the subordination of the Spanish parties to the regional ones also along the socio-economic axis. As a result, AP and the PCE/PDI are practically non-existent and UCD has a limited presence, largely reduced to Álava. The situation of the socialist parties is a bit more complex. The PSOE has a degree of support superior to the national average thanks to its social base amongst the maketos [6], the Spanish-speaking industrial working class living on the east side of the estuary of Bilbao.
Instead, the political landscape of Euskadi is instead dominated by the centre-right Basque Nationalist Party (PNV-EAJ), the radical left-wing Herri Batasuna, a coalition supported by ETA, and EIA [7], an autonomist, centre-left nationalist party formed from the remnants of ETApm as well as the Basquists from the PCE-EPK , followings its implosion by 1980. EIA is a part of the socialist coalition FPS in Madrid, however.
The role of the PNV and to a lesser degree of EIA, as legitimising actors for the Spanish constitutional order and delegitimising actors with regards to the political violence in the Basque Country has meant that both parties are treated by the Spanish government as privileged actors. As a result, the PNV is largely hegemonic, thanks to the support it has received in the past from either EIA, the PSOE or even UCD at times, given the nature of the radical abertzales as the second largest party in Euskadi.
***
[1] The original 1930s ERC was the result of the merger of non-nationalist left-liberal elements that were not actively anti-Catalanist like Lerroux’s PRR and of left-wing Catalan nationalists, which by merging became a centre-left soft-nationalist party. The OTL and TTL party is one that tried to run under that platform in 1977 and 1979 and failed miserably and became a secessionist centre-left party, hence essentially only maintaining the name, not the ideological continuity.
[2] On the autonomist centre-left, you have EIA, which absorbed the Communist section of the PCE in the Basque Country and is linked to the FPS. On the autonomist right, the PNV. As for the radical left, the ETAm-linked groups emerging from KAS, chiefly Batasuna.
[3] All part of the FPS, a centre-left coalition formed around Tierno Galván’s PS.
[4] Convergència Socialista de Catalunya. A part of FPS in Madrid.
[5] The aliancista brand in Catalonia.
[6] Term used to refer to the Spanish-speaking immigrants that arrived to the Basque Country – and Biscay specifically – from other parts of the country to work on the steel or ship industries starting in the late 19th century.
[7] Euskal Iraultzarako Alderdia (Partido para la Revolución Vasca). Party for the Basque Revolution.
I'm a bit lost when you mention the PS and the FPI. Have they already appear in the previous chapters? Because I'm unable to find any clue about them.
About the situation in Catalonia. Is this true for the Catalonia of the 1970s-1980s or does it go further beyond?
About the situation in Catalonia. Is this true for the Catalonia of the 1970s-1980s or does it go further beyond?
Truth be told, that's a bit of the point. I'm creating worldbuilding without giving much away just yet
They haven't been mentioned yet though. But do you mean FPS or the PDI? The FPS is the Federación de Partidos Socialistas, one of the two main socialist parties, containing the PS, CSC, CSM, PSPV, EIA, PSA and others. In the 1970s, they combined social democracy with monarchism and federalism. The PS comes from the old PSI. I won't say more.The PDI is however the successor of the PCE once it goes from Eurocommunism to social democracy.
Beyond. I don't know if up to the 2010s, but certainly to the 2000s
Truth be told, that's a bit of the point. I'm creating worldbuilding without giving much away just yet
We're going to need a chapter just devoted to the new and old political parties...
I see. It makes me feel uneasy, as it look too "good" to last so long. It looks a bit as Weimar, but, it seems, less chaotic.
Yep, Chapter 4 or 5 "Sopa de letras"
I can understand. I mean, it's going to be hard to take it beyond the 1980s, since everything will diverge considerably. However, my end date is probably whenever the left comes to power, since it'd be the 'Second Transition (TM)'