Excerpt: The End of Caliphal Andalus - Radah Alziri, Alcazar Publishing, 1420 (1999)
(From Chapter 5: Hisham II)
Understanding the systemic changes which began to take root in Hisham's time requires unpacking some of the foundational ills which plagued pre-modern al-Andalus in its nature as a society built on the forceful takeover of land from a population of a foreign religion.
From its founding almost 300 years before Hisham, al-Andalus was a society ruled by a small number of Arabo-Andalusians, with Arabized Berbers serving as both allies and thorns in their side, with the bulk of the population initially being of non-Arab extraction. Paradoxically, while Berbers like Tariq ibn Ziyad carried most of the military burden in the conquest of al-Andalus from the Quti[1], the Umayyad governors of the region continued to treat them like second-class citizens even as they relied on them to keep in check a rebellious population unfond of Muslim rule.
Inevitably, in 121[2], the Berbers revolted in al-Andalus and North Africa. The Iberian revolt was finally brought in line when an expedition of Syrians arrived, sparking off a period of infighting among the Andalusis as the Syrians clashed with the local governors. Order was eventually restored when a subsequent governor landed the remnants of the Syrian expedition in the form of
junds - effectively military colonies.
The landing of the
junds proved to be a double-headed decision. The Syrian presence strengthened the hold of the Arabs on al-Andalus, especially in the southern regions along the Wadi al-Qabir[3] and along the coast of the great sea. However, it also created a class of landed tribes with their roots in geographic regions and genealogies outside of al-Andalus, with varying degrees of loyalty to the Emir, and later the Caliph. The
jund system allowed these families enormous autonomy and an ability to operate without the sanction of the governor if they so chose. The decision that stabilized al-Andalus in the short run created a long-term destabilizing factor, because as much as there was always tension between the
junds and the ruler, and even as subsequent rulers granted territory to new tribes, the rulers of al-Andalus nevertheless had to rely on these semi-autonomous tribes.
Until the reign of Hisham II, trends in the Andalusian military scene had been towards revising that military model through the hiring of external armies - mercenaries and slave soldiers. The first Caliph of al-Andalus, Abd ar-Rahman III, in many ways started the trend of hiring in bands of Berbers and putting them on a monthly salary rather than giving them land. This policy was continued by Abd ar-Rahman's son and successor, al-Hakam II. Also popular were
Saqaliba, slaves and freed slaves of eastern European origin. While there was some reluctance to utilize the
Saqaliba as large armies given the trepidation of some towards massing slave soldiers in great numbers,
Saqaliba like Ghalib al-Nasiri nevertheless distinguished themselves in al-Andalus as military leaders, and Berbers as regular troops.
Had trends continued as they were, it would have been easy to envision a circumstance in which an aggressive leader committed fully to hiring a large army of personally loyal Berbers, draining the treasury and taxing the commons to pay for it. Of course the perils of this approach is obvious: A strong man may command the loyalty of the army, but what of when the strong man is no longer there?
Particularly dangerous with Abd ar-Rahman and al-Hakam's reliance on hired Berbers was the place Berbers held in society. While much has been written of the comparative tolerance of the Islamic and Christian worlds of the era, the characterization of medieval al-Andaus as a beacon of egalitarianism is somewhat delusive and obscures the reality that the society was wracked by astonishingly regular small-scale revolts. In truth the polity rested on a distinct racial hierarchy, with Arabo-Andalusians at the top and Berbers occupying a role below the
muwalladun[4], of which the
Saqaliba were often considered a part. Berbers were often held in mistrust and treated poorly by society even at this point in Andalusi history, and many individuals who did cross from the Maghreb often found urban life in Córdoba or other cities difficult to reconcile with their more rigorist tendencies. The confluence of military strength with a societal grievance sets the conditions for a catastrophe.
Hisham, however, benefited from the power struggle between his uncle and regent, al-Mughira, and the powerful master of the estates, Muhammad ibn Abi 'Amir. In particular what changed the trend in al-Andalus - and averted a massive professional army of Berbers from draining the treasury[5] - was that ibn Abi 'Amir was considered an ally of the Berbers. He had strong ties to many Berber tribes, to the point that he commanded the respect of more of them than al-Mughira.
Among al-Mughira's key backers, meanwhile, were the
Saqaliba and the old Arab families, including many of the
jund tribes. It was on them whom Hisham and his regent thus came to rely. With al-Mughira's support lying where it did, the seeds were sown for the
Saqaliba to begin taking on a greater role in Andalusian society. While still employing Berbers where possible, al-Mughira began to place
Saqaliba in positions of greater authority, relying on them as his main commanders. He worked to strengthen Hisham's relationships with the
junds as well, effectively strengthening that institution, at least for awhile.
As before, Hisham and his regent continued to treat the Berbers by looking for those groups who could serve as strong allies while still acceding to Córdoba's wishes. Berber relations were always a fraught problem, though - and one which would become more worrying for the regent and the young Caliph as the Zenata chieftain, Ziri ibn Atiyya, launched his campaigns in the Maghreb in the 370s. Hisham and al-Mughira tacitly endorsed his conquests in the hopes of cultivating him as a client. But Ziri was an unpredictable man, and a Berber at a time when Berbers were held in some suspicion by the ruling caste in Córdoba. Al-Mughira apparently realized that Ziri could be either a strong ally, or a dangerous enemy.
Largely, however, Hisham and al-Mughira kept the old power structure in place, though in Hisham's minority the young caliph struggled to make his power felt in the Northern Marches, where the Banu Tujibi held sway. The year 369 passed with little incident save the dispatching of another army to the north to clash with raiders out of Castile. Al-Mughira celebrated the minor raid with significant pomp, making a point of welcoming his troops - mostly
junds and
Saqaliba - with a ceremony in which he rewarded them for each Christian head delivered back to the palace in Córdoba.
In 370[6], however, the peace along the northwestern border was shaken by civil war from outside of Andalus. Reaching his majority a couple of years prior, the Leonese king, Ramiro III, evidently feeling secure in both his peace treaty with the Caliph and the taming of Viking raids along the Galician coast, moved to increase the monarchical power at the expense of the nobility. This ill-advised move was predictably challenged by partisans of one of his cousins, who in late 370 was crowned King Bermudo II of Galicia in a ceremony in the sacred chapel of Santiago de Compostela.[7] The coronation in many ways dovetailed from decades of succession crises in northwestern Iberia, but immediately set the two cousins at each other's throats.
With his position precarious relative to Ramiro's, Bermudo sought the aid of the semi-independent
junds along the border, and indeed a number of Berbers nominally under the vassalage of the Caliph aided Bermudo's cause in the early months of the war. An incensed Ramiro, struggling both to wage war and to raise his new son, Ordono, appealed to the Caliph to aid him in holding on to his crown. Hisham II evidently declined to send troops, but it's known that he and al-Mughira traveled to Badajoz to meet with the local leaders there, arriving with a certain amount of ceremony.
The meeting proved only modestly effectual; Berbers continued to appear sporadically among Bermudo's forces, allowing the Galician faction to make some headway in the conflict's early months before it ground down to a stalemate. As the year dragged on, Hisham, now close to the age of majority, issued a proclamation recognizing Ramiro as the King of Leon, but consented only to send a few light raids to harry Galicia's borders along with the regular seasonal runs against Pamplona and Castile.
Evidently al-Mughira's hope was that the conflict between Leon and Galicia would exhaust the northwestern polities, and only them would Córdoba send her men north to restore order, ensuring that Leon would remain a weak, squabbling tributary. His vision seems to have favoured a divided, neutered Christian world with petty kinglets too weak and fractious to challenge the Caliphate. However, he was opposed by a faction at the court, among them the influential ibn Abi 'Amir, his perennial rival. Ibn Abi 'Amir favoured aggressively pressing the
jihad against Galicia and Leon and is said to have even proposed pressing north to attack the Galician core in Santiago de Compostela. Al-Mughira brushed that strategy off, fearing it would galvanize the Leonese against Hisham's rule and shatter the prospects for a peaceful entente with what was then the largest Christian kingdom north of the Duero.
This rejection rankled ibn Abi 'Amir, who - for all that he was in the minority at court - retained one key advantage: The favour of Subh, Hisham's mother. While discontent with al-Mughira's elevation to
hajib over ibn Abi 'Amir, who was likely her lover, Subh had held her tongue and given the situation a chance for the first few years or so. But as war raged in Leon and the Maghreb, ibn Abi 'Amir turned to Subh.
Histories from the time tell us that the seed of the Coup of 371 was sown as Hisham drew near to the age of 18, when Subh asked him to remove al-Mughira as
hajib and replace him instead with ibn Abi 'Amir.
[1] The Goths - namely the Visigoths.
[2] AD 739 or so - about 230 years before the POD.
[3] The River Guadalquivir.
[4] Muslims of local descent, or of mixed Arab, Berber and Iberian ethnicity. They make up the majority in al-Andalus. This is distinct from the Mozarabs - that is, semi-Arabized Christians.
[5] Effectively what happened OTL. Almanzor achieved enormous military success and expanded Córdoba's borders, but the price of it was that he over-taxed the
junds and didn't bother raising levies off of them. You ended up with a societal divide: A professional army of rigorist Berber tribes held in check by Almanzor's money, and an unmilitarized commons being taxed to death to give Almanzor enough money to pay the Berbers. Guess how
that turned out when people less competent than Almanzor came into power. Lookin' at you, Sanchuelo.
[6] AD 981.
[7] OTL this happened a year later, but the timetable gets bumped a bit because there's no real unifying factor of an aggressive Muslim world taking Zamora to prevent internal factions from jumping on an unsuspecting Ramiro.
SUMMARY:
981: In Galicia, Bermudo II is crowned King in opposition to his cousin, Ramiro III of Leon. Civil war breaks out in Leon. Berbers out of Badajoz provide the Galicians with some extra muscle. Officially, Córdoban Caliph Hisham II continues to recognize Ramiro as the rightful king and sends some token raiders north to show his power, but on the advice of al-Mughira he sits back and allows Leon to damage itself with a destructive civil war.
981: Subh, mother of Hisham II, urges him to replace al-Mughira as his regent with his rival and her favourite, Muhammad ibn Abi Aamir.
