sealion with a sporting chance

I know sealion has been discussed in depth previously, and I have read a lot of those discussions explaining it was not possible. In particular I have read this:

http://www.flin.demon.co.uk/althist/seal1.htm

which explains the massive problems the Germans encountered just getting the troops off the barges in daylight.

Anyway, I have a particular scenario I would like someone to explain. Could the Germans have won if the following had happened:

Britain decided it would be fun to test how good their ground forces alone were, so decided not to use their navy or air force for a while.

Germans did their night-time landings at whatever success rate is likely.

Germans knew that the RN and RAF could be deployed at any time, so didn't change any tactics.

I specifically want to know how the land battle would have gone, assuming that the Germans had air support while the British didn't.

Was there any time in Sept 1940 or thereabouts that the Germans could have won if the British had given them a sporting chance by standing down the RN and RAF? Were the British ground forces good enough to beat back whatever Germans managed to arrive? Would the Germans have been able to get resupplied? Would they have been able to get any heavy weapons? Assume that both the British and the Germans fight to the last man, and that both sides fought at normal competence, no supermen.

Actually, assume that the RAF is flying to defend the oil refineries so that there is no alternative way for the Germans to win - they have to use their ground forces, with air support, in a force on force battle.

How would it go down?

If it is conceivable that the Germans could have won under those circumstances, would it be possible for them to have won if they also didn't bring their air force, so that it was just ground forces vs ground forces?

From what I have read of the problems with the barges, the Germans would have arrived so slowly on the beaches that the beach defenders would be able to pick them off piecemeal, and even be able to take their weapons.

I'm interested in the actual Sealion plan, not some alternative. With the actual British forces available at that time. The only change being Churchill's curiosity about the competence of his ground forces.

I believe the Home Guard outnumbered the maximum Germans that could be landed 10:1 and the British (and Canadian, Australian and French???) Army outnumbered the maximum Germans 2:1 plus had far superior weaponry. But I don't want to assume that the Germans miraculously land all their troops simultaneously, I want to know what would have happened under a realistic landing scenario. Would they have all been wiped out on the beach in the first few hours?

IIRC, the Sandhurst wargames assumed the Germans had got across the Channel, but the difficulty of resupply always saw them knocked out within a fortnight at most (I think it was usually five days!).

I think if you want to assume the British don't intervene with the Navy or Airforce to stop the Germans, then it's an ASB scenario. Unless you assume an entirely different PoD, and it's a trap laid by the British.

I read somehwere that by Sept Brooke was confident enough that he had redployed and concentrated his armoured forces back from the beaches to conduct a div or corps level counterattack against any lodgement. A German invasion force in Sept would have to fight in place forces as well as a major armoured counterattack within days of a landing. There is no way the Germans could have isolated their landing areas with air and sea forces the way the Allies did in Normandy 1944.

Paul Edwards said:

I know sealion has been discussed in depth previously, and I have read a lot of those discussions explaining it was not possible. In particular I have read this:

http://www.flin.demon.co.uk/althist/seal1.htm

?

Click to expand...

The site is crap as were most 1970s wargames...god the day we have to rely on 1970s wargames as proof of anything we are in trouble...OMG that day is upon us .

It seems these anti german scenarios assume the worse case for Germans and the best case for Brits....not a good approach. One of the standard failures in these scenario is the assumption that they did it the way we did it and thus the disparaging comparisons.

(1) German fleet in the Channel out numbered the RN with 320 mostly vessels vs 290 mostly auxiliary vessels. Lets up date the web sites out dated figures.

RN
5 capital ships
11 Cruisers
53 Destroyers [ with at least 4 guns and 1/2 dozen torps and several flak]
23 Destroyers on convoy duties [as above]
15 MTB with several light flak plus a pair of torps.
334 minesweepers/trawlers; all with mine clearing gear plus a couple of depth charges. About 1/2 of these also had either one 12lb or 4" gun plus some with AAMG , the rest had only machine guns.
29 Subs

The hope was the lightly armed trawlers could sideswipe and dump depth charges, sinking the barges. This often works at night when skilled high speed MTB, attempted such hit and run tactics surprised the unsuspecting Germans spraying them with 20mm flak fire.

KM
1 Capital ship + Heavy Cruiser
3 x light cruisers
3 x 4000-5000ton Fleet tenders with 4 x 4" guns + dozen flak
15 Torpedoboot & Destroyers [with at least 3 x guns and 1/2 dozen torps]
11 captured or WW-I Torpedoboot, with a pair of 4" guns and several torps]
30 FBoot/Sperrbrecher each with several Guns & 1/2 dozen flak.
120 Minesweepers /Trawlers [all with several flak and a pair of 88mm/4" guns and ASW/mine clearing gear]
54 RBoot with several flak and ASW/mine clearing gear plus smoke dispensers [1-8 hours smoke].
32 gunboats each with several flak and either a 6" gun or 3 x 3" guns
24 Schnellboote each with several flak and up to 1/2 dozen torps
28 Uboats

To make matters worse each of the 1500-2100 landing barges were to be armed with a pair of AAMG and most had gun platforms mounted over top where the hundreds of guns/flak were to be deployed. These were improvised gun decks, so the army ordnance could be fired when beached until the troops got ashore. However if RN trawlers were stupid enough to attempt a side swipe these barges, they would be riddled with machine gun fire as they lurched at 8-12 knts and got a full blast at point blank from the deck guns.

(2) The Luftwaffe crippled or sank most of the RN fleet at Dunkirk. After one week only 13 out of the 40 Destroyers involved in 'Operation Dynamo' were still operational. With weeks more such bombing most of the channel fleet would be sunk, crippled or damaged. In the 10 days around Operation Dynamo, roughly 200 Luftwaffe Stuka sank or crippled 23 allied destroyers and 42 trawlers/minesweepers [gone for at least months], while another 38 were damaged [gone for at least a week]. The Admiralty concluded they could not sustain such losses.

For Sealion at least 8-10 days of such bombings were to precede the invasion and given the ease with such deadlines were passed in BoB, this could easily extend into 2-3 weeks, if needed. In addition RAF stations and Army barracks troop concentrations and gun installations were to be massively bombed...IE the weight of ordnance directed at London was to be re directed at the Channel defenses. When such attacks were mounted in France and Russia they were crippling and overwhelming.

(3) Each invasion wave was up to be a week round trip, with resupplied sortie independent of invasion waves. The original plan envisaged 4 days return trips but this was modified to about a week. That these scenarios assume 10 days shows they are assuming the worse case for Germans. This was one of the shortcomings of the allied planning for DDay, they always set the bar too low for the tempo of operations and their troops found a way of living down to that level of expectation.

The resupply lifeline was up to 20,000 tons per day [based on each of the 100 tankers and lighters making one trip a week] to support 24-26 divisions plus Luftwaffe. However unloading supplies would be slowed due to lack of portage. Similar lifelines in Russia was 60,000 tons per day to support 144 divisions, the supplies would be sufficient. Besides any one who has read desert warfare or on the Eastern Front, knows lack of Logistics NEVER prevented the Wehrmacht combat units from either fighting effectively or advancing. Even in Narvik the surrounded German infantry regiment scavenged and held on, out numbered 4:1 for 2 months.

(4) Each German Infantry division deployed were 'semi motorized' with the first echelon [two infantry Regiments] having 16 Arty; 46 tanks and 27 x 47mm PAK plus a dozen flak; and reinforced with bicycle recon battalion and Engineer Battalion. Without resorting to locally commandeered vehicles there own vehicles could transport 1/2 of the troops in this first echelon.

Worse UK had only 26 functional divisions in the entire UK of which [according to General Brooks] only 1/2 were in any state for combat. These divisions had to cover the 1100km of expected invasion frontage. General Brooks ordered his 'thin red line' to withdraw from the front line and concede the beaches to the Germans, in the hope that counter attacks could slow the German advance until the Strategic reserves arrived.

(5) Comparisons to DDay are pointless, since according to Van Creveld the allies almost blew it by sticking to their 'plan' and it was only by breaking that 'plan', they were they able to make any headway. The allies spent 18 months over planned for DDay, they had to set the bar to low and their soldier lived down to that 'level of expectation'. The Germans did the opposite and set the bar too high, but as long as the morale held out, they aspired to reach that bar nonetheless. For Norway the German soldiers got the go warning, days before they went, with zero training or exercises prior to launch, while formal OKW planning only lasted a few months.

(6) Prerequisite for Sealion was command of the skies over the English Channel, NOT defeating the RAF over England. English Radar didn't extend enough over the Channel enough to allow their GCI based air intercepts to work, so the RAF would have to resort to constant CAP patrols, reducing the available fighter strength by 1/2. Over the Channel the RAF lost 1.5 planes for every one the Luftwaffe lost and under GCI, they always arrived AFTER the Stuka had bombed the ships and left.

The victory over the RAF was Hitler and Raeder’s requirement, since Raeder knew he might lose the rest of his fleet. He was not going to be made the scapegoat, when he had repeatedly warned Hitler through the 1930s of the need for a strong German navy, to combat the UK. But Hitler refuse reassuring him there was not going to be any war with the UK. Hitler would cut a deal with the Brits. Hitler always underestimated his enemies through out the war.

Hitler never really wanted to conduct Sealion; he was confidant that with the defeat of the BEF in France, the Uk would come to some arrangement to keep their empire. What Hitler wanted to do was to turn east and get on with his racial cleansing plans. Raeder want the same since that cost him little and it left his precious fleet intact.


(7) Only two of the biggest warships planned to break out into the North Atlantic to draw off the Home fleet. Given the Admiralty feared such surface raiders more than Uboats this was a sound plan. Until August the Admiralty had no clue as to if Bismarck and Prince Eugen were ready to sortie and only then got snippets of Intel suggesting otherwise. Had these deployed a week ahead of Sealion Admiralty would have gone after them [like 'wild gazelles on Steroids].

Some of the German fleet was to conduct diversions faints along the eastern British coast to ensure the first wave got across and then remain to conduct counter sweeps against RN Destroyer-Cruiser sweeps. At that time in the war the German fleet out fought the allies sinking/crippling twice as many ships as they themselves lost. Uboats and Schnell boot were very effective back then.

(8) The Germans didn't need captured ports initially to unload their merchant ships, they had been planning since the early 1930s to unload merchant ships to open beaches through small coastal craft like barges etc. Unloading a merchant ship could be done in 14 hours but would most likely take a couple of days each, which is why after the first wave crossed 400 barges were to be detailed on each side of the channel to speed up loading and unloading.

No doubt ports would speed things up, which is why crack special German commandos were to be rushed ahead ashore via hundreds of Storm boats to seize the beach heads and take local ports. Given that 'Dads Army', had only a couple of days ammo supply and were raw recruits, people should have little trouble envisaging these crack Wehrmacht troops overwhelming them right away. No one should ever be so foolish as to image the British defenses as approaching anything like Dieppe or Normandy. The Germans were flexible enough that they would have gotten enough ports in order to complete what transport and resupply they needed.

(9) The RAF did try to attack the invasion fleet prior to the expected September 15th invasion date but after a week of such bombings they had only sunk or crippled 65 barges /boats/ships. That’s out of 2100 -2400 barges/450 tugs/200 leader boats/170 merchants.... you do the math’s its hardly 10%. About 100 more were lightly damaged and easily repairable.

(10) The barges were very seaworthy operating in exercises through weather of 'force 4-5' [1-2 meter waves]. Even when exposed to gale force winds, they didn't sink only suffered occasional damage to the fabricated bow doors. It seems these anti German scenarios assume the worse case for Germans and the best case for allies.... not a good approach.

(11) The staffing for the barges were found and trained in good order, it never pays to question German training effectiveness in the first years of the war. The morale of these barge crews would have remained a problem through out the operation, however that doesn't = failure. BTW these barges were closed top with retractable roofs and 1/2 the barges were motorized .The UN powered barges were tethered in tandem to the powered barges, and the pair towed by a tug. Combined with exploiting the channel currents [1.5 knts not 4 knts as reported], fleet speeds of 4knts were expected, since most of the route was WITH the current.

Again assuming the worse case for the Germans?

The towing maneuver was going to be extremely difficult, which is why every three tugs were lead by a HQ 'leader boat' with navigation & communications gear to remain in control and improvise as order broke down. Again it never pays to question German command and control methods, since they were mostly adequate to the task and years ahead of the allies in the early years of the war.

When the Germans invaded Norway the troops with ZERO maritime experience sailed in the roughest seas for day prior to landing and were able to function. Again superimposing allied problems and expectations assumes the Germans were the same, which they clearly were not! The Germans troops were far better prepared for war than the allies were.

(12) Many improvisations were tried and rejected and would not have been used. Given more time more could have been done. Power units were developed to motorize all the barges by mounting a combination of surplus aero engines and truck engines, but conversion rate was only about 200 per month. Later kits for improvised 'jetties' were designed and completed so each first line division could have its own jetty to rapidly turn around Barges independent of tides.

Later still improvised 'artificial harbors' were designed and built to be carried in sections across the channel and erected in conjunction with captured ship hulks sunk to create 'breakwaters'. Given 1-year preparations with planning, design and experimentation, followed by at least 6 months construction effort, and finished off with months of exercises and training, all these could have been completed.

The lack of detailed plans for bridgehead & unloading plans were completely consistent with German command methods that left most up to improvisation of the local commanders. No one is better placed to make such judgments. Yes that will mean RAF bomber command will be able to effect things through bombardment and no combat unit would ever function at full capacity, but that rarely affected the Germans. The invasion would go on nonetheless, and be made to work in spite of such losses.

Its typical of Western analysis to completely miss understands and miss represent this as a weakness. The flexibility in the German command was always one of their strengths.

(13) As I pointed out each front line infantry division in the first wave was to reinforce with an engineer battalion to cross obstacles and given experiences in France should not deal the advance much as Germans always found a way around such obstacles as soon as they encountered them.

(14)The British command didn't hold out much hope. Ironside was relieved of command, because he stated they could not stop the panzers once they were ashore. Brooks was depressed about the situation remarking 'how could he be expected to defend a frontline the size of France with only 1/4 of the forces?'. Dowding feared that once ashore the Germans would be in London inside of a week and Churchill was so concerned he ordered the use of gas bombs on the Bridgeheads. Brooks panic knowing full well that could turn every Luftwaffe bomber into a gas bomber.

(15) The Germans planed to level all the RN ports along the channel since the RN needed them to operate from while the Germans could improvise from what every port they could get. In July they did this in a matter of days to Dover Port. This would force the RN to sortie from further and further away reducing their effective 'time on station' and diluting their forces even more.

The rest of the site is just rubbish scenarios with associated misinformed musings. For example the author states. During this period RAF Lufwaffe were exhanging kills at a rate of 1:1 suggesting a stalemat in the air that would last for weeks provided the Germans don't make stupid mistakes like bombing London.

"The Luftwaffe, with its resources, was expected to do all of the following:

• Act as artillery for the landing forces
• Keep the RN out of the Channel
• Win total air superiority
• Prevent British Army reinforcements from getting to the zone by bombing railway lines
• Make a mass attack on London to force the population to flee the city and choke the surrounding roads. "

The Germans didn't plan to fight for 'total air superiority', Luftwaffe NEVER functioned that way...the allies did, which again reveals the weakness in the analysis. Each German infantry division/ army would have been reinforced with extra artillery negating the need for 'acting as artillery'. Bombing the railway lines would help but there would only be sporadic bombing of London since that was the lowest item in Luftwaffe doctrine.

No mention is made of the concentrated mining operations either end of the invasion corridor. The Germans planned to lay 12,500 mines in the two weeks before Sealion even began and update this barrier daily with another 14,000 mines over a period of weeks, since RN minesweeping should be able to cut a corridor through such barriers in a matter of 24-36 hours . Historically during the war the Germans deployed 225,000 mines that sunk or crippled about 1350 allied vessels, suggesting each 165 mines deployed should sink or cripple an RN Vessel.

That’s 65 vessels sunk/crippled before Sealion even begins. With the planned German re mining operations, that could very well amass another 65 RN vessels sunk or crippled in a matter of weeks. Combined with air attacks & mine barrier, they could amass up to 200 RN vessels sunk or crippled before Sealion even begins and add another 65 per week after that. At any given time these attacks should also net another 80 vessels temporarily KOed out for the week with minor damage.

RN did have considerable reserves to draw from including total of 54 Minesweepers/Gunboat + 270 Gun trawlers & 496 small trawlers plus 49 Subs and 24 MTB. However since these vessels were all on continuous patrol routine only ½ of these figures would be available at any time. Reportedly 12 cruisers plus 78 destroyers were on station in nearby ports on alert and could show up the next day and sortie every day for a week after which they would need to return to port for maintenance/refueling etc which should take a week meaning they would be unable to return until week 3.

Historically 2/3 of this force was deployed within reach of the Channel while the rest was distributed around the East and West coasts of Britain. Further at any given time 1/3 to 1/4 of the above mentioned vessels would down for long-term repair, refit or overhaul and would only exist as warboote for the victorious Germans.

If they were rotating patrols these figures would be cut in half, but would reappear [minus losses] each week. The Home fleet, if not decoyed away, could contribute 5 out of 15 Battleships + 1 out of 6 Aircraft Carrier & 22 out of 46 Cruisers & 20 out of 68 Destroyers, but again like the Cruisers if they deploy one week, the next week they would have to return to Scapa Flow for a week of maintenance etc. The Germans would also have ships to draw on since the force they assembled amounted to about 3/4 of their total force.

Even if the RN gets in amongst the barge fleets the results may be much less than spectacular. Historically such attacks in The Channel and Crete, netted each Destroyer/Cruiser sortie only one enemy barge/boat/ship sunk, while suffering 1 out of every 5 vessels attack warship damaged or crippled in the process. The RN auxiliary warships faired worse getting roughly 0.3 enemy barges/boats damaged/crippled per sortie and suffered similar amount damage in such exchanges. Given that the German invasion fleet counted 2100-2400 barges; 430 tugs; 250 leader boats & 170 merchant ships plus 320 naval vessels and RAF could be only counted on to sink at most 65 per week, its going to take thousands and thousands of naval sortie to sink even the 50% level imposed for German abandonment of the invasion.

In the end there is little doubt that the operation would have been a bloody affair either way. But given poor British Morale and usual incompetence, the Germans have a real good chance of pulling Sealion off. The usual micro meddling of Hitler and Churchill might have more to do with the final out come than any military issue mentioned above. What would the Germans need to succeed? Remove Hitler and Goering from the decision cycle and allow OKW to include Sealion invasion plans as an annex to the plans to invade France from the late 1930s on. That way the Wehrmacht could get on with the mission unmolested by political intervention in the summer of 1940, when the timing was best. The rest would fall into place.

Ansel : 'Hitler Confronts England' ,1960
Schenk : 'Invasion of England 1940, the planning of Operation Sealion' , translated 1990
Ellis ; 'Brute Force' , 1990
Levy; The Royal Navy's Home Fleet in World War-II , 2003
Van Creveld ; 'Supplying War', 1977.
Scott; 'The Battle of the Narrow Seas" 1945.
Marix Evans. 'Invasion ,operations sealion , 1940'.2004
Kieser , 'Hitler on the Doorstep', translated 1997
Smith , 'Hold the Narrow Sea', 1984
'Germany and the Second World War', vol-2 , translated 1991
O'Hara; 'The German Fleet at War , 1939-1945, 2004.

The British had around 300,000 regular troops avalible to face the Germans. While those troops were to a degree ill-equiped a great deal of the equipment lost at Dunkirk will have been replaced by the time the Germans have orginised themselves for a landing.

As for the Germans the first wave/s WILL be landing on beaches with minmal armour and artillary support... in short if anything possibly equiped worse than the British defenders.

Now if the poms manage to hold or seriously damage the major ports the Nazis will need to continue landing reinforcements, equipment and supplies over the beaches which will (without the purpose built LSTs, LSIs, LCIs, etc. the allies had in 1944) cause such logistical hassles that they will not be getting sufficient fuel, artillary and tanks ashore to attempt a Blitzkrieg and hence will end up tied down in hostile territory and probably slowly worn down by the British.

If on the other hand one or more of the major british ports fall without serious damage the Germans will be able to deploy the full might of their armour and the poms would be in deep shit.

If memory is correct then the British had at their disposal three fully equipped infantry divisions (1st, 2nd and 3rd London Territorial Divisions), the rest were either at regimental or battalion strength, plus the much vaunted LDV lacked weapons, many trained with brooms and other work implements because the bulk of the British weapons were in France, it is also a known fact that to re-equip the entire British army with weapons and other equipment (trucks etc....) would take at least 12 to 18 months if the British could not gain a lend lease treaty with the US, and about 6 months less if they could, that still leaves at minimum 6 to 12 months of a British army devoid of mobility and defensive firepower.

Plus another point is the fact that the first sea lord Sir Dudley Pound had ordered heavy surface units such as battleships, battlecruiser, heavy cruisers and aircraft carriers, were not to be used in invasion fleet interdiction, they were to be used exclusively for the evacuation of Royal and Government assets, and the Royla Family and the Government, invasion fleet interdiction was up to the light cruisers and destroyers and other types of ships.

Also when Goering had ordered that the Luftwaffe change tactics and began switching from targeting the RAF and concentrated on bombing London records by the RAF indicate they (Fighter Command) was within a week or two of total capitulation, the Luftwaffe also a know fact that Goering forbade follow up attacks two days running on air fields and radar installations.

Regards

Cockroach said:

The British had around 300,000 regular troops avalible to face the Germans. While those troops were to a degree ill-equiped a great deal of the equipment lost at Dunkirk will have been replaced by the time the Germans have orginised themselves for a landing.

As for the Germans the first wave/s WILL be landing on beaches with minmal armour and artillary support... in short if anything possibly equiped worse than the British defenders.

Now if the poms manage to hold or seriously damage the major ports the Nazis will need to continue landing reinforcements, equipment and supplies over the beaches which will (without the purpose built LSTs, LSIs, LCIs, etc. the allies had in 1944) cause such logistical hassles that they will not be getting sufficient fuel, artillary and tanks ashore to attempt a Blitzkrieg and hence will end up tied down in hostile territory and probably slowly worn down by the British.

If on the other hand one or more of the major british ports fall without serious damage the Germans will be able to deploy the full might of their armour and the poms would be in deep shit.

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You have seriosly underestimated the losses of war materiel by the British Army at Norway and France, Britain alone lost 67,000 vehicles, also 750,000 tonnes of supplies, over 300,000 weapons of all calibres, and the quoted numbers of the returning 210,000 British troops many were wounded, exhausted and demoralised, the bulk were unfit for deployment, as were the 110,000 Free French troops, they had nothing in weaponary, i have indicated that it would take at least at best 6 to 12 months to fully re-equip the British army, excluding the Free French, you can not build and replace almost 1,000,000 tonnes in several weeks, the US at it height of war production couldn't achieve that.

Also you are wrong on another point the first wave of Germans were to be the 7th Flieger Division (Paratroops and Gliders Borne) followed up by the 22nd Air Landing Division, these troops were to attack the Langdon and Citadel batteries and also to capture Dover.

Regards

Ah, yes, I really should have remembered esl's thoughts on this.

MrP said:

Ah, yes, I really should have remembered esl's thoughts on this.

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Yes they are rather alternative aren't they?

esl said:

No doubt ports would speed things up, which is why crack special German commandos were to be rushed ahead ashore via hundreds of Storm boats to seize the beach heads and take local ports.

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I specifically didn't want any superman behaviour. Surely the British were competent enough to blow up the ports if it looked like they were going to lose them? I'm after the most likely scenario, not the best scenario for either side.

Given that 'Dads Army', had only a couple of days ammo supply and were raw recruits, people should have little trouble envisaging these crack Wehrmacht troops overwhelming them right away.

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The crack German troops would be lightly armed and have the disadvantage of being the attackers. Did they even have the means to travel to the battle, or are we assuming that the British are going to hand the supermen cars?

And these crack troops are landing at night, right?

(12) Many improvisations were tried and rejected and would not have been used. Given more time more could have been done.

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I'm not asking about a different scenario. I'm asking about the actual scenario. I believe Hitler had the option of ordering the invasion on 21st September. I want to know what would have happened had he actually given that order. Or if it was too late by then, if he'd given the order on the 17th or earlier would that have worked? Actual scenario, with actual preparations at that time.

(15) The Germans planed to level all the RN ports along the channel since the RN needed them to operate from while the Germans could improvise from what every port they could get.

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If they planned it, why hadn't they done it by 21st September?

The Germans planned to lay 12,500 mines in the two weeks before Sealion even began

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Are you saying that on 21st September if Hitler had given the order to go ahead, that the order would have been to do 2 weeks of mining followed by the actual crossing? My understanding was that all the preparations that were ever going to be done had already been done, and that it was just a go/no-go decision for the barge crossing.

But given poor British Morale and usual incompetence, the Germans have a real good chance of pulling Sealion off.

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I specifically don't want to assume such things as poor British morale causing them to all collapse without a fight. I just want them to fight at normal competence. I don't know how you can say their morale was low when they had 1.5 million Home Guard UNPAID VOLUNTEERS when Churchill was expecting to get 150,000. If dedication like that didn't inspire the British, I don't know what would. Quite apart from operating on home turf and basically having to fight for their lives.

The usual micro meddling of Hitler and Churchill might have more to do with the final out come than any military issue mentioned above. What would the Germans need to succeed? Remove Hitler and Goering from the decision cycle and allow OKW to include Sealion invasion plans as an annex to the plans to invade France from the late 1930s on.

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No, I don't want Hitler and Goering removed. The only change I want made is for Churchill to be curious about his ground force capability and not deploy the RN and RAF. Just this one change on the British side. Just so that we can see a land battle.

If you say that those personnel changes are needed for success, then that means no success in the scenario under discussion.

Can't we start with the actual barge unloading? Do you dispute the original article's claims about the problems of offloading in DAYTIME?

If so, what is the actual EXPECTED results at NIGHT TIME for so many more barges?

It still seems to me that the Germans would have offloaded so slowly that the MOST LIKELY scenario is that they would have all been shot on the beaches as soon as they landed. THEY would have been the ones overwhelmed from the moment they landed.

The Dean said:

Yes they are rather alternative aren't they?

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It's always . . . interesting to have esl's thoughts on Sealion and the inevitable German success it would have been.

It's just somewhat unfortunate that my reaction to ideas that assume the Germans had a cat in Hell's chance is less than coherent. Luckily, Grimm did that for me last time.

My God, MrP! Where do we even begin to point all of the factual and historical flaws in esl's post?!?

Hardly any statistic or detail is NOT wrong.

I usually reguard a debate with esl as pointless but will engage him on a few points:

To make matters worse each of the 1500-2100 landing barges were to be armed with a pair of AAMG and most had gun platforms mounted over top where the hundreds of guns/flak were to be deployed. These were improvised gun decks, so the army ordnance could be fired when beached until the troops got ashore. However if RN trawlers were stupid enough to attempt a side swipe these barges, they would be riddled with machine gun fire as they lurched at 8-12 knts and got a full blast at point blank from the deck guns.

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1. Note: improvised gun decks.
To put it another way guns not designed for naval use (i.e. without any fire contol apparatus and so ineffective at long range) manned by gun crews with minmal experiance afloat (i.e. will miss rather more often than the RN gun crews). Hence probably only useful if the poms are intent on boarding the barges... rather useless against a Destroyer standing off at 4000 yards and lobbing 4.7" bricks at the barges.
2. Can the Germans supply sufficient guns to equip these barges without cutting too far into their artillary? Given that unloading these guns from the barges could take a while they will not be avalible for use ashore for quite some time.

No mention is made of the concentrated mining operations either end of the invasion corridor. The Germans planned to lay 12,500 mines in the two weeks before Sealion even began and update this barrier daily with another 14,000 mines over a period of weeks, since RN minesweeping should be able to cut a corridor through such barriers in a matter of 24-36 hours . Historically during the war the Germans deployed 225,000 mines that sunk or crippled about 1350 allied vessels, suggesting each 165 mines deployed should sink or cripple an RN Vessel.

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1. How the hell do you propose to lay those mines and replace the ones that have been swept when you have the Royal navy on the loose? Large surface vessels are not an option and would light units be able to deliver sufficient mines? That leaves the Luftwaffe which is somehow meant to be doing a hundred million different things at once...
2. Presumably that 1350 allied vessels includes a lot of merchantmen rather than warships.
3. Your figure ingores the fact that the poms are not just going to be blundering wildly through the minefields... once a minefield is located a passage will be swept.

Later still improvised 'artificial harbors' were designed and built to be carried in sections across the channel and erected in conjunction with captured ship hulks sunk to create 'breakwaters'. Given 1-year preparations with planning, design and experimentation, followed by at least 6 months construction effort, and finished off with months of exercises and training, all these could have been completed.

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But is that not completely removed from OTL Op Seelowe? Also would not that same 18 months allow the poms to fully reequip the army and fighter command?

But given poor British Morale and usual incompetence, the Germans have a real good chance of pulling Sealion off.

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Poor British moral? While I am aware that the moral of the poms wasn't as high as commonly depicted they were still far from breaking.
"Usual incompetence"? Idiot, we are talking about a completely different set of british generals to the Boer War and WW1. Need I remind you that a matter of months later the British sent the Italians reeling back across North Africa... Or perhaps you will argue that doesn't show anything but then I suggest you remind yourself that when the Africa Corp got there it didn't break the poms, after all both sides spent the better part of two years repeatedly pushing each other back and fowards across North Africa.

Cockroach, we could start by noting that esl's statistics on RN forces is way off, that his presumed effectiveness of small craft with machine guns against proper warships is absurd, and that his report on Luftwaffe effectiveness as Dunkirk is completely worthless.

His estimates on supplies as planned for and as needed by the Germans are also way off, with 20K tons actually being far below what was needed for 4 days operations by the first echelon alon. Not to mention that sea levels 4 would have wiped out the barges.

As to where he got this insane idea that the Germans were not depending on seizing one or more functioning ports but actually intended to destroy them all...

Just one more thing I would like to point out everybody dismisses the Local Defense Volunteers but they did contain a core of WW1 veterans who had already beaten the Germans once and resented the constant jibes that it was not a real victory as there was an armistice not a surrender. Then the younger members would have fought with the same the same level of training and determination as the Hitler Jungen in the battle of Normandy only with a lot more motivation.

I read one S****** scenario that involved a crossing in mid July, while France was still being subjugated. I presume such a scenario would have been impossible anyway, but let's say the Germans have slightly better naval forces than in OTL, and they cross at that stage, without waiting on air superiority. What are their chances of at least landing?

Calgacus said:

I read one S****** scenario that involved a crossing in mid July, while France was still being subjugated. I presume such a scenario would have been impossible anyway, but let's say the Germans have slightly better naval forces than in OTL, and they cross at that stage, without waiting on air superiority. What are their chances of at least landing?

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Mid-July? France was defeated mid-June, so what do you mean "still being subjugated"? Or did you mean mid-June? The original link says:

Thus, any Sealion which takes as its Point of Departure the premise that German forces attempted to cross in the immediate aftermath of Dunkirk has to answer the following questions:

1. How are troops transported?
2. How will the Germans cope with contested air?
3. What is going to prevent the RN from interfering?
4. Once ashore, how will the German forces be resupplied?

Do you want to answer those questions?

The Dean said:

Just one more thing I would like to point out everybody dismisses the Local Defense Volunteers but they did contain a core of WW1 veterans who had already beaten the Germans once and resented the constant jibes that it was not a real victory as there was an armistice not a surrender. Then the younger members would have fought with the same the same level of training and determination as the Hitler Jungen in the battle of Normandy only with a lot more motivation.

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Can you back up your assertion that the LDV was an effective fully equipped and trained fighting force, and not a rag tag bunch of weekend warriors that were at best poorly trained (If trained at all) poorly equipped and most imprtant of all poorly armed (many had shotguns .22 rifles and but the bulk had nothing).

Also in the context of the LDV which was not a military organization but a civilian militia what are the rammification to them if they engage in armed combat with German and are captured would they be considered POW or Partisans and shot on the spot.

But that is the point the Germans in WWI wre not defeated they did not sign a treaty of unconditional surrender but an armistice, there is a big difference, and the bulk of LDV were of dad's army quality and kids, imagine them coming up against battle hardened troops of the Wehrmacht i imagine it would be a slaughter.

Paul Edwards said:

Mid-July? France was defeated mid-June, so what do you mean "still being subjugated"? Or did you mean mid-June? The original link says:

Thus, any Sealion which takes as its Point of Departure the premise that German forces attempted to cross in the immediate aftermath of Dunkirk has to answer the following questions:

1. How are troops transported?
2. How will the Germans cope with contested air?
3. What is going to prevent the RN from interfering?
4. Once ashore, how will the German forces be resupplied?

Do you want to answer those questions?

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Answer to some of your questions.

1. The first wave of troops were to be the 7th Flieger Division these were to be deployed by air drop and also glider borne, then follow up deployment of the 22nd Luftlande Division, it's primary function was to construct airfields and to assist the 7th Flieger Division in securing RAF airfields such as Lympne and Hawkinge thus allowing the initial supply of troops and equipment by air.

2. In an alternate senario the Luftwaffe concentrates on a combination of tactical and strategic attacks, tactical inso far as to attack RAF air fields plus known British army positions and anti invasion ports, and strategic attacks such as destroying the weapons factories especially of Supermarine and Hawker-Siddley (Spitfire and Hurricane production and maintenance), and not forgetting vital railway and road juncture at Canterbury and Ashford.

3. That is tough one there, but one point that the First Sea Lord Sir Dudley Pound had expressly forbidded any use of capital ships for anti-invasion role, they were to used exclusively for the evacuation of the Royal Family and the Government and all assets, this also included, Battlecruisers, heavy cruisers and aircraft carriers, leaving the light cruisers and destroyers and other light vessels to defend Britain, plus i have read that the Schlesswig-Holstien and Schlessian plus the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau would be sacrificed to protect the invasion fleet even if both the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were'nt ready so that gives the KM four capital ships + the incomplete Bismarck. But also the KM and Luftwaffe had plans to extensively mine the Dover Straits sealing off the Dover Staits and making it a suicide mission for the RN to enter it.

4. Intially by air, but once the intial beacheads are secured by the landing parties they would use Folkestone and Hythe harbours plus the beaches as supply dumps, but they did expect that Dover would certainly be out of action for some time.

I hope this is good enough.

Regards

Roddoss72 said:

Answer to some of your questions.

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Ok, most of that is above my head, so I'll let someone else answer. But I have some follow-up questions.

1. The first wave of troops were to be the 7th Flieger Division these were to be deployed by air drop and also glider borne, then follow up deployment of the 22nd Luftlande Division, it's primary function was to construct airfields and to assist the 7th Flieger Division in securing RAF airfields such as Lympne and Hawkinge thus allowing the initial supply of troops and equipment by air.

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Did the RAF not even have the ability to destroy their own airfields if they were captured by the Germans? And as well as capturing the RAF airfields the Germans are able to construct new airfields of their own? Is it so easy to construct airfields?! Maybe our government should employ some of these Germans to do construction work here.

2. In an alternate senario the Luftwaffe concentrates on a combination of tactical and strategic attacks, tactical inso far as to attack RAF air fields plus known British army positions and anti invasion ports, and strategic attacks such as destroying the weapons factories especially of Supermarine and Hawker-Siddley (Spitfire and Hurricane production and maintenance), and not forgetting vital railway and road juncture at Canterbury and Ashford.

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And why do you expect them to be more successful than they were in the Battle of Britain?

3. That is tough one there, but one point that the First Sea Lord Sir Dudley Pound had expressly forbidded any use of capital ships for anti-invasion role, they were to used exclusively for the evacuation of the Royal Family and the Government and all assets, this also included, Battlecruisers, heavy cruisers and aircraft carriers, leaving the light cruisers and destroyers and other light vessels to defend Britain, plus i have read that the Schlesswig-Holstien and Schlessian plus the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau would be sacrificed to protect the invasion fleet even if both the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were'nt ready so that gives the KM four capital ships + the incomplete Bismarck. But also the KM and Luftwaffe had plans to extensively mine the Dover Straits sealing off the Dover Staits and making it a suicide mission for the RN to enter it.

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Ok, so for the Germans to win in this July timeframe, it requires the British to maintain a policy of evacuation rather than fighting for their lives? I really can't see British leaders being so callous. I don't think the Royal family would have a bar of it either. They would go down in history as the most hated people in Britain, and would lose office. Also, the British had minesweepers to get rid of any laid mines. Are you sure you can make it suicide for the British? But presumably at the same time, the British can't lay mines of their own to make it suicide for the German invasion? Also, can you give me an exact date for the Germans to fly in and the exact date for the sea invasion? Also, can the barges be assembled in the timeframe you are talking about?

4. Intially by air, but once the intial beacheads are secured by the landing parties they would use Folkestone and Hythe harbours plus the beaches as supply dumps, but they did expect that Dover would certainly be out of action for some time.

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So the British wouldn't be able to blow up these harbours and the RAF wouldn't be able to bomb them even if they fell to the Germans undamaged?

Like I said, I'm a real amateur here, so my questions may be stupid. I hope someone else can defend that original article (assuming it is correct).