Suppose the Germans realize the infeasibility of the Unmentionable Sea Mammal and instead plan a small raid somewhere along the British coast. Is this possible?
Suppose the Germans realize the infeasibility of the Unmentionable Sea Mammal and instead plan a small raid somewhere along the British coast. Is this possible?
Suppose the Germans realize the infeasibility of the Unmentionable Sea Mammal and instead plan a small raid somewhere along the British coast. Is this possible?
Why would they do that?
I suppose that's one way of getting rid of a Pocket Battleship or Heavy Cruiser you don't want.Yes, It would be a gamble but the Germans would have to be willing to risk using at least a heavy cruiser or Pocket Battleship to support the raid. The Germans could get some fire support form their long range heavy artillery based in France. It would have to be a quick action designed to inflict some humiliation on the British. It would also require the use of a lot of elite German troops.
First Sealord of the Admiralty , Pound wrote a letter to Churchill on 15th August 1940 reporting that they could not prevent upto 100,000 German troops landing on British Soil in Port to Port invasions. All they could guarantee was to be able to cut of any resupply. Churchill agreed but put the figure at 50,000 troops. It would be up to the British Army to contain these and defeat them with RAF support.
British maritime and naval survillance around the UK waters was next to useless. Historically there were upwards of one thousand vessels in UK waters on any given month and at best their so called survaillance system could count on detecting and intercepting only 1 out of every 7 vessels. By 1941 this had improved somewhat to 1 out of every 4 detected and intercepted, but it would not be until 1943 that the situation would reverse itself so that 3 out of 4 vessels in these waters were intercepted.
In the Norway invasion the Germans were able to position a large number of supply and troop ships in the sealanes undetected days before the April 9th invasion deadline.
First Sealord of the Admiralty , Pound wrote a letter to Churchill on 15th August 1940 reporting that they could not prevent upto 100,000 German troops landing on British Soil in Port to Port invasions. All they could guarantee was to be able to cut of any resupply. Churchill agreed but put the figure at 50,000 troops. It would be up to the British Army to contain these and defeat them with RAF support.
British maritime and naval survillance around the UK waters was next to useless. Historically there were upwards of one thousand vessels in UK waters on any given month and at best their so called survaillance system could count on detecting and intercepting only 1 out of every 7 vessels. By 1941 this had improved somewhat to 1 out of every 4 detected and intercepted, but it would not be until 1943 that the situation would reverse itself so that 3 out of 4 vessels in these waters were intercepted.
In the Norway invasion the Germans were able to position a large number of supply and troop ships in the sealanes undetected days before the April 9th invasion deadline.
Propoganda value, perhaps? Showing that the Kriegsmarine can plant troops on british soil despite the best efforts of the much-vaunted royal navy? .
First Sealord of the Admiralty , Pound wrote a letter to Churchill on 15th August 1940 reporting that they could not prevent upto 100,000 German troops landing on British Soil in Port to Port invasions. All they could guarantee was to be able to cut of any resupply. Churchill agreed but put the figure at 50,000 troops. It would be up to the British Army to contain these and defeat them with RAF support.
British maritime and naval survillance around the UK waters was next to useless. Historically there were upwards of one thousand vessels in UK waters on any given month and at best their so called survaillance system could count on detecting and intercepting only 1 out of every 7 vessels. By 1941 this had improved somewhat to 1 out of every 4 detected and intercepted, but it would not be until 1943 that the situation would reverse itself so that 3 out of 4 vessels in these waters were intercepted.
In the Norway invasion the Germans were able to position a large number of supply and troop ships in the sealanes undetected days before the April 9th invasion deadline.
But just WHAT is your source for saying the RN light craft were useless? 1 in 7, in the areas of interest, is simply not the case. Not to mention the fact theye were going out as far as just off the French invasion ports to see what was hapenning.
Why would they do that?
Did the Germans ever plan or attempt a raid on Britain similar to the commando raids on St Nazaire, Lofotten Islands and Bruneval. A series of small succesful raids on airfields or Radar installations would have had tremendous propaganda value and might have forced a nervous UK government to keep more forces at home. Meaning no modern tanks, guns or planes for Africa.
After failure of BoB to keep Britain more on it's toes? To divert more RN ships to Channel area? If raids are made together with E-boats and offensive mining they might have some minor effect upon RN destroyer strength which was already being attrited at rapid pace in 1940-1941. Certainly not war-winning measure, but might be useful in sense of keeping more British troops in Britain.