WI Sealion Attempted

Tyr · Sep 16, 2008

Yes, we all know its destined to fail. Its been discussed many a time. One potentially interesting thing though that never gets discussed amidst the 'ASBS ALERT ARGHHHH!' though is WI the Nazis (rarely the brightest people in the world) tried anyway....
WI...Rather than switching to bombing cities the Germans keep at the RAF and effectivly manage to wipe it out (in southern England) as a credible force. Then they decide to launch sealion...

Exactly how much could they throw at Britain (and so lose)? Effects for the war?

karl2025 · Sep 16, 2008

It could help the Nazis in the long run. They've now lost too much to really make an attack on the USSR practical, and when Hitler starts preparing for it, the Generals might show him the door for being so callous with their men's lives. Instead they throw their forces into the Balkans (To bail out Italy) and then to North Africa, trying to win enough to call for peace and settle for avenging their previous loss.

whatisinaname · Sep 16, 2008

Leej said:
Yes, we all know its destined to fail. Its been discussed many a time. One potentially interesting thing though that never gets discussed amidst the 'ASBS ALERT ARGHHHH!' though is WI the Nazis (rarely the brightest people in the world) tried anyway....
WI...Rather than switching to bombing cities the Germans keep at the RAF and effectivly manage to wipe it out (in southern England) as a credible force. Then they decide to launch sealion...

Exactly how much could they throw at Britain (and so lose)? Effects for the war?

Hi Leej

Try this link - http://www.geocities.com/drammos/sealion1.html
You might find this TL interesting?

Thanks

Whatisinaname

strangeland · Sep 16, 2008

karl2025 said:
It could help the Nazis in the long run. They've now lost too much to really make an attack on the USSR practical, and when Hitler starts preparing for it, the Generals might show him the door for being so callous with their men's lives. Instead they throw their forces into the Balkans (To bail out Italy) and then to North Africa, trying to win enough to call for peace and settle for avenging their previous loss.

Not necessarily: Hitler is going to attack the USSR eventually. It might delay his attack by a year and a half or so, but it won't stop him from doing it. Meanwhile, the defeat of Sealion will provide a tremendous morale boost for the British.

Anaxagoras · Sep 16, 2008

If the Germans attempted Sealion and failed, might this result in a political need to eliminate the British before attacking the USSR? Or perhaps Hitler's ego would demand another attempt at an invasion in 1941?

Fletch · Sep 16, 2008

Anaxagoras said:
If the Germans attempted Sealion and failed, might this result in a political need to eliminate the British before attacking the USSR? Or perhaps Hitler's ego would demand another attempt at an invasion in 1941?

The question I would find most interesting would be how many German troops would be lost in a failed invasion attempt? Think about it. Should Germany lose 80,000-200,000 combat troops dead or POW, it would be a bigger defeat than Stalingrad and Hitler would no longer be seen as infalible and this would be before Barbarosa.

strangeland · Sep 16, 2008

FletcherofSaltoun said:
The question I would find most interesting would be how many German troops would be lost in a failed invasion attempt? Think about it. Should Germany lose 80,000-200,000 combat troops dead or POW, it would be a bigger defeat than Stalingrad and Hitler would no longer be seen as infalible and this would be before Barbarosa.

The German armed forces actually lost over 500,000 men in the Stalingrad Campaign; the Axis allies lost at least as many.

In a failed Sealion, the KM would be gutted, the Luftwaffe would suffer heavy losses (though probably not much worse than it did in the Battle of Britain OTL), and the river barges, which the Germans planned to use to ferry the wehrmarcht to England, would suffer heavy losses, not only from the RN, but also from the stormy seas of the English channel. All of these would hurt the German war effort far worse in the long run than the loss of several divisions worth of combat troops.

CalBear · Sep 16, 2008

Loses would, of course, be catastrophic.

The German expected to send 27 divisions (less their heavy equipment) by towed river barge (two barges per tug, with the rafts for the 4,000 horses being towed behind some of the barges (Yes, that was the ACTUAL plan. You couldn't make this stuff up!) and land four airborne divisions on the flanks of the landing zones. 160K troops & 20K sailors. At the time the landing was scheduled, the Germans were still 4,000 boat handlers short, even after pulling cadre from every combat ship in the Kreigsmarine.

A semi educated guess at results?

Difficulty 1: Only 20-30% of the paras would be fully trained (see Airborne Operations, A German Appraisal at the U.S. Army history site for the gritty details). Operational (not enemy action related)losses for the paras (including those who were not qualified and dropped without personal weapons) 35%

Difficulty 2: The barges (much less the RAFTS) were not seaworthy. Lack of skilled boat handlers. Operational losses (not enemy action related): 10% If a storm catches the invasion at sea during the THIRTY HOURS the passage will take, all bets are off. Think Pharaoh and the Reed Sea.

Difficulty 3: Plan is for the paras to arrive at the same time as the seaborne force. The seaborne force that has been at sea for 30 hours in the ENGLISH Channel. RAF would still be a force in being, even if it had been force north, out of range of the German bombing, meaning the Luftwaffe has, at best, air parity. Radar still works. Chance of the paras achieving surprise ZERO. Losses before reaching ground: 30% Think Sainte-Mère-Église writ large.

Difficulty 4: The barges will take 30 hours (minimum) to reach England. The entire Home Squadron can make it to the Thames from Scapa Flow before the first barge makes it to the beach. The RN will have a minimum of four battleships, 10 CA/CL and 40+ DD ready to surge south on a couple hours notice. There will also be around 40 RN subs on patrol, mainly U Class, but still ready for action. This force accounts for the ships sent out in response to that Germany diversions

Losses (best case): Luftwaffe outperforms USN at Midway and only one BB & a few cruisers make it to the invasion area in time. Only XVI Army 1st wave is caught in open water. 15% losses before the first German solder even sees the beach.

Middle (and most likely) case: Home Squadron arrive mostly intact but finds target rich environment with German invasion barges coming out of Brugges, Dunkirk, Calais, Boulogne bobbing like decoys on a pond and sets to work. XVI army obliterated, Minor losses inflicted on XI & VI by subs and patrol destroyers.

Worst Case: Home Squadron arrives and deploys into three battle groups, each centered on two BB/BC with five cruisers and a dozen or so destroyers each with several cruisers and destroyers out as scouts/pickets. RAF gains temporary air superiority allowing FAA torpedo planes and dive bombers access. Think Pharaoh's Army & the Red Sea.

Troops reaching beach

Best Case: Beachhead is established with overall depth of five miles. Holds for 60 days before being crushed when supplies run out. Three Heer soldiers in ten returns in German Dunkirk operation.10K KIA 60K PoW. Losses of sailors on small boats 5,000 KIA/PoW. Half of invasion flotilla get back to France before the RN can find it at sea

Middle Case. As above but supplies are gone in a month with 20% making it home 15K KIA 55K PoW. Half of small boat handlers lost/PoW

Worst case: 70K KIA (75% by drowning), 60K PoW, remaining 30K either never leave France or manage to get back to UK.

Direct results:

Generals von Rundstedt, Model, Busch arrested & probably executed; Generals von Manstein, Heitz, Strauss and others KIA/PoW. Significant damage to German tactical operations for rest of war.

Invasion of Greece delayed.

Crete does not fall. Loss of virtually entire paratroop force over the Channel or to English PoW camps eliminates desire to try another high risk landing.

Afrika Corps not dispatched in February 1941. Troops can not be spared. Units will be used to replace lost XVI Army.

Somewhat more cautious Heer invades USSR missing numerous very successful combat commanders.

Hitler wasn't going to be deposed. He held the security services in his hands.

Tyr · Sep 17, 2008

Good post. Should probally be a standard reply to the WI Sealion worked threads.
I never thought of Africa...hmm...that's one easy victory for Britain if they're just fighting Italians.

Karlos · Sep 17, 2008

Should also consider the importance of the british losses.
As we know, the RAF and the RN would make an all-out effort against the invaders. That means that the british would lose a lot of planes and a lot of ships, putting their fleet under Luftwaffe range.
After the failed invasion, the RN and the RAF still would have to escort convoys and defend airspace, how would the losses affect their capacity to do so? How would this afect the Mediterranean, North Africa and Middle East, specially if the germans decide to go after them for political face-saving? The british army can suffer also, but it is not as important as the danger of invasion would be completly gone.

Michele · Sep 17, 2008

CalBear said:
Loses would, of course, be catastrophic.

Yes.

The German expected to [...] land four airborne divisions on the flanks of the landing zones.

Sorry, what four airborne divisions?

bill_mchale · Sep 17, 2008

Assuming the Germans were not completely out of their minds (well at least as much as possible with that invasion plan), they don't even attempt it unless the RAF has been effectively neutralized as a fighting force. Figure the Germans had to be in a position where they could throw at least 5 BF-109s at every Hurricane or Spitfire that gets off of the ground. With that kind of operational superiority the Royal Navy would probably be devastated by the Stukas.

Most of the rest of the scenario plays out, the airborne losses, would be bad, the seaborn aspect of the invasion would be even worse. The British would almost certainly throw the Germans off the invasion beaches. It might have been the biggest invasion debacle since Stamford Bridge in 1066.

After the invasion attempt, Hitler would almost certainly have been forced to put his invasion plans on hold. He probably could have held on to power, but he is not going to be able to overcome General Staff resistance to an Invasion of Russia. He might even be forced to the bargaining table with England... making concessions about restoring France, etc to make peace.

--
Bill

HJ Tulp · Sep 17, 2008

Calbear: I totally agree. Adding to that is the fact that those barges the British would sink were originally used for transport across Europe. When they were gathered for Sealion it already greatly disrupted the logistic system. If those aren't returned the German logistic system faces a meltdown in 1941.

Jozon · Sep 17, 2008

Karlos said:
Should also consider the importance of the british losses.
As we know, the RAF and the RN would make an all-out effort against the invaders. That means that the british would lose a lot of planes and a lot of ships, putting their fleet under Luftwaffe range.

And the Germans would lose not only a large number of planes and ships/barges (which would not only hurt their efforts in killing convoys later on, but the loss of the Rhine barges will likely have a large economic impact as well), but a large number of troops as well.
Lots of troops captured, lots of troops killed (both on the ground and in transit in the Channel), and a HUGE propaganda victory for the British.

After the failed invasion, the RN and the RAF still would have to escort convoys and defend airspace, how would the losses affect their capacity to do so? How would this afect the Mediterranean, North Africa and Middle East, specially if the germans decide to go after them for political face-saving? The british army can suffer also, but it is not as important as the danger of invasion would be completly gone.

But at this point, the Germans don't have many subs, and of the ones they did have, almost all took part in Sealion, trying to block the Channel and pick off British ships. They will have suffered heavy losses as well.

Fellatio Nelson · Sep 17, 2008

The only realistic downside being fewer RN convoy escorts against a (largely untouched?) U-boat flotilla, had the RN been suffered heavy losses to aircraft.

Perhaps Germany increases production of submarines, having vindicated pointlessness of investing in any major surface units. Whether this would create problems during a window of c. 6-12 months when the British increased production to meet losses, who knows? More likely that the UK could be forced to sue due to lack of supplies than succumb to invasion, but that's highly debatable.

Soren · Sep 18, 2008

CalBear said:
Loses would, of course, be catastrophic.

The German expected to send 27 divisions (less their heavy equipment) by towed river barge (two barges per tug, with the rafts for the 4,000 horses being towed behind some of the barges (Yes, that was the ACTUAL plan. You couldn't make this stuff up!) and land four airborne divisions on the flanks of the landing zones. 160K troops & 20K sailors. At the time the landing was scheduled, the Germans were still 4,000 boat handlers short, even after pulling cadre from every combat ship in the Kreigsmarine.

I'm sorry but those figures are way off. As Michele (welcome back) as already asked what 4 airborne divisions? The 1st wave consisted of the forward elements of 9 Infantry & Mountain divisions. The main force of 6 divisions would land 2 reinforced regiments while the smaller landing planned at Brighton used approx 1 regiment out of each of the 3 divisions involved. The 7th Flieger Div would also be used. Even adding in the complete planned 2nd & 3rd waves doesn't give you 27 sea landed + 4 airborne divisions. On your figures of 31 divisions = 160k troops gives just over £5k troops per division, does that sound right to you?

A semi educated guess at results?

Difficulty 1: Only 20-30% of the paras would be fully trained (see Airborne Operations, A German Appraisal at the U.S. Army history site for the gritty details). Operational (not enemy action related)losses for the paras (including those who were not qualified and dropped without personal weapons) 35%

Difficulty 2: The barges (much less the RAFTS) were not seaworthy.

Oh good, I keep hearing the same old story about lack of sea worthiness regarding the landing barges & nothing to back it up. Schenk gives the barge specifications as requiring being able to operate in sea state 2 with in practice operations sea state 5 presenting little difficulty.

Lack of skilled boat handlers. Operational losses (not enemy action related): 10% If a storm catches the invasion at sea during the THIRTY HOURS the passage will take, all bets are off. Think Pharaoh and the Reed Sea.

Difficulty 4: The barges will take 30 hours (minimum) to reach England. The entire Home Squadron can make it to the Thames from Scapa Flow before the first barge makes it to the beach. The RN will have a minimum of four battleships, 10 CA/CL and 40+ DD ready to surge south on a couple hours notice. There will also be around 40 RN subs on patrol, mainly U Class, but still ready for action. This force accounts for the ships sent out in response to that Germany diversions.

Or you could look at actual RN deployments. The light cruisers & destroyers at Portsmouth & Plymouth together with the Revenge hardly have to head south while the part of the Home FLEET based at Rosyth = Nelson, Rodney, Hood, 2 X Dido's + DD's (approx 12 without checking exact figure). The only other capital ship in Home waters is the Repulse at Scapa.

.

I'm not going to argue that Sea Lion as planned would be anything other than a disaster for the Germans but some of the facilies that 'keep doing the rounds' are scary. I'll try a dig my copy of Schenk up ASAP to show the planned landing fleets didn't rely solely on towed unpowered barges with horses transported on rafts.

Michele · Sep 18, 2008

Soren said:
I'm not going to argue that Sea Lion as planned would be anything other than a disaster for the Germans but some of the facilies that 'keep doing the rounds' are scary. I'll try a dig my copy of Schenk up ASAP to show the planned landing fleets didn't rely solely on towed unpowered barges with horses transported on rafts.

Thank you for welcoming me.
A few issues.

1. The German infantry regiments of the first wave would be reinforced in that _some_ of these divisional groups would come with an attached Tauchpanzer battalion. OTOH they would be understrength if we look at the number of men and vehicles (for instance, the 35. Infanteriedivision's 1st wave would have had two regiments plus the recon bicycle battalion, but it was going to have only 6,750 men – while two standard regiments in a 1. Welle Infanteriedivision would have some 7,200 men between them alone). Additionally, those panzers have to make up for the complete lack of any artillery worth the name.

2. The unreliability and low seaworthiness of the barges, especially the unpowered ones, is proved by the one exercise the Germans made with them, in calm seas, daylight with good visibility, over a short distance, and of course with nobody shooting at them. About 10% of the vessels never reached the shore. A couple capsized. Several ran aground parallel to the beach, which meant that the ramp could not be lowered and that it would not be that easy to move them off the beach at high tide to use them again.

3. Yes, one could look at the actual Royal Navy deployments. I see you warn you haven't checked the figures for the Home Fleet. The other poster is wrong in the details (calling that the Home Squadron, stating it was based in Scapa Flow), but he's roughly correct, and actually somewhat conservative in numbers if we just take the units that might rush South in the North Sea (from Scapa Flow, Rosyth, Humber, Harwich and Sheerness): 4 between BBs and BCs, 12 CAs, CLs and AA CLs, 38 DDs and 15 DE. And 1 CV. Then, as you correctly point out, there are the units already in the Channel, which can alone make mincemeat of the German armada. And then one should look at spare DDs in places like Belfast or Liverpool or the Firth of Clyde. And then, should Seelöwe come to pass, the British would have several days of notice and would recall the units on convoy duties close enough in the Western Approaches to make it to the great event.

4. In general, when one refers to Schenk, one would be more careful not to talk about a thing, say a barge, as it was in reality, but about how it was in the German planner's ideas. The description of the latter, not of the former, is what one finds in Schenk, and I'm not saying this to fault him; he wrote a book about the German plans, and he simply doesn't seem to give too much importance to the question of whether the plans were adequate to reality. And more often than not, there was a gap between the two.

CalBear · Sep 18, 2008

Soren said:
I'm not going to argue that Sea Lion as planned would be anything other than a disaster for the Germans but some of the facilies that 'keep doing the rounds' are scary. I'll try a dig my copy of Schenk up ASAP to show the planned landing fleets didn't rely solely on towed unpowered barges with horses transported on rafts.

Perhaps I miscounted the Divisions?

I did check it couple times, but it wouldn't the first time I miscounted/miscalulated when combining independent units in Divisional sized units. In any case, here is my source documentation. (In this case from axishistory.com, but it seems to be a generally accepted OOB)

FIRST WAVE
XIII Army Corps: General der Panzertruppe Heinric h-Gottfried von Vietinghoff genannt
Scheel (First-wave landings on English coast between Folkestone and New Romney) –
Luftwaffe II./Flak-Regiment 14 attached to corps
• 17th Infantry Division: Generalleutnant Herbert Loch
• 35th Infantry Division: Generalleutnant Hans Wolfgang Reinhard
VII Army Corps: Generaloberst Eugen Ritter von Schobert
Luftwaffe I./Flak-Regiment 26 attached to
corps
• 1st Mountain Division: Generalleutnant Ludwig Kübler
• 7th Infantry Division: Generalleutnant Eccard Freiherr von Gablenz
SECOND WAVE
V Army Corps:
• 12th Infantry Division: Generalmajor Walter von Seydlitz-Kurzbach
• 30th Infantry Division: General der Infanterie Kurt von Briesen
XXXXI Army Corps: General der Panzertruppe Georg-Hans Reinhardt
• 8th Panzer Division: Generalleutnant Adolf Kuntzen – Luftwaffe Light Flak-Abteilung 94 attached to division
• 10th Panzer Division: Generalleutnant Ferdinand Schaal – Luftwaffe Light Flak-Abteilung 71 attached to division
• 29th Infantry Division (Motorized): Generalmajor Walter von Boltenstern – LuftwaffeLight Flak-Abteilung 76 attached to division
• Infantry Regiment “Großdeutschland”: Oberst Wilhelm- Hunold von Stockhausen
• Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler Regiment: SS-Obergruppenführer Josef “Sepp” Dietrich
THIRD WAVE
IV Army Corps: General der Infanterie Viktor von Schwedler
• 24th Infantry Division: Generalmajor Hans von Tettau
• 58th Infantry Division: Generalmajor Iwan Heunert
XXXXII Army Corps: General der Pionere Walter Kuntze
• 45th Infantry Division: Generalleutnant Friedrich Materna
• 164th Infantry Division: Generalmajor Josef Folttmann

9th Army

(General der Artillerie Christian Hansen’s X Army Corps headquarters staff
with the attached Luftwaffe I./Flak-Regiment 29 was in addition allocated to the 9th Army for use with the first-wave troops)
FIRST WAVE
XXXVIII Army Corps: General der Infanterie Erich von Lewinski genannt von Manstein
(First-wave landings on English coast between Bexhill and Eastbourne) – Luftwaffe
I./Flak-Regiment 3 attached to corps
• 26th Infantry Division: Generalleutnant Sigismund von Förster
• 34th Infantry Division: Generalmajor Werner Sanne
VIII Army Corps: Luftwaffe I./Flak-Regiment 36 attached to corps
• 6th Mountain Division: Generalmajor Ferdinand Schörner
• 8th Infantry Division: Generalleutnant Rudolf Koch-Erpach
• 28th Infantry Division: Generalmajor Johann Sinnhuber

SECOND WAVE
XV Army Corps: Generaloberst Hermann Hoth
• 4th Panzer Division: Generalmajor Willibald Freiherr von Langermann und Erlencamp –Luftwaffe Light Flak-Abteilung 77 attached to division
• 7th Panzer Division: Generalmajor Erwin Rommel – Luftwaffe Light Flak-Abteilung 86 attached to division
• 20th Infantry Division (Motorized): Generalleutnant Mauritz von Wiktorin – LuftwaffeLight Flak-Abteilung 93 attached to division

THIRD WAVE
XXIV Army Corps: General der Panzertruppe Leo Freiherr Geyr von Schweppenburg
• 15th Infantry Division: Generalleutnant Ernst-Eberhard Hell
• 78th Infantry Division: Generalleutnant Curt Gallenkamp

Airborne Formations

7th Flieger-Division (Parachute): Generalmajor Richard Putzier
1. Kampfgruppe “Meindl” was to land at Hythe, secure crossings over the Royal MilitaryCanal at and west of Hythe and advance along the line from Hythe rail station to
Saltwood to prevent any flanking moves by the British.
2. Kampfgruppe “Stentzler” led by Major Edgar Stentzler
These two groups would be timed to drop as the landing craft carrying 17th InfantryDivision hit the beach near Folkestone.
3. Kampfgruppe “Bräuer” was to drop an hour later south of Postling. This enlargedgroup would consist of a complete parachute battalion, a parachute engineer battalion, the antitank company of FJR1, all of FJR2 and FJR3, and an extra battalion as divisional reserve.

22nd Air Landing Infantry Division: Generalleutnant Hans Graf von Sponeck (under OKH control, but temporarily placed under the command of the 16th Army on 20 September1940)

Bau-Lehr-Regiment z.b.V. 800 “Brandenburg”

16th Army Area of Operations

6th Army

Commander-in-Chief: Generalfeldmarschall Walther von Reichenau

6th Infantry Division
256th Infantry Division, commanded by

OKH Reserves

These divisions, comprising the Fourth Wave, were to be designated on S-10 Day.

Submersible/Amphibious Tanks

Three battalions were allocated to the 16th Army and one battalion to the 9th Army. As of 29 August 1940, the four battalions, lettered A-D, totaled 160 PzKpfw III (U) submersible tanks with 37mm guns, 8 PzKpfw III (U) submersible tanks with 50mm guns, 42 PzKpfw IV (U) submersible tanks with 75mm guns, and 52 PzKpfw II (Schwimm) amphibious tanks with 20mm guns. The battalions were organized into three
companies of four platoons each. **

Luftwaffe
Luftflotte 2

(cooperating with the 16th Army)
Commander-in-Chief: Generalfeldmarschall Albert Keßelring
II. Flakkorps – Commanding General: Generalleutnant Otto Deßloch

• Flak- Regiment 6 (Ostende): Oberstleutnant Georg von Gyldenfeldt
• Flak- Regiment 136 (Boulogne): Oberstleutnant Alexander Nieper
• Flak- Regiment 201 (Calais): Oberstleutnant Adolf Pirmann
• Flak- Regiment 202 (Dunkirk): Oberstleutnant Donald von Alten

Luftflotte 3

(cooperating with the 9th Army)
Commander-in-Chief: Generalfeldmarschall Hugo Sperrle
I. Flakkorps – .This Flakkorps also controlled those Luftwaffe Flak elements attached to the corps and divisions of the 9th Army (see that army’s OOB).
Flak-Brigade I: Generalmajor Walther von Axthelm
• Flak- Regiment 102: Oberstleutnant Otto Stange
• Flak- Regiment 103: Oberst Alfred Kuprian
Flak-Brigade II: Oberst Erich Kressmann
• Flak- Regiment 101: Oberstleutnant Johann-Wilhelm Doering-Manteuffel
• Flak- Regiment 104: Oberst Hermann Lichtenberger

While the Heer was not relying solely on barges, the reliance was extremely high. The equipment was supposed to be capable of handling sea state 2, what it was actually capable of, in mid-Channel, in the fall or winter, is unknown as it was never tried.

As far as the RN forces, you give them credit for one more capital ship (five vs. four) than in my post. Regarding total number of DD and or CA/CL in place the number is a constant variable, as is the availability of the RN carriers. The more warning available would, of cource, allow for great concentration of forces. I assumed a "no warning" bolt from the blue, which, while extremely unlikely, is also the best case for the Heer. If there is any reasonable warning, as one would expect, the British would be able to recall major fleet units from the Med, off convoy duty, etc. That would obviously make the worst case suppositions likely the best case.