Subject: President Irvine Lenroot--part one (introduction) Date: 16 Jul 2001 05:27:33 GMT From: dtenner@ameritech.net (David Tenner) Organization: http://extra.newsguy.com Newsgroups: soc.history.what-if Sorry if I'm a little bit heavy on the factual background here, but after all the man I am discussing is not exactly a household word. I'm sure a lot of you are asking "Irvine *who*?" and that would have been my own reaction not long ago. Anyway, I have recently been reading Herbert F. Margulies, *Senator Lenroot of Wisconsin: A Political Biography 1900-1929* (Columbia and London: U. of Missouri Press 1977). As Magulies notes in the Preface: "When Irvine L. Lenroot died in January 1949, one event in his eighty-year life was remembered in the obituaries. Lenroot, according to the papers and magazines, was the man chosen by the Republican Senate oligarchs of 1920 as vice-presidential running mate for Warren G. Harding, only to be turned down by the rebellious delegates favoring Calvin Coolidge. But for the unprecedented act of delegate independence, the obituaries noted, Lenroot would have become president on Harding's death in 1923. The reader could presume further that he would have been elected in his own right in 1924, as Coolidge was. "These stories were not inaccurate and their presumptions were reasonable. If they tended to underplay other less sensational aspects of Lenroot's life, they nevertheless did focus on one of the more valid and important might- have-beens in American history..." So let me examine three questions: (1) Who was Irvine Lenroot, and how did he become a serious contender for the GOP vice-presidential nomination in 1920? (2) Why didn't he get the nomination, and what is a good POD for allowing him to get it? (3) What kind of president would he have made, especially compared to Coolidge? I will devote this post to the first question. Irvine Lenroot was born in Superior, Wisconsin in 1869 of Swedish immigrant parents. He began his political career as a strong supporter of Robert La Follette, Senior. In 1908 he won election to Congress on a platform calling for downward revision of the tariff, antitrust legislation, stricter regulation of railroads, conservation--in short, the standard progressive agenda of the day. As a freshman Congressman, he took part in the "insurgent" rebellion against Speaker "Uncle Joe" Cannon. However, in 1912 his relations with La Follette began to cool, Lenroot thinking La Follette blinded by hatred of Roosevelt. After Taft won the nomination, Lenroot said that as a candidate of the Republican party, he could not join the new Progressive party, but he would not support Taft "as I consider that the circumstances of his nomination were such that no party obligation is entailed upon any Republican to support him." After Wilson's victory, Lenroot moved closer to regular Republicans, opposing the Underwood Tariff, accusing Congressional Democrats of using the same authoritarian methods Joe Cannon had once used, etc. He still considered himself a progressive and an advocate of stronger anti-trust and conservation measures. He hoped for the Republicans to nominate a moderate progressive like Charles Evans Hughes who he thought could unify regulars and ex-Bull Moosers. When Hughes was nominated, Lenroot was disturbed by La Follette's failure to back him (in fact, La Follette almost explicitly endorsed Wilson). If the rift between Lenroot and La Follette widened in 1916, it became a chasm in 1917-18 because of the war issue. In many states, it required courage to vote against the declaration of war. In heavily German-American Wisconsin, it took courage to vote for it. Lenroot was one of only two Wisconsin Congressmen to vote for the war. In a 1918 special election, Lenroot ran for the Senate, first defeating a La Follette-backed candidate (James Thompson) in the primary by 73,186 to 70,722. (Lenroot gladly accepted the support of the conservative or "stalwart" faction of the state GOP; he explained that he had had his disagreements with them in the past and would no doubt have them in the future, but for now the only issue was "loyalty.") Lenroot then proceeded to win the April special election, with 163,983 votes to the Democrat Joseph E. Davies' 148,923 and an impressive 110,487 for the Socialist Victor Berger (whose denunciations of the "capitalist war" attracted many German-American voters). (That 1918 race is itself an interesting what-if, for if Davies had won, the Democrats could have retained control of the Senate after November--and Gilbert M. Hitchcock rather than Henry Cabot Lodge would have been chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. Davies might well have won if not for the inept intervention of President Wilson and Vice-President Marshall. First, Wilson wrote a letter endorsing Davies and implicitly questioning Lenroot's Americanism because of his pre-1917 votes for things like the McLemore resolution (warning Americans against traveling on armed belligerent ships). This helped bring Thompson voters around to supporting Lenroot. Then Marshall came to Wisconsin and gave an amazingly intemperate speech: "Your state of Wisconsin is now under suspicion. You Republicans have made the issue here in Wisconsin. If the vote at the primary is based upon the charges and counter charges you have made each against the other, you are about half for America, half for the kaiser and all against Wilson. Your self appointed leaders are now trying to convince the loyal half that the really important thing is not loyalty or disloyalty, but party success. Having purified the stream in the primary you welcome the sewage to help you over the election." Lenroot, Marshall added, was "now bidding for the vote of the German sympathizer , the traitor, the seditionist, the pacifist." Margulies is surely being restrained when he calls Wilson's and Marshall's tactics "monumental errors of political judgment.") After being elected to the Senate, Lenroot continued to make a moderately progressive record, favoring for example a prohibitive tax on child labor. He tried to salvage the League of Nations with mild reservations. By 1920, he was widely spoken of as a likely GOP vice-presidential nominee... (Part Two to be posted soon.) -- David Tenner dtenner@ameritech.net Subject: President Irvine Lenroot--part two (why the delegates wouldn't be Badgered) Date: 22 Jul 2001 00:50:41 GMT From: dtenner@ameritech.net (David Tenner) Organization: http://extra.newsguy.com Newsgroups: soc.history.what-if The standard explanation for why Irvine Lenroot did not win the GOP vice- presidential nomination in 1920 is that the delegates were not going to allow an oligarchy of Republican senators to dictate the choice of the vice- presidential as well as presidential candidate. This explanation, though by no means totally false, is oversimplified. Specifically, what it ignores is the following: (1) The idea that Harding's nomination was put through by a clique of senators meeting in a "smoke-filled room" is a myth--though it was a myth that many of the delegates believed, and the fact that they believed it did hurt the chances of a senator getting the vice-presidential nomination. (2) Lenroot was hurt not only by the perception of him as the choice of a "senatorial clique" but by widespread anti-Wisconsin prejudice among the delegates. (3) Most important: despite the resentments against both the "senatorial clique" and the state of Wisconsin, Lenroot very likely still could have gotten the vice-presidential nomination if he had really wanted it. To go through these points, one by one: (1) With respect to the legend of the "smoke-filled room": the famous conference in the Blackstone Hotel suite shared by Republican national chairman Will Hays and publicist George Harvey was actually not so much a conference as an open house, presided over by Harvey, and attended at one time or another by many party leaders, most of them senators. During the course of the long evening of Friday, June 11, the attendees considered various "dark horse" alternatives to the front-runners, General Leonard Wood and Governor Frank Lowden of Illinois. There had been four inconclusive ballots taken at the convention, and while it could not yet be said that the delegates were hopelessly deadlocked, it was obvious that both of the front- runners were greatly flawed. A recent senatorial investigation had revealed both of them, especially Wood, had spent huge sums of money. And some of the Lowden money had been used to bribe two delegates from Missouri. In discussing alternatives to Wood and Lowden, one of the names that came up was Irvine Lenroot. (He had been much mentioned by reporters because of his prominence in the League fight--where he was something of an intermediary between the Mild Reservationists and Lodge--the blessing that TR had placed on him, the strength that his progressivism would bring the party in the West, and the fact that he had powerful friends in the East.) The chief objection to him was that he came from Wisconsin, and that name connotated La Follette, Berger, "and who not else that is obnoxious." Paradoxically, Lenroot was handicapped both by being from La Follette's home state (and having once been a close associate of his) and by "not being supported by his own state" (whose delegates favored La Follette). The name that was mentioned more than any other at the suite was that of Warren G. Harding. But it would be misleading to say that at the time the "conference" broke up (around 1 AM Saturday morning) there had been any firm consensus in favor of Harding. As Robert K. Murray has pointed out, there were sixteen senators who were delegates to the convention, and "If a definite pro-Harding decision had been reached in the Blackstone suite the night before, thirteen senators inexplicably continued to vote against him on the first four ballots on Saturday morning [i.e., ballots five through eight]. Even after the convention reconvened for the ninth ballot on Saturday afternoon and rumors were flying of an impending Harding victory, only three of the thirteen switched to Harding, leaving ten still voting for other candidates. Far from supporting Harding, a few of these, such as Lodge, used the Saturday recess to attempt the creation of a stop-Harding movement. Senator Boies Penrose, who continued to support Knox before belatedly turning to Harding, did not agree to free the Pennsylvania delegation for the Ohioan until after the eighth roll call. Even this move was not finally consummated until the final [tenth] ballot." (*The Harding Era*, p. 39) Why the legend of the senatorial cabal, then? For one thing, it is probably true that Harding's name was more discussed at the Blackstone suite than that of any other candidate. (He was, after all, the most obvious choice, given that he was from the pivotal state of Ohio, and given the disadvantages the other "dark horses" had--Hoover was not yet sufficiently Republican, Knox was from the wrong state and had voted against the 18th and 19th Amendments, Johnson was disliked by many Easterners, Hays was too young, etc.) In rumors reaching the delegates, this was exaggerated into the notion that "they" (the party leaders) had already decided on Harding. The senatorial delegates themselves encouraged this belief by quickly spreading the word *after* Harding's victory that their Ohio colleague had always been their choice. So sure were many ordinary delegates that a conspiracy had occurred that they were likely to revolt against any further sign of dictation. Which brings us back to Irvine Lenroot... (2) Lenroot had been talked about as a vice-presidential prospect before the convention met, but nothing could be decided until the first place was filled. Even those in Harvey's "smoke-filled room" had deferred consideration of the matter. It was not until Saturday afternoon that a conference of Republican leaders started to consider the question. Actually, they at first met to consider the presidency--which would have been odd if Harding had already been decided on in the "smoke-filled room" the night before. But when they heard at 3 PM that Lowden was withdrawing they all assumed that Harding was a certainty and began considering the vice- presidency. After learning that Johnson was unavailable, they began considering the remaining prospects one by one. The governor of Kentucky was too close to Harding geographically. Governor Calvin Coolidge of Massachusetts was discussed but put aside, perhaps because he was too close to Harding ideologically. A western progressive, it was suggested, would be a good way to balance the ticket. Irvine Lenroot, well respected among his fellow senators (who were more than adequately represented at the conference) and a progressive but not an "extreme" one, was an obvious choice. Senator Medill McCormick, a friend of Lenroot's despite their differences over the League (McCormick was an Irreconcilable) asked for the privilege of nominating him. First, however, Lenroot would have to accept. However, when approached by McCormick, Lenroot declined the offer. He said that he would rather stay in the Senate than be vice-president--and he now rightly believed that he could win a full term in November. Senators after all wielded far greater power than vice-presidents. And someone was needed to provide responsible, progressive opposition to La Follette "radicalism" in Wisconsin. Besides, even if Lenroot were to lose the Senate race, that wouldn't be so bad. He was 51; his wife Clara was 63; it might be a good idea to go back to practicing law and earning some money toward retirement. At least that would be better than to be "shut up in the vice president's chair." The conference dispersed without reaching a decision. Meanwhile, the expected swing to Harding was proceeding. Word came that Governor Henry Allen of Kansas would be nominated for vice-president (not coincidentally, Kansas shifted its votes to Harding on the ninth ballot). McCormick and Borah, however, persuaded the man who was to make the nomination (Senator James Watson of Indiana) that the Kansas industrial court was anathema to organized labor and that a Harding-Allen ticket would lose much of the labor vote. McCormick assembled a group of party elders-- including Borah, Harding's manager Harry Daugherty, Hert of Kentucky, Wadsworth of New York, Watson, and several others--and again pushed for Lenroot. The group agreed. Again, an attempt was made to get Lenroot's acceptance. Hays, who had been present when Lenroot had earlier rejected the offer, now tried to make it as attractive as possible. He quoted Harding as saying that the office would be more than honorary--Lenroot would sit with the Cabinet and help to make policy. He also appealed to Lenroot's party loyalty--the nomination would be made in a few minutes. Would Lenroot go before the convention and reject the nomination? Lenroot restated his objections, but he finally agreed to consult with his wife and some friends and to return with his answer. By this time Harding had already been nominated and McCormick excitedly nominated Lenroot for vice-president. He was seconded by, among others, Senator Calder of New York. But during McCormick's speech someone cried out "Coolidge! Coolidge!" and after Calder uttered the words "of Wisconsin" following Lenroot's name, another voice shouted "not on your life." Wisconsin--the state whose delegates each day held themselves righteously apart; which voted for La Follette when nobody else would; and which had within the hour refused to make Harding's nomination unanimous--was not exactly the most popular state at the convention. By contrast, when Coolidge's name was placed in nomination, a loud cheer went up, and there were many seconding speeches. Coolidge won with 674 1/2 votes to 146 1/2 for Lenroot. (Lenroot got only 2 votes from Wisconsin; the other 24 went to Asle Gronna of North Dakota, who had La Follette's support.) (3) So does it follow that Lenroot never had a chance, that he was doomed by anti-senatorial and anti-Wisconsin sentiment? Not necessarily. Hays later told Lenroot that if he had accepted the offer of the earlier conference, during the recess, there would have been time to get word to the delegates that Lenroot was the choice, not just of a "Senate cabal" but of the presidential nominee, which was quite another matter. Marguiles concludes that "if Harding's preference had been made forcefully clear, nothing else would have mattered--neither Wisconsin's unpopularity nor the conservatism of the delegates and the popularity of Coolidge nor the smoldering resentment against the senators." (*Senator Lenroot of Wisconsin*, p. 331) In other words, whereas I had thought that to get Lenroot the vice- presidential nomination some POD would be necessary that would do away with the Boston police strike, or make Coolidge a non-candidate or a less attractive candidate, it may be that the only POD necessary would be for Lenroot to actually want the job, and make that known in time. (Yet I am not so certain of this as Marguiles. After all, a majority of the delegates were originally for Wood or Lowden. This does not mean Harding was "forced" on them by a cabal--as I have indicated, he was a logical choice once it was clear neither Wood nor Lowden could get the nomination. But that does not mean that the delegates were so enthusiastic about Harding that they would necessarily have accepted whoever he wanted as vice-president.) Whether, if nominated, Lenroot would have accepted we do not know, and perhaps *he* did not know since the Coolidge stampede made the matter moot before he could get back to Hays. Later, acknowledging that he would have become president in 1923 had he been nominated as vice-president, he expressed no regrets. What kind of president Lenroot would have made, and in particular how he would have differed from Coolidge, will be discussed in part three. -- David Tenner dtenner@ameritech.net Subject: Re: President Irvine Lenroot--part two (why the delegates wouldn't be Badgered) Date: 22 Jul 2001 02:18:07 GMT From: congyoglas@aol.comgentboss (President Chester A. Arthur) Organization: AOL http://www.aol.com Newsgroups: soc.history.what-if References: 1 This is some cool stuff. President Chester A. Arthur, the anti-Rutherford Hayes Subject: President Irvine Lenroot--part three (the Lenroot era--1923-?) Date: Mon, 13 Aug 2001 19:24:13 GMT From: dtenner@ameritech.net (David Tenner) Organization: Prodigy Internet http://www.prodigy.com Newsgroups: soc.history.what-if As I pointed out previously, Senator Irvine Lenroot of Wisconsin almost certainly could have had the Republican vice-presidential nomination in 1920 had he accepted the offer early enough to make it clear to the delegates that he had the support not only of the "Senatorial cabal" but of Harding. Had he been nominated, he would of course have been elected, and would have become president on Harding's death in 1923. So the question arises, What kind of president would he have been, especially compared to Coolidge? First, we have to ask how long Lenroot would have served as president. He almost certainly could have had the nomination in 1924 had he wanted it-- there would no doubt be some Republicans who would regard him as too progressive (there were similar reservations about Lenroot's friend Hoover in 1928), but he had for years been drawing closer to party regulars, and in the wake of the Harding scandals, dumping an incumbent who had a reputation for integrity--and who might offset La Follette's presumed appeal to Midwestern farmers--was highly unlikely. (Again, we must remember that the 1924 election in OTL was not known *in advance* to have been a sure thing. There was considerable concern that Democratic victories in the Southern and border states combined with La Follette victories in the Midwest and West might throw the election into the House.) Besides, an incumbent Republican president can always count on patronage to get him plenty of Southern delegates at the convention, as Taft showed in 1912. What complicates things, however, is that in the early summer of 1924, Lenroot's wife Clara became seriously ill, and did not fully recover until early 1926. Lenroot was a devoted husband, and it is possible that in view of his wife's condition he would have decided not to run in 1924. In that case, I would say that Hoover would be most likely to win the nomination (his great prestige with the public would override any concerns some party regulars still felt about him), though there might also be movements for Dawes (who in OTL was Harding's personal favorite as a successor) and maybe even dark horses like Calvin Coolidge of Massachusetts... However, let's assume Lenroot does run--say, he committed himself to it before Clara became ill, and he (and she) felt that he could not back off now. (Especially with a third party candidacy by his Wisconsin rival La Follette looming.) He would be president until at least March 1929. It is possible that unlike Coolidge he would choose to run in 1928, but I doubt it, especially since his friend Hoover was available as a successor. (Lenroot does not seem to have been the kind of man with a burning desire to be president, anyway. In August 1923, just after Harding's death, when it was not yet clear that Coolidge would be a candidate in 1924, and some people were talking about Lenroot as a possible candidate, Lenroot wrote Clara that "I'm afraid if elected it would be disastrous for you and probably for me, and I'd rather have a few more years of happiness with you than be President.") So, assuming the Lenroot administration lasts from 1923 to 1929, what kind of administration would it be? Judging from his record in the Senate, his positions on the issues would be as follows: (1) Foreign policy--Lenroot had been generally regarded as a Mild Reservationist on the League but by 1921 he accepted that US membership was a lost cause. He did however support US membership on the World Court, and was one of the leading defenders of the Four Power Pact, the most controversial of the Washington Conference treaties. In fact, along with his Prohibitionism, his support of the World Court (or what its opponents liked to call the "League Court") may have been the biggest factor in his defeat for re-election to the Senate in 1926. (Governor Blaine, who defeated him in the primary, even got the surreptitious support of the Ku Klux Klan, thanks to the World Court issue, despite the fact that Blaine was a "wet" on Prohibition.) Lenroot also defended against La Follette, Borah and others an agreement with Great Britain by which her war debts might be paid over a long term at low interest. In short, Lenroot was in general accord with Harding- Coolidge foreign policy, which was not as "isolationist" as is sometimes portrayed. There *was* one Lenroot idea on foreign policy that could have made a difference. In 1922, he argued for a world conference to cope with problems arising from the unrealistic reparations burden that had been placed on Germany. If Harding had died earlier than in OTL, and if President Lenroot could have arranged for such a conference with US participation, might the 1923 occupation of the Ruhr and German hyperinflation have been avoided? (If so, one important consequence might have been Wilhelm Marx beating Hindenburg for Reich president in 1925.) In OTL, of course, the US did involve itself in the reparations issue through the Dawes and Young plans, but by that time, German middle class sentiment had been permanently poisoned against the Republic. (2) Tariffs--Lenroot like most Republicans was a protectionist, but a much less extreme one than many. In various speeches in 1921, he noted that the US "had become a creditor nation, had a favorable balance of trade, and possessed about a third of the world's gold supply. Unless she bought foreign goods, she would have no market for surpluses of agricultural or manufactured goods. In the Senate debate, Lenroot stressed something else. The average farmer, as consumer, had more to lose from high duties on the things he bought than he could hope to gain from protection of his products." Herbert F. Margulies, *Senator Lenroot of Wisconsin: A Political Biography 1900-1929*, pp. 353-4. In the end Lenroot was one of five Senate Republicans to vote against the Fordney-McCumber Act. The problem is that by the time Lenroot would have become president, Fordney- McCumber would have already been enacted and there would not be much President Lenroot could do about it, except to use some of the "flexible tariff" features of the Act in a less protectionist way than Coolidge. But that would probably have little effect on the overall US economy. And in OTL in at least one instance, Lenroot persuaded Coolidge to use the flexible tariff provisions to *increase* a tariff--as one would expect from a Wisconsin senator, it was on butter. (Incidentally, if Lenroot had been vice-president in 1921, Fordney-McCumber might have been worse than it was; as a senator, Lenroot had forced a lowering of some of the highest rates proposed in the House version of the bill, and it is doubtful that he would have had the same power as vice-president.) (3) Taxation--Lenroot was a key figure in getting the Revenue Act of 1921 enacted. He favored repeal of the excess profits tax, but thought that Mellon's proposal to reduce the maximum surtax from 65 to 32 percent went too far. He also opposed the attempt of Senator Smoot, backed by many eastern Republicans, to enact a one percent tax on manufacturers' gross income (in effect, a form of sales tax). As Margulies writes, on the whole, contrary to the widespread view that Mellon's conservative views were enacted in the tax legislation of the 1920s, the Revenue Act of 1921 was a victory for moderate Republicans like Lenroot: "They warded off the sales tax on the one hand, and on the other, the continuation of the tax on excess profits along with prohibitive wartime rates." p. 349 Mellon was more successful in 1926; the Revenue Act of that year trimmed the maximum surtax from 40 to 20 percent, wiped out the gift tax, and cut the estate tax in half. Again, Lenroot thought that Mellon was going too far, but this time his attempts to amend the Act were unsuccessful. Very likely President Lenroot would not have retained Mellon as Secretary of the Treasury, and he would probably have arrived at a compromise with Congress that would have left the top rate lower than 40 percent (as in the 1921 Act) but higher than 20 percent. (4) Interest rates--Lenroot was a strong opponent of the Federal Reserve Board's "easy money" low interest rate policies of the mid-1920s, which he thought were encouraging a speculative boom on Wall Street. (It was Hoover who aroused Lenroot to action on this issue.) Lenroot suggested to Federal Reserve officials that the matter might come up for discussion in the Senate, and this threat may have had something to do with a temporary tightening by the Fed. But the Fed reverted to an easy money policy in 1927. Assuming that President Lenroot could, through appointments or through behind-the-scenes pressure, modify the Fed's easy money policy, this would be of great importance *if* you accept the theory that the Fed's policy in OTL led to the speculative Wall Street boom, which led to the stock market crash, which led to the Great Depression. But even if you accept the first two links in this chain, the third one is dubious--as 1987 shows, there can be stock market crashes without even a recession immediately following, let alone a decade-long depression. (5) Agriculture--Lenroot supported legislation to encourage farm cooperatives but opposed the Farm Bloc's panacea, the McNary-Haugen Act, and would no doubt have vetoed it as Coolidge did in OTL. (McNary-Haugen was a scheme to help farmers through a government corporation which would buy up their surpluses and dump them abroad or keep them off the market until prices rose. It was very popular among farmers, though economists generally agreed with Coolidge that it would not work, and that the guaranteed higher prices would just encourage larger surpluses.) (6) Economy in government--Like many old Progressives, Lenroot was a big fan of economical "businesslike" government. After all, La Follette in 1898 had declared that "Never in the history of this state was there a more urgent demand for reducing expenditures at the state capitol and in all the state institutions to an economical business basis." This was a belief Lenroot retained all his life and one reason why, like so many other Progressives, he would later object to the deficit financing of the New Deal. (But it was also a reason he objected to tax breaks for "special interests" which he believed too many conservatives supported.) To sum up: Lenroot viewed himself as seeking a middle ground between "standpattism" and "radicalism." In some ways, he was like Hoover, and if that comparison suggests that a Lenroot presidency would be a failure, one must remember that (a) Lenroot was much more politically savvy and liked by GOP leaders than Hoover (whose 1918 appeal for a Democratic Congress was never forgotten by some Republicans), and (b) in any event, even a Hoover presidency of 1923-1929 might have been much more successful than the one of 1929-1933. All in all, the US could have (and has had...) considerably worse presidents than Irvine Lenroot. -- David Tenner dtenner@ameritech.net Subject: Re: President Irvine Lenroot--part three (the Lenroot era--1923-?) Date: 14 Aug 2001 14:19:13 -0700 From: mtk1701@chek.com (Mike Keating) Organization: http://groups.google.com/ Newsgroups: soc.history.what-if References: 1 dtenner@ameritech.net (David Tenner) wrote in message news:<90FC9365Ddtennerameritechnet@news.chi.sbcglobal.net>... So, assuming the Lenroot administration lasts from 1923 to > 1929, what kind of administration would it be? Does Lenroot then make a public statement refusing to run in 1928, like Coolidge did? There was no 23rd Amendment then, and even if there was, he'd still be eligible for another term, having served less than half of Harding's. Subject: Re: President Irvine Lenroot--part three (the Lenroot era--1923-?) Date: Tue, 14 Aug 2001 22:54:44 GMT From: dtenner@ameritech.net (David Tenner) Organization: Prodigy Internet http://www.prodigy.com Newsgroups: soc.history.what-if References: 1 , 2 Mike Keating wrote in <9275b533.0108141319.42255500@posting.google.com>: >dtenner@ameritech.net (David Tenner) wrote in message news:<90FC9365Ddtennerameritechnet@news.chi.sbcglobal.net>... > So, assuming the Lenroot administration lasts from 1923 to >> 1929, what kind of administration would it be? > >Does Lenroot then make a public statement refusing to run in 1928, >like Coolidge did? There was no 23rd Amendment then, and even if >there was, he'd still be eligible for another term, having served less >than half of Harding's. > It would certainly be possible for Lenroot to run (and win) again in 1928. However, my impression from Margulies' bigoraphy is that by the mid-1920s Lenroot wanted to get back into private life. He decided to run again for the Senate in 1926 only reluctantly, and only because he thought it his duty to stop La Follette "radicalism" in his state; his friends told him that he was the only man who could beat Governor John Blaine, who had the La Follettes' backing. I don't think he would feel any such need to run again for the presidency in 1928, inasmuch as his good friend Hoover was the heir-apparent and was favored to beat any Democratic candidate. -- David Tenner dtenner@ameritech.net Subject: Re: President Irvine Lenroot--part three (the Lenroot era--1923-?) Date: 15 Aug 2001 09:01:27 GMT From: mwstone@aol.com (mike stone) Organization: AOL, http://www.aol.co.uk Newsgroups: soc.history.what-if References: 1 >From: dtenner@ameritech.net (David Tenner) > >There *was* one Lenroot idea on foreign policy that could have made a >difference. In 1922, he argued for a world conference to cope with problems >arising from the unrealistic reparations burden that had been placed on >Germany. If Harding had died earlier than in OTL, and if President Lenroot >could have arranged for such a conference with US participation, might the >1923 occupation of the Ruhr and German hyperinflation have been avoided? (If > >so, one important consequence might have been Wilhelm Marx beating Hindenburg > >for Reich president in 1925.) In OTL, of course, the US did involve itself >in the reparations issue through the Dawes and Young plans, but by that time, > >German middle class sentiment had been permanently poisoned against the >Republic. > One possibility. Is there any way he could have been "paired" with Philander Knox (another potential Dark Horse in 1920) instead of Harding? If so, he becomes President a good deal earlier, as Knox died in October 1921 -- Mike Stone - Peterborough England Last words of King Edward II. "I always said that Roger Mortimer was a pain in the - - - AAARGHH!!!"