Subject: A Left SR Russia Date: 14 Jan 2001 02:58:54 GMT From: dtenner@ameritech.net (David Tenner) Organization: http://extra.newsguy.com Newsgroups: soc.history.what-if In this newsgroup, there has been discussion of all sorts of alternative outcomes for the Russian Revolution--the February Revolution crushed and the Tsar staying in power; the Provisional Government surviving; Kornilov coming to power; the Whites winning the Civil War, etc. However, one possibility I don't recall our having discussed is a Russia governed by the Left Socialist Revolutionaries (Left SRs). Oliver Radkey, one of the leading historians of the SRs, has noted that "The martyrs of Social Revolutionism were more often than not the left SR's, since they stayed and took it while other SR's were finding refuge in Paris and in Prague. Their competition was peculiarly unwelcome to the Bolsheviks because of the combination of genuine revolutionary fervor with championship of the peasant cause. As a result, they were smashed by a regime which always insisted on having its left flank clear..." *The Sickle under the Hammer: The Russian Socialist Revolutionaries in the Early Months of Soviet Rule* (New York and London: Columbia University Press 1963). The Left SRs supported the October Revolution, they joined Sovnarkom as the Bolsheviks' coalition partner (after first pressing unsuccessfully for a coalition government of all the socialist parties), and they even approved of the dispersal of the Constituent Assembly (in which they were poorly represented, the lists of candidates having been decided on before the "Lefts" had split off from the SR party). For all these reasons, they have been condemned as being (until Brest-Litovsk) tools of the Bolsheviks. Yet in fact they had numerous differences with the Bolsheviks: (1) The Left SRs were a genuinely pro-peasant party; for the Bolsheviks, concessions to the peasantry were at best a tactical matter until the peasants could be proletarianized. (2) For the Left SRs, "all power to the soviets" meant all power to genuinely independent soviets, not soviets manipulated from above. (3) The Left SR People's Commissar of Justice, I. N. Steinberg was a strong critic of the repressive methods of the Cheka, and did his best to prevent an all-out Red Terror during his period in office. (OTOH, I am skeptical of the claim of some supporters of the Left SRs that the only reason the Left SRs stayed on in the Cheka even after the party had withdrawn from Sovnarkom was to mitigate Bolshevik terror. At least one historian, Alter L. Litvin, has concluded that "The presence of the Left SRs in the Cheka did nothing to lessen the terror. An examination of the minutes of the Cheka Presidium between January and June 1918 shows that the Bolsheviks and Left SRs were unanimous in their decisions." Litvin, "The Cheka," in Edward Acton, Vladimir Iu. Chernaev, and William G. Rosenberg, *Critical Companion to the Russian Revolution 1914-1921* [Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana UP 1997], p. 316) The immediate occasion of the breach between the Left SRs and Bolsheviks was Brest-Litovsk. The Left SR withdrawal from Sovnarkom has been criticized as removing an obstacle to one-party dictatorship by the Bolsheviks, but it boosted the Left SRs' popularity immensely. In the spring of 1918, all sorts of opponents of the Bolsheviks and the treaty-- Left SR, SR, and Menshevik--made big gains in elections to the soviets. The Left SRs with their heavy peasant support (in what was after all a predominantly peasant country) thought they could achieve a majority at the Fifth Congress of Soviets that would assemble on July 6, 1918. Between April and the end of June, membership of the party went from 60,000 to 100,000. Lenin, however, frustrated the Left SRs' plans by having Bolshevik- organized "Committees of Poor Peasants" proclaim that they had the right to represent at the Congress all those districts where local soviets had not been "cleansed of kulak elements and had not delivered the amount of food laid down in the requisitioning lists of the Committee of Poor Peasants." (Quoted in Geoffrey Swain, *The Origins of the Russian Civil War*, p. 176) This blatant manipulation assured the Bolsheviks of a majority at the Fifth Congress of Soviets. Deprived of their democratic majority, the Left SRs resorted to terror: they assassinated the German ambassador, Mirbach, hoping that this would force a renewal of the war. When Dzerzhinsky demanded that the assassins be turned over for arrest, the Left SRs in the Cheka arrested him instead. At this point the Left SRs could easily have seized power. They had 2,000 well-armed troops in Moscow, compared to 700 loyal to the regime. The bulk of the Latvian Rifles, the only reliably pro-Bolshevik military unit in the capital, were celebrating St. John's Day on the outskirts of Moscow, and were unable to get back because of poor weather. Lenin was as defenseless as Kerensky had been in October. The Left SRs, however, did not press home their military advantage (by seizing the Kremlin) largely because they did not really want to seize power. What they wanted was to set off a popular uprising that would force the resumption of the war. Just where the uprising would lead, they did not know; they would leave that to the "revolutionary creativity of the masses." In any event, the Bolsheviks were able to capture the Left SR headquarters, liberate Dzerzhinsky, and arrest the Left SR Central Committee. Steinberg later said that the uprising had failed "not because [the] leaders were not brave enough, but because it was not at all their purpose to overthrow the government." Indeed, it is ridiculous to accuse Left SR leaders like Maria Spiridinova of timidity. (As a 20 year old, she had shot and killed a brutal Tsarist official, and was sentenced to death-- which however the Tsar commuted to life imprisonment. In 1937, arrested in Stalin's Great Purge, she refused to yield to torture, and denied the charges of "counterrevolutionary conspiracy." Sentenced to 25 years in prison, she was shot in 1941.) The problem with Spiridinova, Kamkov (also executed under Stalin) and other Left SR leaders was not lack of courage but lack of political judgment. Suppose the Left SRs had indeed successfully put through their own "October" in July 1918--no nonsense about the "revolutionary creativity of the masses"? There would be an immediate resumption of the war with the Germans, but with the critical situation on the Western Front, the Germans could hardly seize all of Russia, and if need be the new government could retreat to the east. The new government would, at least at first, be very popular with middle peasants, who resented grain requisitioning and the "Committees of the Poor." Also, they might get the support of the remaining pro-war Bolsheviks. The problem is that they did not have much of a military force of their own. Would they be able to make common cause with the Czechoslovak Legion and its Right SR allies? They would agree on the war, but there were plenty of other things on which Left and Right SRs still disagreed--in particular, rule by soviets versus the Constituent Assembly. -- David Tenner dtenner@ameritech.net Subject: Re: A Left SR Russia Date: Sun, 14 Jan 2001 05:24:23 GMT From: raharris1973@my-deja.com Organization: Deja.com Newsgroups: soc.history.what-if References: 1 In article <9028D8458dtennerameritechnet@enews.newsguy.com>, dtenner@ameritech.net (David Tenner) wrote: > In this newsgroup, there has been discussion of all sorts of alternative > outcomes for the Russian Revolution--the February Revolution crushed and > the Tsar staying in power; the Provisional Government surviving; Kornilov > coming to power; the Whites winning the Civil War, etc. However, one > possibility I don't recall our having discussed is a Russia governed by the > Left Socialist Revolutionaries (Left SRs). > > Oliver Radkey, one of the leading historians of the SRs, has noted that > "The martyrs of Social Revolutionism were more often than not the left > SR's, since they stayed and took it while other SR's were finding refuge in > Paris and in Prague. Their competition was peculiarly unwelcome to the > Bolsheviks because of the combination of genuine revolutionary fervor with > championship of the peasant cause. As a result, they were smashed by a > regime which always insisted on having its left flank clear..." *The Sickle > under the Hammer: The Russian Socialist Revolutionaries in the Early > Months of Soviet Rule* (New York and London: Columbia University Press > 1963). > > The Left SRs supported the October Revolution, they joined Sovnarkom as the > Bolsheviks' coalition partner (after first pressing unsuccessfully for a > coalition government of all the socialist parties), and they even approved > of the dispersal of the Constituent Assembly (in which they were poorly > represented, the lists of candidates having been decided on before the > "Lefts" had split off from the SR party). For all these reasons, they have > been condemned as being (until Brest-Litovsk) tools of the Bolsheviks. Yet > in fact they had numerous differences with the Bolsheviks: (1) The Left > SRs were a genuinely pro-peasant party; for the Bolsheviks, concessions to > the peasantry were at best a tactical matter until the peasants could be > proletarianized. (2) For the Left SRs, "all power to the soviets" meant > all power to genuinely independent soviets, not soviets manipulated from > above. (3) The Left SR People's Commissar of Justice, I. N. Steinberg was a > strong critic of the repressive methods of the Cheka, and did his best to > prevent an all-out Red Terror during his period in office. (OTOH, I am > skeptical of the claim of some supporters of the Left SRs that the only > reason the Left SRs stayed on in the Cheka even after the party had > withdrawn from Sovnarkom was to mitigate Bolshevik terror. At least one > historian, Alter L. Litvin, has concluded that "The presence of the Left > SRs in the Cheka did nothing to lessen the terror. An examination of the > minutes of the Cheka Presidium between January and June 1918 shows that the > Bolsheviks and Left SRs were unanimous in their decisions." Litvin, "The > Cheka," in Edward Acton, Vladimir Iu. Chernaev, and William G. Rosenberg, > *Critical Companion to the Russian Revolution 1914-1921* [Bloomington and > Indianapolis: Indiana UP 1997], p. 316) > > The immediate occasion of the breach between the Left SRs and Bolsheviks > was Brest-Litovsk. The Left SR withdrawal from Sovnarkom has been > criticized as removing an obstacle to one-party dictatorship by the > Bolsheviks, but it boosted the Left SRs' popularity immensely. In the > spring of 1918, all sorts of opponents of the Bolsheviks and the treaty-- > Left SR, SR, and Menshevik--made big gains in elections to the soviets. > The Left SRs with their heavy peasant support (in what was after all a > predominantly peasant country) thought they could achieve a majority at the > Fifth Congress of Soviets that would assemble on July 6, 1918. Between > April and the end of June, membership of the party went from 60,000 to > 100,000. > > Lenin, however, frustrated the Left SRs' plans by having Bolshevik- > organized "Committees of Poor Peasants" proclaim that they had the right to > represent at the Congress all those districts where local soviets had not > been "cleansed of kulak elements and had not delivered the amount of food > laid down in the requisitioning lists of the Committee of Poor Peasants." > (Quoted in Geoffrey Swain, *The Origins of the Russian Civil War*, p. 176) > This blatant manipulation assured the Bolsheviks of a majority at the Fifth > Congress of Soviets. > > Deprived of their democratic majority, the Left SRs resorted to terror: > they assassinated the German ambassador, Mirbach, hoping that this would > force a renewal of the war. When Dzerzhinsky demanded that the assassins > be turned over for arrest, the Left SRs in the Cheka arrested him instead. > At this point the Left SRs could easily have seized power. They had 2,000 > well-armed troops in Moscow, compared to 700 loyal to the regime. The bulk > of the Latvian Rifles, the only reliably pro-Bolshevik military unit in the > capital, were celebrating St. John's Day on the outskirts of Moscow, and > were unable to get back because of poor weather. Lenin was as defenseless > as Kerensky had been in October. > > The Left SRs, however, did not press home their military advantage (by > seizing the Kremlin) largely because they did not really want to seize > power. What they wanted was to set off a popular uprising that would force > the resumption of the war. Just where the uprising would lead, they did > not know; they would leave that to the "revolutionary creativity of the > masses." In any event, the Bolsheviks were able to capture the Left SR > headquarters, liberate Dzerzhinsky, and arrest the Left SR Central > Committee. > > Steinberg later said that the uprising had failed "not because [the] > leaders were not brave enough, but because it was not at all their purpose > to overthrow the government." Indeed, it is ridiculous to accuse Left SR > leaders like Maria Spiridinova of timidity. (As a 20 year old, she had > shot and killed a brutal Tsarist official, and was sentenced to death-- > which however the Tsar commuted to life imprisonment. In 1937, arrested in > Stalin's Great Purge, she refused to yield to torture, and denied the > charges of "counterrevolutionary conspiracy." Sentenced to 25 years in > prison, she was shot in 1941.) The problem with Spiridinova, Kamkov (also > executed under Stalin) and other Left SR leaders was not lack of courage > but lack of political judgment. > > Suppose the Left SRs had indeed successfully put through their own > "October" in July 1918--no nonsense about the "revolutionary creativity of > the masses"? There would be an immediate resumption of the war with the > Germans, but with the critical situation on the Western Front, the Germans > could hardly seize all of Russia, and if need be the new government could > retreat to the east. The new government would, at least at first, be very > popular with middle peasants, who resented grain requisitioning and the > "Committees of the Poor." Also, they might get the support of the > remaining pro-war Bolsheviks. The problem is that they did not have much > of a military force of their own. Would they be able to make common cause > with the Czechoslovak Legion and its Right SR allies? They would agree on > the war, but there were plenty of other things on which Left and Right SRs > still disagreed--in particular, rule by soviets versus the Constituent > Assembly. > > -- > David Tenner > dtenner@ameritech.net > Good one. Thoughtful. Political consensus in Russia is going to be hard to find, but one thing will be pretty certain, the Allies will not support alternate White factions, but will hope everyone works together for the war effort. The Right SR's might forgive the left, once they do in the Bolesheviks, perhaps not. Maybe it just give the Right SRs a chance to take power, but they will support many similar objectives. Either type of SR regime should get along with the Czechs fine. > Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/ Subject: Re: A Left SR Russia Date: Mon, 15 Jan 2001 14:19:29 +0000 From: Anthony Mayer Organization: Dept. of Computing, Imperial College, UK Newsgroups: soc.history.what-if References: 1 David Tenner wrote: > Steinberg later said that the uprising had failed "not because [the] > leaders were not brave enough, but because it was not at all their purpose > to overthrow the government." Indeed, it is ridiculous to accuse Left SR > leaders like Maria Spiridinova of timidity. Indeed. The Left SR revolt seems to me to betray the same sort of lack of judgement as the July Days. > Suppose the Left SRs had indeed successfully put through their own > "October" in July 1918--no nonsense about the "revolutionary creativity of > the masses"? There would be an immediate resumption of the war with the > Germans, but with the critical situation on the Western Front, the Germans > could hardly seize all of Russia, and if need be the new government could > retreat to the east. The new government would, at least at first, be very > popular with middle peasants, who resented grain requisitioning and the > "Committees of the Poor." Also, they might get the support of the > remaining pro-war Bolsheviks. The problem is that they did not have much > of a military force of their own. Would they be able to make common cause > with the Czechoslovak Legion and its Right SR allies? I think not. At this stage the accumulated differences will too great for anything but the most superificial of alliances, and then only if the Germans resumed the march east. I think the real question is how this effects the war. I suspect that Great Russian nationalists/partiots like Brusilov would trust a government that insisted on a resumption of the war. If they recive support of this calibre they might just manage to survive. In addition, how will the allies treat the new regime? Will the allies recognise the SRs now that they've resumed the war? If the allies accept the Soviet / SR government, will they support the Whites? As far internal politics goes, I think if the Left SRs displayed the same kind of ruthless leadership as Lenin they'd certainly get a good bunch of the senior Bolsheviks on side; there was plenty of suspicion of Lenin by this time, and not just over the war issue. A Left SR government could legitimately call itself a Soviet government, and form a coalition of genuine hard left types. Assuming that they survive the war, put down the Leninists and survive the civil war (IMHO more likely than the Bolsheviks suriving the civil war, with the proviso that if the SRs have got this far, they must have some good central organisers). Then what? While the ghastly problems and famines produced by war socialism aren't going to be there (a Leninist project if ever there was one) the country is still in a terrible mess, the Cheka will still be in the process of a Red Terror of some sort. We would need to know the personalities and policies of the surviving SR / Soviet leadership to guess what happens next. -- Anthony Mayer ICQ: 70054740 email: aem3@doc.ic.ac.uk