Wrapped in Flames: The Great American War and Beyond

[EnglishCanuck]

Fascinating!

Come to think of it, now that you mention the Fenian raids I think I recognise "this" Napier... or at least it rings a bell.

He's an interesting fellow. Devilishly hard to find details on outside the Fenian raids though!

Anyway, please continue, not going to lie but this is one of my favourite TLs

Why thank you! Glad to know I'm entertaining a few people at least! I'll definitely stay hard at work with this

 

[galveston bay]

The Fenian Raids always struck me as even more hopeless than toasting the "Prince Across the Water" but then I am not an Irish Nationalist from the 19th Century.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

The Fenian Raids always struck me as even more hopeless than toasting the "Prince Across the Water" but then I am not an Irish Nationalist from the 19th Century.

They were somewhat fanciful in their conception. Though being entirely fair, it was far less insane than that conceived by the Front de liberation du Quebec.

However, like OTL, we will be hearing from the Fenians in this time line! I have some in particular in mind...

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Unfortunately, the next chapter has been somewhat delayed thanks to some editing grumblings on my part. I'm simply not satisfied with part of the narrative. Never fear though! It shall hopefully be up and running on Tuesday as I take some time tonight to devote to writing.

However, as some filler for the evening, I was working on a Canadian militia staff roster to show how the "rationalized" militia system would function. Under the previous Militia Acts in the Province of Canada, each province had been divided into militia districts (10 in Canada West and 11 in Canada East) but as mentioned in the last chapter, to make that system more efficient there has been a reorganization to put the various districts under the Imperial Military scheme of 5 military districts to iron out some of the kinks. These are the militia staffs responsible for managing the militia formations and administration in their respective districts:

1st Military District: Quebec

Commanding the Volunteers: Col. John Sewell
Chief of the Staff: Maj. Charles J. Anderson
Aide-de-camp: Lt. E. Blais
Asst. Adjutant General: Maj. Hewitt Bernard
Paymaster: Maj. L. T. Suzor
Asst. Quartermaster General: Eleazar Lamontagne

2nd Military District: Montreal

Commanding the Volunteer Force: Col. John Dyde
Chief of the Staff: Lt. Col. W. F. Coffin
Asst. Adjutant General: Lt. Col. George Smith
Paymaster: Lt. Colonel C. E. Belle
Asst. Quartermaster General: Maj. Theodore Lyman

3rd Military District: Kingston

Commanding the Volunteers: Col. Hugh Bouchier
Chief of the Staff: Lt. Col. Thomas Wily
Asst. Adjutant General: Maj. K. M. Wilkinson
Paymaster: Capt. William P. Lett
Asst. Quartermaster General: Capt. John Sutherland

4th Military District: Toronto

Commanding the Volunteers: Col. George Denison II
Chief of the Staff: Lt. Col. John Stoughton Denis
Aide-de-camp: Lt. Thomas Sargent
Asst. Adjutant General: Maj. Henry Goodwin
Paymaster: Maj. Robert Spence
Asst. Quartermaster General: Maj. Michael Dowd

5th Military District: London

Commanding the Volunteers: Col. James Shanly
Chief of the Staff: Maj. John McMillan
Asst. Adjutant General: Maj. James Moffat
Paymaster: Capt. Thomas Cowan
Asst. Quartermaster General: Maj. William Star

I would note that each district is headquartered in its namesake city. That really cuts down on bloat and rationalizes things for the overall command of the Province of Canada. All the officers here were on the books circa-1862, but I have divvied out a few promotions to fill slots, and presumably further men would be promoted to fill some of the positions they left behind if they were serving in a field capacity.

Cheers for now as I return to writing!

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Chapter 20: The Invasion of Canada: Part 2​

"The day was hot, I was thirsty, and we knew the Yankee's were coming." - Veteran of the Queens Own Rifles describing the Battle of Lime Ridge[6]

“The mettle of the Canadians was first tested when the enemy crossed the Detroit frontier. Col. Newdigate did admirable work in slowing their advance to the interior, but a single brigade, no matter how well led cannot hold such a flat country against an invader. Especially a force such as ours, which was woefully deficient in cavalry for reconnaissance purposes, meaning we had to often rely on local guides or citizens for information which was simple hearsay or rumour more often than not.

The enemy had a force of approximately 8,000 men at his disposal, nearly equal in numbers to our own. I was able to observe the fighting from my position with Napier’s headquarters in Coombs Mound, and thus can relate much of the battle. The enemy first advanced upon our position at the Delaware Cross Roads where he engaged the defenders under, Newdigate who held firm despite hot fire and a skillfully employed cannonade. The enemy, thus with our southern flank emplaced, turned his attention to those forces in that unenviable position on Komoka.

It was there that the fire was hottest, and I later learned that amongst the forces of the enemy was a unit of Yankee sharpshooters. Having read about the mischief they caused for us in their Revolution and in the 1812 war, I saw that they did their legacy proud that day. In the space of one hour, the battalion commanders for each militia battalion were killed or wounded, which greatly demoralized the Canadian defenders. General Napier was slow to react to this threat to the northern flank, and despite having a strong reserve of 2,000 men he hesitated in the face of determined attack. It was this hesitation which would cost us the battle.

The sharpshooters having done their terrible work, our force was met with a well handled bayonet charge. The lack of remaining officers, and the demoralized state of those forces caused the militia of the 3rd Brigade to break in the wildest confusion. Even though we possessed the strength to plug such a gap, Napier dawdled in sending in the reserve, and when the militia at Delaware Cross Roads saw the rout of their fellows, the bugle call for withdrawal was mistakenly sent up. Though order might have been restored, it was too late. The withdrawal had become general, and Napier seemed to lose what little nerve he possessed with it. It was then left to our reserve under Brigadier General Fordyce to stall the Yankee pursuit, and in conjunction with our guns atop Coombs Mound, they could not mount a hasty attack and thankfully many men would live to eat their dinner at the bivouac that night.

Speaking with my own significant experience of the Canadian Militia, who I have every reason to think highly of, I should believe that had they been well led that day we should never have been forced to withdraw. Instead they were led to a panic by their own officers, who at that time were not well drilled in the ways of war. Instead they had been mishandled by our commanding officer and taught the childish barrack maneuvers which were perfectly useless in the field. And so we were compelled to withdraw up the highway, protecting the immense train carriage which withdrew our heavy equipment.

Though many of my colleagues have attempted to use this battle at London to disparage the fighting prowess of the Canadian militia, I would simply direct them to the events of Lime Ridge or Doran Creek to assuage them of that opinion…” – The Story of a Soldiers Life, Volume II, Field-Marshal Viscount Garnet Wolseley, Westminster 1903

The Royal Canadian Rifles skirmishing with Palmer's Division​

“My troop was assigned to the headquarters of Colonel Mauleverer alongside that of Captain Teeter’s and it was there we learned the enemy had crossed the frontier. Much to my consternation our first week of the war was spend as messengers, delivering news to the front and in return as the Yankee’s cut the telegraph wires. Though they had landed on the 17th, their position was widely spread out and the enemies formations spent much time connecting with one another from the 17th to the 20th as their forward elements moved inland.

My first contact came with the enemy at St. David’s on May 22nd 1862. We had ridden in support of the 12th Volunteers under Lt. Col. Worthington, as he withdrew from Niagara against the enemies formations there. The day was damp, and the mud would have made the enemies advance precipitous at best, but on he came. When my troop arrived the 12th was engaged in withdrawing up the Queenston Road, but their flank was engaged by a party of the enemy concealed in the woods. Unable to ride them down I led my men around the wooded copse of trees, where I left a dozen good men to watch the horses, while the remaining forty of us advanced upon the enemy. We came upon him in the woods, and we opened fire with our old Victoria Carbines, weapons far better for scaring horses than killing men, and exchanged shot with him for over an hour driving him from the wood. However, our victory was short lived, as the enemy had the numbers and we were forced to withdraw in the direction of St. Catherines with the infantry.

It is here that I should relate the bravery of one of our newest members of the troop, a young trooper named John James. He proved himself most formidable in the skirmish, and with a whooping war cry like some Indian brave he had spent much of the skirmish popping in and out from behind various logs, making it appear like our company was more like a battalion. Cool under fire he had crawled forward to where a downed enemy lay and taken his pistol for himself, thereby making off with a second Colt revolver like the remainder of our corps used.

Though we would bivouac for two days at St. Catherines, our stay there was cut short by the Yankee’s landing at Port Colbourne on May 25th. An audacious landing of 2,000 men under the protection of the enemy fleet was undertaken and thus upended our forward defence. It had been our hope that we could prevent the enemy from advancing further inland, but with the enemy supreme in Lake Erie and contesting the waters of Lake Ontario, it was a forlorn hope. Our unhappy task was then to cover the engineers as they sabotaged the Welland canal to deny its use to the enemy and then withdraw towards Hamilton to rendezvous with the remainder of the division under Major General Rumley.

Our retreat was joined by throngs of citizens fleeing the depravations of the Yankees. Young and old alike had strapped their belongings to carts, drove their flocks ahead of them, rode with heavy saddlebags, or walked with their worldly belongings in hand. It brings at once to mind the flight of the Loyalists from the savagery of the so-called Patriots in the American Revolutionary War. For many they would be running for some time against the onslaught of Yankee raiders.

Amongst the desperation though, were true stories of bravery and stout heartedness of the local populace. On the frontier itself many men were former soldiers of the Queen’s forces settling themselves into a simpler life. One man, former Captain Lewis Palmer who had served in the 1812 war and the Rebellions of 1837-38, saw the approaching Yankee’s and despite being much advanced in age, mounted his horse and galloped about the countryside to give warning to his neighbors, before disappearing himself to cause mischief for the invader. Another veteran of those conflicts, Henry F. Angur, who though crippled by gout and at the age of 69, encouraged his family to leave without him as “he had survived two wars, and would risk a third” in this fashion he would harangue a column of Yankee cavalry so crossly that their officer would apologize for the destruction of his and his neighbors picket fences and even pay compensation for the damaged properties! It was thanks to the quick wit of one engineer of the Buffalo and Lake Huron Railroad which would save two railcars from American capture. 21 year old Robert Larmour was roused by the sounds of ruckus from the harbor as the Yankee’s landed and managed to steam up two engines of that rail line in and slip them away from the invaders in a wild chase, but for his actions all three engines would have fallen into American hands and eased their passage inland.[7]

Despite this heroism we were forced to steadily give ground as the number of American troops grew daily. By the start of June there were some 15,000 advancing inland towards Toronto. Our troops steadily withdrew, not easing the passage of the enemy one mile, but slowly we were pushed back to our defensive positions on the outskirts of Hamilton. General Dundas had, in accordance with our engineers, chosen an excellent defensive site near the old Stoney Creek battlefield.

Lime Ridge is a limestone ridge which joins the local highlands above the city of Hamilton and overlooking Burlington Bay. It extends at a rough 90 degree angle along the coast, overlooking both the Queen’s Highway, the Great Western Railway on the lake shore, and observing the Thorold Road leading to the interior. At 90 feet in height a frontal assault is an impossibility, allowing guns to cover the roadways, and the infantry a relative position of safety from the enemy. Each flank has a weakness however, on the lake shore it may be assaulted in conjunction with gunboats, while the position at Albion Mills might be attacked by a force coming up the Thorold Road. However, each point had been strengthened by earthworks and covered with many guns, which General Rumley had spent many weeks inspecting by this point. By June 3rd our whole force had been collected, and numbered some 9,000 Volunteers and British troops.

The enemy had made good time in his pursuit in spite of our efforts, and he endeavored to break us here. I learned later that their commanding officer, Major General Charles Smith, had served in their war in Mexico, and so felt we would be in for a rough fight. He was skillful in his attack, directing a feint against the lakeside entrenchments up Barton Road along Albion Creek and probing our works there. Knowing his ships were driven to distraction by the daring do of Captain Bythesea, he gambled his assault on our more vulnerable landward position at Albion Mills.

Our positions were outlined as follows. On the Highway leading to Hamilton manning the earthworks was the 2nd Brigade under Col. Thomas Ross, comprised of the13th, 19th, and 20th Battalions of Volunteer Infantry. Col. Mauleverer’s 1st Brigade was atop the ridge, constituting a reserve. The 3rd Brigade under Col. Baron, John De Courcy comprising the 27th, 28th, and 30th Battalions of Volunteer Infantry, stiffened by the 45th which had withdrawn from Port Colbourne.

Our rear was protected by the Hamilton Garrison under Col. Booker who held the 38th Battalion in the city, while the 39th was guarding our lines of communication with Toronto.

Lt. Col. Boulton had the Dragoons protecting the flanks, skirmishing with the Yankee riders when the battle started, and I was present at Albion Mills when the attacks first came…” – Soldiering In Canada, Recollections and Experiences of Brigadier General George T. Denison III, Toronto Press 1900

Canadian militia skirmishing with Smith's scouts.​

“As Smith moved inland, his engineers repaired bridges and railroads, establishing supply depots at Fort Erie and Port Colbourne fueling the American advance inland. He pursued Rumley’s retreating forces to the Welland Canal, where after the daring landing of Sweeney’s brigade he bypassed the British lines compelling their withdrawal.

Upon reaching the defences erected by Rumley he paused awaiting word from Palmer on his advance, upon which so much of his campaign was dependent. When he received word of London’s fall he was ecstatic and ordered the attack for the next day on June 6th. McArthur’s brigade was assigned to test the British defences on the lake shore, while Prentiss’s brigade would assault the British positions at Albion Mills in the hope of unhinging their lines and sweeping the British force into Hamilton.

The two divisions were organized as such:

1st Division (BG John McArthur)

1st Brigade: (Col. Isaac C. Pugh) 9th, Illinois, 12th Illinois, 41st Illinois, 7th Illinois
2nd Brigade: (Col. Thomas W. Sweeney) 50th Illinois, 52nd Illinois, 12th Iowa, 52nd Indiana, 13th Missouri
3rd Brigade: (Col. Jacob G. Lauman) 2nd Iowa, 7th Iowa, 14th Iowa, Birge's Western Sharpshooters

3rd Division (BG Benjamin M. Prentiss)

1st Brigade (Col. Everett Peabody) 21st Missouri, 25th Missouri, 16th Wisconsin, 12th Michigan
2nd Brigade (Col. Madison Miller) 18th Missouri, 61st Illinois, 16th Iowa
3rd Brigade (Col. John Turchin) 19th Illinois, 15th Iowa, 23rd Missouri, 18th Wisconsin

The attack began at 10am June 6th with McArthur’s leading brigade, Pugh’s, attacking against the British works on Albion Creek as a diversion. His guns kept up a steady cannonade on the British positions there and on the heights in order to try and tie the defenders down. His remaining two brigades demonstrated against the base of the ridge for effect, and moved as if to support Pugh, but in reality they were simply covering for Prentiss attack.

Prentiss attack began well with his leading division under Peabody coming on the Canadians as they were having breakfast, but the quick wits of their officers allowed them to recover, and repulse Peabody’s attack. The nature of the terrain chosen by the British allowed them to attack their attackers in a small ravine which lead to the low ground, breaking up the main thrust of Peabody’s brigade and diverting the second wave under Miller to the flank where it was hoped the Canadians would be less prepared, instead they found the vicious fighting of Stone Church.

Properly known as Barton Stone Church, it had been constructed in 1847 on the site of a former Lutheran Church it was eventually bought up by American Presbyterians who took charge of the property in 1850. In 1862 Reverend Anthony Gill was managing the congregation and would be well regarded in the aftermath of the battle for his ministrations to the wounded.

However, it had been absorbed by the militia for very un-Christian purposes. The Church now formed a strong point in a series of entrenchments dotting the high ground behind both Stone Church Road and the Thorold Road which ended at Rosseau Creek securing the positions flanks. Here the militia of the 30th Battalion made their stand against the men of Peabody’s attack, and then Miller’s as the action became general. This point was considered crucial to the defence and so they hung on tenaciously, egged on by their battalion’s commanding officer John Fitzroy De Courcy.

A nobleman of Anglo-Irish descent he was a career soldier in the British army, joining the 47th Regiment of Foot at the age of 17 in 1838. He was also a decorated veteran of the Crimea. He had also faced the Americans before in the stand-off over the San Juan Islands, the abortive “Pig War” which had made his series of decisions leading up to May of 1862 very confusing to follow. De Courcy was a fighter, not much else. So when the prospect of war beckoned to the south he decided that rather than moldering away from the fighting he would volunteer to lead a regiment of Union forces against the South, appointed command of the 16th Ohio Volunteer Infantry in 1861. However, as the rumours of war between the Union and Britain had deepened. He had felt it his duty to resign his commission and travel north to offer his services in Canada, where he was soon appointed a brevet Colonel and drilling a brigade of militia. The Canadian militiamen soon shared the opinion of the Union men he had commanded in that he was “cruel, but fair.” It was this disciplinarian attitude which allowed them to hold firm against two attacks, before finally facing their most pressing challenge yet.

John Fitzroy De Courcy
​

The 3rd Brigade of Prentiss’s Division was John Basil Turchin, or as he had previously been known, Ivan Vasilyevich Turchaninov. Turchin was a combat veteran from the Imperial Russian Army. He had fought in the suppression of the Hungarian Revolution, as well as in the Crimean War against the British seeing action at Balaclava. After the war he would marry the daughter of his commanding officer, Nadezhda (or Nadine) Lovow and would immigrate to the United States in 1856. While there he grew to love his new country writing “I have to thank America for one thing. This country helped me destroy my nobleman’s ideals and put me on the level of an ordinary person. I am not afraid of any kind of work, no matter what situation I am in. It does not matter to me… I have been reborn.” Upon the outbreak of war he naturally sided with the North. He quickly rose through the ranks, soon commanding a brigade of Midwesterners who, much like their commander, felt a great deal of disdain for their foreign aristocratic opponents. They had in their minds, a score to settle.

John Basil Turchin​

That two noblemen, one reformed and the other a symbol of foreign aristocracy could end up at the head of brigades of more democratically minded soldiers is perhaps emblematic of this conflict. However, few had time for high ideals or romantic notions of war on that hot June day, and it soon turned to a contest of bullets and bayonets.

Turchin’s brigade led the renewed charge, led by his former regiment, the 19th Illinois. The fighting at the church was bloody, with men sniping one another amongst the gravestones of the church yard. De Courcy was in the middle of the fray, urging his men on, and eventually taking the graveyard back pushing out a determined assault by the 19th, he would be wounded twice that day, but despite the exhortations of his men, he refused to withdraw. Soon the vigor of Miller’s assault began to push and the militia were forced slowly but surely back.

However, this was when Rumley chose to commit his reserve, and Col. Mauleverer’s 1st Brigade rejoined the fray. The committal of perhaps the most veteran troops in Canadian ranks turned the tide and Prentiss was forced to withdraw. Smith, seeing his gamble failed, judged it would be prudent to end the day’s fighting and ordered his men to withdraw in the direction of St. Catherine’s at 2pm. The Canadians were left holding the ridge, and victorious. Over the course of battle the Canadians had suffered 1,100 killed, wounded and captured, while the Americans lost 2,600 to all causes.

The victory would be short lived though, as news of Napier’s defeat at London, and Smith’s ambitious turning movement through the countryside at Brantford unhinged the British defensive line around Hamilton, compelling Rumley to withdraw to Toronto, which would begin the long retreat. This might have demoralized the Canadians had it not been for their taste of victory and the infamous burning of Brantford…”– For No Want of Courage: The Upper Canada Campaign, Col. John Stacey (ret.), Royal Military College, 1966

-----

6] Based on a quote spoken by a veteran of Ridgeway in 1930. Funny how there’s more than once Lime Ridge in Canada!

7] It goes without saying these are all real people. I’ve based their actions primarily off what they did in the historic Fenian raids in 1866.

As an aside, I had to edit chapter 19 as I made an error in geography, Fort Malden is rather far from Sarnia!

 

[EnglishCanuck]

To perhaps give a better idea of Lime Ridge as a military position, here is a picture of it today with Google Maps in comparison to the surrounding countryside:

It's a natural strong point that chokes off any chance of easy advance into the interior, and being so high above the surrounding countryside and so wide it's rather difficult to attack easily. It was recognized as such by the historic planners of Canada's defence in 1862, and I figure I might as well incorporate into the narrative.

 

[Saphroneth]

Hm, high ground... tasty, tasty high ground for those long range Armstrongs (and any Whitworths which can be gotten hold of). I wonder if this will be one of the world's first engagements where the shell guns are firing such a distance that you have to judge if you're hitting by way of the effect on the enemy formation! (OTL those were mostly in 1870-1).

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Hm, high ground... tasty, tasty high ground for those long range Armstrongs (and any Whitworths which can be gotten hold of). I wonder if this will be one of the world's first engagements where the shell guns are firing such a distance that you have to judge if you're hitting by way of the effect on the enemy formation! (OTL those were mostly in 1870-1).

Unfortunately not at this battle. While the Canadians have some (two batteries) of Armstrongs, the Union force only has Napoleons at present, and the Canadians still have some 9pnd guns in service.

However, the Quebec frontier will probably have a few such fights coming up as things swing into gear. There's a nice piece of ground south of Montreal I want to be looking at...

 

[Saphroneth]

the Union force only has Napoleons at present,

I don't think the Ordnance rifle was accurate enough to reach out as far as I'm thinking with any effectiveness (though deviation stats are something I've been after for a while). Pretty sure the Armstrong was though.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

I don't think the Ordnance rifle was accurate enough to reach out as far as I'm thinking with any effectiveness (though deviation stats are something I've been after for a while). Pretty sure the Armstrong was though.

Most likely not far enough to deliver effective counter battery fire to the top of a 95 foot ridge where guns that can outshoot them twice over I would think. The ridge is probably impossible to attack head on, but a turning movement into the high ground is perfectly capable of out flanking it.

 

[Saphroneth]

Most likely not far enough to deliver effective counter battery fire to the top of a 95 foot ridge where guns that can outshoot them twice over I would think. The ridge is probably impossible to attack head on, but a turning movement into the high ground is perfectly capable of out flanking it.

The words that occur to me are "Malvern Hill".

 

[EnglishCanuck]

The words that occur to me are "Malvern Hill".

Only this time it's the Union charging uphill into superior batteries...

 

[Saphroneth]

Only this time it's the Union charging uphill into superior batteries...

And very welcome they are to it. It's possible to assault that kind of position if you have superior enough artillery (easy, in fact!) but - more to the point - it's got a certain disadvantage, which is that it's possible to wheel around and cut off from supply. (Malvern, that is - I'm not sure if the same is true here).

Though, of course, if a turning movement ends up uncovering the Union supply line they're in trouble themselves, especially if the British have Britomarts on the Lakes.
(Not sure if you've seen this: https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...tion-and-the-acw.405931/page-27#post-14022076 but it suggests that the whole Canadian defence scheme's gunboats could be found without raiding Haslar - or, at worst, that any extraneous needs once the reserve is activated are manageable when compared to British construction capacity by the time of the thaw.)

 

[EnglishCanuck]

And very welcome they are to it. It's possible to assault that kind of position if you have superior enough artillery (easy, in fact!) but - more to the point - it's got a certain disadvantage, which is that it's possible to wheel around and cut off from supply. (Malvern, that is - I'm not sure if the same is true here).

Though, of course, if a turning movement ends up uncovering the Union supply line they're in trouble themselves, especially if the British have Britomarts on the Lakes.
(Not sure if you've seen this: https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...tion-and-the-acw.405931/page-27#post-14022076 but it suggests that the whole Canadian defence scheme's gunboats could be found without raiding Haslar - or, at worst, that any extraneous needs once the reserve is activated are manageable when compared to British construction capacity by the time of the thaw.)

Well the biggest problem facing the Canadians under Dundas is that they have a very small number of cavalrymen available to them, while the Americans are drawing on a much larger number, meaning that while the Canadian Dragoons are certainly brave and daring, there's only about 800 of them which means that for scouting, piquet duty, and patrols they're stretched thin as the Americans advance. Smith's force has about twice to three times the number of cavalry facing them which leaves him many more options in terms of maneuver on the interior, and when hes up on the high ground away from the shores of Lake Ontario he can't really be interdicted from the water, which gives him an open turning movement. Slower, but much less bloody than trying to force the ridge.

The ridge's main advantage is that it a) is a nigh invulnerable position to assault, and b) being on the main highway to Toronto and with a good railroad connection you kind of have to try to dislodge the enemy. It's problems though are that it's not an impervious military position, and that it could be turned by an army advancing from say London. Also, the commissioners who inspected it estimated that it would take 15,000 men to securely hold that position, but the Canadians have only 9,000. A flanking movement is thus the only rational movement Smith could make against it.

Though as an aside, let me talk about a different Limestone Ridge which comes up:

This Lime Ridge is rather different for its position. Though we have before been told the Canadians couldn't fight since they lost one skirmish in 1866! It's absurd, and it's equally absurd to think a battle would have been fought there under different circumstances (the ridge faces north, meaning it's only a good position for an invading army to use) and that battle really is something I've gotten tired of seeing repeated as a catch all for Canadian prowess.

Sorry about the rant, but in writing these battles I've been going over Peter Vronsky's Ridgeway, which is probably the best (and most modern) book dealing with the ins and outs of that battle, for some information and inspiration and when one reads about the events that took place to ensure that the battle went the way it did you can see how Volunteers who haven't been drilling under British regulars continuously for months, and have been mobilized with 24 hours notice might not preform well.

Needless to say, men who've been drilling for 4-5 months continuously would obviously have a bit more cohesion and utility.

 

[Saphroneth]

Hmmm.

Firstly, 4-5 months of drill with people who know Hythe? I could see that really making the Canucks better at shooting than almost any Union troops in the OTL, which makes a big difference.

Secondly - if it matters, I've seen indications that the British drillmasters of OTL were a bit frustrated with the Canadian militia's inability to properly skirmish (though of course that was after less than this much time), where "properly skirmish" means the kind of complex evolutions in the field manual. I imagine the result would be kind of like OTL Union/Confederate infantry in terms of tactical cohesion, maybe a little better (the Union's drill was not great by many accounts, especially at this point) and much better with their rifles.

Third, the point about turning the ridge by advancing from London... honestly that would be a pretty spectacular move by the Union. Their base of supply would be roughly Sarnia if lake navigation's not opened, and the same if the Welland's open (because gunboats - Clown class and new build) so that's about 130 straight line miles from base - London ON not being secure enough - and this early in spring for Canada I'm not sure you can rely on getting all the forage for your wagon train from the surrounds (it's not concentrated) so the Union is pretty much launching troops on a two-three week road march from their base of supply to achieve this. It just seems like the force would have to be mostly wagon train unless it's gambling the lives/liberty of the soldiers on breaking through the Canadian lines - which is a bit March To The Sea, at best.

And, of course, the main Union force is itself operating ~50 miles from its main base of operations (Buffalo), so that limits their own ability to use artillery fire, and is why I mention the Britomarts. That kind of distance is pretty painful in terms of supply train management, especially if the enemy's able to try and cut your supply route off with gunboats. (If the Welland's cut then they can't use it, but the time that you can actually cut the Welland before gunboats get up it is pretty short... but then that's water under the canal by this point.)


Cavalry, now... if there's any Regulars here, they'll kill the Union cavalry half a mile out if it tries anything exposed. (they did it OTL in India, after all.) So that Union cavalry should be pretty careful!

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Firstly, 4-5 months of drill with people who know Hythe? I could see that really making the Canucks better at shooting than almost any Union troops in the OTL, which makes a big difference.

Secondly - if it matters, I've seen indications that the British drillmasters of OTL were a bit frustrated with the Canadian militia's inability to properly skirmish (though of course that was after less than this much time), where "properly skirmish" means the kind of complex evolutions in the field manual. I imagine the result would be kind of like OTL Union/Confederate infantry in terms of tactical cohesion, maybe a little better (the Union's drill was not great by many accounts, especially at this point) and much better with their rifles.

Potentially, but arguably not really. The British argued it takes a year to make a rifleman, so the Canadians probably aren't that much more adept than their American counterparts (though arguably better off than the poor lads thrown into it at Bull Run with 3 months training). So the Canadians are at least going to be the equivalent (if unblooded) of their American opponents when it comes to maneuver and fighting.

Third, the point about turning the ridge by advancing from London... honestly that would be a pretty spectacular move by the Union. Their base of supply would be roughly Sarnia if lake navigation's not opened, and the same if the Welland's open (because gunboats - Clown class and new build) so that's about 130 straight line miles from base - London ON not being secure enough - and this early in spring for Canada I'm not sure you can rely on getting all the forage for your wagon train from the surrounds (it's not concentrated) so the Union is pretty much launching troops on a two-three week road march from their base of supply to achieve this. It just seems like the force would have to be mostly wagon train unless it's gambling the lives/liberty of the soldiers on breaking through the Canadian lines - which is a bit March To The Sea, at best.

And, of course, the main Union force is itself operating ~50 miles from its main base of operations (Buffalo), so that limits their own ability to use artillery fire, and is why I mention the Britomarts. That kind of distance is pretty painful in terms of supply train management, especially if the enemy's able to try and cut your supply route off with gunboats. (If the Welland's cut then they can't use it, but the time that you can actually cut the Welland before gunboats get up it is pretty short... but then that's water under the canal by this point.)

There's two problems in here.

The first is assuming the Union couldn't move overland, for one thing the column from Sarnia would reach London after marching for ten days, and only three days ahead of their counterparts coming up from Detroit. Assuming forage (which with the nature of the countryside it would be impossible not to) they make the trip in 10 days at good speed with wagons moving with them, and if they capture rail stock they have an advantage. The second problem with the assumption is forgetting Port Stanley, which could be used as a hub for London and allow troops to move inland well supplied.

Also, Smith's turning movement goes through Brantford, which means he's moving with his own troops and linking up with those under Palmer.

Secondly, assuming British gunboats could get up the canal is wildly optimistic. There's two reasons for this; the first is that the Union can extemporize gunboats as well as the Canadians can (the only potential limiting factor being how long it takes to ship guns back from the East Coast), has the only real warship on Lake Erie to base a squadron around, and is operating from Buffalo, which is pretty much on the Welland Canal's doorstep. British gunboats transiting the canal can only come down one at a time, and frankly that's suicide with the nature of waters around Port Colborne. Lake Erie, is basically uncontestable by the British unless they manage to take Buffalo, and with the resources available to them in Canada/their strategic thinking and the expectation of a short war... well that is unlikely.

There's a reason the Admiralty felt it could only contest Lake Ontario.

Cavalry, now... if there's any Regulars here, they'll kill the Union cavalry half a mile out if it tries anything exposed. (they did it OTL in India, after all.) So that Union cavalry should be pretty careful!

No regular cavalry in Canada West, just the Canadians armed with Victoria Carbines.

The Regular Cavalry is all in Canada East with the field army.

 

[galveston bay]

Potentially, but arguably not really. The British argued it takes a year to make a rifleman, so the Canadians probably aren't that much more adept than their American counterparts (though arguably better off than the poor lads thrown into it at Bull Run with 3 months training). So the Canadians are at least going to be the equivalent (if unblooded) of their American opponents when it comes to maneuver and fighting.



There's two problems in here.

The first is assuming the Union couldn't move overland, for one thing the column from Sarnia would reach London after marching for ten days, and only three days ahead of their counterparts coming up from Detroit. Assuming forage (which with the nature of the countryside it would be impossible not to) they make the trip in 10 days at good speed with wagons moving with them, and if they capture rail stock they have an advantage. The second problem with the assumption is forgetting Port Stanley, which could be used as a hub for London and allow troops to move inland well supplied.

Also, Smith's turning movement goes through Brantford, which means he's moving with his own troops and linking up with those under Palmer.

Secondly, assuming British gunboats could get up the canal is wildly optimistic. There's two reasons for this; the first is that the Union can extemporize gunboats as well as the Canadians can (the only potential limiting factor being how long it takes to ship guns back from the East Coast), has the only real warship on Lake Erie to base a squadron around, and is operating from Buffalo, which is pretty much on the Welland Canal's doorstep. British gunboats transiting the canal can only come down one at a time, and frankly that's suicide with the nature of waters around Port Colborne. Lake Erie, is basically uncontestable by the British unless they manage to take Buffalo, and with the resources available to them in Canada/their strategic thinking and the expectation of a short war... well that is unlikely.

There's a reason the Admiralty felt it could only contest Lake Ontario.



No regular cavalry in Canada West, just the Canadians armed with Victoria Carbines.

The Regular Cavalry is all in Canada East with the field army.

plus to get to the other 3 Lakes you have to get past Detroit ... so those are pretty much guaranteed to be under Union control and the industrial base on the Canadian side doesn't exist yet in the 1860s

Also here is a pretty big list of what seems like everyone who made artillery during the Civil War (and its a long one)
http://www.civilwarartillery.com/manufacturers.htm

Rodman guns are made in Pittsburgh (also other weapons in Lawrenceville which is a suburb of Pittsburgh),light field artillery in Cincinnati, West Point which is ideally situated to serve Buffalo and Cleveland.

(Pittsburgh really got rolling as an industrial city because of the War of 1812 supplying the US Navy on the Great Lakes, it was also the third largest US port by tonnage in 1861!)

 

[galveston bay]

as to long distance shooting at 400 yards or more
A few links discussing things like drop, wind deflection, etc with modern weapons
https://www.buckmasters.com/Magazines/GunHunter/Articles/ID/193/The-Truth-About-Long-Range-Shooting

a whole discussion from the Civ War forum about sniping
http://civilwartalk.com/threads/longest-sniper-hit.16731/

the whole topic of long distance shooting
http://clevelandcivilwarroundtable.com/articles/means/sharpshooter.htm

and that was simply the first 3 google results from search "How hard is long distance shooting with black powder weapons"

All of which are why I remain highly skeptical of claims of British infantry routinely hitting targets beyond 250 -300 yards in field conditions other than through volley fire. Scopes, smokeless powder, metal cartridges and the like are not available or available in small numbers in 1862.

 

[longsword14]

@galveston bay
Yes, black powder rifles used Minie rounds that had awful aerodynamic characteristics. It would drop very quickly.
Keeping the British aside for a minute, if accuracy was all that mattered then how the heck did the French ever lose? All the marksmanship praise given to Britain is true for France also, and they had a large force.
In 1870 they had even better rifles.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Just for the purposes of this TL I have done a quick tabulation of weapons available to the Union come the declaration of war in February 1862.

There were on hand in 1861 some 452,936 weapons directly available[1] to the forces mustering in the theaters on the East Coast according to the Union records. Using Executive Document 99[2] we have a rough idea of when weapons were arriving to the Union. Now taking into account those on hand and those purchased between the outbreak of war, plus domestic production, we can see exactly how many weapons are arriving to the Union by the time of the outbreak of war.

In doing this calculation I have purposely excluded any British weapons after November 1861, but even without British weapons we arrive at a hefty number of arms in Union hands by February.

With all the imports available and domestic production up to this time, the Union has (inclusive of weapons on hand in April 1861) some 991,759 muskets and rifles as of February 1862 when war breaks out in TTL.

However, for fairness sake we can also remove the 450,000 on hand in April 1861, and we arrive at 538,823 weapons imported/produced between the outbreak of war with the Confederacy and the outbreak of hostilities with Britain in TTL. That means, that the maintenance of the historic troop levels by the Union come January 1861, is plausible by any margin. When given wiggle room for weapons smuggling in the months where the blockade is weakest from March-May 1862 the number could very well rise to over 700,000[3].

As a note none of this requires raiding any of the existing state arsenals.

The short purpose of this tabulation is merely to illustrate that the Union in this scenario will not be wanting for arms upon the outbreak of war, and would have enough on hand to prosecute the war effectively throughout the spring campaign season. This is just a look at a known variable to the reader before I introduce my assumptions for much of the TL forward.

----

1] This is assuming some 40,000 weapons were shipped East from California, as there are 54,000 weapons in state before the war, but I have found reference to only 10,000 in the arsenal after the outbreak of war so this is my assumption, but I'm open to being proven wrong.

2] For convenience sake a link to the tabulations by robcraufurd.

3] This assumes a 50% success rate for blockade running in these months, so this could be higher or lower.