WIF WWI ended in 1917 how would the Washington treaty of gone

[xchen08]

The War was were both sides lost more men on the Western Frount and Both the French and British Armys Muntined against there commanders ording them to attack .

And the Naval war went very much against the British in 1916 and 1917 . With most of the British BC being Sunk . And The German Ship Designs were able to stand up to punishment Better then the British ships were .

When Russia Fell in 1917 to the Red Revolt and spiled down to Civil War the Western allies And Central powers started to look at there own troops with fear .
Germany offered the Allies a way out when they Offered to Pull back to there Boarders of 1914 on the Western Frount and in the Balkans also .

The British were forced to hand back over South West Africa to Germany as well as free the Boar Republic .

The Japanise Ended up paying the Germans For the German Territories in the Pacific and China that they had taken .

The US in Early 1916 went to War against Mexico and Hatia and conqured both of them by 1918 with over 300,000 dead and 400,000 wounded by the end of the War .

I think you are positing a Central Powers victory of a magnitude too high for a Washington Treaty analogue that includes Germany. You are basically suggesting a scenario where Germany has the Western Allies on the ropes, but offers them an out in order to concentrate on its new Eastern acquisitions. (in fact, I don't see how Britain could possibly be subjected to a defeat severe enough to release the long dead Boer Republics) Under this circumstance, I'd agree with Douglas that there's no chance in hell of Britain doing anything other than working to the brink of bankrupcy in building up its fleet. Hell, Britain may even encourage the U.S. to do the same with hopes of a strong anti-German ally capable of contributing major naval support in a rematch with Germany. And the U.S. outright conquering Mexico and Haiti (why?) seems extraordinarily unlikely, and certainly would not involve the kind of losses you are positing, just look at the OTL occupation of Veracruz, for instance.

Really, it's a lot easier just to have a peace of exhaustion arising from Russian collapse and no U.S. entry, German colonies are not returned, possibly some token amount paid for them, no indemnities, maybe a promise for plebiscites in A-L, and other disputed Western front territories, and everybody settling down to rebuild. If you want the U.S. to be a bit more distracted, just have the Mexican civil war drag on, ABC arbitration fail, continued occupation of Veracruz and other Mexican Atlantic ports, and low level skirmishing over Pancho Villa.

 

[DD951]

The War was were both sides lost more men on the Western Frount and Both the French and British Armys Muntined against there commanders ording them to attack .

And the Naval war went very much against the British in 1916 and 1917 . With most of the British BC being Sunk . And The German Ship Designs were able to stand up to punishment Better then the British ships were.

Actually, there were no large scale mutinies in the British Army on the Western Front during the war like the French suffered in 1917- there were a couple incidents within individual batallions and artillery batteries, and an incident at the Etaples depot that could more accurately be characterized as a riot provoked by some insensitive and overzealous military police and REMF types. After the armistice was signed, there were a few 'strikes' by rear-area service troops upset over the slow pace of demobilization that could be classified as mutinies, although the British government treaded lightly due to fears of spreading 'Bolshevik sentiment.'

Nor did the British lose most of their battlecruisers. In 1916, they had 10 battlecruisers in service, of which 9 were at Jutland (HMAS Australia being in the yard due to damage suffered in a collision with New Zealand in late April). Three of them were lost at Jutland, and 3 more suffered significant damage, which required about a month in the yard to repair, although the most heavily damaged (Lion) was at reduced capability until September, because it took that long to rebuild and reinstall the burned out 'Q' turret destroyed due to a ammunition fire and explosion that came close to destroying the ship. Two more battlecruisers (Renown & Repulse) were commissioned in 1917. The Queen Elizabeth-class ships of the 5th Battle Squadron also suffered significant damage due to gunfire, also requiring about a month to repair in the yard, while Marlborough, which had been hit by a torpedo required two. No other British capital ships suffered damage which required them to go into drydock at a shipyard to fix.

Although the German ships did tend to have superior armor and compartmentialzation as a result of a design trade-off costing smaller guns, a sometimes overlooked but important point was that early to mid-war British AP shells were crap- they either tended not to be built properly and broke up on impact, even on armor they should have been capable of penetrating, or a combination of somewhat unstable lyddite bursters and overly sensitive fuzes caused them to detonate before penetrating fully. Improved AP shells, even the 'Greenboys' the British introduced late in 1917 would have likely penetrated German armor much more often at Jutland ranges, and caused the loss of a couple German ships.

Another factor that made the German ships seem better than they were were the propellant charges used- German powder tended to be in brass cases and was much more stable than the British cordite, which allowed several German ships to survive massive ammunition fires despite inferior flash protection to the British ships (assuming the British crews hadn't removed several of the protective devices to increase the rate of fire). It's likely that had the Germans been using British-type charges, at least 2 or 3 German ships would lilkely have blown up, while if the British used German-type charges, 1 or 2 of the battlecruisers may have survived.

On the other side of the equation, many of the German ships were in the yard for several months. So, as far as Jutland went, although the battle may have been a narrow victory for the Germans on points in the tactical sense (fighting their way out of a trap and inflicting heavier losses), it didn't change anything stragegically- the British still had naval superiority and British yards were outbuilding the Germans in all types of surface combatants. Although the British may have been losing a lot of older ships, these were on secondary missions away from the main naval theater of war, and the real naval threat to Britain was the U-Boat campaign that would kick off several months after Jutland.

 

[Grimm Reaper]

Guys, Ward was obviously proposing an AH timeline, not presenting history as it actually happened. Unless one of you knows about the US conquest of Mexico and Haiti in 1917 which I missed in high school...


xchen08, in fact the British and Americans would have, if necessary, agreed to give the Japanese a ratio as high 5:5:4. Unfortunately for Japan US analysts were reading Japan's mail and knew exactly what the minimum Japan would settle for, which convinced the US to shift to insisting on the 5:5:3 ratio. Of course, if the US and/or UK respond to this improvement for Japan by actually building fleets to the size permitted under the treaty...let's see, that's 12 more carriers for the US...

 

[HMS Warspite]

The difference in shipdesigns are well known to me and therefore, the 1914 designs of the USN, of whom all succeding designs were simply offshoots and not revelotionary different in layout, up to the often praised, but still not very different South Dakota Class of 1921. The Lexingtons were as much equal in fightingpower as any of the new large BB's but still were not much better armored as the British 1st generation BC's of Invincible and Indifatigable classes.

Point is that all USN designs foccussed heavily on the new All or Nothing Principle of the period, when plunging fire was not yet fully understood, while the British (and actually the Germans too) had had warexperience, which proved this threat to be real and therefore opted for a much heavier horizontal protection, even at the cost of the now less important vertical protection, since battleranges became more longer ranged.

The Germans did not design new capital ships during the war and for a long time after, but the British did, culminating in the 1921 designs of the G-3 and look a likes. These designs were vastly superior and were (with offshoot HMS Nelson) ready in 1927, although this ship was a redesign, started only AFTER the OTL WNT was signed. In theory the G-3 could have been started without problems or redesigning in 1921 straight ahead adn be completed in 1925, about the same time as building a Nelson from scratch. With the first such a ship, all of the USN and even the IJN would be overclassed as thses vesses had a very heavy deckprotection,. making them close to immune to plunging fire from all heavy calibers, at the known ranges. The IJN adn USN designs could still be hit hard by any heavy calliber shell from 12 inch on, as their decks never exceeded the 3.5 inch of the Prewar period. Only some serious redesinging could remedy this weakness, while the 6.5 inch British Armored decks were keeping anything out and their underwaterprotection was vastly superior in almost all aspects, being heavily compartimentized.

So in battleworthyness and survivability, the British remained in any case the leaders in Navalpower, while the USA and Japan could never match this, until something else happeded in Naval technology, or by entirely new construction.

As said before, the USN did have one advantage in its large reconstructed Lexingtons, as these ships were far more usefull as carriers, than the battlecruisers, they innitially had to become. These two ships gave the USN a set of tools to learn a lot about naval aviation and about all sorts of possibilities the new weapons offered, eventually replacing the battleship as capital ship of the fleet. If the USN were smart, they should abbandon the battleshipprogram and focus entirely on the Aircraft Carrier and its uses in especailly the pacific theater. COmbined with the newer designs on submarines, especially of the development of the Fleet type, the USN became a more usefull force, compared to the big gunned scrapheap it was to become, innitially.

 

[xchen08]

Warspite, is there any point in your repeating what previous posters have already said, except in a more rambling manner with a number of canards tossed in? And why exactly do you think it legitimate to compare the designs of the U.S. Standards with warships designed a decade later rather than their contemporaries, then declare U.S. designs outdated?

xchen08, in fact the British and Americans would have, if necessary, agreed to give the Japanese a ratio as high 5:5:4. Unfortunately for Japan US analysts were reading Japan's mail and knew exactly what the minimum Japan would settle for, which convinced the US to shift to insisting on the 5:5:3 ratio. Of course, if the US and/or UK respond to this improvement for Japan by actually building fleets to the size permitted under the treaty...let's see, that's 12 more carriers for the US...

Was this in reference to something? And I'm not sure how the OTL treaty would allow the U.S. to squeeze in a dozen more carriers in the 69,000 tons left under treaty terms after accounting for the Lex and Sara.

 

[burmafrd]

http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-071.htm

A good article that I have managed to check out to some extent as being accurate.

I think under the changed conditions suggested there would have also been changes to the US Naval program. I tend to think that the South Dakota class and the Lexington class would have not been built as suggested; there was indeed a fair amount of infighting in the design boards OTL; with conditions changed I think those two classes would have been changed. Hopefully for the better.

By 1917 most of the combatants were economically exhausted or getting there. I think there would have been significant pressure to find ways to avoid building more expensive ships. The US, being unexhausted but still worried about keeping our shores safe and also watching an expanding IJN would have kept building ships that they alone could easily afford. The other countries recognizing this would have found it in their interest to see if they could control things.

 

[stevep]

As for the IJN, it was already really bigger than it should have been in economic terms, as to support their peacetime military establishment, the percentage of the Japanese GDP devoted to defense expenditures was at mobilization levels, and it’s generally accepted that a Japanese attempt to complete the 8-8 Plan anywhere close to on schedule, even if the 1923 Tokyo Earthquake is somehow butterflied away TTL, would most likely have bankrupted the country.

It was the problem of what the economy could afford compared to what Mahanian theory told them they would need to defend their home waters against a possible US attack. That was why the US was so determined on the 60% ratio. According to theory with that they would be able to defeat Japan from a standing start. If the Japanese got a 70% ratio then in the event of war the US would have to build up before they could isolate Japan.

And the standard type is inferior to which British and German ships- the closest equivalents in terms of design year, size, protection, and firepower would be the R and Bayern classes. This article comparing the standards with their British and Japanese contemporaries may be of interest.

What you say here is accurate. The R's and the Bayern's were laid down in late 1913, about the same time as the Penesylvannia''s. Hence they do not compare well with the markedly later Colorado's and S Dakota's. Hence the need for more modern ships by the British once the US started a new race. If the US had announced their programme in 1916 [as OTL] and the war had ended in 1917 [as suggested] the British would have ended their wartime 'holiday' on capital production earlier. You would definitely have seen ships in advanced stage of construction by ~1920, especially if it looked like a Germany freed of the blockage had resumed construction of some of their designs. This was especially since the US had completed more standards since then. Best guesstimate would probably be that the improved Hoods would have been completed [as well as the original ship] a year or two earlier and the G3's would probably have been laid down in 1919 or early 1920. [Working on the war ending a year or so earlier and the greater incentive to respond to a very worrying situation, as well as the greater resources available].

However, the G3s would have likely fallen victim to TTL treaty as well, as the design was a 1920-1 one, and probably wouldn’t have been started entering until 1925-6, and thus only partially built, and at nearly 50000 tons, well over the likely tonnage limits (35,000 tons being a British suggestion) assuming the government would have been willing to pay for them. The G3 design would have been several years newer, as well as nearly 20000 tons bigger than the standard type classes and 10000 bigger than the South Dakota, although the British 16” was something of a lemon. (TTL, barring any treaty interference, the first South Dakotas would have been entering service about 1921.) Furthermore, US designers had come up with concepts for a 30-knot fast battleship of about 50-55 thousand tons, with improved battleship protection, using inclined armor and substantially improved deck armor for long-range combat, and between 8-12 16”/50 Mk. 2 guns (also used on South Dakota), but the General Board didn’t want to go ahead with it just yet, for fear that it would start another revolution in battleship design that it didn’t want to have happen if it could be helped. Moreover, these guns were as powerful as anything else planned at the time, so much so, that they would have been used on the Iowas had there not been a major miscommunication between the designers and ordinance people, making the old guns in new turrets incompatible with the hull and requiring the new Mk. 7 gun to be designed.

A number of errors here. As mentioned above they would probably have been developed earlier. Given that the Nelson's which had to be designed after the 22 treaty, and then had work parcelled out to keep yards active were completed by 1927 a 1925 completion date for a OTL G3 might be possible, if a bit tardy but is highly improbable for anything started earlier or with a decent priority.

35k was a British proposal only in that the US suggested 32k to match the standards but British designers argued for 35k as the minimum for a re-designed G3.

The 16" gun was problematic but that was largely due to weight savings introduced to fit the Nelson design. If going for a G3 most of those problems would have been avoided. Although you might still have had the faulty analysis that went for a lighter, higher velocity shell rather than the heavier, low velocity philosophy used before.

How is a 48k design 20k heavier than 32k [standard] or 10k heavier than 43k [SD & Lex]? I know some dodgy figures were put out by some sources allegying that the G3's would be about 59k but this was simply propaganda. Think the main culprits here were a couple known as the Spoags [might have the spelling wrong as a couple of decades since I read about it].

The Lexington or two that would’ve been completed by 1920-1 would have been a real lemon, as the POD here would have meant the original 1916 design would have been built, without the 1918-9 revisions or much chance of a different change, although by 1919-20, the USN probably would have been looking at ways to complete a couple as carriers and cancel the other pair in favor of a new design.

Agreed. AS you say crap ships by the 1916 design and dodgy by the 1920 but good converted CVs.

However if your talking about a new treaty about 1920, with the huge US construction in the last decade I don't think a new design would have been practical. Both in terms of external politics as it would require large scale production by other powers to match so many new ships and internally. Given the hostility towards the historical 1916 programme by ~1920 I can't see it mostly completed and the navy successfully arguing 'we want to scrap those two partially completed ships and replace them with something newer and bigger/more expensive.

The German Pacific colonies were of practically no value to Germany, very difficult to defend especially if there’s a hostile power in Europe. A narrow CP victory isn’t going to make Germany the recognized dominant power in Europe; rather Europe is going to look like a replay of the 18th Century and the old Anglo-French rivalry because of concerns about the balance of power, old grievances left unaddressed, and minor border and colonial adjustments; the two sides are going to lick their wounds, and stare at each other for the better part of a generation before finding some excuse to have another go. Rinse & repeat until someone gets nukes making the old cycle too dangerous to continue. More or less a return to what was before the war with things adjusted a bit more in Germany’s favor, and if Germany with the #2 navy before the war didn’t make a substantial effort to defend them because of more pressing threats closer to home, why would they later, especially since the fundamental strategic calculus wouldn’t have changed much. And that’s assuming that the Germans even bother asking for them back (snapped up very quickly by the Japanese and Australians in 1914), which is not a common feature of CP victory scenarios (most of them simply have them sending Japan & the UK a bill), because of their basic indefensibility by Germany, which would have to send most of it’s fleet and a couple army corps halfway around the world to contest control of them, which would be difficult because of the short range of many German ships (designed for the North Side) and a lack of friendly bases, nor did the Germans really study long-range operations.

Partially correct. Especially with the territorial gains for Germany and collapse of Russia as an eastern counter Germany domination of the continent will be seen to have been increased. May not actually do so given the economic weakness of Germany and the problems of controlling its new conquests. However both Britain and France will be very worried. Coupled with the naval race the US has trigged by its 1916 programme, which is going to be largely completed it is argued, Britain will have to build extensively.

You’re also operating under a misapprehension over the US goals in calling for a naval conference- the US political leadership wasn’t seized by some sort of crazy pacifist brainbug. By 1920-21, there was starting to become considerable unease about paying for a new naval arms race, which was developing, and trying to limit the size of fleets through a treaty so that the goals of US naval strategy (rough parity with the strongest fleets in Europe to deter Eurpoean adventures in the Americas and maintain the superiority over Japan that it had for more than a decade) could be achieved by putting a lid on everything and not having to pay for another arms race. But again, on multiple threads, you’ve demonstrated considerable misunderstandings about US politics and consistent failures to do a complete job of researching your claims, so I’m not surprised you’d put the US in a borderline ASB situation.

No it wasn't a case of 'crazy pacifist brainbug'. It was a case of we're got this massive programme that Congress won't fund but has triggered a response in Japan and now Britain which could actually worsen our position, militarily and internally. As such it made very good sense for the US to end things when they had gained a considerable advantage.

In TTL its argued that the 1916 programme would have been largely completed and by this sort of period. Might be without the distraction of US involvement in WWI and its own losses that although limited generated concern about militarism. However that would mean that the US has committed itself to a huge and expensive programme that prevents any realistic treaty. [Britain is not going to limit itself to say the Queen's and R's when the US has since then completed ~20 new large warships. It will need at least say the 4 Hoods, 4G3 types then probably ~8N3 equivalents to balance things out.

Japan only came because the other powers were there and a few civilians in the government realized that after looking at the balance sheet, they couldn’t afford to build the fleet the Navy wanted. Britain came because their economy was still in sorry shape, and although they could still squeeze a few ships out, having to outbuild both the US & Japan would have been too much. Germany, in this scenario would have been in a similar situation, a heavily strained economy where a new naval race would muck things up even further. Britain and Germany would have had similar goals in using a treaty to nip the nascent arms race the US and Japan are starting off in the bud, likely saddle them with some older ships to keep numbers up, while using a provision to build Nelson-analogues to have a few ships better than anything else that could be built for several years.

The problem is, as you have pointed out it would be too late to nip the naval race in the bud as the US and Japan would have completed sizeable numbers of their ships, requiring Britain to respond.

Besides, if someone decided that they were going to get screwed in the negotiations, it wouldn’t have been that hard to push the Japanese into scuttling the talks- they almost did over Mutsu and several other points, and even despite everything they extorted, the negotiators were excoriated back home for subjecting Japan to what was seen as a ‘national insult and humiliation’- Japan signing on was a very narrow thing, and if anyone refuses to budge for Japan on a point, the whole thing could easily fall apart.

The Japanese would have had to stand firm over Mutsu rather than agree to scrapping a newly completed ship. As it was they made a number of concessions, mainly over the ratio with the US which, according to the calculations of both powers put the Japanese in a very exposed position militarily. The fact they were probably both wrong is less important than that they thought otherwise.

Steve

 

[David S Poepoe]

The Germans did not design new capital ships during the war and for a long time after, but the British did, culminating in the 1921 designs of the G-3 and look a likes. .

The Germans did design new capital ships during the war. They had several designs for battleships and battlecruisers under consideration as late as 1918. I refer youto Forstmeier & Breyer's Deutsche Grosskamphfschiffe 1915 bis 1918. I've got my copy right in front of me.

 

[DD951]

A number of errors here. As mentioned above they would probably have been developed earlier. Given that the Nelson's which had to be designed after the 22 treaty, and then had work parcelled out to keep yards active were completed by 1927 a 1925 completion date for a OTL G3 might be possible, if a bit tardy but is highly improbable for anything started earlier or with a decent priority.

From what I've seen, working at their normal schedule, a British shipyard would take about 2.5-3 years to build a battleship, although the could cut that by more than half if it was made a priority rush job at the expense of other ships in the pipeline (i.e. Dreadnought, Renown, Repulse), but might also stretch it out a bit for the benefit of the shipbuilding industry if the economy is in trouble. From what I've been able to find out on the subject, the design process that resulted in the G3 took a couple years, and it might take up to another year to get the government to authorize and pay for the ships, and get the contracts signed. With the OTL G3s, I don't believe that they had been laid down at the time of the OTL Washington Conference late in 1921, although orders for long-lead items such as big guns, armor plate, and machinery, as well as orders for structural steel had already been made, so unless the first example of a G3 is a special rush project, my guestimate would have had her joining the fleet as a fully operational unit in 1925.

35k was a British proposal only in that the US suggested 32k to match the standards but British designers argued for 35k as the minimum for a re-designed G3.

My sources indicate (primarily Friedman) that 35k was what the British DNC said was the minimum for a design incorporating the 'post-Jutland' features and improvements, and that the US was thinking in terms of larger ships, as they unsuccessfully tried to have stores excluded from the definition of 'standard displacement' as well

The 16" gun was problematic but that was largely due to weight savings introduced to fit the Nelson design. If going for a G3 most of those problems would have been avoided. Although you might still have had the faulty analysis that went for a lighter, higher velocity shell rather than the heavier, low velocity philosophy used before.

My info is that weight-saving measures were only one of the problems with the British 16" design, and that structural reinforcements to the Nelsons solved many of the problems such as decks buckling, turrets jamming in train in heavy seas or after prolonged use, and excessive shock and shaking caused by the firing of the main guns. Besides the faulty concept behind the shells, most of the problems with the gun/mounting combo stemmed from the overly complex and somewhat unreliable mechanical safety interlocks and anti-flash devices installed; this was also a problem to some extent with the World War 2 King George V class.

How is a 48k design 20k heavier than 32k [standard] or 10k heavier than 43k [SD & Lex]? I know some dodgy figures were put out by some sources allegying that the G3's would be about 59k but this was simply propaganda. Think the main culprits here were a couple known as the Spoags [might have the spelling wrong as a couple of decades since I read about it].

I was rounding a bit to make a point, and did say 'nearly', while I had the G3 at around 48.5. Nor do the standards as built all have the same standard displacement. From the data in Friedmans, Nevada was 26.1k, Pennsylvania 29.1k, New Mexico 29.9k, Tennessee 32.1k, and Colorado 32.4k, so an average standard displacement as built would be in the neighborhood of 30-31k. South Dakota's standard displacement was estimated at 41.4k, as opposed to the designed normal dislplacement of 43.2k.

Agreed. AS you say crap ships by the 1916 design and dodgy by the 1920 but good converted CVs.

However if your talking about a new treaty about 1920, with the huge US construction in the last decade I don't think a new design would have been practical. Both in terms of external politics as it would require large scale production by other powers to match so many new ships and internally. Given the hostility towards the historical 1916 programme by ~1920 I can't see it mostly completed and the navy successfully arguing 'we want to scrap those two partially completed ships and replace them with something newer and bigger/more expensive.

This was based on actual debate within the General Board between 1918-20. By 1920, the USN was very seriously considering completing a couple of the Lexingtons as carriers, and although the USN was reluctant to go that direction for staring a second revolution in capital ship design, there were several studies in the battlecruiser series incorporating battleship armor and firepower in a ship in the 48-55k range capable of 28-29kts, while the Naval Historical Center at one point had some scanned 'springstyles' of stretched South Dakotas capable of 25-26kts on their website.

My guess is that if in 1919-20, whatever Britain and Germany are building then appear to warrant such a departure, such as modified Hoods or evolutions of Ersatz Yorck, the USN would try coming up with a 'modified design' based on those studies and incorporating the latest ideas on protection, and either cancelling a couple of the SDs and Lexingtons least advanced in favor of or reordering them to the 'modified design,' possibly sacrifising a couple hulls in an effort to convice Congress that the the program is being trimmed a bit. Even if the USN could sell Congress on that, they'd very likey fall prey to the treaty.

No it wasn't a case of 'crazy pacifist brainbug'. It was a case of we're got this massive programme that Congress won't fund but has triggered a response in Japan and now Britain which could actually worsen our position, militarily and internally. As such it made very good sense for the US to end things when they had gained a considerable advantage.

That's pretty much what I said in response to Warspite's borderline ASB claim that the US would deliberately throw those advantages away and make itself weaker than Japan in the name of international peace.

Partially correct. Especially with the territorial gains for Germany and collapse of Russia as an eastern counter Germany domination of the continent will be seen to have been increased. May not actually do so given the economic weakness of Germany and the problems of controlling its new conquests. However both Britain and France will be very worried. Coupled with the naval race the US has trigged by its 1916 programme, which is going to be largely completed it is argued, Britain will have to build extensively. (...)

In TTL its argued that the 1916 programme would have been largely completed and by this sort of period. Might be without the distraction of US involvement in WWI and its own losses that although limited generated concern about militarism. However that would mean that the US has committed itself to a huge and expensive programme that prevents any realistic treaty. [Britain is not going to limit itself to say the Queen's and R's when the US has since then completed ~20 new large warships. It will need at least say the 4 Hoods, 4G3 types then probably ~8N3 equivalents to balance things out.

The problem is, as you have pointed out it would be too late to nip the naval race in the bud as the US and Japan would have completed sizeable numbers of their ships, requiring Britain to respond.

What the British and Germans can build in approximately the 1918-21 timeframe is going to have a very important part in shaping what the treaty looks like, and in this environment, I could actually see a provision allowing the British and Germans to complete some of the ships then building on top of any Nelson-analogs, while allowing them to keep some of the pre-QE/R/Bayern ships that would otherwise be disposed of for a couple more years, until those new ships finish. I could also see the British holding out over the Dominion navies, so that they aren't counted against the RN, as a means to artificially inflate the fleet a bit, which would likely come out as the RAN having a battlecruiser or two in the treaty era.

The Japanese would have had to stand firm over Mutsu rather than agree to scrapping a newly completed ship. As it was they made a number of concessions, mainly over the ratio with the US which, according to the calculations of both powers put the Japanese in a very exposed position militarily. The fact they were probably both wrong is less important than that they thought otherwise.
Steve

The Japanese were in a pretty bad position, as they were pretty much trying to punch above their stragegic weight, and thus put themselves in a position where their self-identified security interests required more military than they could afford (even after the treaties OTL), which coupled with the irrationality of the military hard-liners, made them pretty stubborn over things such as Mutsu (where they deliberatly misrepresented the ship as being about half a year further along than it was), fortifying island bases (a term they violated in some places), and tonnage ratios, as well as offering unrealistic proposals, and later on, playing very fast and loose with tonnage limits (Japanese heavy cruisers tended to be a couple thousand tons 'overweight'), so I don't think it would have been that hard for someone to push them into staying outside of the treaty in an effort to scuttle it, although that wouldn't have been a good long-term idea for the Japanese. (But again, long-term stragegy isn't exactly something the Japanese were very good at after the Russo-Japanese war.)

 

[HMS Warspite]

The Germans did design new capital ships during the war. They had several designs for battleships and battlecruisers under consideration as late as 1918. I refer youto Forstmeier & Breyer's Deutsche Grosskamphfschiffe 1915 bis 1918. I've got my copy right in front of me.

I am aware of that, as I have this work of Breyer's at home. The point is that these designs were not new, but an offshoot of the earliers 1912 designs of the Baden and Derfflinger classes and therefore technically not new. The USN designs too were all related to the 1914 designs of the Nevada class and their offshoot, while the IJN 8-8 planned vessels all were related to the 1916 design of Nagato.

Technically a new design is not simply an evolution of an older design, but a radical departure from it, as had HMS Dreadnought and HMS Invincible been in 1906 and the G-3/HMS Nelson in 1921/25. Both were completely different in both layout and fittings, compared to the preceding designs, itroducing many new items in both weaponsystems and propulsion, besides general layout.

 

[stevep]

From what I've seen, working at their normal schedule, a British shipyard would take about 2.5-3 years to build a battleship, although the could cut that by more than half if it was made a priority rush job at the expense of other ships in the pipeline (i.e. Dreadnought, Renown, Repulse), but might also stretch it out a bit for the benefit of the shipbuilding industry if the economy is in trouble. From what I've been able to find out on the subject, the design process that resulted in the G3 took a couple years, and it might take up to another year to get the government to authorize and pay for the ships, and get the contracts signed. With the OTL G3s, I don't believe that they had been laid down at the time of the OTL Washington Conference late in 1921, although orders for long-lead items such as big guns, armor plate, and machinery, as well as orders for structural steel had already been made, so unless the first example of a G3 is a special rush project, my guestimate would have had her joining the fleet as a fully operational unit in 1925.

The dates for production are about right but your forgetting that this war ended a year earlier, Britain has very strong incentives to build [a still dominant Germany on the continent and a massive US programme & Japanese response] and the massive construction industry in Britain is desperate for work. Hence I would see the G3's being at a minimum a year ahead of the Sept 21 ordering of OTL.

My sources indicate (primarily Friedman) that 35k was what the British DNC said was the minimum for a design incorporating the 'post-Jutland' features and improvements, and that the US was thinking in terms of larger ships, as they unsuccessfully tried to have stores excluded from the definition of 'standard displacement' as well

I've read that the US wanted to limit 'Washington ships' to the Colorado tonnage. That the argument over tonnage displacement was because Britain argued it wanted to exclude stores as its ships had further to travel due to the size of the empire. While accurate this was also to keep secret the use of fluid tanks for anti-torpedo protection. An innovation that have resulted from the research into the G3 design.

My info is that weight-saving measures were only one of the problems with the British 16" design, and that structural reinforcements to the Nelsons solved many of the problems such as decks buckling, turrets jamming in train in heavy seas or after prolonged use, and excessive shock and shaking caused by the firing of the main guns. Besides the faulty concept behind the shells, most of the problems with the gun/mounting combo stemmed from the overly complex and somewhat unreliable mechanical safety interlocks and anti-flash devices installed; this was also a problem to some extent with the World War 2 King George V class.

There was a problem with safety interlocks but most of the others problems I've read about relate to the drastic reduction in size from G3 to Nelson. That's generally considered, from what I've read, to be responsible for the problems with steel rather than brass in turret fittings, deck stress and shock problems from the full salvoes.

I was rounding a bit to make a point, and did say 'nearly', while I had the G3 at around 48.5. Nor do the standards as built all have the same standard displacement. From the data in Friedmans, Nevada was 26.1k, Pennsylvania 29.1k, New Mexico 29.9k, Tennessee 32.1k, and Colorado 32.4k, so an average standard displacement as built would be in the neighborhood of 30-31k. South Dakota's standard displacement was estimated at 41.4k, as opposed to the designed normal dislplacement of 43.2k.

Ah, mis-read the note as I was thinking you were comparing with the Colorado's rather than the average for the standards. With the SD's the displacements I have seen have been for 43k as compared to 48-49k for the G3's. Think that is normal displacement for both figures. [Checking in a Tony Gibbons book, Complete Encyclopedia of Battleships and Battlecruisers 1860-present day, the 1st reference I have to hand, it gives SD as 43.2k and G3 as 48.4k.

This was based on actual debate within the General Board between 1918-20. By 1920, the USN was very seriously considering completing a couple of the Lexingtons as carriers, and although the USN was reluctant to go that direction for staring a second revolution in capital ship design, there were several studies in the battlecruiser series incorporating battleship armor and firepower in a ship in the 48-55k range capable of 28-29kts, while the Naval Historical Center at one point had some scanned 'springstyles' of stretched South Dakotas capable of 25-26kts on their website.

My guess is that if in 1919-20, whatever Britain and Germany are building then appear to warrant such a departure, such as modified Hoods or evolutions of Ersatz Yorck, the USN would try coming up with a 'modified design' based on those studies and incorporating the latest ideas on protection, and either cancelling a couple of the SDs and Lexingtons least advanced in favor of or reordering them to the 'modified design,' possibly sacrifising a couple hulls in an effort to convice Congress that the the program is being trimmed a bit. Even if the USN could sell Congress on that, they'd very likey fall prey to the treaty.

Yes but your talking about the US scrapping a couple of partially completed BCs then asking Congress to build even larger ships having build 12 large 16" ships in the past 4-5 years. If those are completed in this timetable the US effectively has the most powerful battlefleet in the world already. Given that Congress was unwilling to fund the programme OTL they could really object to funding a let further one even with other nations building ships in response to the US.

Also, if in the period ~1914-20 the US has produced ~20 large capital ships while Britain is also watching a Germany clearly dominating the continent the question is what treaty? For reasons of both national self interest and internal politics there would have to be a response.

What the British and Germans can build in approximately the 1918-21 timeframe is going to have a very important part in shaping what the treaty looks like, and in this environment, I could actually see a provision allowing the British and Germans to complete some of the ships then building on top of any Nelson-analogs, while allowing them to keep some of the pre-QE/R/Bayern ships that would otherwise be disposed of for a couple more years, until those new ships finish. I could also see the British holding out over the Dominion navies, so that they aren't counted against the RN, as a means to artificially inflate the fleet a bit, which would likely come out as the RAN having a battlecruiser or two in the treaty era.

This is a possibility. Having a wander around Goggle Books last night trying to find a bit more about the G3's - without success unfortunately. However a mention, think from the early part of the OTL treaty negotiations, which seemed to suggest that if the US and Japan pretty much completed their 16 ship programmes Britain would be looking at ~13 ships in response. Guessing this would be the original Hood, 4 G3's and 8 N3's. Would actually prefer 12 G3's myself for their greater flexibility and also the commonality that would be gained.

The Japanese were in a pretty bad position, as they were pretty much trying to punch above their stragegic weight, and thus put themselves in a position where their self-identified security interests required more military than they could afford (even after the treaties OTL), which coupled with the irrationality of the military hard-liners, made them pretty stubborn over things such as Mutsu (where they deliberatly misrepresented the ship as being about half a year further along than it was), fortifying island bases (a term they violated in some places), and tonnage ratios, as well as offering unrealistic proposals, and later on, playing very fast and loose with tonnage limits (Japanese heavy cruisers tended to be a couple thousand tons 'overweight'), so I don't think it would have been that hard for someone to push them into staying outside of the treaty in an effort to scuttle it, although that wouldn't have been a good long-term idea for the Japanese. (But again, long-term stragegy isn't exactly something the Japanese were very good at after the Russo-Japanese war.)

Yes they did clear pretty blatantly, especially when the military hard liners were in full control later on, but on the other hand the US had painted them into a pretty nasty corner. Especially with the insistence on making the Japanese so vulnerable to a US attack. That's why, having accepted the loss of the defencive alliance and the 70% ratio the banning on fortifications in the western Pacific was so important to them.

Steve

 

[xchen08]

The dates for production are about right but your forgetting that this war ended a year earlier, Britain has very strong incentives to build [a still dominant Germany on the continent and a massive US programme & Japanese response] and the massive construction industry in Britain is desperate for work. Hence I would see the G3's being at a minimum a year ahead of the Sept 21 ordering of OTL.

If Britain does go for an immediate construction program, it's unlikely to be of anything similar to the OTL G3. The basic sketch of the G3 wasn't thought up until the end of 1920. The preceding K-H/L-M designs are generally thought to be impractically large but a more desperate Britain might have gone ahead and tried adapting, then building one of them. Or maybe Britain would go for a further evolution of the rather traditional Admiral design. Certainly the G3 was a major departure from the prevailing British design philosophy, and Britain rarely goes for revolutionary.

Yes but your talking about the US scrapping a couple of partially completed BCs then asking Congress to build even larger ships having build 12 large 16" ships in the past 4-5 years. If those are completed in this timetable the US effectively has the most powerful battlefleet in the world already. Given that Congress was unwilling to fund the programme OTL they could really object to funding a let further one even with other nations building ships in response to the US.

Well, at least some of those BCs are going to be carrier conversions. The design is simply too crappy, and more importantly, known and clearly understood to be crappy for the full run to be completed. And Congress's willingness to fund the program will depend on just how much Germany is viewed as a threat. The U.S. will aim at a fleet, and Congress will approve of one that can take on Japan and Germany at the same time without British support. If German shipbuilding is clearly moribund, then I can see Congress complaining, but if Germany immediately begins laying down new ships...

This is a possibility. Having a wander around Goggle Books last night trying to find a bit more about the G3's - without success unfortunately. However a mention, think from the early part of the OTL treaty negotiations, which seemed to suggest that if the US and Japan pretty much completed their 16 ship programmes Britain would be looking at ~13 ships in response. Guessing this would be the original Hood, 4 G3's and 8 N3's. Would actually prefer 12 G3's myself for their greater flexibility and also the commonality that would be gained.

I actually have some serious doubts about the N3 design. It's really undersized for packing 9 18in guns, and as the Japanese learned, there are a whole slew of unforseen problems scaling up from 16in to 18in. I'd expect they'd either end up with an underpowered and problematic 18in gun, with issues similar to but more extreme than those that plagued the 16/45 OTL, and thus an unsatisfactory N3, or Britain just goes for more G3s, and you get a fast but relatively weak battleline. Either way, 12 new capital ships of around 50k tons in an anyway remotely timely manner is completely out of the question financially. It'll break Britain's government as easily as the 8-8 would break Japan's.

 

[burmafrd]

The interesting thing about these times were that the naval experts were so involved about the size of the caliber of the guns that they pretty much neglected things like shells and powder, which in the long run were much more important. Our 16" shells were so superior that they outperformed the IJN 18.1" shell. Superior shells and powder really told the tale much better then size.

 

[Ward]

The interesting thing about these times were that the naval experts were so involved about the size of the caliber of the guns that they pretty much neglected things like shells and powder, which in the long run were much more important. Our 16" shells were so superior that they outperformed the IJN 18.1" shell. Superior shells and powder really told the tale much better then size.

That true the French 13.5 in had longer range then the 16 in did .

 

[DD951]

I've read that the US wanted to limit 'Washington ships' to the Colorado tonnage. That the argument over tonnage displacement was because Britain argued it wanted to exclude stores as its ships had further to travel due to the size of the empire. While accurate this was also to keep secret the use of fluid tanks for anti-torpedo protection. An innovation that have resulted from the research into the G3 design.

My sources indicate that both the US & UK wanted standard displacement to be used because other definitions would give French, Italian, and Japanese ships unfair advantages because they didn't need as much fuel, as British ships would due to the empire, and the US because of the operational requirements imposed by the prospect of a war with Japan (without the advantages of the British base network,) and it was the US who tried to have stores excluded, while throughout the history of attempts to engage in naval arms limitations through treaty, the positions were fairly consistent in that the British wanted smaller ships for greater numbers, while the US wanted larger ones because it felt that it was impossible to build a useful warship that met operational requirements on smaller tonnages, and even the original WNT limits were inadequate for purposes of building properly balanced ships in the opinions of USN designers.

The multi-bulkhead TDS introduced on the Tennessee also heavily relied on some of the spaces being filled with liquid, either water ballast or fuel oil, to absorb the effects of the hit (others were set up as voids to dissipate shock.)

There was a problem with safety interlocks but most of the others problems I've read about relate to the drastic reduction in size from G3 to Nelson. That's generally considered, from what I've read, to be responsible for the problems with steel rather than brass in turret fittings, deck stress and shock problems from the full salvoes.

I took a look at the Navweaps page for the gun, and it notes 3 major problems, breakdowns in the ammunition supply due to the interlocks, the stress, shock, and jamming due to being built too lightly, and excessive gun wear. The structural problems were corrected with various pre-war alterations, and the gun wear problem somewhat corrected by reducing the muzzle velocity, although wear and accuracy continued to be markedly inferior to the older 15"/42. A proposal to improve things with a heavier shell in the 1930s never got anywhere due to budget cuts preventing even a design proposal from being made. However, the interlock problems continued to be a serious issue that was never fully corrected, and the page notes that when Rodney was engaging Bismarck, there were numerous instances of guns missing salvos due for mechanical failures with the interlocks, shell hoists, and ramming gear, including one failure compounded by crew error that knocked a gun in A turret out of action until over 12 hours after the battle ended. These safety mechanisms were duplicated on the later King George V class, and were responsible for arguably worse problems, especially on King George V & Prince of Wales when they engaged Bismarck.

Yes but your talking about the US scrapping a couple of partially completed BCs then asking Congress to build even larger ships having build 12 large 16" ships in the past 4-5 years. If those are completed in this timetable the US effectively has the most powerful battlefleet in the world already. Given that Congress was unwilling to fund the programme OTL they could really object to funding a let further one even with other nations building ships in response to the US.

Also, if in the period ~1914-20 the US has produced ~20 large capital ships while Britain is also watching a Germany clearly dominating the continent the question is what treaty? For reasons of both national self interest and internal politics there would have to be a response.

The Lexingtons in this TTL would be most likely the original 1916 design with 10x14"/50 guns, as the POD of a 1917 peace would butterfly away what resulted in the 1919-20 revisions resulting in the 8x16" design with more compact machinery and improved armor, as delays imposed by the OTL crash programs to counter the U-Boat threat by spamming destroyers and merchants resulted in their being laid down postponed until after the war. With the extra time on their hands and information about foreign developments such as the Hood, the designers realized that the design wouldn't really cut it and altered it, but TTL, there'd probably be a few under construction by the time that the USN realizes the revolution in capital ship design they tried to avoid was happening and new designs are needed ASAP.

I might not have been very clear about this, but what I had in mind was that in 1919 or so, the USN comes to that realization, and tries to modify the 1916 program to reflect the changing state of warship design and get some carriers, so there'd be a proposed alteration to the capital ship part of the program so if the USN got it's way, it'd be 4xColorado, ~4xSouth Dakota, ~2x Lexington BC, 2 Lexington CV conversion, & ~2-3 of that hypothetical fast battleship design. At this point, depending on yard space and building tempos, there'd probably be a few South Dakotas & Lexingtons that haven't been laid down yet or have barely had any work done on them, which would be candidates for being supplanted by the new design. Never said that Congress would go along, and even if they did, the ships being built to the new design would be likely treaty victims.

Yes they did clear pretty blatantly, especially when the military hard liners were in full control later on, but on the other hand the US had painted them into a pretty nasty corner. Especially with the insistence on making the Japanese so vulnerable to a US attack. That's why, having accepted the loss of the defencive alliance and the 70% ratio the banning on fortifications in the western Pacific was so important to them.
Steve

Even by 1920, the Japanese were being seen as something of a rogue state, and the British wanted out of their alliance with Japan because it was seen as likely to drag Britain into a war with the US which nobody really wanted, while making the Japanese vulnerable to US attack was not what the US was intending to do. US planners, with a fleet likely operating in a strategic offensive, though that a fleet heading out into the western Pacific was in an exposed position, while the cumulative effects of operating so far from base (especially compared to Japan) combined with lilkely attrition due to submarines, air attacks, mines, etc. would reduce the effective combat power of the US fleet by at least 25% by the time of the projected decisive fleet actions around the Marianas or the Philippines, so that a peacetime fleet equal to Japan would actually be substantially inferior by that point, and at least a 25% numerical superiority was necessary to have actual parity in practice.

By the time of the WNT, the idea of a major fortified fleet base in the Philippines had been decisively rejected by naval planners, as any of the suitable anchorages, especially Manila Bay & Cavite, were too vulnerable to being neutralized by ground assault (large perimeter of hills where siege guns would make it too dangerous for ships and required a force in excess of the US Army's entire peacetime establishment to adequately defend), while Guam was seen as a bit too small and exposed as well as possibly putting the fleet in a precarious situation, while Congress never warmed to the idea of building the place up, even when the military had the greatest influence under TR.

 

[burmafrd]

Actually where in the pacific could you have a fortified naval base that could really be defended? Outside of Australia maybe, there really are no places that could stand off an attack in force. Truk was wide open to an attack and as pointed out Guam was too small.

 

[stevep]

If Britain does go for an immediate construction program, it's unlikely to be of anything similar to the OTL G3. The basic sketch of the G3 wasn't thought up until the end of 1920. The preceding K-H/L-M designs are generally thought to be impractically large but a more desperate Britain might have gone ahead and tried adapting, then building one of them. Or maybe Britain would go for a further evolution of the rather traditional Admiral design. Certainly the G3 was a major departure from the prevailing British design philosophy, and Britain rarely goes for revolutionary.

If Britain goes for an immediate response it would probably be to complete the 4 Hoods, the last 3 with modifications. Would probably work on new designs to match the US and Japanese designs [plus any fears of possible German construction] as a parallel project. This could well lead to something like the G3's since the wartime experience would be the same, the need would be even greater and the ability to experiement with old ships would be similar - just lacking the Baden. Hence, with an extra year or so and a greater incentive, plus lack of other distractions I would expect the G3's to be started at least a year earlier, say in late 20 at the latest. Presuming the US has got funding for its programme that will be finished earlier but Britain will be producing new ships.

Well, at least some of those BCs are going to be carrier conversions. The design is simply too crappy, and more importantly, known and clearly understood to be crappy for the full run to be completed. And Congress's willingness to fund the program will depend on just how much Germany is viewed as a threat. The U.S. will aim at a fleet, and Congress will approve of one that can take on Japan and Germany at the same time without British support. If German shipbuilding is clearly moribund, then I can see Congress complaining, but if Germany immediately begins laying down new ships...

Possibly although as DD951 says we're presuming the US doesn't take a break because of WWI and does get funding it won't get the chance to re-design the initial set of hulls. Also, without contact with Britain and other European powers they might not realise how crappy the design is. Especially if the US is concerned to have some counter to the fast ships possessed by Germany and Japan you could see at least some ships launched at something like their original design. Agreed that later units will be completed as carriers once they realise and possibly the early designs will be rebuilt. However might be that original Lexington designs are in service until something better is built. If Congress is complaining about the huge expenditure that could be some time.

I actually have some serious doubts about the N3 design. It's really undersized for packing 9 18in guns, and as the Japanese learned, there are a whole slew of unforseen problems scaling up from 16in to 18in. I'd expect they'd either end up with an underpowered and problematic 18in gun, with issues similar to but more extreme than those that plagued the 16/45 OTL, and thus an unsatisfactory N3, or Britain just goes for more G3s, and you get a fast but relatively weak battleline. Either way, 12 new capital ships of around 50k tons in an anyway remotely timely manner is completely out of the question financially. It'll break Britain's government as easily as the 8-8 would break Japan's.

I would prefer more G3's as well. Marginally weaker armour but still very, very good, a powerful armament and high speed which gives them considerable strategic and tactical flexibility.

Not sure they are unfundable. Don't forget that the TL shaves at least a year off the war and removes the vast majority of the debts to the US. [Allied nations only really turned to the US from about 1917 as funds for loans from Britain dried up because the US loans had much higher interest rates and more strings attached. Actually, if the other powers paid their debts Britain's position would be very strong but I doubt they will be able/willing to]. Furthermore the TL also removes a number of costly commitments that occurred OTL, such as the interventions in Russia and Turkey. It will be an overstretched Germany most likely bogged down in such circumstances.

Britain is a much wealthier nation than Japan at the time and also has a much more efficient construction industry. There is still a lot of slack in Britain in terms of savings that can be made and new incomes. Also Britain needs the ships in response to the situation. As such, it might take until the end of the 20's but Britain can find the funds and definitely has the capacity.

Steve

 

[stevep]

My sources indicate that both the US & UK wanted standard displacement to be used because other definitions would give French, Italian, and Japanese ships unfair advantages because they didn't need as much fuel, as British ships would due to the empire, and the US because of the operational requirements imposed by the prospect of a war with Japan (without the advantages of the British base network,) and it was the US who tried to have stores excluded, while throughout the history of attempts to engage in naval arms limitations through treaty, the positions were fairly consistent in that the British wanted smaller ships for greater numbers, while the US wanted larger ones because it felt that it was impossible to build a useful warship that met operational requirements on smaller tonnages, and even the original WNT limits were inadequate for purposes of building properly balanced ships in the opinions of USN designers.

Interesting. Never read that before although as you may have gathered most of my knowledge comes from a while back.

The multi-bulkhead TDS introduced on the Tennessee also heavily relied on some of the spaces being filled with liquid, either water ballast or fuel oil, to absorb the effects of the hit (others were set up as voids to dissipate shock.)

Again interesting. Was this used in the later standards or the 1916 designs?

I took a look at the Navweaps page for the gun, and it notes 3 major problems, breakdowns in the ammunition supply due to the interlocks, the stress, shock, and jamming due to being built too lightly, and excessive gun wear. The structural problems were corrected with various pre-war alterations, and the gun wear problem somewhat corrected by reducing the muzzle velocity, although wear and accuracy continued to be markedly inferior to the older 15"/42. A proposal to improve things with a heavier shell in the 1930s never got anywhere due to budget cuts preventing even a design proposal from being made. However, the interlock problems continued to be a serious issue that was never fully corrected, and the page notes that when Rodney was engaging Bismarck, there were numerous instances of guns missing salvos due for mechanical failures with the interlocks, shell hoists, and ramming gear, including one failure compounded by crew error that knocked a gun in A turret out of action until over 12 hours after the battle ended. These safety mechanisms were duplicated on the later King George V class, and were responsible for arguably worse problems, especially on King George V & Prince of Wales when they engaged Bismarck.

Sounds like the interlock would be the major problem in TTL. The problems from being too lightly built would be avoided without a treaty. [Or if the US & Japan had raised the bar by building ships of similar size]. In terms of the lighter shell hopefully the faulty research that suggested it would be avoided. Failing that, with far more interest in capital ship development during the 20's there's a good chance of a heavier shell being developed then, preventing the wear problems and giving better accuracy as a result.

The Lexingtons in this TTL would be most likely the original 1916 design with 10x14"/50 guns, as the POD of a 1917 peace would butterfly away what resulted in the 1919-20 revisions resulting in the 8x16" design with more compact machinery and improved armor, as delays imposed by the OTL crash programs to counter the U-Boat threat by spamming destroyers and merchants resulted in their being laid down postponed until after the war. With the extra time on their hands and information about foreign developments such as the Hood, the designers realized that the design wouldn't really cut it and altered it, but TTL, there'd probably be a few under construction by the time that the USN realizes the revolution in capital ship design they tried to avoid was happening and new designs are needed ASAP.

I might not have been very clear about this, but what I had in mind was that in 1919 or so, the USN comes to that realization, and tries to modify the 1916 program to reflect the changing state of warship design and get some carriers, so there'd be a proposed alteration to the capital ship part of the program so if the USN got it's way, it'd be 4xColorado, ~4xSouth Dakota, ~2x Lexington BC, 2 Lexington CV conversion, & ~2-3 of that hypothetical fast battleship design. At this point, depending on yard space and building tempos, there'd probably be a few South Dakotas & Lexingtons that haven't been laid down yet or have barely had any work done on them, which would be candidates for being supplanted by the new design. Never said that Congress would go along, and even if they did, the ships being built to the new design would be likely treaty victims.

Ah. Sorry. I see where your coming from here. Think you might still have some problems getting further spending through Congress after such a big programme, especially if Japan and Germany are struggling to complete major new ships. However definitely possible.

Even by 1920, the Japanese were being seen as something of a rogue state, and the British wanted out of their alliance with Japan because it was seen as likely to drag Britain into a war with the US which nobody really wanted, while making the Japanese vulnerable to US attack was not what the US was intending to do. US planners, with a fleet likely operating in a strategic offensive, though that a fleet heading out into the western Pacific was in an exposed position, while the cumulative effects of operating so far from base (especially compared to Japan) combined with lilkely attrition due to submarines, air attacks, mines, etc. would reduce the effective combat power of the US fleet by at least 25% by the time of the projected decisive fleet actions around the Marianas or the Philippines, so that a peacetime fleet equal to Japan would actually be substantially inferior by that point, and at least a 25% numerical superiority was necessary to have actual parity in practice.

The problem was the US policy was to make Japan vulnerable to a US attack. That was the entire purpose of the 60% ratio at OTL Washington and why the Japanese wanted 70%. Heading a book about this a year or so back and both nations calculated under Mahanian theory that the US needed to restrict Japan to a 60% ratio to be able to defeat them in a straight war - without new construction. Which is pretty much what you seem to say above? No one was suggesting equality between Japan and the US, at least before the more extreme claims of the Japanese militarists in 1930. The debate in OTL Washington was whether it would be a 60% or 70% ratio.

I'm not saying everything was the US's fault but I think there are arguments that Japan had considerable fears and concerns. Have considered that if it hadn't been so isolated and the alliance retained we might have avoided the collapse into militarism in Japan. Note that one of the arguments given by the foreign office for maintaining the alliance was that it also gave Britain influence over Japan.

Steve

 

[burmafrd]

Japans fears and concerns were of their own making. They chose the road which ended in nuclear destruction and devastation for their entire country. No one forced them or even pushed them.

 

[xchen08]

If Britain goes for an immediate response it would probably be to complete the 4 Hoods, the last 3 with modifications. Would probably work on new designs to match the US and Japanese designs [plus any fears of possible German construction] as a parallel project. This could well lead to something like the G3's since the wartime experience would be the same, the need would be even greater and the ability to experiement with old ships would be similar - just lacking the Baden. Hence, with an extra year or so and a greater incentive, plus lack of other distractions I would expect the G3's to be started at least a year earlier, say in late 20 at the latest. Presuming the US has got funding for its programme that will be finished earlier but Britain will be producing new ships.

Well, the first British design sketch to feature all main turrets forward didn't show up until October of 1920, and it is a major innovation, not one of those things that designers would naturally come to if ordered to come up with a design a year early. As such, I rather doubt a G3 analogue could possibly be laid down in 1920.

I would prefer more G3's as well. Marginally weaker armour but still very, very good, a powerful armament and high speed which gives them considerable strategic and tactical flexibility.

Not sure they are unfundable. Don't forget that the TL shaves at least a year off the war and removes the vast majority of the debts to the US. [Allied nations only really turned to the US from about 1917 as funds for loans from Britain dried up because the US loans had much higher interest rates and more strings attached. Actually, if the other powers paid their debts Britain's position would be very strong but I doubt they will be able/willing to]. Furthermore the TL also removes a number of costly commitments that occurred OTL, such as the interventions in Russia and Turkey. It will be an overstretched Germany most likely bogged down in such circumstances.

Britain is a much wealthier nation than Japan at the time and also has a much more efficient construction industry. There is still a lot of slack in Britain in terms of savings that can be made and new incomes. Also Britain needs the ships in response to the situation. As such, it might take until the end of the 20's but Britain can find the funds and definitely has the capacity.

The lowest estimates I've seen for the cost of the G3 design are somewhat over 11 million pounds, which is nearly twice that of the Hood, 4x that of a QE, or 5x that of a R. Using the lower estimate of 11 million, 12 ships would be 132 million pounds, or over half the total British naval expenditures from 1908 to 1914. Assuming we want the 12 ships over 6 fiscal years 1920-1926, (which is really rather long, since it means the final ships will be entering service about the same time as the first vessels of the response from the U.S. and Japan) adding in the costs of necessary escorts, manning and maintaining the existing fleet, manning and maintaining the new ships as they are built, and expanding support infrastructure, and we are looking at naval expenditures 3+ times that of the height of the last naval race at the minimum on a rather less fit economy. Maybe Britain can pull it off, but I wouldn't bet on it.