WI: Soviet Invasion of Honshu

[seraphim74]

Originally posted by CalBear

No, I gave you a direct comparative. The P-47 had a COMBAT RANGE of 800 miles, the bF-109 had a combat range of 521 miles, the P-51 had a combat range of 950 (all of these are on internal fuel). The P-51 with drop tanks had a combat range of 1,650 miles. This does not mean it could fly out 1,650 miles on an escort mission and return (if that were the case it would have a combat range greater than the B-29 which could reach out 1,600 miles and return with a 10,000 pound bomb load). The formula for combat radius is (combat range/2)*.9 the result for the P-51D w/tanks is 745 miles

Well, then Pe-2 has more than enough time to loiter; so does Yak-9D; Il-10s indeed might have problems; some support can be provided also by Tu-2 (not mentioned earlier), although not as CAS.
I think Pe-2 was capable of providing CAS - it was a diving bomber after all; during the battle of Kursk 116 Pe-2s allegedly destroyed almost 300 vehicles (tanks and trucks), 14 artillery pieces and even some machine gun positions - all that in 1 day. Even if number themselves are wrong, the categories of targets seem to confirm that Pe-2s could act as CAS.
Also after securing a northern part of Hokkaido Soviets can easily build bases there for Il-2s and Il-10s. The problem might be with supplying those bases. If the waters around Hokkaido are indeed mined, as it was mentioned above, then getting ammunition, bombs and most of all, fuel, will be very difficult.
OTOH if Japan does not surrender I doubt if Truman would have tried to stop the Soviets from invading Japan. It might be hard to explain to Amrican public opinion why US forces shoot at their allies fighting the enemies of America.

 

[Curiousone]

No, I gave you a direct comparative. The P-47 had a COMBAT RANGE of 800 miles, the bF-109 had a combat range of 521 miles, the P-51 had a combat range of 950 (all of these are on internal fuel). The P-51 with drop tanks had a combat range of 1,650 miles. This does not mean it could fly out 1,650 miles on an escort mission and return (if that were the case it would have a combat range greater than the B-29 which could reach out 1,600 miles and return with a 10,000 pound bomb load). The formula for combat radius is (combat range/2)*.9 the result for the P-51D w/tanks is 745 miles

It means the P-51 (w/tanks) could take off, form up into a formation, fly ~700 miles out from base in high economy cruise, engage in air combat for roughly 20 minutes, and make it home with enough fuel to make at least two landing attempts. That is why you need to discuss combat radius not range. Range is only useful if you are taking off at one point, overflying your target, and landing at a different location (the USAAF occasionally did this with bomber mission flying out of the UK and landing at Allied air bases in Italy).

An aircraft like the Yak-9D had a maximum range of 2,285km (1,400mi) in absolutely clean unladen status with drop tanks, 845 miles w/o tanks. This is the ferry range. The P-51D had a ferry range of 2,300 miles, this means the combat range of the P-51 was 71% of its maximum range, and its combat radius was~30% of maximum range. If one uses the Mustang as a guide (which actually rather generous since the Mustang was a remarkably efficient air frame/engine combination) you will get a combat radius of 420 miles for the Yak-9D (which makes it, by far, the longest range Soviet fighter of the war) and a loiter time of around 30 minutes from the time it reaches the beach, more likely 20-25 by the time it is actually orbiting (this is just about what the P-47 managed over Normandy which was flown from similar ranges). The quick and dirty method of figuring out loiter time is to take the excess range of an aircraft, in this case the Yak and divide that by the cruise speed of the aircraft. In the case of the Yak this is 200/225 or 53 minutes Of course the Yak-9D was pure fighter, and a rather poorly armed one (the aircraft had one 20mm cannon and one 12.7mm (.51 cal) machine gun, with very limited ground attack capacity.

A better comparative is the Il-2 which comes out with with a combat radius of 225 miles. This leave around the ground attack aircraft with a ten minute loiter (I used 25 miles for the excess range since using the actual data of 200 out and 200 back would leave basically nothing, since the Il-2 combat radius is 202 miles, rather than come back with this result I used the ~500 mile range of the Il-10) Ten minute loiter is effectively zero unless you have a target already selected before the aircraft goes feet dry.

The figures for the Pe-2 are somewhat better. Using a cruise speed of 300 mph and the 200 mile out & 200 back you come back with a very reasonable 24 minutes of loiter. I am unsure of the effectiveness of the Pe-2 in the CAS role. The Soviets seem to have used it in the level bomber role, an attack methodology that is ill suited to the close support mission.

If the combat radius of the IL-2 is 202 miles & the distance is 140 miles that's 62 miles of flying within the combat area. It's max speed is 414km/hr (257Mph). It's cruise speed is 320km/hr(198Mph/hr). So 15min on station going nuts or 20min actually loitering. Finding a target should be pretty simple.. the destroyers are covering the roads on the coast. The air power is dealing with anything coming down the road going inland. Anything else is probably too mountainous. 'Comrade - follow the road on this map until you get to the shooting. When you get there, drop a bomb on the guys shooting towards the West'. 10min is enough. 15-20 is overkill.

One squadron of Il-2's (12 aircraft) circling can keep 2 overhead constantly as CAS. Having another two on the job mean the pilots only need fly 4 missions a day, something quite sustainable.

The IL-2 fought as a ground attack aircraft successfully, without having to (although it could) be a dive bomber. Initially it wasn't used as one & the cluster bombs it deployed were more evenly spread in a low level horizontal attack. When it was employed as a dive bomber the attack angle was only 30 degrees.

Now the Pe-2 *is* a dive bomber. That's it's role & designation.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1T4gcII2afw

Here's a better translation of that amphibious portion of the attack plan:
___
The report of the commander of the Pcific Ocean Fleet to the Commander-In-Chief of the Soviet troops in Far East with the description of the plan of the transferring of the 87th Rifle Corps to the Hokkaido Island and the southern islands of the Kurils

August, 19th of 1945

I an informing you about the plan of the transferring by sea the 87th RC to the Hokkaido Island and the southern part of the Kuril Islands.

1. The operation will be done in 3 phases:
a) Phase 1 - the trasnferring of one RD to the port Rumoi
b) Phase 1 - the trasnferring of one RD to the port Rumoi
c) Phase 1 - the trasnferring of one RD to the Kurils Islands through the Hokkaido.

2. The realization of the operation:
a) to concentrate on the airfields of Bladimiro-Olginskaia Naval Base the following air forces: 2 regiments of DB-3, 1 regiment of Yak-9 and 20 Yak-9T
b) to deply 4 positions of submarions from the directions of the Sangarskii and Laperuz straits; their task is recon and the destruction of enemy combat ships. Total - 4 submarines.
c) to make recon of the ports and naval bases of the southern Sakhalin, Hokkaido, Sangarskii Strait and approaches to the western coast of the Hokkaido from 19, August of 1945 with the task to define enemy combat ships

3 The transferring of the troops is to be done according the following: the first rush - one battalion of Marines and one rifle regiment on 6 landing ships under the guard of 4 destroyers and 6 torpedoe boats. The destroyers are to be used as artillery support ships in the case of enemy resistance, the torpedoe boats are to be used as landing means of the first rush in the case of auspicious conditions. The main forces of the rifle division are to be transferred by 6 transport ships under the guard of 4 fregates, 4 mine-sweepers and 4 large sub-chasers. The first rush forces are to go to sea with the expectation of arriving to the landing region - port Rumoi - 2 hours before the arriving of main forces of the rifle division.

4 Protection: 2 destroyers and 6 torpedoe boats "Vladimir". The fighter aviation is to cover all the forces during the transferring, the bomber and torpedo-bomber aviation is to be in the zone of waiting over the port Rumoi by the time of the arriving of the ships. Air strike against the port is to be done only after the sign of the landing commander. Rear Admiral Sviatov is to command the landing. I do the common commanding of the operation.

The ships are to be ready to load the first division by 12.00 of August, 19th. Coming out - 20.00 of August, 21st. The landing - 05.00 of August, 24th. The loading of the other troops - as far as transport would come back.

Ask your approving.

Commander of the Pacific Ocean Fleet Iumatov,
Member of Military Council of the Pacific Ocean Fleet Zakharov
___

Of interest is the presence of the DB-3's (about 120 of them), a twin engined bomber the 1937 variant of which has the ability to carry a bombload of 1000kg for 1900 miles or 2500kg for shorter distances.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M79XqeLhgq8

This should suggest once the Soviets take Rumoi they can bomb (what's left of) Tokyo.

edit, adding further info)..

As to whether they can get tanks ashore, in the first wave, their LCI(L)'s of which they have 25 (originally 30, 5 were hit by coastal artillery in the attack on the Northern most) can carry either 200 troops or up to 75 tonnes of cargo. These would seem to be the types of 'transport ships' mentioned above. For those still not convinced of their ocean going capacity after they sailed from Petroplavosk to the Kurils direct, some of the same types of ship were involved in operation Torch, sailed from the U.K to North Africa across the Atlantic.

This page notes the composition of a Soviet Rifle regiment - http://canuckcommander.pbworks.com/w/page/14311324/WW2 Soviet Wargaming as organized for attack.
3 Rifle battalions and a Tank Battalion, more typically a SU-76 battalion or 4 rifle battalions.

A 'regiment' of Su-76's is going to have around 16-20 examples. A 'battalion' should therefore have around 4-5.

The Su-76 'self propelled gun' weights only 10 tonnes. It's frontal armour at 35mm is impervious to the 25mm penetration capacity of the 57mm gun on Japanese medium tanks. It was primarily used in attacks on the Eastern front where other units couldn't go like swamps do to it's low ground pressure. Useful for getting over beach sand. Can offer artillery support with an indirect max fire range of 17km. Seems if the Soviets deem tank support necessary from the get go they can get it. After they take the portside docks at Rumoi merchant ships can bring in larger quantities.

 

[kasumigenx]

I think in this scenario Japan would lose both Tohoku, Okinawa and Hokkaido, actually both Tohoku and Okinawa have no lost love for Central Japan, during the time Japan was aggressive the Central Japanese government destroyed the culture of the people of Okinawa and Tohoku.

 

[Curiousone]

I'd be really interested in reading that timeline. Some possible considerations:

- A successful coup would probably prolong the war enough for the Nationalists to retake much of Japanese-held south/east China. This would greatly help their credibility and authority in the postwar outcome.

- Tactical atomic bombing would almost certainly be used in the Kyushu invasion, resulting in radiation poisoning of numerous American GIs (as radiation was not well understood) - in the long term, this would probably stigmatize the postwar reputation of nuclear power.

I believe the detonations planned on the Kyushu beaches were airbursts not groundbursts. Not good but not awful radiation wise.

 

[Chris S]

This whole discussion on air coverage seems odd. The soviet airbases that would have been available are in northern Sakhalin, Vladivostok (480 miles from Rumoi), Khabarovsk (440 miles from Rumoi) and Sovetskaya Gavan (350 miles from Rumoi). By the time the Soviets are planning to land in Rumoi they have already captured some Japanese airbases in southern Sakhalin (making the distance under 400 miles in most cases) and would soon capture Toyohara and it's airbase (about 215-240 miles from Rumoi). So the Soviets would have air support. However they don't actually have to worry about being contested in the air for long. Japanese forces had already been severely decimated by years of bombing and Allied fighter engagements over Japan itself. They were keeping fuel, ammunition and planes in reserve to serve as kamikaze attacks for an expected American attack (with Kyushu and the kanto plain region receiving a disproportionate bulk of the fuel, planes and ammo). Even with a Soviet attack at Rumoi the Japanese defenders there couldn't possibly expect all the kamikaze in Hokkaido to show up for them alone as the commanders on the island would still have an eye on repelling an expected American attack on southeast Hokkaido. And once the kamikaze are gone then that's it. There would be no more Japanese aircraft. Even then the kamikazes themselves would tend to be hastily trained pilots going up against veteran pilots transferred from Europe. The outcome would be in little doubt as it had been for ever Allied attack against that style of Japanese defense since the tide of war changed. Would there be high Soviet losses? Most likely. But that would be no different than what the Americans experienced and were expected to experience in Kyushu. And crucially, it would be something the Soviets were already long since used to in Europe (but which the Americans were only really beginning to experience as Japanese resistance grew more suicidal yet ultimately futile). There would also be even higher Japanese losses.

A lot of this discussion seems to revolve around the unspoken assumption that the Soviet air forces would be going up against Japanese forces circa 1941 or 1942 rather than in August/September 1945....

 

[Curiousone]

..A lot of this discussion seems to revolve around the unspoken assumption that the Soviet air forces would be going up against Japanese forces circa 1941 or 1942 rather than in August/September 1945....

I think the importance of air assets is primarily around whether.

- The Soviets can provide air cover to their light naval forces against what few Kamikazes there are, which in agreement with you it seems they can.

- An invasion can be conducted solely by air in the sub-sub-scenario where Truman doesn't want to open fire on Soviet forces but mines the marine approaches (to think of it the, Soviets do have minesweepers..) which while taking longer and being more difficult would probably be do-able (if they can air-drop and supply a division that denies a 3-1 ratio of forces required for a successful counter attack by the Japanese. That airborne division will only need to hold out in a defensible position, the Japanese will run out of ammunition).

&

- The ability of combat air support to assist in a rapid invasion of Hokkaido, freeing Soviet forces in the event of a continued war to try something on Honshu before Olympic or Coronet are ready.

 

[seraphim74]

Somehow I do not see the Soviets launching the invasion purely by air. Capturing an airfield and bringing the reinforcements was possible, but there would be problems with supplying those forces. Also conquering not so small island without tanks and strong artiller support, only with air support... Apart from human losses (and even the Soviets were slowly running out of men) it would take a lot of time.
Now, the Soviets had some minesweepers - they might be able to clear a corridor to a captured Japanese port if the Americans do not mine it again. But that would be mostly political problem. I still don't understand how would Truman explain to American people that while American boys are dying fighting the Japanese he orders US forces to stop their allies from fighting the same Japanese and in doing so increases American losses.

 

[Curiousone]

Somehow I do not see the Soviets launching the invasion purely by air. Capturing an airfield and bringing the reinforcements was possible, but there would be problems with supplying those forces. Also conquering not so small island without tanks and strong artiller support, only with air support... Apart from human losses (and even the Soviets were slowly running out of men) it would take a lot of time.
Now, the Soviets had some minesweepers - they might be able to clear a corridor to a captured Japanese port if the Americans do not mine it again. But that would be mostly political problem. I still don't understand how would Truman explain to American people that while American boys are dying fighting the Japanese he orders US forces to stop their allies from fighting the same Japanese and in doing so increases American losses.

Hmm, yeah I'm in doubt about Truman necessarily opposing a Hokkaido invasion if the war continues but I'm willing to explore the scenario if it did continue and he did happen to oppose it with various levels of interference.

Apparently OTL Truman at noon on August the 14th figured the Japanese weren't invading & ordered an Atomic Bombing of Tokyo.. only to hear later in the day that they were actually surrendering & called it off? >
http://www.warbirdforum.com/downfall.htm

There's a nice P.O.D. 'Truman takes the Afternoon of Aug 14th off for a walk in the park.'

Other info.. (finding better maps)

There's a cluster of P.O.W camps on Hokkaido that seem to be near Fukugawa, the main point inland from Rumoi. Americans, British, Dutch, Australians.
http://home.comcast.net/~winjerd/HakGroup.htm

 

[The Red]

- Tactical atomic bombing would almost certainly be used in the Kyushu invasion, resulting in radiation poisoning of numerous American GIs (as radiation was not well understood) - in the long term, this would probably stigmatize the postwar reputation of nuclear power.

I don't think tactical use of the bomb is very likely, the fighting in Southern Kyushu would be largely mountainous and at close quarters, neither of which would make use of the bomb particularly attractive. More bombs might be dropped on the ports of northern Kyushu, but as the Americans only planned to occupy the southern third of the island before Coronet, there isn't any danger of radiation exposure for G.I's hundreds of miles away.

 

[Curiousone]

I don't think tactical use of the bomb is very likely, the fighting in Southern Kyushu would be largely mountainous and at close quarters, neither of which would make use of the bomb particularly attractive. More bombs might be dropped on the ports of northern Kyushu, but as the Americans only planned to occupy the southern third of the island before Coronet, there isn't any danger of radiation exposure for G.I's hundreds of miles away.

Marshall considered it, as a kind of 'pre-invasion bombardment' on the beaches themselves. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/general-article/pacific-operation-downfall/

 

[Chris S]

The idea that the Americans would mine Hokkaido to prevent the Soviets landing is really out there on the implausibility side, if not outright as impossible as Operation Unthinkable. While MacArthur definitely preferred to just defeat the Japanese his way and with his soldiers, the fact is that MacArthur was not ultimately in charge of how the Allies conducted the war. He had a significant voice but his was not the be all and end all. And even then he was quite fine with Canadian forces participating in the planned landings under Downfall as long as they utilized American equipment and command structures. His reasoning was simple; he wanted a simplified command and control structure and logistics in place. However despite his reluctance his superiors and colleagues all agreed to some further Allied participation in the form of British Commonwealth (and later French) air and naval assets being involved and allowing for a Commonwealth Corps which would receive American equipment and training and be under MacArthur's command. The reasoning here was also simple; NO American politician and quite a few senior American commanders would not simply have refused the offer of other Allied troops and equipment because doing so would possibly engender further war weariness on the part of the American public (and this at a time when the American government was becoming very focused on maintaining public support for the prosecution of the war with Japan until the very end). It would also be crazy to do because any sane American politician and commander who didn't have delusions of grandeur (and MacArthur is the only one who might have had such delusions) also knew that Allied support in the form of troops and equipment would mean fewer American troops dying in combat.

Truman on the other hand, despite his wariness of the Soviets still didn't tell the Soviets "don't bother again" when it came to having them enter the Pacific War (even though he would have had ample opportunities to do so in his correspondence with them before August 1945). In fact, up until 3 months before the Soviets entered as promised, he was quite keen on getting them to enter in order to help bring about a swifter defeat of Japan so that he could bring the American soldiers home and stop having them die in the Pacific.

So Truman is extremely unlikely to do anything as underhanded as deliberately mining Hokkaido with the intention of preventing a Soviet landing. Even if he wanted to do so, it is extremely unlikely that the Soviets would have told him exactly where they were planning to land, which would make the task of actively preventing a Soviet landing through mining that much more difficult since US and Japanese studies had identified numerous possible landing sites in Japan as part of their offensive and defensive plans. If I'm not mistaken Rumoi didn't pop up as one of the more likely landing sites since there were better landing sites for American purposes (which is what the Japanese would be focusing on up until mid August 1945). And given that the Soviets did have minesweepers, laying mines alone without actively shooting at the minesweepers doesn't seem like it would be all that effective.

And as US plans for laying offensive mines in Japan tended to concentrate on Kyushu, Honshu and Shikoku (for very obvious reasons) it would have to be a hasty mine laying campaign covering pretty much all of northern Hokkaido. As the Americans apparently didn't even mine Otaru and Rumoi in OTL (as it would have been unnecessary once they mined northern Honshu as ships leaving Otaru or Rumoi would've hit minefields before docking at ports in Honshu to transfer men and materiel), it's doubtful the Joint Chiefs of Staff are going to sign off on a campaign to lay mines around Hokkaido (an area where the Americans were not about to land, and even worse these mines would be on the side of Hokkaido that the Americans were unlikely to land on until after they had conquered the Kanto Plain in 1946...) when doing so means less mine-laying in the areas that were actually important to the conduct of Operation Downfall. Any scenario where the Soviets actually land on Hokkaido and have to fight to conquer the area is most likely going to be one where the Japanese have not as yet surrendered and the thinking of the American government and military command is going to be very different that it would have been between August 15 and September 2, 1945 in OTL where Japan had already effectively surrendered to the Allies and Americans were now looking to make the best of that situation to ensure that they had a simplified occupation of Japan. It's going to be hard for Truman to convince people like Marshall that they should divert resources to preventing a Soviet landing in Hokkaido when even Truman would know full well that such a landing might well cause Japan to surrender to the Americans faster and avoid a costly and bloody Operation Majestic (as Operation Olympic had been renamed). That's the kind of thing that dictators who don't give a sot about their soldiers lives (*cough* Stalin *cough*) or people playing computer games would do. As Truman was neither and as Truman knew he was dealing with the lives of real people who were his fellow American citizens, his decisions were based primarily on successfully prosecuting America's war aims while minimizing the loss of life incurred by his soldiers as much as possible. If he would have been willing to actively prevent a Soviet invasion he would have also outright not entertained the idea of the British and French contributing in some form to the planned assaults in southern Japan.

 

[The Red]

Marshall considered it, as a kind of 'pre-invasion bombardment' on the beaches themselves. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/general-article/pacific-operation-downfall/

That's a great way of pointing out where you plan to land though (well the Japanese had correctly predicted it anyways, but the Americans weren't aware of that) plus, a beach assault is tough enough at the best of times without having your troops crawl through the broken glass of superheated sand.

 

[Chris S]

This source outlines Japanese defensive plans against the Soviets and claims that the Japanese did not have much defences prepared at Rumoi.

 

[Curiousone]

Back to OP's Q, Soviets having a crack at Honshu. What does it look like?

So for whatever reason Japan stays in the war. Hokkaido falls at minimum 2-3 weeks after Aug 19. Likely later, it probably takes another 2 weeks to clear up the Kurils given the forces that took them OTL were scheduled for Hokkaido before Truman intervened given peace.

Around Oct 1 at the earliest the Soviets are ready to pull something on Western/North Western Honshu. They can get three divisions over amphibiously max. How many airborne? What state is their Pacific merchant marine in to ship reinforcements if they capture a Port (likely first target). Do they want to get the jump on the W/Allies.. or let them take the brunt of the Kamikazes? Kamikazes that are preparing for an invasion near Tokyo - do they have enough fuel to play a part?

The W/Allies are planning Operation Olympic/Majestic for Nov 1, they've probably switched to looking to invade Northern Honshu or Kanto given decrypts about Kyushu. Maybe they've argued for airbases on Hokkaido to support an earlier Coronet. Invasion plans can get delayed by Typhoon. If Japan is collapsing & the Soviets are grabbing everything in their path, how quick can the W/Allies accelerate an attack?

There's about 14 Japanese divisions on Honshu, primarily clustered around the Kanto plain (details of positions?). The transport grid is smashed. How many Divisions can they move to face a Soviet beachhead, how quickly? How many can they spare if they want a showdown with the U.S? Normandy/Cobra had a 1 to 1 ratio under air superiority allowing for a tight if slowly expanding beachead. Beyond that in tank country, a breakout. The element of shock from Soviet entry into the war is lost, there'll be some preparations along the coast. Strategy? Hold onto the ports like Nazi Germany in 1944-45 in France to deny the Soviets somewhere to dock the Merchants? Scorched Earth?

 

[Chris S]

Don't think the Soviets would have been that interested in Honshu to b honest. Soviet aims in Japan seemed to be limited to ensuring control of the Sea of Okhotsk, hence Stalin's aim to occupy Hokkaido from Rumoi to Kushino (the northern third of the island) and his hope to have that area as a Soviet occupation zone even after Japan's surrender. That leads me to suspect that Stalin was only interested in the main islands of Japan as far as he could expect to benefit and that he wasn't as concerned about Japan as he was about Germany.

IF the Soviets sensed an opportunity to land in northern Honshu though, I suppose they might just be able to do it after taking Hokkaido, but if they land they face the possibilty of fighting on Honshu with no defined end until Japan surrenders as there are no natural barriers to prevent the Japanese from sending up forces from Kanto to attack the Soviet lodgement on Honshu.

 

[lycan]

The Soviets had the Bomb in 1949.

 

[seraphim74]

Originally posted by lycan

The Soviets had the Bomb in 1949.

So what? We're talking about 1945-1946. 1947 tops.

 

[The Red]

Around Oct 1 at the earliest the Soviets are ready to pull something on Western/North Western Honshu. They can get three divisions over amphibiously max. How many airborne? What state is their Pacific merchant marine in to ship reinforcements if they capture a Port (likely first target). Do they want to get the jump on the W/Allies.. or let them take the brunt of the Kamikazes? Kamikazes that are preparing for an invasion near Tokyo - do they have enough fuel to play a part?

Upon further reading, Calbear's correct, by October the Tsushima strait would likely be heavily mined, a serious naval crossing is thus quite likely to fail even if the Soviets spend the winter sweeping the strait. Before the war the Soviets had the largest airborne forces in the world, and though most became Guards Divisions during the war, the 4th Airborne Corps had had active combat drop experience. Transporting them would likely require bring the Tupolev TB-3 out of retirement once again. Though the obsolete craft had been retired before Barbarossa began, the massacre of the Soviet Air Force in the first days of the German invasion led to it being rushed back into service, where it performed heroically against far superior enemy aircraft. Now by the summer of 1945 there were only ten left in active service as they had been gradually replaced by more modern bombers, but there were likely over a hundred left in flyable condition, giving the Soviets the ability to land 3-4000 paratroops on Honshu.

Now I'm about to go into a lecture so I can't do much just now, but do you have any idea of airfields in northern Honshu they might try to take?

 

[Jukra]

Now by the summer of 1945 there were only ten left in active service as they had been gradually replaced by more modern bombers, but there were likely over a hundred left in flyable condition, giving the Soviets the ability to land 3-4000 paratroops on Honshu.

Soviet Union constructed a few thousand Li-2's (a license produced DC-3) which would be more useful.

 

[The Red]

Soviet Union constructed a few thousand Li-2's (a license produced DC-3) which would be more useful.

Oh, that makes things much easier then, although I'd sort of fallen in love with the rickety old bangers.