gloster meteor mk3
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True but occupying just Europe would be better than trying to fight on TWO fronts thus meaning no Battle for Moscow.
WI: No Battle of Moscow?
- Thread starter machine3589
- Start date
Halting all operations at end of September may or may not work. It is depending on Russian strategy.
1. If Russian has digged in like they did before battle of Kursk and recalled up its reserves, German would not be able to gain upper hand in spring of 1942. I would say stalemate would be reached.
2. If Russian has attacked and exhausted its strength in winter of 1941, German would have defeated Russian in summer of 1942.
1. If Russian has digged in like they did before battle of Kursk and recalled up its reserves, German would not be able to gain upper hand in spring of 1942. I would say stalemate would be reached.
2. If Russian has attacked and exhausted its strength in winter of 1941, German would have defeated Russian in summer of 1942.
Only temporary stalemate. Soviets would gain superiority in equipment and quantity of troops and improve their quality.
Don't think so. Soviets were exhausted after winter offensive and still didn't collapsed in 1942. IF Germans stopped in September 1941, that's mean no Soviets losses in Vyazma and other German attacks, for example toward Rostov so they could even more afford losses in winter 1941. Spring comes and Germans could attack in one direcetion as OTL. Let it be Moscow or Kaucasus-Stalingrad. End would be same, except, maybe Germans would be able to capture Stalingrad for very short period of time.
Daffy Duck
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In this insane invasion of the USSR, the 'sane' strategy would have been to straighten the lines after Smolensk. The area around Moscow is not the best for Blitzkrieg. Southern Russia was. What they should have done, in my small opinion, instead of going after Moscow, was to knock out Leningrad and the northern ports (Murmansk and Archangelesk). At THIS particular point in the war, these ports were one of the main points where Lend Lease was coming in. The Axis could have siezed a crap load of supplies too.
They also 'potentially' could have hurt Moscow in a big way by following through with Operation Eisenhammer.
Just my 2 cents worth...
In this insane invasion of the USSR, the 'sane' strategy would have been to straighten the lines after Smolensk. The area around Moscow is not the best for Blitzkrieg. Southern Russia was. What they should have done, in my small opinion, instead of going after Moscow, was to knock out Leningrad and the northern ports (Murmansk and Archangelesk). At THIS particular point in the war, these ports were one of the main points where Lend Lease was coming in. The Axis could have siezed a crap load of supplies too.
They also 'potentially' could have hurt Moscow in a big way by following through with Operation Eisenhammer.
Just my 2 cents worth...
There was a good thread on halting Barbarossa after Kiev a while back.
https://www.alternatehistory.com/di...hp?t=235035&highlight=Halting+Barbarossa+kiev
https://www.alternatehistory.com/di...hp?t=235035&highlight=Halting+Barbarossa+kiev
As with any other sort of "reign-in-the-advance" scheme when it comes to fighting the USSR, not continuing the advance results in the strategic advantage shifting towards the USSR faster then IOTL. Yes, the Russians will likely launch a winter offensive and said winter offensives will likely fail rather more so then IOTL, however that is entirely offset by the fact that the Soviets will still have military and industrial assets that Operation Typhoon denied to them IOTL and will undoubtedly retain said assets throughout the winter. This means the Red Army come 1942 will be in a much better shape then IOTL while the Germans are (at best) only in a marginally better shape. Thus, the overall result is a net gain for the Soviets.
My guess is about as good as the others; in the event that the Germans stop at Smolensk, the focus would shift to the peripheries. In the North, the focus would be on starving out Leningrad and achieving a link up with the Finns. I should also think that a (likely unsuccessful) effort would be made for 16th Army to reach the Valdai hills, and avoid the situation that led to Demyansk. To the south, the objective would be to reach Rostov, and then focus on clearing the Crimea (this of course assuming that the Kiev Kesselschlacht goes as IOTL). The Germans might be spared some of the worst casualties of OTL Winter 1941, but I wouldn't expect them to do much better than they did in real life, especially with Herr S**t-digger running the show from cloud-cuckoo land!
Hm. Didn`t find that one. I`ll see if it has the same premise as mine; sounds a bit different, though.
Occupying Britain is a non-starter and occupying neutral countries just turns what were once friendly borders [which give access to foreign markets] into unstable occupation zones with all the attendant resistance. I should note that Switzerland, Turkey and Sweden have some of the best guerrilla country in the world. All this does is take even more German manpower away from the eastern front, imagine several Yugoslavias and the effect that would have on the German war effort.
teg
I think they would have a better than even chance. When frozen the marshy ground of that area should be less of a problem for the panzers which would have good infantry support.
Where it gets tricky is that if Leningrad does try to surrender. Hitler, Goering et. al. wanted Leningrad's population greatly reduced (there is an interesting discussion of this in Clark's book). They might instruct Leeb to wait a long time before accepting the surrender to start the process. There is then a chance that devoutly Catholic Leeb might ignore this order and accept the surrender. What happens next should be interesting.
The only reason the Soviets couldn't break the siege of Leningrad for so long was because they couldn't spare troops defending Moscow. If the Germans ignore Moscow, really they're only going to make gains in the south. Can they win the war by seizing the Caucasus? I don't think so.
IMO their aim in the south should've been limited to taking Sevastopol and securing the Black Sea. Far from avoiding a fight at Moscow, it's where they should've concentrated their resources.
IMO their aim in the south should've been limited to taking Sevastopol and securing the Black Sea. Far from avoiding a fight at Moscow, it's where they should've concentrated their resources.
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They still won`t be able to spare troops defending Moscow if an AGC that hasn`t been mauled is sitting right there with all its tanks, artillery pieces and prime movers that haven`t been destroyed in Typhoon - the Soviets need to keep forces in place to counter AGC if it starts moving again. It`s a bit silly to say that the Germans are "ignoring Moscow", because you can`t ignore the capital of your enemy, they`re just not launching operation Typhoon.
You do realise that without Typhoon and the Bryansk/Vyazma pockets the Red army has an additional 500k men available for offensive operations.
Who will be available to attack at a time and place of their choosing, the time being when the panzers are bogged in the mud and unable to maneuver.
The whole premise shows just how flawed Barbarossa is. Yes the best option is to halt early but the purpose of the operation is to knock the USSR out in a single blow because if you do not you will have opened up the a war on two fronts that Germany cannot sustain long term.
Who will be available to attack at a time and place of their choosing, the time being when the panzers are bogged in the mud and unable to maneuver.
The whole premise shows just how flawed Barbarossa is. Yes the best option is to halt early but the purpose of the operation is to knock the USSR out in a single blow because if you do not you will have opened up the a war on two fronts that Germany cannot sustain long term.
For the record, mud and cold mauled both sides. Well, sometimes it mauled the soviets more than the germans.
And about the flaws in barbarossa... the more i think about it, the more i realised, that it had only one flaw: to call it an operation. The idea behind it was not bad, but to achive it in one operation? Physically impossible. They messed it up.
The mud and cold affect both sides yes, But only one side has to react speedily with armoured forces to an attack with equipment not designed for operations in these conditions that has just driven from the Polish border with detours to Kiev and back.
Based on what the Soviets achieved OTL any offensive stands a good chance of being a tactical surprise requiring a panzer response to shore up the line.
Based on what the Soviets achieved OTL any offensive stands a good chance of being a tactical surprise requiring a panzer response to shore up the line.
The point will be to entrench the line, and if the Rzhev Salient is anything to go by, the Soviets will not be making massive gains for some time if the line is properly entrenched. The key isn`t the Panzers (at least during the winter), but the artillery the Germans don`t lose.
Not really the point of the thread.
Again, Rzhev. You could even count Demyansk, since it was under heavy assault from large infantry and armoured forces for months without any large armoured component of it`s own.
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During the July, September, and December 1942 Demiansk operations the Red Army committed minimal armored and artillery resources, and armies committed were severey understrength. They also didn't have their full fill of ammunition, crippling preparations. Demiansk was never more than a sideshow in terms of resources committed (Only the December offensive involved a serious effort, and even then it was a secondary offensive within the broader strategic concept).
A better example for planned operations against a strong German defensive position in the Smolensk region is the Rzhev-Sychevka Offensive in summer 1942.
A better example for planned operations against a strong German defensive position in the Smolensk region is the Rzhev-Sychevka Offensive in summer 1942.
I was going to ask which Rzhev was meant. The 1941 version leads to a 110km penetration into the rear of AGC. The 42 version (MARS) is a soviet disaster, but involved 5 Pz and 3 Mot German Divs.
If the Germans stop in October the question is will they be better off in the next campaign season than they were OTL.
Stopping has two effects. First the initiative goes to the Red army. They can control their own casualty rate. Second presumably it saves manpower. November - March the Germans suffer roughly 200k KIA/MIA all theatres but mostly on the east.
But the minimum monthly casualties once the war in the East opens up are 30-35k per month so at best the germans are +50k total and the Soviets without the experience of nearly beating the Wehrmacht maybe dont launch second Battle of Kharkov
If the Germans stop in October the question is will they be better off in the next campaign season than they were OTL.
Stopping has two effects. First the initiative goes to the Red army. They can control their own casualty rate. Second presumably it saves manpower. November - March the Germans suffer roughly 200k KIA/MIA all theatres but mostly on the east.
But the minimum monthly casualties once the war in the East opens up are 30-35k per month so at best the germans are +50k total and the Soviets without the experience of nearly beating the Wehrmacht maybe dont launch second Battle of Kharkov
The summer 1942 Rzhev-Sychevka Operation (Main phase July-August, seconds operations until the end of September) is the best example of the effects of a well planned, camouflaged, and executed Red Army offensive against strong German defenses. Utilizing just two tank corps and a cavalry group Zhukov penetrated over 100km into the German rear, forcing the commitment of AGC's reserves to the Zubstov area. At the same time Konev penetrated 15-20km, only halting in the suburbs of Rzhev. It was an excellent operation, especially considering how few resources were committed to it.