That's a good idea, hit the targets that need hitting, not just the ones that are 'there'.
Though the RAF had a horrible track record of actually hitting and knocking out subpens. Instead they mostly killed and maimed French civilians and increased hostility toward the Allies, resulting in Vichy bombing Gibraltar:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Milit...uring_World_War_II#Vichy_French_attacks:_1940
Among other pro-Axis acts, such as using Syrian weapons stocks to support Iraqi rebels and letting German units base out of that area. Plus there is a reason over 3,000 Vichy French soldiers were made casualties fighting against the Allies in Algeria.
However, without the Blitz I'm inclined to think we won't get so many, "reduce enemy morale" raids, with a greater focus on smaller, more precise raids on factories, marshalling-yards, ports and the like.
They had an awful track record with that too, which resulted in the Butt Report and Dehousing paper, which demonstrated the only viable strategy for night bombing was area bombing.
Until 1942 the Brits are going to end up ineffectively wasting resourcing going after the Ruhr and Brest, killing French civilians and getting attritted in the process, while demonstrating the need to get German night defenses up to snuff. Also without the Blitz the Brits don't learn their lesson about incendiaries:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firebombing#Tactics
Early in World War II many British cities were firebombed. Two particularly notable raids were the Coventry Blitz on 14 November 1940, and the blitz on London on the night of 29 December/30 December 1940, which was the most destructive raid on London during the war with much of the destruction caused by fires started by incendiary bombs. During the Coventry Blitz the Germans pioneered several innovations which were to influence all future strategic bomber raids during the war.[2] These were: The use of pathfinder aircraft with electronic aids to navigate, to mark the targets before the main bomber raid; The use of high explosive bombs and air-mines coupled with thousands of incendiary bombs intended to set the city ablaze. The first wave of follow-up bombers dropped high explosive bombs, the intent of which was knock out the utilities (the water supply, electricity network and gas mains), and to crater the road - making it difficult for the fire engines to reach fires started by the follow-up waves of bombers. The follow-up waves dropped a combination of high explosive and incendiary bombs. There were two types of incendiary bombs: those made of magnesium and iron powders, and those made of petroleum. The high-explosive bombs and the larger air-mines were not only designed to hamper the Coventry fire brigade, they were also intended to damage roofs, making it easier for the incendiary bombs to fall into buildings and ignite them. As Sir Arthur Harris, commander of RAF Bomber Command, wrote after the war:
In the early days of bombing our notion, like that of the Germans, was to spread an attack out over the whole night, thereby wearing down the morale of the civilian population. The result was, of course, that an efficient fire brigade could tackle a single load of incendiaries, put them out, and wait in comfort for the next to come along; they might also be able to take shelter when a few high explosives bombs were dropping. ... But it was observed that when the Germans did get an effective concentration, ... then our fire brigades had a hard time; if a rain of incendiaries is mixed with high explosives bombs there is a temptation for the fireman to keep his head down.
The Germans again and again missed their chance, as they did during the London blitz that I watched from the roof of the Air Ministry, of setting our cities ablaze by a concentrated attack. Coventry was adequately concentrated in point of space, but all the same there was little concentration in point of time, and nothing like the fire tornadoes of Hamburg or Dresden ever occurred in this country. But they did do us enough damage to teach us the principle of concentration, the principle of starting so many fires at the same time that no fire fighting services, however efficiently and quickly they were reinforced by the fire brigades of other towns could get them under control.
—Arthur Harris, [3]
The development of the tactical innovation of the bomber stream by the RAF to overwhelm the German aerial defenses of the Kammhuber Line during World War II would have increased the RAF's concentration in time over the target, but after the lessons learned during the Blitz, the tactic of dropping a high concentration of bombs over the target in the shortest time possible became standard in the RAF because it was known to be more effective than spreading the raid over a longer time period.[3] For example, during the Coventry Blitz on the night of 14/15 November 1940, 515 Luftwaffe bombers, many flying more than one sortie against Coventry, delivered their bombs over a period of time lasting more than 10 hours. In contrast, the much more devastating raid on Dresden on the night of 13/14 of February 1945 by two waves of the RAF Bomber Command's main force, involved the bomb released at 22:14, with all but one of the 254 Lancaster bombers releasing their bombs within two minutes, and the last one released at 22:22. The second wave of 529 Lancasters dropped all of their bombs between 01:21 and 01:45. This means that in the first raid, on average, one Lancaster dropped a full load of bombs every half a second and in the second larger raid that involved more than one RAF bomber Group, one every three seconds.
So the British don't learn first hand how to incinerate cities from first hand experience on the receiving end, which taught them the effect of fire and concentration. With Germany effectively being behind a iron curtain in terms of intelligence on bombing effects (the reason the USSBS was done after the war, because they couldn't tell what the primary effect was from aerial recon alone), they don't develop things like the Firestorm on Hamburg and Dresden.
In the meantime the Germans get time to work out their AI radar and intruder operations, so that as the war goes on the British are behind the curve on bombing technics and techniques, while the Germans realize the need for their defenses sooner, so aren't as behind the curve as IOTL. I'm not saying that all things would be in Germany's favor or that the British wouldn't have major benefits to not going through the Blitz and BoB (especially in terms of the BotA being won sooner and the fight being taken to Germany sooner), but in terms of their success in bombing we probably don't see an effective bombing campaign at night and we have the LW getting their night fighter force together sooner, as well as an earlier and more effective intruder campaign that seriously hampers effective operations of RAF BC until 1943 or so. So the air war plays out quite differently and not necessarily in Britain's favor, especially if Germany does better in the East and adjusts to strategic realities vis a vis the CBO and night bombing.
German fighter pilots losses in the BoB were devastating in terms of the Jagdwaffe building up an effective replacement/leadership organization, as they never got the chance to rotate out experienced pilots due to losses and the raiding of training programs. Without the BoB and a purely defensive posture during daylight from June 1940 in the West, then the LW fighter force gets to rest and rotate out of the line, which makes them a much more effective and dangerous foe during the day. Of course this doesn't necessarily fix the production issue, nor fuel problems for training (though training in 1940-41 will be seriously boosted by not using that fuel in the BoB and in the Blitz and of course having instructors not being killed/used in operations). Perhaps that avoids silly decisions to use the best men in concentrated elite units that guts training, like the Panzer Lehr division or keeping the excellent pilots of JG 26 in combat constantly:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jagdgeschwader_26#Service_in_World_War_II
n late August it was becoming apparent to the German High Command that the Battle of Britain was not going as planned. A frustrated Göring relieved several Geschwaderkommodore of their commands, and appointed younger, more aggressive men in their place.[3] Thus Major Adolf Galland was given command of JG 26 on 22 August 1940. During the Battle of Britain, the Geschwader claimed 285 fighters shot down, for losses of 76 aircraft and 45 pilots killed, and 29 prisoners of war.[2]
In 1941 most of the fighter units of the Luftwaffe were sent east to the Eastern Front, or south to the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, thus leaving JG 26 and Jagdgeschwader 2 Richthofen as the sole single-engine fighter Geschwader in France. For the next two years these two Geschwader were the main adversaries to the Royal Air Force's (RAF) day offensives over Occupied Europe. The two Jagdgeschwader maintained around 120 serviceable Bf 109 E and F’s to face the increasing number of aggressive RAF Fighter Command sweeps conducted to wear down the Luftwaffe in a war of attrition and so relieve pressure on the Eastern Front.
Galland's careful husbanding of his resources and astute tactical awareness meant JG 26 kept their losses to a minimum while inflicting maximum damage on the RAF's Spitfires through 1941. By the end of 1941 JG 26 had claimed more than 900 victories since September 1939 (some 400 since May 1941), and had lost some 95 pilots killed (34 POW) in return. The highest scoring pilots at this time were Galland (97), Hptm Müncheberg (62) and Hptm Josef Priller (58).[citation needed]
JG 26 and Jagdgeschwader 2 (JG 2) had to defend the entire Atlantic Wall from the Spanish border through Belgium, until late 1942 when more units were directed West after the Allied bombing campaigns increased in ferocity.
Galland wasn't a good commander in the sense of developing talent or effectively managing his experienced men; he really should not have been in command, but would have been awesome shifting back between the front lines as an 'expert' and conducting operational training of men he would end up commanding in the field. On the defensive they could really gut the RAF fighter command sweeps with the best talent passing on their knowledge to the young eagles moving up thanks to experienced commanders who were desk bound managing personnel and talent as they should have been rather than fighting and trying to do everything and getting little done effectively in terms of long term management. Especially if this resulted in better team tactics rather than the 'experten' doing the killing, get the acolades, and letting their wingmen suffer, while establishing nothing when they developed combat fatigue or were killed in combat.