WI: No Battle of Britain

Probably leaves Britain in a somewhat better condition to build up militarily, though their fighter plan doctrine could be impacted as several lessons from the Battle of Britain aren't learned.

Agreed that having the LW in better shape would probably help Babarossa. Still I always wondered how winnable that fight with Russia was realistically in the long term. Assuming Germany does manage to take Moscow that's still barely a third a of Russia geographically, even if a good chunk of Russian industry was in the west.

Even with the extra resources Germany suddenly has to devote a fair bit of manpower to policing their new conquests. Moving troops back and forth inside Russia is still going to be just as bad until they can build up infrastructure. Wouldn't be surprised if they wound up facing a number of insurgencies as well.

Long term at best you might get about a third of Russia under defacto German control, but with some fairly heavy resistance.
 
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It's really not an option to just ignore the British. Sooner or later, Bomber Command is going to come over to pound German cities. Hitler is not going to let that happen without retaliation.

Of course. A couple of things:
1) Defender advantage. Wiking has mentioned this as well - it's easier to defend than attack.
2) Playing to Hitler's Eastern obsession (with promised of destroying Britain later) is the play here.
3) It might not be without retaliation - a smaller bombing campaign is a possible just against factories. Almost as training sorties for the bombing in Russia to come.
 
Of course, if the BoB never happens then it's possible massed bomber raids either don't happen, or only happen later than in OTL, which frees up both aircraft and later resources on both sides to be put towards more useful operations like maritime patrol, air-sea rescue, and tanks (fewer Lancasters means fewer Merlins needed, and thus potentially more Meteors).
 
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Deleted member 1487

Of course, if the BoB never happens then it's possible massed bomber raids either don't happen, or only happen later than in OTL, which frees up both aircraft and later resources on both sides to be put towards more useful operations like maritime patrol, air-sea rescue, and tanks (fewer Lancasters means fewer Merlins needed, and thus potentially more Meteors).

Why not though? That's a separate POD, as there were bombing raids ongoing during the BoB and Blitz by the British. They were trying to bomb Germany ineffectually throughout it all, which led to the Butt Report in 1941:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Butt_Report

Britain turned to strategic bombing because they had no other way to fight Germany directly; the blockade was mooted by the USSR supplying Germany (they didn't realize there was trouble in 'paradise' yet) and fighting in North Africa gets them no close to liberating Europe. Winning the BoA is important so there is probably resources for that, but the cult of the offensive was still in effect in WW2, so Churchill is going to want a direct attack on Germany, even if it only is bombing ports to try and shut down Uboat attacks. Strategic bombers if anything will get more play here because of greater resources; still as we are before the Lancaster is ready we get other bombers in greater numbers that weren't as good, like the Wellington, Whitley, Halifax, and Stirling. In fact the Stirling gets into service sooner without the Blitz disrupting production and wrecking the early production units.

No, Britain is coming with its bombers one way or another. The question is whether Germany opts to keep up with its effective intruder tactics in 1940-41.
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=104024
http://www.ww2f.com/topic/2543-intruder-ops-by-luftwaffe-after-1941/
 
...so Churchill is going to want a direct attack on Germany, even if it only is bombing ports to try and shut down Uboat attacks.
That's a good idea, hit the targets that need hitting, not just the ones that are 'there'.

Strategic bombers if anything will get more play here because of greater resources; still as we are before the Lancaster is ready we get other bombers in greater numbers that weren't as good, like the Wellington, Whitley, Halifax, and Stirling. In fact the Stirling gets into service sooner without the Blitz disrupting production and wrecking the early production units.
However, without the Blitz I'm inclined to think we won't get so many, "reduce enemy morale" raids, with a greater focus on smaller, more precise raids on factories, marshalling-yards, ports and the like.
 

Deleted member 1487

That's a good idea, hit the targets that need hitting, not just the ones that are 'there'.
Though the RAF had a horrible track record of actually hitting and knocking out subpens. Instead they mostly killed and maimed French civilians and increased hostility toward the Allies, resulting in Vichy bombing Gibraltar:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Milit...uring_World_War_II#Vichy_French_attacks:_1940
Among other pro-Axis acts, such as using Syrian weapons stocks to support Iraqi rebels and letting German units base out of that area. Plus there is a reason over 3,000 Vichy French soldiers were made casualties fighting against the Allies in Algeria.


However, without the Blitz I'm inclined to think we won't get so many, "reduce enemy morale" raids, with a greater focus on smaller, more precise raids on factories, marshalling-yards, ports and the like.

They had an awful track record with that too, which resulted in the Butt Report and Dehousing paper, which demonstrated the only viable strategy for night bombing was area bombing.

Until 1942 the Brits are going to end up ineffectively wasting resourcing going after the Ruhr and Brest, killing French civilians and getting attritted in the process, while demonstrating the need to get German night defenses up to snuff. Also without the Blitz the Brits don't learn their lesson about incendiaries:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firebombing#Tactics
Early in World War II many British cities were firebombed. Two particularly notable raids were the Coventry Blitz on 14 November 1940, and the blitz on London on the night of 29 December/30 December 1940, which was the most destructive raid on London during the war with much of the destruction caused by fires started by incendiary bombs. During the Coventry Blitz the Germans pioneered several innovations which were to influence all future strategic bomber raids during the war.[2] These were: The use of pathfinder aircraft with electronic aids to navigate, to mark the targets before the main bomber raid; The use of high explosive bombs and air-mines coupled with thousands of incendiary bombs intended to set the city ablaze. The first wave of follow-up bombers dropped high explosive bombs, the intent of which was knock out the utilities (the water supply, electricity network and gas mains), and to crater the road - making it difficult for the fire engines to reach fires started by the follow-up waves of bombers. The follow-up waves dropped a combination of high explosive and incendiary bombs. There were two types of incendiary bombs: those made of magnesium and iron powders, and those made of petroleum. The high-explosive bombs and the larger air-mines were not only designed to hamper the Coventry fire brigade, they were also intended to damage roofs, making it easier for the incendiary bombs to fall into buildings and ignite them. As Sir Arthur Harris, commander of RAF Bomber Command, wrote after the war:

In the early days of bombing our notion, like that of the Germans, was to spread an attack out over the whole night, thereby wearing down the morale of the civilian population. The result was, of course, that an efficient fire brigade could tackle a single load of incendiaries, put them out, and wait in comfort for the next to come along; they might also be able to take shelter when a few high explosives bombs were dropping. ... But it was observed that when the Germans did get an effective concentration, ... then our fire brigades had a hard time; if a rain of incendiaries is mixed with high explosives bombs there is a temptation for the fireman to keep his head down.

The Germans again and again missed their chance, as they did during the London blitz that I watched from the roof of the Air Ministry, of setting our cities ablaze by a concentrated attack. Coventry was adequately concentrated in point of space, but all the same there was little concentration in point of time, and nothing like the fire tornadoes of Hamburg or Dresden ever occurred in this country. But they did do us enough damage to teach us the principle of concentration, the principle of starting so many fires at the same time that no fire fighting services, however efficiently and quickly they were reinforced by the fire brigades of other towns could get them under control.
—Arthur Harris, [3]


The development of the tactical innovation of the bomber stream by the RAF to overwhelm the German aerial defenses of the Kammhuber Line during World War II would have increased the RAF's concentration in time over the target, but after the lessons learned during the Blitz, the tactic of dropping a high concentration of bombs over the target in the shortest time possible became standard in the RAF because it was known to be more effective than spreading the raid over a longer time period.[3] For example, during the Coventry Blitz on the night of 14/15 November 1940, 515 Luftwaffe bombers, many flying more than one sortie against Coventry, delivered their bombs over a period of time lasting more than 10 hours. In contrast, the much more devastating raid on Dresden on the night of 13/14 of February 1945 by two waves of the RAF Bomber Command's main force, involved the bomb released at 22:14, with all but one of the 254 Lancaster bombers releasing their bombs within two minutes, and the last one released at 22:22. The second wave of 529 Lancasters dropped all of their bombs between 01:21 and 01:45. This means that in the first raid, on average, one Lancaster dropped a full load of bombs every half a second and in the second larger raid that involved more than one RAF bomber Group, one every three seconds.

So the British don't learn first hand how to incinerate cities from first hand experience on the receiving end, which taught them the effect of fire and concentration. With Germany effectively being behind a iron curtain in terms of intelligence on bombing effects (the reason the USSBS was done after the war, because they couldn't tell what the primary effect was from aerial recon alone), they don't develop things like the Firestorm on Hamburg and Dresden.

In the meantime the Germans get time to work out their AI radar and intruder operations, so that as the war goes on the British are behind the curve on bombing technics and techniques, while the Germans realize the need for their defenses sooner, so aren't as behind the curve as IOTL. I'm not saying that all things would be in Germany's favor or that the British wouldn't have major benefits to not going through the Blitz and BoB (especially in terms of the BotA being won sooner and the fight being taken to Germany sooner), but in terms of their success in bombing we probably don't see an effective bombing campaign at night and we have the LW getting their night fighter force together sooner, as well as an earlier and more effective intruder campaign that seriously hampers effective operations of RAF BC until 1943 or so. So the air war plays out quite differently and not necessarily in Britain's favor, especially if Germany does better in the East and adjusts to strategic realities vis a vis the CBO and night bombing.

German fighter pilots losses in the BoB were devastating in terms of the Jagdwaffe building up an effective replacement/leadership organization, as they never got the chance to rotate out experienced pilots due to losses and the raiding of training programs. Without the BoB and a purely defensive posture during daylight from June 1940 in the West, then the LW fighter force gets to rest and rotate out of the line, which makes them a much more effective and dangerous foe during the day. Of course this doesn't necessarily fix the production issue, nor fuel problems for training (though training in 1940-41 will be seriously boosted by not using that fuel in the BoB and in the Blitz and of course having instructors not being killed/used in operations). Perhaps that avoids silly decisions to use the best men in concentrated elite units that guts training, like the Panzer Lehr division or keeping the excellent pilots of JG 26 in combat constantly:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jagdgeschwader_26#Service_in_World_War_II
n late August it was becoming apparent to the German High Command that the Battle of Britain was not going as planned. A frustrated Göring relieved several Geschwaderkommodore of their commands, and appointed younger, more aggressive men in their place.[3] Thus Major Adolf Galland was given command of JG 26 on 22 August 1940. During the Battle of Britain, the Geschwader claimed 285 fighters shot down, for losses of 76 aircraft and 45 pilots killed, and 29 prisoners of war.[2]

In 1941 most of the fighter units of the Luftwaffe were sent east to the Eastern Front, or south to the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, thus leaving JG 26 and Jagdgeschwader 2 Richthofen as the sole single-engine fighter Geschwader in France. For the next two years these two Geschwader were the main adversaries to the Royal Air Force's (RAF) day offensives over Occupied Europe. The two Jagdgeschwader maintained around 120 serviceable Bf 109 E and F’s to face the increasing number of aggressive RAF Fighter Command sweeps conducted to wear down the Luftwaffe in a war of attrition and so relieve pressure on the Eastern Front.
Galland's careful husbanding of his resources and astute tactical awareness meant JG 26 kept their losses to a minimum while inflicting maximum damage on the RAF's Spitfires through 1941. By the end of 1941 JG 26 had claimed more than 900 victories since September 1939 (some 400 since May 1941), and had lost some 95 pilots killed (34 POW) in return. The highest scoring pilots at this time were Galland (97), Hptm Müncheberg (62) and Hptm Josef Priller (58).[citation needed]

JG 26 and Jagdgeschwader 2 (JG 2) had to defend the entire Atlantic Wall from the Spanish border through Belgium, until late 1942 when more units were directed West after the Allied bombing campaigns increased in ferocity.

Galland wasn't a good commander in the sense of developing talent or effectively managing his experienced men; he really should not have been in command, but would have been awesome shifting back between the front lines as an 'expert' and conducting operational training of men he would end up commanding in the field. On the defensive they could really gut the RAF fighter command sweeps with the best talent passing on their knowledge to the young eagles moving up thanks to experienced commanders who were desk bound managing personnel and talent as they should have been rather than fighting and trying to do everything and getting little done effectively in terms of long term management. Especially if this resulted in better team tactics rather than the 'experten' doing the killing, get the acolades, and letting their wingmen suffer, while establishing nothing when they developed combat fatigue or were killed in combat.
 
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Deleted member 1487

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RAF_Fighter_Command#1941_air_offensive
As 1941 began, Fighter Command began the onerous task of winning air superiority over North Western France from the Germans. By May 1941, the Squadrons based at all the main fighter airfields were now to operate together as integral Fighter Wings, under the tactical control of the newly created post of 'Wing Leader', invariably an experienced 1940 veteran of wing commander rank. Various types of short-penetration fighter operations were tried out in a bid to draw the Luftwaffe into a war of attrition, and keep inordinate numbers of fighters tied down in France, particularly after the German attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941. Large numbers of Spitfires were sent out with small groups of medium bombers in often vain attempts to lure the German fighters into combat. Results of these operations through 1941 were decidedly mixed, as the short range of the Spitfire precluded an overly aggressive stance, and with just two experienced Jagdgeschwader units left in Western Europe (JG 2 & JG 26; comprising 180 fighters at most) targets were often few but dangerous. Most of the factors that had allowed Fighter Command to win the Battle of Britain were now reversed. For example, British pilots who were shot down in 1940 and survived would be patched up and sent back to their units as quickly as possible. In 1941, over France, a shot down pilot would, as likely as not, end up a prisoner of war. The year saw RAF Fighter Command claim some 711 Luftwaffe fighters shot down (although only 236 were lost from all causes, 103 in combat) for losses of approximately 400 RAF fighters lost.[2] As 1941 ended, the appearance of the new Fw 190, with its obvious technical superiority over the current Spitfire Mark V, would make Fighter Command's job that much harder in 1942.

This starts sooner ITTL, but without the valuable lessons learned over their home turf, so they learn the hard way over enemy territory without radar organization against a rested and reorganized and victorious enemy. The Germans don't have to worry about their fuel tanks by flying over the Channel and the British get to relive their Dunkirk experience, but now having to fly escort missions for their bombers, rather than the other way around and the Germans having bases on the coast, rather than having to fly from Germany.

The RAF would have a major benefit of not having the reserves dipped into and losing many of their best and more experienced pilots in the BoB, but neither would the Germans; it should be remembered that the Germans were actually outnumbered in terms of pilots and fighters in the BoB, so their losses and combat fatigue affected them much more than the RAF, as they had a deeper replacement pool and higher fighter production. Now the Germans can husband their resources to maximize returns like the WW1 Luftstreitskräfte. Coastal Command, Bomber Command, and Fighter Command would be coming against the Germans immediately by August if the LW is obviously standing down, which wears them down much more badly than IOTL, as the 'Channel Sickness' because a British issue rather than a German one, so the results of OTL BoB is reversed, but even worse than IOTL due to British losses in France not being made good and their worse training and lack of experience, while the German morale is sky high after beating France and their technique/experience is far greater than the Brits, having just won a major war, with the British having mostly not been engaged in France, but rather stayed home, so weren't prepared for the fight them would be walking into. It would be like the first day of the Somme all over again for the RAF, as they are walking into the Luftwaffe's turf with all the disadvantages of the time.

Perhaps the Spitfire actually gets that extra fuel tank behind the pilot's seat to extend its range?
 

TFSmith121

Banned
One question here is how long will the British fight

One question here is how long will the British fight in a strategic situation where both sides acknowledge neither can get at the other effectively.

If the Germans can prevent the Italians from attacking Greece in October, the British realistically are limited to:

1) Battle of the Atlantic (which the Germans, presumably, are fighting only in a limited basis);

2) Air offensive over German-occupied Europe (which, as others have pointed, in 1940-42 basically costs the British more than it cost the Germans);

3) Running over the Italians in North and East Africa.

Absent the German commitment of forces in Africa and whatever "threat" that presents to British interests, the British are faced with a situation where the Germans can be supplied through neutral states (USSR, Turkey, Sweden, Unoccupied France, Spain, etc.) and are in control (more or less) of Western Europe and much of Central Europe...

Not unlike the situation when the Peace of Amiens was signed, honestly.

Best,
 

Saphroneth

Banned
Peace of Amiens is thrown around a fair bit. For clarification, though, the ultimate result of the Peace of Amiens was a breathing space for both sides.
Germany may want that breathing space, but Britain will get more benefit out of it - a few months or even a full year or two taken out of the Happy Time will mean more supplies, more production, more equipment...
Remember, Germany was using the fruits of several years of frantic weapons and equipment production in 1940; British production had only been ramping up hard since 1938.
As and when things kick off again (to liberate France, if France needs it; otherwise, whenever France feels ready), the British army will be larger and fully equipped; the air force will be all Spits and Hurries, quite possibly with Stirlings and Wellingtons and Lancasters forming the bomber fleet; there might even be a few jet aircraft in the RAF, without the frantic dash to produce fighters ASAP which caused the cancellation or severe postponement of a number of interesting projects... and Germany will still be unable to touch the British Isles.
 
One question here is how long will the British fight in a strategic situation where both sides acknowledge neither can get at the other effectively.

If the Germans can prevent the Italians from attacking Greece in October,

Wasn't that a surprise to Hitler as much as anyone else?

the British realistically are limited to:

1) Battle of the Atlantic (which the Germans, presumably, are fighting only in a limited basis);

2) Air offensive over German-occupied Europe (which, as others have pointed, in 1940-42 basically costs the British more than it cost the Germans);

3) Running over the Italians in North and East Africa.

Absent the German commitment of forces in Africa and whatever "threat" that presents to British interests, the British are faced with a situation where the Germans can be supplied through neutral states (USSR, Turkey, Sweden, Unoccupied France, Spain, etc.) and are in control (more or less) of Western Europe and much of Central Europe...

Not unlike the situation when the Peace of Amiens was signed, honestly.

Best,

You are assuming no Barbarossa? OK, where is Adolph Hitler and what have you done with him?:confused:
 

TFSmith121

Banned
I'm not saying it would lead to the Germans occupying London;

Peace of Amiens is thrown around a fair bit. For clarification, though, the ultimate result of the Peace of Amiens was a breathing space for both sides.
Germany may want that breathing space, but Britain will get more benefit out of it - a few months or even a full year or two taken out of the Happy Time will mean more supplies, more production, more equipment...

I'm not saying it would lead to the Germans occupying London; simply that the Germans have to consolidate what they have conquered and have to be thinking about SE and Eastern Europe, as the British have to be thinking about Africa and Asia and, as you say, actually mobilizing...

Best,
 

Deleted member 1487

To be honest the Italians would get run over quickly in Africa and probably wouldn't have time to invade Greece due to British resources being able to be spent in that theater instead; the BotA would probably be over much sooner without the aerial offensive delaying things. Coastal Command can help close the Atlantic Gap even sooner. Certain tech issues won't be able to be moved up like the cavity magnetron radar, which really made surfaced uboats unable to operate in the Atlantic, so it wouldn't be totally over, but convoys will be much less vulnerable by 1941 with extra resources able to be put into that effort. Frankly Italy is the only one that is hurt in the meantime, while Germany on balance in the short term wins. Britain has a political issue to continue the war without the Germans pressing it home and making the British want to continue to fight, provided Hitler doesn't order retaliatory bombings of British cities after BC tries to hit Germany in 1940-41.

Of course IMHO this is ASB, because Hitler was offensively minded and wouldn't sit back and let the British sit idle, because in the long run it gives them the ability to build up in peace and become more powerful than they were IOTL in the air, on land, and at sea. Still it removes a powerful motivation for the US public to be interested in the war in Europe and very hard for Roosevelt to politically move the US public to a pro-war stance without a hard battle in the Atlantic. Lend-Lease might not even be politically viable if Germany is not attacking British cities and is only in a limited naval fight in the Atlantic. Politically Germany would get a boost to a degree by fighting the Soviets, as the right wing in the US would love that, while the British conservatives would also be for letting the Soviets and Germans murder each other, only to be interested in preventing German hegemony in the East if they look like they are going to win.

The other issue is that without LL Britain is going to run out of hard currency by early 1941, which is why LL got passed in the first place. Without a pressing need to supply the British war effort given Germany's lack of attacks on Britain, the US won't be as up to supplying them on credit...so Britain can fight on at a reduced pace with Commonwealth resources and loans, but not nearly as well. Also the Japanese not go balls out without Germany tying up the British nearly as much as IOTL and the Mediterranean theater being tied up pretty quickly. So the US stays out and Britain pretty much is stuck blockading Germany without much means of really building up a major strategic force without US LL financing it. It would be very interesting to see how that plays out without a major British threat, an undiminished LW, and no US or LL in the war. Russia can still pay cash for US and British goods, but won't be quite the same flood of goods with cash as they did on credit. Also not having the US helping militarily and the British limited in what they can do will have important affects on the war in the East.

Peace of Amiens is thrown around a fair bit. For clarification, though, the ultimate result of the Peace of Amiens was a breathing space for both sides.
Germany may want that breathing space, but Britain will get more benefit out of it - a few months or even a full year or two taken out of the Happy Time will mean more supplies, more production, more equipment...
Remember, Germany was using the fruits of several years of frantic weapons and equipment production in 1940; British production had only been ramping up hard since 1938.
As and when things kick off again (to liberate France, if France needs it; otherwise, whenever France feels ready), the British army will be larger and fully equipped; the air force will be all Spits and Hurries, quite possibly with Stirlings and Wellingtons and Lancasters forming the bomber fleet; there might even be a few jet aircraft in the RAF, without the frantic dash to produce fighters ASAP which caused the cancellation or severe postponement of a number of interesting projects... and Germany will still be unable to touch the British Isles.

Britain though was out of hard currency by December 1940, so financed most of its production on Lend-Lease from the US and loans from the Commonwealth; without the Germans presenting an existential threat to the British via the BotA and bombing London (LL came after the December 30th firestorm in London), politically Roosevelt can't pass LL. So Britain has to finance its war on Commonwealth loans, while they were worrying about the Japanese in Asia and the Indian political situation (they won't be as willing to wait for independence without the war in Europe and Asia being so dire). Its impossible to create that aluminum rain of a strategic bombing force that bankrupted Britain IOTL without LL. The British army cannot invade Europe on its own even with Lend-Lease (Dieppe), though it can kick the Italian around all it wants. Italy will just leave the war and Britain can only really blockade Europe and try to bomb her at a reduced level, which just racks up more debt that Britain will have to pay off post-war with no hope of actually liberating Europe on its own. Finances would be a lot harder to push for a conservative government when the Germans aren't attacking them and are bogged down in the USSR.

Offensive costs on their own will see the British bombing without US help, so the Germans can defensively match and beat whatever Britain throws at them thanks to not having the overwhelming USAAF doing to bulk of the attrition during the day. Britain can nip at Germany's heels and distract her, but cannot build up a war winning for on its own, nor the massive night bomber force of OTL without LL, which the US won't provide if Britain is the one doing all the attacking and Germany leaving her alone...especially if Britain wins the BotA on her own early on.
 
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Saphroneth

Banned
I'm not saying it would lead to the Germans occupying London; simply that the Germans have to consolidate what they have conquered and have to be thinking about SE and Eastern Europe, as the British have to be thinking about Africa and Asia and, as you say, actually mobilizing...

Best,
Arguably, since the story of Britain in WW2 is one of frantically struggling to meet snowballing commitments around the world before their previous disaster has died down, a breathing space might let them actually refocus, sort things out, and regain the initiative. As such, it might result in an earlier (or easier) victory for the UK. (Hard to say.)
One thing I can see going on, though, is the various Vichy French colonies and overseas territories declaring for the Allies one by one. The Brits can probably support de Gaulle quite strongly (try to look french, lads!) and turn them one by one, which might ultimately lead to use of the manpower of non-metropolitan France.
Another is that Singapore and the Far East squadron can be reinforced sooner than OTL, which will disrupt the Southern Advance and might well wrap up the Pacific War by 1943!
 

TFSmith121

Banned
I did say "if"...which, if the Germans aren't engaged in

Wasn't that a surprise to Hitler as much as anyone else?



You are assuming no Barbarossa? OK, where is Adolph Hitler and what have you done with him?:confused:

I did say "if"...which, if the Germans aren't engaged in a strategic air offensive against Britain in the summer and fall of 1940, might give them some understanding (and better sway over) their ally to the south.

Might.

If the Germans are prepared to tell the Italians - "good luck, but we don't have much of a merchant marine either" - the Italians may understood they have to focus whatever they can scrape together in Libya and call it a day.

I'm not going any further in time than 1940, other than observing that the Soviets were content to deal with the Germans, and vice-versa, for much of the year between the fall of France and when BARBAROSSA kicked off.

If the Germans had avoided Africa, yanked the Italians back from Greece, and chosen not to squander their air strength over southeastern England in 1940, there is a more than slender chance they could have maintained what they had conquered for some period of time....

Obvously, some sort of understanding, however brutal to those under German occupation, may have eventually come into being - it is not unknown for nation states to sacrifice others in its own interests.

Best,
 

Saphroneth

Banned
I did say "if"...which, if the Germans aren't engaged in a strategic air offensive against Britain in the summer and fall of 1940, might give them some understanding (and better sway over) their ally to the south.

Might.

If the Germans are prepared to tell the Italians - "good luck, but we don't have much of a merchant marine either" - the Italians may understood they have to focus whatever they can scrape together in Libya and call it a day.

I'm not going any further in time than 1940, other than observing that the Soviets were content to deal with the Germans, and vice-versa, for much of the year between the fall of France and when BARBAROSSA kicked off.

If the Germans had avoided Africa, yanked the Italians back from Greece, and chosen not to squander their air strength over southeastern England in 1940, there is a more than slender chance they could have maintained what they had conquered for some period of time....

Obvously, some sort of understanding, however brutal to those under German occupation, may have eventually come into being - it is not unknown for nation states to sacrifice others in its own interests.

Best,

The USSR was supplying huge amounts of raw materials to Germany at this point, and Germany was dragging severely behind on the payments.
That's a combination of events you can't maintain much longer than OTL... and if Germany decides to forgo the raw materials, they run out of food and rubber.
The ultimate advantages for the Allies were economic. Germany is not and cannot be an autarky, and if it tries it collapses. And if they pay the USSR in full, that means giving the USSR a free hand in SE Europe along with supplying large amounts of machine tools (which is not what Herr Hitler wants!)
Finally, if the USSR continues to supply Germany with rubber, then the rubber might well end up being cut off. Guess who owns the entire world supply of rubber at this time?
Rule, Britannia, Britannia rules the rubber...
 

TFSmith121

Banned
This is smy view - basically a hot war cooling off in 1940-41

...So the US stays out and Britain pretty much is stuck blockading Germany without much means of really building up a major strategic force without US LL financing it. It would be very interesting to see how that plays out without a major British threat, an undiminished LW, and no US or LL in the war. Russia can still pay cash for US and British goods, but won't be quite the same flood of goods with cash as they did on credit. Also not having the US helping militarily and the British limited in what they can do will have important affects on the war in the East.

Yes, Hitler was offensively minded, but from everything I've read, his focus was always on eastern Europe; and without the defensive victory of the BoB and the invasion of Greece, it is more difficult for the British to make the case to the US that the British are fighting the US' fight. Also, once the British roll into Tripoli (and Addis) sometime in 1941, where else can the British and Italians get at each other?

Now, if the Germans and Soviets commence hostilities, that changes the strategic balance overnight...

But if they don't? A three-way cold war in Europe in the 1940s seems possible.

Best,
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Maybe a different victory?

Arguably, since the story of Britain in WW2 is one of frantically struggling to meet snowballing commitments around the world before their previous disaster has died down, a breathing space might let them actually refocus, sort things out, and regain the initiative. As such, it might result in an earlier (or easier) victory for the UK. (Hard to say.)
One thing I can see going on, though, is the various Vichy French colonies and overseas territories declaring for the Allies one by one. The Brits can probably support de Gaulle quite strongly (try to look french, lads!) and turn them one by one, which might ultimately lead to use of the manpower of non-metropolitan France.
Another is that Singapore and the Far East squadron can be reinforced sooner than OTL, which will disrupt the Southern Advance and might well wrap up the Pacific War by 1943!

Simply surviving without having to go through the blitz?

Yes, my take is if the Germans wage a limited maritime war in the west, and the British roll over the Italians in Africa, the question of the European governments in exile and their various colonial holdings will become critical - but if the British simply swing at anything "Vichy" in Africa and Asia in 1941-42 (especially French North Africa) the German response may be to occupy southern France - which at least opens the door to major gains in terms of naval strength for the Axis in the Med, which has its own series of knock-ons for the British.

Best,
 

Saphroneth

Banned
Simply surviving without having to go through the blitz?

Yes, my take is if the Germans wage a limited maritime war in the west, and the British roll over the Italians in Africa, the question of the European governments in exile and their various colonial holdings will become critical - but if the British simply swing at anything "Vichy" in Africa and Asia in 1941-42 (especially French North Africa) the German response may be to occupy southern France - which at least opens the door to major gains in terms of naval strength for the Axis in the Med, which has its own series of knock-ons for the British.

Best,
Interestingly, since the Vichy government was created under pressure of military action from an outside source, it's actually illegal under the then-current French constitution. As such, there's a legal justification the Allies can use to tempt the colonies to switch sides. And if the Germans invade Vichy France in response, the rest of the French flip to Free basically straight away - the whole point of forming the Vichy government in the first place was a ceasefire, and if the Germans violate that then it's goodbye even remote legitimacy of the Vichy system. (Plus, OTL the Vichy sea men scuttled their own ships rather than see the Germans get them.)
 
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