WI: Hitler captured Stalingrad

[aktarian]

case blue was the only major german offensive of 1942 and luftlotte 4 was allocated exclusively to army group south.

And AGS just happened to be German formation conducting their greatest effort in 1942.

How many planes did Germans have anyway? Not sure if they could properly support hypothetical northern thrust and strategic bombing campaign in south. Latter would have to be launched from further west, Crimea at best.

 

[Bagration]

What is AGS?

 

[mayboro]

AGS = Army Group South

 

[wietze]

How many planes did Germans have anyway? Not sure if they could properly support hypothetical northern thrust and strategic bombing campaign in south. Latter would have to be launched from further west, Crimea at best.

more than enough planes, but wasn't the problem that there were not enough pilots?

 

[aktarian]

more than enough planes, but wasn't the problem that there were not enough pilots?

Enough planes to effectively conduct both strategic bombing campaign against oilfields and support TTL northern offensive?

 

[ObssesedNuker]

The only way this can work is if 62nd and 64th armies are trapped outside Stalingrad before they have a chance to retreat.

The Germans had exactly this opportunity on August 29th. Shuffle German units around a bit so as to avoid 4th Panzer Army's traffic jam, and you get this:

I doubt the German forces and supplies can be redeployed fast enough to ever accomplish that encirclement before the 62nd and 64th armies withdraw regardless of what Hitler and the OKH orders. The Stalingrad Operation was receiving top-priority in supply allocation in August as it was. In fact, it seems the "traffic logjams" occurred less from any orders on high and more from a lack of fuel because the all the formations were only being supported by a single, low-capacity rail line.

In other words: it was Barbarossa all over again. The logistics would not permit it.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

I doubt the German forces and supplies can be redeployed fast enough to ever accomplish that encirclement before the 62nd and 64th armies withdraw regardless of what Hitler and the OKH orders. The Stalingrad Operation was receiving top-priority in supply allocation in August as it was. In fact, it seems the "traffic logjams" occurred less from any orders on high and more from a lack of fuel because the all the formations were only being supported by a single, low-capacity rail line.

In other words: it was Barbarossa all over again. The logistics would not permit it.

The traffic jam was the result of Hitler's orders and indecision about what the objectives were going to be:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Stalingrad#Case_Blue

The initial advance of the 6th Army was so successful that Hitler intervened and ordered the 4th Panzer Army to join Army Group South (A) to the south. A massive traffic jam resulted when the 4th Panzer and the 1st Panzer both required the few roads in the area. Both armies were stopped dead while they attempted to clear the resulting mess of thousands of vehicles. The delay was long, and it is thought that it cost the advance at least one week. With the advance now slowed, Hitler changed his mind and re-assigned the 4th Panzer Army back to the attack on Stalingrad.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

The traffic jam was the result of Hitler's orders and prevarication about what the objectives were going to be:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Stalingrad#Case_Blue

"The advance"... which advance? The one on Stalingrad or the one into the Caucasus? The one on the Caucasus definitely got as far as it was ever going to be able to go and I don't see how the advance on Stalingrad could go any faster given that the tanks were repeatedly running out of fuel and then having to wait days for resupply as it was. XIV Panzer Corps, for example, spent at least 3 days without any fuel on the southern bank of the Don.

In any case, it turns out that the aforementioned encirclement was attempted. Looks like the Soviets just withdrew in response.

 

[Shaby]

murmansk and archangel aren't that far from leningrad so the arctic lend lease route could be cut off some time later.

Well, those distances look small only on the map. The fact is there is no infrastructure up there capable of supporting large armies, terrain is tough and interspersed with forests and lakes, ideal for defensive, as the Soviets found out in winter of '39/40 and campaign season is too short.

As for Leningrad, the Germans did try that in 1942, when they transferred the forces from Crimea up there, but quickly gave up when they realised how many casualties would the reduction of Leningrad involve.

 

[Gannt the chartist]

I think you guys need to go back to the Blue ( and Brunswick) directives.
The Caucuses is the point of the offensive. Germany is now at war with the US and UK as well as the USSR. It’s a resource poor state it believes it needs oil. It has scraped the bottom of the barrel in terms of German Infantry for the Offensive and all but AGS are severely under strength. This is the last offensive possible in Russia before the skies over germany grow dark with allied planes and the Atlantic gets a steel top.

http://www.reocities.com/pentagon/1084/hitler_directives/dir41.htm

The underlying belief is that the Russians have expended the bulk of their reserves and are, once again, just about to collapse. Everything about both operations is coloured by this belief. Which Fridericus & MARS and the near collapse of the Soviet defensive systems in the AGS area do nothing to counteract.

Technically it is called a delusional state. The voices made them do it.

The Germans also acknowledge they do not have the strength to do everything at once and the Priority is the destruction of Soviet forces west of the Don then the Caucuses oilfields.

The original Blue version says take Stalingrad or bring it under artillery fire. Its actually quite prescriptive about tactics and the nature of encirclements.

Three weeks later is Brunswick. They think they have destroyed the forces west of the Don and with only weak forces escaping west. The belief is that the strong forces have escaped to the Caucuses. And that new forces are being established at Stalingrad. The orders are to ‘smash’ the defences at Stalingrad, and then proceed on to Astrakhan. (297.1 again)

The air section of the order says

‘In view of the decisive importance of the Caucasas oilfields for the further prosecution of the war, air attacks against their refineries and storage tanks, and against ports used for oil shipments on the Black Sea, will only be carried out if the operations of the Army make them absolutely essential. ‘

Can the Germans Take Stalingrad on the Bounce’ not really – the Orders are to for short distance encirclements which involves fighting after the pocket is formed so while a recon element might get to Stalingrad OTL whatever forces that were there were initially able to fight off a Panzer Korps so its going to need to be pretty meaty or get stomped by girls.

By 13 september though its 78k germans with 120 tanks vs 52,500 soviet with 100 tanks – defending a city. Its after only a month or so fighting that the Soviets are relatively ground down and the Germans have a local 2:1 superiority.

As far as the Luftwaffe is concerned nominal strength would be Luftflotte 1 332a/c Luftflotte 4 1400a/c Luftflotte Ost 520 a/c. Actual strength 40-60% of that on any one day.

Operationally the problem is they can only really gain air superiority using LF4 ( or more accurately over one Army Group Sector) at a time. That’s one of the reasons why the 42 Operations a specifically in sequence.

 

[usertron2020]

I think you guys need to go back to the Blue ( and Brunswick) directives.
<snip>
Operationally the problem is they can only really gain air superiority using LF4 ( or more accurately over one Army Group Sector) at a time. That’s one of the reasons why the 42 Operations a specifically in sequence.

What can you tell us of any ACTUAL strategic bombing that occurred at Baku itself?

 

[Gannt the chartist]

10 and 12 October 42 its attacked with whatever of the 130 bombers Richthofen has flying and there is a lot of smoke.

Slightly later LF4 has 186 and is ordered to launch a massive attack - 22 October.

Through all of this ofc LF4 has to provide support to everyone else and in the last week inoctober his recon aircraft start to see things happened behind soviet lines.

Grozny and Maikop combined amount to 10% of the soviet needs.

 

[Michele]

just like the previous soviet coutnerattacks against AGS they would be defeated and soviet forces in that area would be severely defeated and so not a threat.

The first Soviet winter counteroffensive in December 1941 also was contained and eventually defeated. It still does not mean that it had no impact whatsoever on the new starting positions, strength, equipment and morale of the German forces come the spring of 1942.

 

[Michele]

then why not just go make case blue an operation to take leningrad and wipe out the soviet baltic fleet. murmansk and archangel aren't that far from leningrad so the arctic lend lease route could be cut off some time later.

Logistics.

 

[pattersonautobody]

Logistics.

Is surrounding Lake Ladoga a realistic objective? Success in this leads to the fall of Leningrad ultimately.

Germany might have been better served by "logistic" offensives in 1942 (i.e. cutting off the Volga but not necessarily taking Stalingrad and surrounding Lake Ladoga, but making no real attempt to capture oil fields or or capturing Stalingrad. Obviously, Leningrad would fall if completely surrounded while this is impossible with Stalingrad, as it can be supplied from across the Volga.)

 

[ivanotter]

1942 was vry much a defining moment for Germany.

There were not many options:

1) Go for Leningrad and the industrial area, manufacturing vital equipment
2) Go for Moscow (again) where Stalin expected the offensive to be heading
3) Go south and close the oil fields

Case Blue was probably the best option but again, Russia is big and requires more and more resources as one gets further into it. Like looking down a funnel the wrong way. It opens up!

Securing the Don bend with German troops will make the push South impossoble, so gamble on it and put 'allies' there.

Going into Caucasus without Stalingrad is ... boring.

Stalingrad in itself is not a goal. It is the hinge for Caucasus.

So, what would you have done in 1942? (short of shooting yourself of course)

Ivan

 

[Cronos988]

So, what would you have done in 1942? (short of shooting yourself of course)

If I assume I am wargaming this, i.e. can assess the situation objectively, do not need to get people to agree with me?

Go with the first Stage of Case Blue towards Voronezh. From there, have a part of AGS try to push the southernmost front towards Rostov. Establish a defensive line on the Donets in the south.
Take most of the mobile troops and push North from Voronezh, along the Don. Try to roll up the front until you reach Moscow from the south. I am not sure how the Rail lines run, but this might cut a lot of supply lines. Then try to capture or encircle Moscow.

The Russians either collapse or you loose. Either way, cannot imagine this being much worse than case blue, and it doesn't horribly overstretch your frontlines.

 

[pattersonautobody]

Wargaming 1942 I will reiterate what I was speculating about in my previous post.

1. Cut off some Russian oil, don't strike towards the oil fields.

The main summer offensive would still be towards the south, but with only the field equivalent of Army Group B, with perhaps a larger armor complement. Seizing Rostov on Don is a sensible campaign objective, as is the the coast of the Don River as a defensive barrier to prevent Russian offensives to retake Ukraine.

Taking Stalingrad on the march in this plan is not impossible, but not absolutely necessary. A suitable line between the Don and the Volga Rivers can be established, cutting off Volga traffic and establishing forward air fields for a possible one off against Baku. Attacks against Grozny and Maikop can be made from the Crimean Peninsula, as they were OTL.

A protracted attack against Baku may have required an attack towards Maikop, but it requires a perfect foretelling of the future to know that air defense around Baku for the month of August was close to non-existent, so it is hard to justify an entire front just to capture closer air fields towards the Caucusus.

2. Surround Lake Ladoga and siege Leningrad so that it surrenders after starvation.

From what I can tell, logistics around Leningrad prevent the moving of huge armies. However, the Germans man-for-man in 1942 were much better than the Russians. With the equivalent of Army Group A, the Germans would take these and existing forces taken from the Crimean siege and attack to surround Lake Ladoga at the same time they attack in the south. Because this theater does not support large armies, the Russians won't be able to win by sheer numbers and it allows Germans to hold Lake Ladoga for a significant period of time to truly starve Leningrad.


Both of these operations offer the hope that 1. the Germans don't suffer a catastrophe, and 2. the Russian economy is given a huge dagger blow and 3. German logistics in the East are much improved. These moves may make a stalemate in 1943 at least theoretically possible. The mass death of millions from starvation, or more likely their surrender before this point, on top of economic issues caused by having a significant portion of oil production disrupted, may make Stalin throw in the towel when there is no new front in Europe at the end of 1942. This gives the Germans the chance to fight off the western allies now nipping at their heels. Both goals are realistic and doable, and can pay large dividends.

Even if they work out, though, Russia 90% chance continues the war, and wit h the western allies will crush Germany.

 

[Gannt the chartist]

The German army is much better that the Russian while it is fighting mobile operations. The more it becomes an infantry/artillery fight which is the case around Leningrad the more even things become. Actually much worse for the germans because they lose out in the replacement game.

Any operational maneuver in the north ends up being at least in part against the Moscow defense sector where the bulk of the Soviet reserves are known to be.

Bringing AGN up to anything like strength means starving AGS of replacements with no prospect of a decisive result quickly and every prospect of a Soviet counterattack in the south or MARS succeeding because of the losses in the attacks.

Germany has no realistic chance for a decisive victory in 42. Given what they believe Blue is probably the best bet - they just have no idea of the actual strength of the soviets.

If they know that the best bet is a limited Kursk type offensive to spoil the Soviet counterattack which would probably result in a Soviet breakthrough in late 42 gaining similar ground but with lower german and particularly allied losses.

 

[pattersonautobody]

The German army is much better that the Russian while it is fighting mobile operations. The more it becomes an infantry/artillery fight which is the case around Leningrad the more even things become. Actually much worse for the germans because they lose out in the replacement game.

Any operational maneuver in the north ends up being at least in part against the Moscow defense sector where the bulk of the Soviet reserves are known to be.

Bringing AGN up to anything like strength means starving AGS of replacements with no prospect of a decisive result quickly and every prospect of a Soviet counterattack in the south or MARS succeeding because of the losses in the attacks.

Germany has no realistic chance for a decisive victory in 42. Given what they believe Blue is probably the best bet - they just have no idea of the actual strength of the soviets.

If they know that the best bet is a limited Kursk type offensive to spoil the Soviet counterattack which would probably result in a Soviet breakthrough in late 42 gaining similar ground but with lower german and particularly allied losses.

OTL the Germans did not require much more than Army Group B (half of AGS) to achieve the objective of cutting off the Volga. The question is whether any break through at all is possible in the North. If so, the dividends are huge.