WI Dunkirk evacuation a complete failure for the Allies?

There was no order to halt, the panzers stopped because on reaching the sea they had to make the decision as to whether to throw their full weight north against the BEF plus the Belgians and several French divisions or south against the bulk of the French army.

That delay was vital to the British as an otherwise identical state of affairs only 3-4 days earlier would have cut the number of troops evacuated by nearly two-thirds.

The bold part is incorrect.
There most certainly was a halt order.
Earlier, on May 22nd at 8:00 AM the decision was made to move North against the BEF and not South.

Advocates of the halt-order who succeeded in convincing Hitler (although he didn't need much convincing as he was afraid of another Miracle of the Marne) were amongst others Göring, Ewald von Kleist (Pz Group commander), Hans von Kluge (4th Army commander) and Von Rundstedt!
The initial order to halt on the 24th actually came from Rundstedt on the 23th of May. Hitler approved of this on the 24th itself and voiced it more explicit (naming lines on the map which weren't to be passed by the Panzertroops).
Advocates against stopping were Guderian (commander XIX Corps), Halder, von Bock and von Brauschitsch (chief OKH) amongst others.


You see the choice to go North/South was a different one from the Halt-order?
I'm copying the above almost literally from Walter Lord's "The miracle of Dunkirk", page 30.


Astrodragon said:
Oh, picky picky....:p:p
Open beaches as in no port - the port of Dunkirk was bombed and unusable, the mole was just that, a mole..
But yes, you're quite correct.

The mole was used as an improvised quay/mooring and made sure the moored ships were in calm waters. How is that any different from the most important roles a port would provide for shipping?

As opposed in open waters the only way to moor would be to anchor on the seabottom and be hindered by waves etc.
I agree I'm a bit nitpicking...
 
Here we go:

As of May 26th a total of 27,936 had been evacuated. These were the men from training centers, bases and such whose mission no longer was relevant on French soil.

May 27th: 7,669

May 28th: 17,804

May 29th: 47,310

May 30th: 53,823

May 31st: 68,014

June 1st: 64,429

June 2nd: 26,256

June 3rd: 26,175

Nearly 40,000 were captured by the Germans, a key reason Germany first doubted a successful evacuation had taken place. Kesselring, for one, openly mocked the idea that even 100,000 had been evacuated.



Rundstedt ordered a regrouping of his panzers on the 23rd as preparation for Operation Red, the assault over the Somme against the heart of France but many units and most German infantry divisions, including no less than ten under Bock, were unaffected. Indeed, by the 25th half the territory held by the BEF and allied units had been lost to German advances, primarily but not entirely in the east.

Also Franklyn's counter-attack around Arras had much to do with Rundstedt's decision. No less a figure than Rommel panicked and reported one battered British armored brigade as five(!) armored divisions while Rundstedt saw this as the beginning of what he feared, an allied effort to cut off the panzers before the rest of the Wehrmacht caught up.

Further, it wasn't Rundstedt who wasted 10th Panzer Division for 36 hours by ordering it to Panzer Group reserve and then returning it nor Rundstedt who diverted elements of 2nd Panzer Division to guard the Somme bridgeheads.

The 1st and 10th Panzer Divisions might dispute Guderian's claims of a halt from May 22nd to May 26th as history recalls these two divisions playing the decisive role in the capture of Boulougne and Calais.

On May 26th German forces were attacking the Allied perimeter, including no less than five panzer and one motorised divisions in direct contact with the BEF, with another two panzer and one motorised divisions in support. The resulting carnage led Guderian to announce on May 28th "Further tank attacks would involve useless sacrifice of our best troops".
 

mowque

Banned
Given how badly every one misunderstood the effectiveness of modern warfare...including the Germans, they probably could have pulled off Sealion , just based on incompetance alone....it might have been a race to see who mirco meddled the fighting the most Hitler or Churchill. The British were only slightly more mentally prepared for war than the French were and would have folded once the main battle came to their shores.

The Number of people who believe the BEF defense of Dunkirk and the counter attacks at Arras were great British actions are probably equal to the number of people who believe Sealion was impossible in the first place.

Say what?:eek:
 
The bold part is incorrect.
There most certainly was a halt order.
Earlier, on May 22nd at 8:00 AM the decision was made to move North against the BEF and not South.

Advocates of the halt-order who succeeded in convincing Hitler (although he didn't need much convincing as he was afraid of another Miracle of the Marne) were amongst others Göring, Ewald von Kleist (Pz Group commander), Hans von Kluge (4th Army commander) and Von Rundstedt!
The initial order to halt on the 24th actually came from Rundstedt on the 23th of May. Hitler approved of this on the 24th itself and voiced it more explicit (naming lines on the map which weren't to be passed by the Panzertroops).
Advocates against stopping were Guderian (commander XIX Corps), Halder, von Bock and von Brauschitsch (chief OKH) amongst others.


You see the choice to go North/South was a different one from the Halt-order?
I'm copying the above almost literally from Walter Lord's "The miracle of Dunkirk", page 30.




The mole was used as an improvised quay/mooring and made sure the moored ships were in calm waters. How is that any different from the most important roles a port would provide for shipping?

As opposed in open waters the only way to moor would be to anchor on the seabottom and be hindered by waves etc.
I agree I'm a bit nitpicking...

Except that a major portion of the evacuated forces DIDN'T use the mole - they were picked up on the beach or in chest deep water by smaller boats and then either ferried to the RN further out ('cause only a small number of ships could tie up to the mole at once) or even all the way back to England.

I have no clue what 'major portion' here is. 1/2? 1/3? 2/3?
 

Markus

Banned
The French at that time had 60+ divisions, the British 9 completely defeated and exhausted ones.

On top of 16 armoured and motorized divisions Germany had 61 fully combat ready infantry divisions, 29 partially ready ones (and 46 that are not relevant because they were third and fourth rate). Most of the infantry saw little or no combat so far. That´s more than enough to defeat 60+ 1st and 2nd rate french divisions.
 
Except that a major portion of the evacuated forces DIDN'T use the mole - they were picked up on the beach or in chest deep water by smaller boats and then either ferried to the RN further out ('cause only a small number of ships could tie up to the mole at once) or even all the way back to England.

I have no clue what 'major portion' here is. 1/2? 1/3? 2/3?

The books I have don't break down the numbers port/mole versus beach. They do mention that the loading over the mole went ten times as fast then through the beach. The mole was big enough IIRC for 4 men abreast and made it possible for destroyers and up to load there without having to use smaller ships to ferry men.

On the beach it wasn't so much the room on the ships which limited the amount of men evacuated, it was the hours of nighttime they had.
Several ships went back to England with < 10% of the evacuees they could have carried thanks to the slow loading on the beach.
Despite some ships beaching themselves at low tide, most ships waited for hours to get men loaded by boats rowing to and from, despite men standing in lines for hours up to their necks in the water.

From this I assumed the majority or so would be evacuated by the moles, not the beach. Further proof for that would be the enormous difference in men evacuated on the first day (not using the mole) versus later.
 
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