WI:Confederate Target after Gettysburg Victory

[usertron2020]

This is a good point. Even if we can see in retrospect that the Confederate capture of Washington was exceedingly unlikely, it doesn't change the fact that Lincoln, Stanton and Co. greatly feared the possibility and went to great lengths to avoid even the appearance of a threat to the capital.

Indeed. While separation from the telegraph lines meant that Meade mostly had a free hand, no way can he defend to Lincoln and Stanton his allowing Lee to get between him and DC. Besides, at no point did Meade ever consider doing that.

We see this in retrospect, but in looking at the reports, letters, and diaries of the time, it seems that not everyone thought so in 1863.

Interestingly enough, pretty much everyone in Europe DID think so. (1) Outside, that is, of the London Times. The Times seems to have been the 19th century's version of the Fox News Channel when it came to narcotic self-deception (2) over the subject of American politics and reporting in general.

1) Tell me, in your honest opinion, do you think that perhaps Europeans were judging the battle-to-battle results of the American Civil War more along the lines of the English Civil War? A war where as long as Parliament was seen in complete control of London they would continue to be seen to be in the ascendency? No matter how many defensive victories the Royalists won? Kind of like in the ACW in the early years? That the CSA was needed to be seen to be strategically winning the war, on the basis of seizing Northern cities and states, as opposed to surviving, or merely "holding on"?

2) See their reporting of Sherman's "escape" to the sea!

Many Confederates regarded Gettysburg as a rather unfortunate setback and some even saw it as a standoff rather than a defeat ("Hey, we won on the first day, didn't we?").

How long did that attitude hold after the full casualty lists came in?

Many Union commentators, Lincoln being only the most important one, dwelt on the missed opportunity to destroy Lee's army far more than Meade having turned back Lee's invasion.

Lincoln et al were not in a position to appreciate the degree to which the near Noah's Ark level of the torrential downpour starting on July 4th threw a complete monkey wrench into offensive operations by either side. Though had Meade followed his own council rather than that of his councils-of-war, Gettysburg would have ended very differently. But he was new to command, and you couldn't expect that kind of drive from any new commander this side of Grant, Sherman, or Sheridan (yes not even Thomas would have struck out to cut off Lee after the Third Day that quickly).

Had the South won the war after Gettysburg, the historiography of the battle would be completely different. We see it today as the "turning point of the war" and the "high water mark of the Confederacy", but that's only because we know how the war eventually turned out.

Hmm. I guess that would depend on exactly HOW the South won? Assuming some kind of Democratic 1864 electoral victory.

 

[dmg86]

Something else to consider is that the Confederate Artillery had bad fuses and couldn't get supplied easily. The fuse problem was due to 2 factors one was their was an explosion at the place that manufactured the fuses for the ANV in Richmond and that leads to problem 2 the replacement fuses from SC were later to have been noticed by the army in combat and the Ordnance Department in testing to expold later then they should have.

 

[usertron2020]

Something else to consider is that the Confederate Artillery had bad fuses and couldn't get supplied easily. The fuse problem was due to 2 factors one was their was an explosion at the place that manufactured the fuses for the ANV in Richmond and that leads to problem 2 the replacement fuses from SC were later to have been noticed by the army in combat and the Ordnance Department in testing to expold later then they should have.

And overall ordnance shortages prevented the live-fire training time that could have brought out these problems for the Conferate Army. Also, while their artillery officers were generally quite good, the level of training for their crews tended to be poor. Add on to the artillery re-supply ordnance trains coming by wagon all the way from Staunton, and...

 

[Johnrankins]

And overall ordnance shortages prevented the live-fire training time that could have brought out these problems for the Conferate Army. Also, while their artillery officers were generally quite good, the level of training for their crews tended to be poor. Add on to the artillery re-supply ordnance trains coming by wagon all the way from Staunton, and...

Add in the fact that Union artillery crews were trained well having enough ammo to train all day if need be, union made shells being quite reliable and the fact that the Union had no problems with getting enough shells you can see why the CSA came in second by quite a margin when it came to artillery.

 

[Readman]

And again that's just indicative of the David.v.Goliath aspect of the ACW in a nut-shell, the CSA could not, would not, ever, have even a fraction of a fraction of the Union Industry/Production/Quality Control needed in the drawn out long run war the ACW was

 

[usertron2020]

Add in the fact that Union artillery crews were trained well having enough ammo to train all day if need be, union made shells being quite reliable and the fact that the Union had no problems with getting enough shells you can see why the CSA came in second by quite a margin when it came to artillery.

Yep. At Gettysburg and afterwards, in some cases the AotP were getting artillery re-supplies straight from the factories in Philadelphia, down the rail lines, to the railheads not far from Pipe Creek.

 

[usertron2020]

And again that's just indicative of the David.v.Goliath aspect of the ACW in a nut-shell, the CSA could not, would not, ever, have even a fraction of a fraction of the Union Industry/Production/Quality Control needed in the drawn out long run war the ACW was

In the AotP, initially, the Infantry Arm was the flower of the army. Until after Fredricksburg. Where it was literally shot to pieces, and the infantry's elan was no more.

OTOH, the Cavalry Arm, which was a complete joke at the start of the war, facing a Rebel Cavalry that ran rings around it, by 1863 could face Stuart's Cavaliers as equals. By 1864, Sheridan's troopers were the Coming Man of the Army of the Potomac.

Meanwhile, the Artillery Arm had been, remained, and would always be the elite of the army.

 

[usertron2020]

The problem is that western war mentality (even more so american) was and is molded around von Clausewitz ideas that you have to Conan your enemy into submission and annihilation.

It is an interesting intellectual exercise to imagine guys like Sun Tzu, Sun Bi and the other great generals of chinese history in charge of confederate armies and war politics, using the 36 Stratagems, the taoist concept of Wu Wei, hitting northern fullness with southern emptiness [1] and so on.

[1] Davis and Beauregard suddenly get slanted eyes. The union holds Fort Sumter, the tiger is safe in his mountain lair. Since the enemy exhibits fullness, hit it with emptyness. Do nothing (Wu Wei). When civilian ships pass along Fort Sumter two things can happen: nothing and then union emptiness deflates or the fort fires upon them, attacking unarmed civilian ships, wounding, maiming and killing defenceless civilians who pose no threat at all. See how much sympathetic will be french and british governments and public opinions to such a move .

Agreed. But...

Said Chinese generals would be ignored by the Fire-Eaters, who would call them lily-livered Submissionists. The Southrons were spoiling for a fight, and got it by opening fire in the very heart of the most Secesh city in the South. Lincoln may have maneuvered the situation to his liking, but the results proved it didn't take much to arile the CSA.

 

[Johnrankins]

Agreed. But...

Said Chinese generals would be ignored by the Fire-Eaters, who would call them lily-livered Submissionists. The Southrons were spoiling for a fight, and got it by opening fire in the very heart of the most Secesh city in the South. Lincoln may have maneuvered the situation to his liking, but the results proved it didn't take much to arile the CSA.

It is also true that if they let a foreign nation (And they considered the US as foreign after secession) operate a fort on their territory without their permission it would be difficult for Europe or anyone else to take them seriously as a sovereign nation should be able to put a stop to it.

To be honest Lincoln was looking for a fight too and would have kept pushing until he got it. He saw (correctly IMO) secession as illegal and unlike Buchanan was going to do something about it.

 

[Athelstane]

Washington was pretty much out of the question, mainly because not only did they have a large garrison, but it was also heavily fortified. Any attack against those fortifications would probably result in massive casualties, pretty much making their victory at Gettysburg null and void. Forcing them to fall back to Virginia, before union reinforcements arrived. Their best chance was to take Baltimore where there were more southern sympathizers.

Baltimore didn't have all that much in the way of fortifications on its landward side, nor near the garrison that Washington had.

I DO NOT RECOMMEND THAT TRILOGY.

"HE'S DONE WHAT!?" was an outrageously overused line to explain away how general after general in the Union Army would defy orders and throw themselves into ambush after ambush, Confederate maelstrom after Confederate maelstrom, all in the name of slaughtering huge numbers of Union troops to little loss to the Confederates, for the purpose of "making the story fair".

Apparently their storytelling methods was becoming too notorious for the authors, so they switched the formula around just once to sully an otherwise perfect record of Rebel generalship by having one single Southron divisional commander go haring off to get his command destroyed.

Pickett, of course.

Gingrich and Forschten's series actually starts with a not implausible way for Lee to win at Gettysburg - not surprising since it represents the novelization of a long-held theory at the Army War College. In short, Lee wins at Gettysburg by leaving it, and seizing a favorable line (Pipe Creek) between Meade and Washington (along with Meade's supplies). It's not all that implausible that Meade, a very competent and unflappable, but also cautious (and very new to command), general, would delay long enough in moving from a very tough defensive position he had just raced his army into as a result of equivocal reports of Lee doing something rather un-Lee-like (abandoning a battlefield he had given blood for while still retaining the power to contest it).

The problem, however, is that it all requires Lee acting in a way that was very unlike Lee.

After this, the whole thing tends to go off the rails into less plausible trajectories. Yes, Lee could have taken Baltimore, had he gone at it full tilt; yes, it had a large horde of supplies and resources to sustain him for a while; but doing so leaves Washington between him and his supply base in Virginia, and too vulnerable to being cut off, especially once Grant shows up.

More likely, he hovers in western Maryland and southern PA, living off the land as long as possible to relieve Northern Virginia, putting pressure on Lincoln to call for terms. But that was very unlikely, especially in the wake of Vicksburg. In short, even a Gingrich-style victory in the Gettysburg campaign really doesn't lead anywhere, not even to Baltimore, no matter how much southern boys like William Faulkner dreamed. Lee's best chances for forcing peace came in 1862, either at the Seven Days, or after Second Bull Run, and even those would have been iffy.

 

[CT23]

Didn't the Union still win the war eventually in that trilogy?

 

[usertron2020]

Baltimore didn't have all that much in the way of fortifications on its landward side, nor near the garrison that Washington had.


Gingrich and Forschten's series actually starts with a not implausible way for Lee to win at Gettysburg - not surprising since it represents the novelization of a long-held theory at the Army War College. In short, Lee wins at Gettysburg by leaving it, and seizing a favorable line (Pipe Creek) between Meade and Washington (along with Meade's supplies). It's not all that implausible that Meade, a very competent and unflappable, but also cautious (and very new to command), general, would delay long enough in moving from a very tough defensive position he had just raced his army into as a result of equivocal reports of Lee doing something rather un-Lee-like (abandoning a battlefield he had given blood for while still retaining the power to contest it).

The problem, however, is that it all requires Lee acting in a way that was very unlike Lee.

After this, the whole thing tends to go off the rails into less plausible trajectories. Yes, Lee could have taken Baltimore, had he gone at it full tilt; yes, it had a large horde of supplies and resources to sustain him for a while; but doing so leaves Washington between him and his supply base in Virginia, and too vulnerable to being cut off, especially once Grant shows up.

More likely, he hovers in western Maryland and southern PA, living off the land as long as possible to relieve Northern Virginia, putting pressure on Lincoln to call for terms. But that was very unlikely, especially in the wake of Vicksburg. In short, even a Gingrich-style victory in the Gettysburg campaign really doesn't lead anywhere, not even to Baltimore, no matter how much southern boys like William Faulkner dreamed. Lee's best chances for forcing peace came in 1862, either at the Seven Days, or after Second Bull Run, and even those would have been iffy.

Outstanding analysis. Well done sir.

That said, the contrivances used by the two authors to make every corps commander/army commander of the AotP into a bunch of ding-a-lings broke the camel's back about halfway through the second book. SIX Union corps destroyed due to incompetence versus only one Confederate division. The only reason Sykes of all people wasn't made a goat was because of the repeated need by the two authors to keep major formations of the AotP out of action (to make the ATL ANV victories possible) meant that SOMEBODY had to be lefting standing in the AotP in the end.

 

[Johnrankins]

Didn't the Union still win the war eventually in that trilogy?

I am pretty sure it did. From what I have heard that was the point. The North could screw up badly and repeatedly and still wind up winning.

 

[TFSmith121]

Nicely summed up...

In the AotP, initially, the Infantry Arm was the flower of the army. Until after Fredricksburg. Where it was literally shot to pieces, and the infantry's elan was no more.

OTOH, the Cavalry Arm, which was a complete joke at the start of the war, facing a Rebel Cavalry that ran rings around it, by 1863 could face Stuart's Cavaliers as equals. By 1864, Sheridan's troopers were the Coming Man of the Army of the Potomac.

Meanwhile, the Artillery Arm had been, remained, and would always be the elite of the army.

Nicely summed up...

As far as the AotP's infantry, the May 10 and May 11 attacks at Spotsylvania were a hell of an effort...big part of that was Emory Upton's planning, but still...

Best,

 

[usertron2020]

Didn't the Union still win the war eventually in that trilogy?

Yes, but only by moving major formations from the West along with Grant and the cavalryman Benjamin Grierson. And even then, Grant's forces are all but destroyed, reduced to two shrunken corps, and the AotP itself under Sykes is down to the V Corps alone, with amalgamated units from the remnants of the other six corps and cavalry attached to restore his own losses.

IIRC, Lee is down to a similarly sized force, but is trapped between Grant, Sykes, the Washington Garrison (XXII Corps), and the Potomac River. With no bridging equipment, and Union gunboats shelling any attempts to build new bridges with 30 pounder Parrott guns and (I think) 100 pounders on barges from DC. Said barges also allowing Union troops to be redeployed to any threatened spot that Lee tries to take to cross the Potomac. So after spending 2 2/3 books whipping the yankees force-to-force, Lee is forced to surrender by a campaign of maneuver.

 

[usertron2020]

Nicely summed up...

As far as the AotP's infantry, the May 10 and May 11 attacks at Spotsylvania were a hell of an effort...big part of that was Emory Upton's planning, but still...

Best,

Yes, but when it came time to exploit the advantage achieved on the second assault, where instead of four regiments they threw in the whole of II Corps, despite eliminating the Mule Shoe and making the Stonewall Brigade Part Of The Things That Were, General Gibbon (good an officer as he was) was forced to tell Hancock that his men could simply do no more that day.

Too many conscripts, substitutes, and worn out veterans counting the days to their mustering out.

 

[TFSmith121]

Other than not introducing steam powered tanks;

Yes, but only by moving major formations from the West along with Grant and the cavalryman Benjamin Grierson. And even then, Grant's forces are all but destroyed, reduced to two shrunken corps, and the AotP itself under Sykes is down to the V Corps alone, with amalgamated units from the remnants of the other six corps and cavalry attached to restore his own losses.

IIRC, Lee is down to a similarly sized force, but is trapped between Grant, Sykes, the Washington Garrison (XXII Corps), and the Potomac River. With no bridging equipment, and Union gunboats shelling any attempts to build new bridges with 30 pounder Parrott guns and (I think) 100 pounders on barges from DC. Said barges also allowing Union troops to be redeployed to any threatened spot that Lee tries to take to cross the Potomac. So after spending 2 2/3 books whipping the yankees force-to-force, Lee is forced to surrender by a campaign of maneuver.

Other than not introducing steam powered tanks, the above is almost as ridiculous as Harry Harrison...and Harrison had no pretensions of being a historian.

Best,

 

[TFSmith121]

Perhaps; my point is the straight legs were still capable of

Yes, but when it came time to exploit the advantage achieved on the second assault, where instead of four regiments they threw in the whole of II Corps, despite eliminating the Mule Shoe and making the Stonewall Brigade Part Of The Things That Were, General Gibbon (good an officer as he was) was forced to tell Hancock that his men could simply do no more that day.

Too many conscripts, substitutes, and worn out veterans counting the days to their mustering out.

Perhaps; my point is the AOTP's straight legs were still capable of surprises in '64...

They did a pretty solid job in the '65 campaign as well, when things finally broke into mobile warfare, as well.

And FWIW, Sherman's army was some of the finest infantry in the world by 64-65; something like 50 percent of his troopers were long-service from 61-62 who had re-uppped for the duration...

Best,

 

[usertron2020]

Yes, but only by moving major formations from the West along with Grant and the cavalryman Benjamin Grierson. And even then, Grant's forces are all but destroyed, reduced to two shrunken corps, and the AotP itself under Sykes is down to the V Corps alone, with amalgamated units from the remnants of the other six corps and cavalry attached to restore his own losses.

IIRC, Lee is down to a similarly sized force, but is trapped between Grant, Sykes, the Washington Garrison (XXII Corps), and the Potomac River. With no bridging equipment, and Union gunboats shelling any attempts to build new bridges with 30 pounder Parrott guns and (I think) 100 pounders on barges from DC. Said barges also allowing Union troops to be redeployed to any threatened spot that Lee tries to take to cross the Potomac. So after spending 2 2/3 books whipping the yankees force-to-force, Lee is forced to surrender by a campaign of maneuver.

Other than not introducing steam powered tanks, the above is almost as ridiculous as Harry Harrison...and Harrison had no pretensions of being a historian.

Best,

Yeah, a hard fist rather than a simple thumb on the scales for the Confederates, as if Lee were operating with satellite recon, and his troops were wearing body armor.

 

[usertron2020]

Perhaps; my point is the AOTP's straight legs were still capable of surprises in '64...

I would say that extracting from the trap at North Anna River was more a matter of Lee not having any competent corps commanders left and his own illnesses keeping him in his tent at a crucial time.

Grant's getting to the James River was a matter of Lee's concentration being to the north-eastern outskirts of Richmond rather than listening to the warnings of Beauregard, in whom Lee appears to have had no confidence.

They did a pretty solid job in the '65 campaign as well, when things finally broke into mobile warfare, as well.

In 1865 you had a large upswing of fresh recruitment, including freed slaves and old AotP veterans who came back to be "in on the kill".

And FWIW, Sherman's army was some of the finest infantry in the world by 64-65; something like 50 percent of his troopers were long-service from 61-62 who had re-uppped for the duration...

Best,

Uncle Billy's boys never had any problems with their personal sense of elan, except the Army of the Cumberland. They got their elan at Missionary Ridge