WI: Beaches at Normandy switched

[marathag]

Think if they made Sink the Bismarck today it would have been USS Ranger pulling off the torpedo-bomber strike?

A modern US produced 'Sink the Bismarck would mention something over the role of the Coast Guard Cutter Modoc that spotted Bismarck,
plus USS Texas while on Neutrality Patrol, crossed the areas that Bismarck would go thru two days later

US Navy wasn't quite as neutral at they as they probably should have been at that point of the war

 

[marathag]

Does Hobart have enough time to come up with alternative funnies for the Bocage? His variants on the Rhino hedgerow cutters?

I never came up as a potential problem.

Just hedges, right?

didn't think on the fact of them being there for many hundreds of years would result in berms that the few engineers M4s with the Dozer blade couldn't handle.

The cutters were a big deal that many tanks could bust thru, and not wait for specialist armor to do that job

 

[marathag]

I'd say it's very likely we don't see the Battle of the Bulge, because the US would have the experience of taking Caen as a warning about the inadequacies of the standard Shermans vs Panthers.

M4s wasn't the problem of the Bulge, having put green and beatup infantry units recovering from the Hürtgen Forest and Aachen campaigns into the path of where the SS planned to attack from, that was the problem.

Remember Patton's M4s got into Bastogne

 

[TFSmith121]

Well, sure, there are ripples right, left, and sideways...

German troop deployments would probably be different as a response to different Allied movements, so the Canadians would be facing different odds than OTL Americans did. Plus we're creative (night assault with tanks for instance).

Well, sure, there are ripples right, left, and sideways...

My point is, after the basic task of getting ashore and connecting the beachheads, the Allies - no matter who lands where - have several tasks:

1) Take the Cotentin and Cherbourg (need a port, and Cherbourg is it, essentialy);
2) Take (ideally) Caen and the good ground around it as space to deploy and sustain an army group+;
3) Get the ell through the bocage;
4) Break out - south toward Paris AND north toward Brussels.

At that point, once mobile warfare is underway and the realities of getting to Paris and Brussels (road and rail nets, if nothing else), as well as the Scheldt-Antwerp and/or the Channel and Breton ports (the Allies needed some combination, obviously) there are all sorts of possibilities, but 1-4 are pretty much a given.

So, the question is, given the river lines, rough/easy country, and the liklihood of where the German defenders and reinforcements will be (7th Army and PG West in Normandy, 15th Army from the north, odds and ends from 1st and 19th armies to the south, and whatever can be scraped up from points east) means - roughly - the initial Allied army group for the assault (21st, historically) will be split by about M+60-90 into two army groups (21st and 12th, historically), one of which will be moving (more or less) northeast into Belgium and the other (more or less) east into France.

Given the distances, something approximating a breakout on each front is probabaly going to be necessary, and once those occur, something akin to the Falaise Pocket will be created (frankly, because the majority of the German units, even in 1944, were leg infantry, whereas the majority of Allied units amounted to motorized troops - certainly in comparison to the Germans).

So the point is, for the Allies to get from the infantry campaign in Normandy (the assault itself and the follow-up) to the mobile campaign in France and the Low Countries, odds are the US force and the British & etc. force will each need a "mobile" army and an "assault" army...

But the reality is that while the US managed that, with Hodges' 1st and Patton's 3rd, the British really didn't - Dempsey's British 2nd did double duty, and Crerar's Canadian 1st functioned largely as an infantry-centered army on the Channel coast, the Scheldt, etc.

There's a reason Simpson's 9th US Army was assigned to the 21st Army Group, after all; Montgomery's forces could not have covered their section of the line, otherwise.

I'd argue that to really take advantage of the situation in NE Europe in the summer and autumn of 1944, both army groups needed three field armies assigned - two in the line and one ready to act as the flank/mobile force.

The thing is, with two field armies (British 8th and US 5th in Italy), the Allies did not have the strength to do that.

And the 6th AG (US 7th and French 1st) was necessary to open the French Mediterranean ports and clean up the German 1st and 19th armies, so Devers' troops were not an option.

Best,

 

[TFSmith121]

Don't forget this individual:

A modern US produced 'Sink the Bismarck would mention something over the role of the Coast Guard Cutter Modoc that spotted Bismarck,
plus USS Texas while on Neutrality Patrol, crossed the areas that Bismarck would go thru two days later

US Navy wasn't quite as neutral at they as they probably should have been at that point of the war

http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq118-3.htm

Best,

 

[ObssesedNuker]

So terribly flawed the US tankers beat the German tankers anywhere they faced them, Arracourt being the obvious example.

To be fair to the Germans, veteran tankers versus under-trained Panzer crews isn't really a fair fight. Most of the best German tank crews at Normandy were killed in the attritional battles with the British.

Arracourt is also a poor comparison to things like Totalize and Goodwood because it was a major German counteroffensive which allowed the Americans to run a mobile defense. Totalize and Goodwood, in the mean time, were offensives into German defense-in-depth. Experience in the hedgerows indicate that the Americans didn't really handle those any better then the British. It was only when the Germans were attrited away to nothing that the Americans were able to manage a break out.

 

[TFSmith121]

So basically it's wash - US 1st Army does no worse than

To be fair to the Germans, veteran tankers versus under-trained Panzer crews isn't really a fair fight. Most of the best German tank crews at Normandy were killed in the attritional battles with the British.

Arracourt is also a poor comparison to things like Totalize and Goodwood because it was a major German counteroffensive which allowed the Americans to run a mobile defense. Totalize and Goodwood, in the mean time, were offensives into German defense-in-depth. Experience in the hedgerows indicate that the Americans didn't really handle those any better then the British. It was only when the Germans were attrited away to nothing that the Americans were able to manage a break out.

So basically it's wash - US 1st Army does no worse than British 2nd does on the left flank, and the British 2nd does no worse than the US 1st did on the right?

During the first couple of months of the campaign, presumably, but then the mobile phase breaks out..

Best,

 

[ObssesedNuker]

So basically it's wash - US 1st Army does no worse than British 2nd does on the left flank, and the British 2nd does no worse than the US 1st did on the right?

Correct.

During the first couple of months of the campaign, presumably, but then the mobile phase breaks out..

Also correct. Once the Americans have ground the panzer divisions down to nubbins and breakthrough the German defense belts, then they will be truly in their element.

 

[TFSmith121]

So, alt history where nothing changes...

Correct.

Also correct. Once the Americans have ground the panzer divisions down to nubbins and breakthrough the German defense belts, then they will be truly in their element.

So, alt history where nothing changes...

Best,

 

[Saphroneth]

The question, old boy, was NOT how many British and BNAers it would take to defend BNA in the event of unpleasantness in the 1860s between the U.S. and the British Empah ... The question was how many slave-holding rebels, British, and BNAers it would take to defeat the U.S. in the same period, given the ratio of British Empahers to Boers in 1899-1902.

Given the 450,000 to 90,000 ratio in South Africa (5-1, essentially), and the reality the U.S. mobilized about 2.7 million in 1861-65, the same 5-1 ratio yields about 13.5 million, give or take a few hundred thousand or so, to conquer the U.S. in the sense that the Transvaal and Vrystaat were defeated.

Was it really that hard to follow? I would have thought the statement you have so helpfully included regarding "British (and Confederates, Province of Canada, etc.) would have made that clear?

Perhaps not.

Best,

So, presumably, turning that around, given the 1.1 million long term enlistments of the US Army, then for the US to conquer Canada would mean the Canadians would need about 220,000 (5:1 ratio inversed) defending troops.
Since the population of Canada was about 3.1 million in 1861, then that seems entirely doable. Half of them can be long term enlisted as per the US lot, the other half can be short term plus British Army.

And that would also mean that, since the CSA's army enlisted something around a million men, the US Army needed five million to defeat and occupy them.
Hm.

Applying this to other conflicts is fun. It tells us, for example, that the Germans in WW2 would take about sixty million troops to defeat and occupy.

 

[LHB]

So, alt history where nothing changes...

Best,

Well not quite.

Different people are going to live and die. That's going to unleash it's own cloud of butterflies.

Like, for example, are there any famous or influential people who may end up dead due to swapping beaches thanks to different luck?

 

[TFSmith121]

What does any of this have to do with the Poster's question,

Applying this to other conflicts is fun.

What does any of this have to do with the Poster's question?

I mean, really, I expanded on my comment regarding the capabilities of the Canadian 1st Army to engage in a mobile offensive across France in 1944 as a substitute for the US 1st and/or 3rd armies - do you have anything to say about that, or are you just being - um - ornery?

 

[TFSmith121]

Damned if I know.

Well not quite.

Different people are going to live and die. That's going to unleash it's own cloud of butterflies.

Like, for example, are there any famous or influential people who may end up dead due to swapping beaches thanks to different luck?

Damned if I know.

The whole thing is rather theoretical at this point, isn't it?

Best,

 

[LHB]

Damned if I know.

The whole thing is rather theoretical at this point, isn't it?

Best,

It'd be an interesting question worth exploring. If there's anyone who was huge in terms of politics, art, business, or academics who didn't bite it between D-Day and the Bulge OTL might end up getting a run of rotten luck.

Granted there's a LOT you could play with but if there's any in particular that jump out there's always a good start. There's also nothing saying it would just be dead famous Americans.

Beedok's point on different German responses is also one worth considering. That could lead to the war shaping up differently following Cobra* and impact how the Cold War shakes out.

 

[MattII]

M4s wasn't the problem of the Bulge, having put green and beatup infantry units recovering from the Hürtgen Forest and Aachen campaigns into the path of where the SS planned to attack from, that was the problem.

Remember Patton's M4s got into Bastogne

So you're saying that even if they'd had way more East Eights they'd have been brushed aside at the start? I'm inclined to be sceptical of that, I mean the 76mm M1 might not have had the punch of the 17 Pounder, but it was still miles better as a tank-killer than a 75mm M3.

 

[Gannt the chartist]

Well the forces you list are those needed to operate out of two Beaches OTL. The follow on forces reinforce two beaches Third army is the exploitation force at theatre level. Of the additional forces most do not arrive in the UK until very late in 43 (December) and even the veteran and highly experienced 1st infantry started training for its Overlord role in November 43. Switching the beaches as proposed means a third beach for the US to assault.

So what do you change in the US divisional production line to get forces in place 3-6 months before they were OTL.

Listing lots of airborne divisions (several of which are still in the US) misses the point. British airborne were trained for coup de main type missions. US airborne to be infantry transported to battle by aircraft. So while the British gliders were expected to hit Pegasus bridge (or the LZ at Merville or Horsa bridge) the US were not, they were on the other hand capable of defending Bastogne and spending very long periods in the line once the ground tail had caught up. This is a philosophical difference in the point of airborne forces. So on 6 June a US assault at Pegasus bridge would have been a landing followed by approach and assault against an alerted garrison, may have worked may not the objective being to capture the bridges intact.

21st panzer you are missing the point. On the afternoon of 6 June two things prevent the capture of Caen. One is the difficulty of getting off the beaches (and getting off the Beaches is what the funnies are all about) the second is the presence of the Hillman position calling artillery in from as yet undetected firing positions and the presence of elements of 21st panzer in unknown strength in the way which means the advancing forces need armour which is still on the beaches until late afternoon. Nothing to do with 21st Pz attacking – which it was incapable of doing on 6th June anyway.

Arracourt is a poor example. Any german counterattack will be beaten off handily by any of the allied armies. The OTL attack by 2 SS Pz Corps gets obliterated before the start line. Unless the germans oblige by throwing away their armour in obviously suicidal attacks they will do what they did OTL which is attempt to contain the beachhead and defeat any breakout attempt. Eventually that results in the destruction of the German army the question is how long is eventually.

The problem the US will have is attacking. I can’t see the US armour being any more effective than the British in attacking and probably less so. It does not have the Fireflies nor the Churchills which give offensive firepower and defensive armour.US armoured forced are set up as exploitation forces not breakthrough.

Shelling won’t actually work quickly. But the US will believe it will. One of the lessons of WW1 (British and German version) is that destruction of defensive positions by indirect fire artillery is ineffective and casualties on entrenched positions very low. In fact the US Army deliberately forgot the lessons of WW1 because they did not fit Pershing’s preconceptions, or for that matter the needs of the US army in the interwar period. The knowledge is there but it’s not what the US Army was trained to do so it’s the exception. What Indirect fire artillery can do is supress defensive fire and there is a brief window ~ maybe 2 minutes from the lifting of the fire when the defense is ineffective. The US do not as a matter of course use close rolling barrages to cover the advance. They can but they have to adapt (5th infantry did once in the entire war). The US will relearn the lesson but probably not until they have had a couple of Somme Moments with assaulting infantry caught by the unsuppressed machine gun then pounded by mortars and armoured/infantry counterattacks. Whiich leads to armour being up with the assault troops and
The killing of German infantry is actually done when they counterattack ( ~80% of german casualties in Normandy). Now the US response time for fire support on fleeting targets was around 3-4 minutes on a reasonable day. The UK/CW 1-2 minutes because the RA had a fetish about extremely rapid response and were responding to fire orders not fire requests. To put that in context a german would have to wait 10-12 minutes.

Shelling and bombarding is nice but it never really stopped the Germans from managing to hold on or in fact launch the Mortain counterattack. Which is stopped by US infantry in fact. Allied air power never really stops german mobility. It severely restricts it and prevents it from doing much damage but we are not talking about vast distances here or unlimited air support. Even 500 yards back takes forces out of the observed zone for artillery fire and is a matter of 30 minutes/ an hour from there to reinforcing a significant part of the defensive line. The German army is by no means supermen but they are competent and resilient. What you are suggesting is that the US artillery could do in Normandy what no artillery had been able to do in WW1 and the US were unable to do in WW2 anywhere else.

I expect the US would try to do just that but all the evidence is they would fail. Then advance in the expectation of having succeeded and getting shot apart.

If the British knew they were going to assault Omaha they would have looked at the situation on Omaha and if that needed tanks on stilts would probably have tried to make it work. But the real difference is likely to be with the presence of AVRE clearing the beach obstacles and more cover from the hulls and just more tanks ashore ( based on OTL what happened on the British and Canadian Beaches) most of the descriptions of Omaha emphasise the role of the tanks in clearing the way and the disorganisation of the US forces due to casualties in the initial waves. More tanks initially speeds up the process of clearing defensive positions, fewer casualties and less disorganisation.

I don't think its wash overall but generally benefits the British in casualty terms.


The US succeed in holding the German Armour on the allied left the US will take much higher casualties and have to face up to issues OTL that came up only late in 44/45 earlier and the British clear the Bocage earlier. At worst the US will fail to write down as much of the german armour but destroy it as they break out (and the germans can no longer repair overnight) and then the allies will run out of steam about where they did unless Ike agrees with Patton's request for a narrow thrust across the North German Plain. Personally I don't think he would but its possible.

 

[MattII]

But with more Easy Eights in ranks (Caen will be an unpleasant surprise for the US, as it received a lot of armoured support), The German attempt at a breakout later in 1944 will probably be more bloody for both sides, but also more decisive.

 

[Rubicon]

But with more Easy Eights in ranks (Caen will be an unpleasant surprise for the US, as it received a lot of armoured support), The German attempt at a breakout later in 1944 will probably be more bloody for both sides, but also more decisive.

The M4A3E8 (Easy Eight) didn't arrive on the battlefield untill August -44, I think you mean M4A1(76)W, M4A2(76)W and M4A3(76)W all with the same 76mm M1 gun as the Easy Eight, but they were not Easy Eigths.

 

[Ian Hathaway]

But with more Easy Eights in ranks (Caen will be an unpleasant surprise for the US, as it received a lot of armoured support), The German attempt at a breakout later in 1944 will probably be more bloody for both sides, but also more decisive.

The only problem with this is that the Easy Eight was still two months away from production on D-Day so it's going to be a while before any of them appear on the Normandy battlefield unless this can be altered. It was a matter of quantity over quality so new developments got pushed back. Whereas there were over 340 Fireflys available on or immediately after D-Day.

 

[Ian Hathaway]

The M4A3E8 (Easy Eight) didn't arrive on the battlefield untill August -44, I think you mean M4A1(76)W, M4A2(76)W and M4A3(76)W all with the same 76mm M1 gun as the Easy Eight, but they were not Easy Eigths.

Even these weren't deployed to combat units until a month after D-Day, seems like a bit of a cock-up really.