Why did Germany do so well in WW1?

[Deleted member 1487]

The 100 days didn't just defeat a tottering German Army, but mid 1918 the Allies had built up a level of tactical mastery more or less equal to the Germans. This tactical mastery allowed the operational and strategic advantages shine through in this offensive.

Tactics were far less important to that victory than the numerical, material, and morale superiority they had over the Germans; anyone could reliably break a point in an enemy line, the Allies just massed enough trucks to be able to extend an advance over 100 days, rather than bogging down logistically after 20-30 as the Germans did. They were also fighting a beaten enemy that had expended their best troops on 5 major offensives, while the US freed up huge reserves for the Allies to attack with; its pretty easy to advance when your enemy is more interested in surrendering than fighting; then its more a question of how deeply you could logistically extend the advance than having to support a major series of offensives to break line after line as the Germans did in 1918.

 

[Garrison]

In the process of breaking the British and French lines they took casualties; cumulatively after doing it repeatedly and not being able to move quickly enough to prevent the Allies from forming new lines every few days (a mobility in the attack issue that wasn't solved until WW2; the 100 days don't count because the German army was surrendering and not putting up a concerted fight), forcing them to break through again repeatedly. The exhaustion was a function of attacking in WW1 plus all the cumulative losses of the previous 4 years. The Allies did nothing extraordinary in the defense, they just fought and retreated until the Germans were logistically overextended and switched to different attack axises.

And so of course you give the Entente troops and leadership not one iota of credit. Their skill, courage, and capability have nothing to do with the German defeat and of course when they having endured the same four years of warfare and spent far more of it on the costly offensive break the Germans in the 100 days it 'doesn't count', right...

 

[Deleted member 1487]

And so of course you give the Entente troops and leadership not one iota of credit. Their skill, courage, and capability have nothing to do with the German defeat and of course when they having endured the same four years of warfare and spent far more of it on the costly offensive break the Germans in the 100 days it 'doesn't count', right...

What did they do that was extraordinary? They had a numbers and material advantage, time was on their side, they just had not to lose, which wasn't hard given all the above advantages and the disadvantages the Germans were laboring under (not least of which was Ludendorff's leadership). It was their incompetence that even gave the Germans a chance to win in 1918 anyway; of course the Germans threw away that opportunity.

By the time the 100 days rolled around it was just a matter of pushing the Germans over and liberating Europe, as the Central Powers were falling apart on all fronts and internally, while the Entente had every conceivable advantage. That's like calling a Billionaire that inherited his wealth a savvy investor; sure, he might have made some good investments, but its pretty hard not to do well when you've got the leverage.

The 100 Days Campaign was really about pushing in one area until resistance stiffened, then switching to another axis and repeating over and over, which was only possible because of their vast numerical and material advantages, just like the Soviets had in 1943-45. Plus the German army had beaten itself on the offensive and was now more interested in surrendering than fighting. If they hadn't won at that point they'd be totally hopeless.

 

[Garrison]

What did they do that was extraordinary?

Extraordinary is your strawman, and frankly I'm done with dealing with your denigration of the Entente armies because you can't accept the Germans could be beaten by anything other than bad luck and the 'unfariness' of the enemy having more troops.

 

[John Farson]

Extraordinary is your strawman, and frankly I'm done with dealing with your denigration of the Entente armies because you can't accept the Germans could be beaten by anything other than bad luck and the 'unfariness' of the enemy having more troops.

Might as well claim that Napoleon's armies couldn't be beaten by anything other than bad luck and the unfariness of his enemies having more troops...

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Extraordinary is your strawman, and frankly I'm done with dealing with your denigration of the Entente armies because you can't accept the Germans could be beaten by anything other than bad luck and the 'unfariness' of the enemy having more troops.

I'm not denigrating them, I had direct ancestors in the Allied armies fighting in 1918. I'm just realistically pointing out what actually happened in 1918; neither the Germans nor Allies did anything especially extraordinary; the Germans attacked a weak point in the Allied lines in March and broke through, bogging down when logistics got the best of them. The rest of of their attacks weren't that great and fell well short of their objectives due to the waste of resources in stupid diversions in March and April. After that they did initially well against the French because their enemy ran away and the Germans again overextended themselves and bogged down as the enemy got their act together, just as had been the pattern prior to 1918.

For the Allies in 1918 they screwed up and gave the Germans a chance to do well and nearly lost as a result. Thereafter the Germans were to exhausted to continue and the Allies beat them through sheer numerical and material advantage. I've read my great grandfather's journal about the fighting during Meuse-Argonne and its clear that the Germans were done by the time the attack went in and the die hards were just delaying the inevitable. Plus all my reading on the subject of 1918 backs up that the 100 Days was just putting the exclamation on the German defeat, which had been achieved really before the offensive even started:
http://www.amazon.com/Imperial-Germ...TF8&qid=1413924406&sr=1-19&keywords=1917-1918
http://www.amazon.com/With-Our-Back...2?ie=UTF8&qid=1413924363&sr=8-2&keywords=1918
http://www.amazon.com/Victory-1918-...3?ie=UTF8&qid=1413924363&sr=8-3&keywords=1918

 

[Lee-Sensei]

I shall leave you gentlemen to your Delusional German Wank

First of all, the 100 days wasn't just a British offensive. In fact, half of them were French. Secondly, even with their material weakness the Germans still managed to get near equal casualties against there numerically superior enemies.

 

[Lee-Sensei]

Er... the Hundred Days?
That was, basically, a combined-arms offensive which rolled the Germans back successively across most of their gains from four years of offensives. It's hard to argue that the British during the Hundred Days were outmatched by the Germans at the same time!

Again. The Hundred Days wasn't a British only offensive so crediting them with the victory would be like saying Poland was stronger than Germany because they fought on the Eastern Front too. An exaggeration. The British contributed a great deal, but to say that the British Army on it's own was superior to the German Army is inaccurate.

 

[Riain]

The Australian corps developed their own tactics of infiltration and tank cooperation, the Canadian corps was oversupplied with artillery and developed tactics using this particular advantage. The British also finally got the integration of tanks right after 2 years.

If numbers were the only thing that counted then the allies would have won the war in 1916 or 17, but instead we see costly failed offensives.

As for the Germans being defeated and on the run, the casualties suffered during the offensive by the allies shows the heer was far from a spent force. Indeed in the week of the armistice the french were about to launch a fresh offensive of their own into alsace, rather than just waiting for the supposed spent Germans to surrender.

 

[rast]

The Hundred Days, the famous vindication of the donkey-led lions. Somehow, people tend to get this a little wrong.

a. The British effort was strong and effectful, but it hardly shocked the German commanders. The had still the whole of Belgium to fight through.
b. The French effort was kind of stale, just capturing ground the Germans had to give up anyway because of a and c.
c. The US effort really drove the German commanders to frenzy. The US were coming up the Meuse (on both sides) and thus were threatening to cut off the German forces in France.

You can read about this in Vol. 14 of the Reichsarchiv's war history. Army Group Rupprecht, opposite the Brits, were calm and detached. They were calculating how long to hold where and how to manage forming new lines of resistance.
Army Group Deutscher Kronprinz, opposite the French, were desperate and urgently asking for retreat, because they were in acute danger of being cut off by the US advance.
Army Group Gallwitz, opposite the US, said they were unable to contain the Americans any longer. They had spent all their reserves, weren't getting any reinforcements - and only by further retreat could hope to keep a continuous front line.

There's some justification to the statement of Hindenburg (opposite an American journalist) that the US were the ones who forced the Germans to ask for an armistice.

 

[Cronos988]

Extraordinary is your strawman, and frankly I'm done with dealing with your denigration of the Entente armies because you can't accept the Germans could be beaten by anything other than bad luck and the 'unfariness' of the enemy having more troops.

What's up with the reactions of indignation? It seems to me you are the one who is not objective here. It's not "unfair" to have more troops, but it's certainly "unfair" to ignore the material conditions of forces when assessing their effectiveness. We are not talking about how the defeat of Germany was "unfair", we are talking about how well, in the context of contemporary resources, knowledge and capabilities, the Germans did, and what they did that gave them an advantage over their opponents.

If we have a poorly trained, outnumbered militia force, we would say they do well if they keep the enemy somewhat at bay, despite heavy losses. That is not suggesting the battle is "unfair" because the enemy is more numerous and better trained, that is just taking the realities into account.

What performance do you demand of a WW I army in order to consider them "doing well"?

 

[Saphroneth]

What's up with the reactions of indignation? It seems to me you are the one who is not objective here. It's not "unfair" to have more troops, but it's certainly "unfair" to ignore the material conditions of forces when assessing their effectiveness. We are not talking about how the defeat of Germany was "unfair", we are talking about how well, in the context of contemporary resources, knowledge and capabilities, the Germans did, and what they did that gave them an advantage over their opponents.

If we have a poorly trained, outnumbered militia force, we would say they do well if they keep the enemy somewhat at bay, despite heavy losses. That is not suggesting the battle is "unfair" because the enemy is more numerous and better trained, that is just taking the realities into account.

What performance do you demand of a WW I army in order to consider them "doing well"?

Well, if the Germans surpassed the Entente in 1918 by holding together in the face of serious attack, then the Entente surpassed the Germans in 1914 with the "Miracle of the Marne".
The idea that the Entente "never" surpassed the Germans was the contention that I, for one, took issue with...

 

[MattII]

I'm always cautious about the Germans sitting on the defensive, not only because it leaves the French Industry intact, but it also forces the U-boats to travel an extra 1,000 km to get out through the channel compared to OTL (when they based out of Ostend), which will reduce patrol time.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

Well, if the Germans surpassed the Entente in 1918 by holding together in the face of serious attack, then the Entente surpassed the Germans in 1914 with the "Miracle of the Marne".
The idea that the Entente "never" surpassed the Germans was the contention that I, for one, took issue with...

Seconded!

I couldn't beleive what I was reading

 

[Natte]

Honestly I find it impressive that the Entente was unable to beat Germany faster than it did. Even without the US joining the war the Entente outnumbered, had a larger army, larger navy and had a larger industry than the central powers. On top of that it had US financial support. They had almost every advantage in the book.

The Entente SHOULD win such a war, it should not be a question of "if", it should be a definite and straight forward victory. It's the fact that Germany was managing to stalemate and even push the entente back and was not broken until the US threw its men and manpower onto the western front that is impressive. Not who won or lost the war. That is why people view them as "successful". When you are out-manned, outproduced, out-financed and still manage to hold on for so long against the odds, that is usually viewed as very impressive, which is probably a better word to use in this instance.

Ofc in the end they were not successful in the war, but they certainly did well considering the odds, they put up an impressive performance. The same can not be said for the entente. Sure brave and gallant men etc, that went for every side, overall the entente underperformed considering their multiple advantages.

In the end is was still an unfortunate war, with brave young men thrown away like fodder for the glory of old men and nationalism.

 

[trajen777]

The German army from 1914 on had better tactics and artillery then the Brit / French. IN the 100 days really the failure of the German attacks was as much based upon the raising USA troop level and the realization of the Germans that they needed to move to the defensive as millions of USA troops were available. The defeatist attitude came simply that they could not possibly defeat the amount of supplies and massive additional resources of the Allies because of the USA. The French learned the lessons and made excellent progress against the Germans starting in 1917. But if the USA had not joined in the fact is that the Allies would have been bankrupt and could not have gone on the offensive in 1918. So basic stalemate. I think like all Euro wars pre 1918 there would have been some type of negotiated peace. Perhaps
• German gains – not what was negotiated with Russia originally but perhaps Baltic states and parts of Poland,
• Germany colonies gone and massive reduction in fleet
• Return of Alas / Lorr to France
• German more democratic

 

[Ithron]

Answering the OP question: because it was a highly industrialized, rich country with probably the best organized army in the world. It could fight for so long because the level of "fat" (different kind of reserves, especially financial) the country had were large enough. In WW2 it had little fat and had to 1) conquer for resources and money, 2) collapse or 3) drop militarization entirely. So using risky and revolutionary military tactics was a must. The proof that they were risky can be seen by their enemies learning how to counter it by 1942-1943.

 

[Glenn239]

The 100 days didn't just defeat a tottering German Army, but mid 1918 the Allies had built up a level of tactical mastery more or less equal to the Germans. This tactical mastery allowed the operational and strategic advantages shine through in this offensive.

The Battle of Cambrai in 1917,

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Cambrai_(1917)

is when the Anglo-French 1918 tactics were first used successfully. The difference between the 1918 offensive and Cambrai is in the second half of the link - at Cambrai there was the large German counterattack that eliminated the gains of the initial breakthrough. In the Hundred Days, the pace of the advance could be maintained because there was no Cambrai-style counterattack in the offering - the Germans, conforming to the strategic principle that operations flow from the requirements of strategy and not vice versa, had completely spent their reserves in their own attacks during the first half of 1918. Whereas in 1917, as the Germans still possessed powerful reserves, the new tactics so successful in the hundred days were not at that point yet able to effect a similar sustained advance.

 

[pdf27]

The Hundred Days, the famous vindication of the donkey-led lions. Somehow, people tend to get this a little wrong.

a. The British effort was strong and effectful, but it hardly shocked the German commanders. The had still the whole of Belgium to fight through.
b. The French effort was kind of stale, just capturing ground the Germans had to give up anyway because of a and c.
c. The US effort really drove the German commanders to frenzy. The US were coming up the Meuse (on both sides) and thus were threatening to cut off the German forces in France.

You can read about this in Vol. 14 of the Reichsarchiv's war history. Army Group Rupprecht, opposite the Brits, were calm and detached. They were calculating how long to hold where and how to manage forming new lines of resistance.
Army Group Deutscher Kronprinz, opposite the French, were desperate and urgently asking for retreat, because they were in acute danger of being cut off by the US advance.
Army Group Gallwitz, opposite the US, said they were unable to contain the Americans any longer. They had spent all their reserves, weren't getting any reinforcements - and only by further retreat could hope to keep a continuous front line.

There's some justification to the statement of Hindenburg (opposite an American journalist) that the US were the ones who forced the Germans to ask for an armistice.

How much of this is a reflection of the superiority of the US army, however, and how much a reflection of the poor quality of Army Group Gallwitz versus Rupprecht (which was IIRC very much stronger and more experienced)?

 

[rast]

How much of this is a reflection of the superiority of the US army, however, and how much a reflection of the poor quality of Army Group Gallwitz versus Rupprecht (which was IIRC very much stronger and more experienced)?

When Gallwitz started reacting to the US offensive (Meuse-Argonne), he was rather optimistic to teach the inexperienced 'Amis' a lesson. But they simply kept coming, despite blunders and losses. - And when Gallwitz eventually had to ask for reinforcements because his units were worn out, he was told there were none left. That started a series of retreats, which also affected neighbouring Army Group Crown Prince. In the end, Gallwitz was unable to prevent the AEF from crossing the Meuse.

The Americans still had the 'spirit of 1914', i.e. they kept coming despite terrible losses. The Germans no longer had it. Already by early October 1918, simple soldiers were writing home that the end of the war was close. And risking once's life for a lost cause is kind of stupid.

Gallwitz was perhaps more experienced than Rupprecht. He had fought two years on the Eastern Front, were manoeuvre was the rule. Then, he had been army commander at the Somme and at Verdun; and the units in AG Gallwitz were no worse than Rupprecht's or Wilhelm's.