Vickers VC-7 in RAF service

[Riain]

Only G.222s bound for Libya were fitted with Tynes because the GE T-64s were embargoed by the US.

True, but unlike many other 'just put this or that engine into this or that plane' suggestions that get thrown around willy-nilly the Tyne into G222 was actually done so is actually possible.

 

[Crowbar Six]

I thought the Sterling Crisis was in the aftermath of the Six Day War of 1967 and the closing of the Suez Canal. That must have contributed to the cost increases that led to the cancellation of the F-111K. It probably contributed to the cost increases in the Spey-Phantom. Some of the Phantoms ordered were also cancelled. However, none of the Hercules that got as far as receiving serial numbers were cancelled. In fact after the initial 48 ordered in 1965 another 18 were ordered later. However, I don't know if more were planned, but not ordered because of the Sterling Crisis.

The Stirling crisis had been brewing for years certainly before Wilson was elected, there was a school of thought that Wilson should have bitten that particular bullet when he was elected but didn't for a mix of reasons including internal Labour politics and worries about giving the Tories more ammunition. There was a surprisingly fascinating program on BBC R4 a few weeks ago that discussed these issues, normally I avoid economics but this was quite interesting.

 

[Crowbar Six]

Also the decision to reduce the RAF strategic transport fleet does make some sense in the post no-commitments-East-of Suez and the decline of UK forces in former colonial possessions. The UK would be concentrating on mainly NATO missions in and around Europe so the need for large numbers of Strategic transports goes out of the window it also removes the need to have large numbers of tactical transport assets to be distributed around the globe in places like Singapore, Malaysia, Africa etc as the remaining aircraft would now be located mostly in Europe supporting NATO.

 

[Just Leo]

True, but unlike many other 'just put this or that engine into this or that plane' suggestions that get thrown around willy-nilly the Tyne into G222 was actually done so is actually possible.

True, but just because it was done doesn't mean it was as good or better. Although hot and high performance improved, Payload/range did not.

 

[Riain]

True, but just because it was done doesn't mean it was as good or better. Although hot and high performance improved, Payload/range did not.

What about the balance of trade and British jobs differences between the US and British engine? Such issues, despite the trashing they get from technophiles, are legitimate and important. Its why I keep bashing on about the 30 Belfasts, a fleet of that size would generate its own industrial momentum that would be difficult to put aside in a way that 10 was, despite the significant capability advantages of the Belfast over the Hercules.

 

[Just Leo]

What about the balance of trade and British jobs differences between the US and British engine? Such issues, despite the trashing they get from technophiles, are legitimate and important. Its why I keep bashing on about the 30 Belfasts, a fleet of that size would generate its own industrial momentum that would be difficult to put aside in a way that 10 was, despite the significant capability advantages of the Belfast over the Hercules.

I could have sworn you were talking about G222s with Tynes. Rolls Royce did produce an engine for the C-27 which was good, but it wasn't a Tyne. The British government could never pass on a good chance to screw the British aircraft industry.

 

[Riain]

I could have sworn you were talking about G222s with Tynes. Rolls Royce did produce an engine for the C-27 which was good, but it wasn't a Tyne. The British government could never pass on a good chance to screw the British aircraft industry.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aeritalia_G.222#Further_development

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

First of all, what a fun life you must live.

Evolution of the RAF Transport Force 1947-57 not including helicopters, fixed wing short range transport aircraft and communications aircraft.

LRT = Long Range Transport
MRT = Medium Range Transport
HF = Heavy Freighter
ABF = Airborne Forces​

Actual Position 31/12/1947 - 213 aircraft (56 LRT, 128 MRT, 24 ABF and 5 flying boat) in 28 squadrons

Transport Command - Total 144 aircraft in 19 squadrons

56 aircraft in 7 LRT squadrons
64 aircraft in 8 MRT squadrons
24 aircraft in 4 ABF squadrons​

Mediterranean and Middle East Command (M.E.D.M.E.)

40 aircraft in 5 MRT squadrons​

Air Command Far East (A.C.F.E.) - 29 aircraft in 4 squadrons

24 aircraft in 3 MRT squadrons
5 aircraft in one flying boat transport squadron​

Source: National Archives File AIR20/6766/31265 Plan F​

Actual Position 31/03/1950 - 152 aircraft (72 LRT and 80 MRT) in 19 squadrons

Transport Command - 88 aircraft in 11 squadrons

72 in 9 LRT squadrons
16 in 2 MRT squadrons​

Middle East Air Force (formerly M.E.D.M.E.)

40 aircraft in 5 MRT squadrons​

Far East Air Force (formerly A.C.F.E.)

24 aircraft in 3 MRT squadrons​

Source: National Archives File AIR20/7085/31265 Plan G​

Actual Position 30/06/1952 - 114 aircraft (40 LRT and 74 MRT) in 15 squadrons

Transport Command - 50 aircraft in 7 squadrons

40 Hastings in 5 LRT squadrons
10 Valettas in 2 MRT squadrons - one regular at 8 U.E. and one RAuxAF at 2 UE.​

Middle East Air Force

40 Valettas in 5 MRT squadrons​

Far East Air Force

24 Valettas in 3 MRT squadrons​

Source National Archives file AIR20/8714/31265 Plan J Stage II​

The above was also the actual position on 31/12/1952 and 31/03/1953 - Source: National Archives File AIR20/8714/31265 Plan K

Actual Position 31/03/1954 - 116 aircraft(40 LRT and 76 MRT) in 14 squadrons

Transport Command - 52 aircraft in 6 squadrons

40 Hastings in 5 LRT squadrons
12 Valettas in one MRT Squadron​

Middle East Air Force

40 Valettas in 5 MRT squadrons​

Far East Air Force

24 Valettas in 3 MRT squadrons​

Source: National Archives File AIR20/15110/30150 Plan K (Star)​

Actual Position 31/12/1954 - 108 aircraft (40 LRT and 68 MRT) in 13 squadrons

Transport Command - 52 aircraft in 6 squadrons

40 Hastings in 5 LRT squadrons
12 Valettas in one MRT Squadron​

Middle East Air Force

32 Valettas in 4 MRT squadrons​

Far East Air Force

24 Valettas in 3 MRT squadrons​

Source: National Archives File AIR20/15110/30150 Plan L​

Actual Position 31/12/1956 - 104 aircraft (50 LRT, 8 HF and 10 MRT) in 11½ squadrons

Transport Command - 64 aircraft in 7 squadrons

40 Hastings in 4 LRT squadrons
6 Comets in one LRT squadron
8 Beverleys in one HF squadron
10 Valettas in one MRT squadron​

Middle East Air Force - 16 aircraft in 1½ squadrons

4 Hastings in half a LRT/HF squadron
12 Valettas in one MRT squadron​

Far East Air Force

24 Valettas in 3 MRT squadrons​

Source: National Archives File AIR02/14707/30150 Plan L​

Actual Position 30/06/1957 - 116 aircraft (48 LRT, 24 HF and 44 MRT) in 13 squadrons

Transport Command - 64 aircraft in 7 squadrons

30 Hastings in 3 LRT squadrons
10 Comets in one LRT squadron
24 Beverleys in 3 HF squadrons​

Middle East Air Force - 28 aircraft in 3 squadrons

AHQ Levant

8 Hastings in one LRT/HF squadron
8 Valettas in one MRT squadron​

British Forces Arabian Peninsular

12 Valettas in one MRT squadron​

Far East Air Force

24 Valettas in 3 MRT squadrons​

Source: National Archives File AIR02/14707/30150 Plan L​

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

That's a pretty strange list;

• 50 Orion/Atlantic but also an unstated number of OR.357 that became the (46) Nimrods
• 10 Belfast, 14 VC10 but also 4 strategic transport replacement
• 62 HS.681A but also an unstated number of Short Range Transport VTOL, which was the spec the HS.681 was designed for

The book that said the Belfast was cut said it was due to the late 64-early 65 sterling crisis, not early 64, but I'm working from unreliable evidence and conjecture rather than official documents so bow to better evidence.

The reason for 50 Orion/Atlantic and an unstated number of OR.357 was because they were alternatives to replace the Shackelton. I.e.

• Plan A - Replace the Shackleton with the Atlantic or Orion in the late 1960s;
• Plan B - Run the Shackletons on until the middle 1970s when replacement by OR.357 would begin.

 

[Riain]

The reason for 50 Orion/Atlantic and an unstated number of OR.357 was because they were alternatives to replace the Shackelton. I.e.

• Plan A - Replace the Shackleton with the Atlantic or Orion in the late 1960s;
• Plan B - Run the Shackletons on until the middle 1970s when replacement by OR.357 would begin.

What about the short range VTOL transport? Was that subsumed by advances in helicopters?

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Also the decision to reduce the RAF strategic transport fleet does make some sense in the post no-commitments-East-of Suez and the decline of UK forces in former colonial possessions. The UK would be concentrating on mainly NATO missions in and around Europe so the need for large numbers of Strategic transports goes out of the window it also removes the need to have large numbers of tactical transport assets to be distributed around the globe in places like Singapore, Malaysia, Africa etc as the remaining aircraft would now be located mostly in Europe supporting NATO.

Not exactly. Like Eric Morecambe you've played the right notes in the wrong order.

Evolution of the RAF Transport Force 1957-75 not including helicopters and communications aircraft.
Actual Position 30/06/1957 - 112 aircraft (48 LRT, 24 HF and 44 MRT) in 13 squadrons

Transport Command - 64 aircraft in 7 squadrons

30 Hastings in 3 LRT squadrons
10 Comets in one LRT squadron
24 Beverleys in 3 HF squadrons​

Middle East Air Force - 28 aircraft in 3 squadrons

AHQ Levant

8 Hastings in one LRT/HF squadron
8 Valettas in one MRT squadron​

British Forces Arabian Peninsular

12 Valettas in one MRT squadron​

Far East Air Force

24 Valettas in 3 MRT squadrons​

Source: National Archives File AIR02/14707/300150 Plan L​

Actual Position 31/03/1964 - 164 aircraft (130 MRT and 34 Strategic Transport) in 16 squadrons

Transport Command - 96 aircraft (62 MRT and 34 Strategic Transport) in 8 squadrons

23 Britannias in 2 Strategic Transport squadrons
11 Comets (6 C Mk 2 and 5 C Mk 4) in one Strategic Transport squadron
30 Hastings in 2 MRT squadrons
8 Beverleys in one MRT squadron
24 Argossies in 2 MRT squadrons​

Near East Air Force (formerly AHQ Levant)

6 Hastings in one MRT squadron​

Air Forces Middle East (formerly British Forces Arabian Peninsular) - 26 aircraft in 3 squadrons

12 Beverleys in 2 MRT squadrons
14 Argossies in one MRT squadron​

Far East Air Force - 36 aircraft in 4 squadrons

12 Hastings in one MRT squadron
8 Beverleys in one MRT squadron
10 Argossies in one MRT squadron
6 Valettas in one MRT squadron​

Source: National Archives File AIR20/11708/68770 Plan P​

These are the first squadron patterns I have that are after the 1957 Defence Review and they are also the ones that were in force when the TSR.2, P.1154 and HS.681 were cancelled. The transport force was the only part of the RAF that was larger after the 1957 Defence Review.

In Plan P the transport force planned for 31/03/1975 was 102 aircraft (58 MRT and 44 Strategic Transports) in 11 squadrons

Transport Command 70 aircraft in 8 squadrons

15 Britannias in 2 Strategic Transport squadrons
4 Comet Mk 4 in one Strategic Transport squadron
8 Belfasts in one Strategic Transport squadron
13 VC.10s in one Strategic Transport squadron
4 Strategic Transport Replacements
26 HS.681 in 3 MRT squadrons​

Near East Air Force

6 Argossies in one MRT squadron​

Air Forces Middle East

12 HS.681 in 2 MRT squadrons​

Far East Air Force

14 HS.681 in 2 MRT squadrons​

Part of the reason for the reduction in the number of Britannias, Comets, Belfasts (from the 10 ordered) and VC.10s (from the 14 ordered) is that no backing aircraft were provided for the Unit Equipments they were therefore patterned as wasting assets by applying S.D.98 wastage rates. Although the source does not say so the Strategic Transport Replacement was to satisfy Air Staff Operational Requirement No. 364 (ASR.364) for an aircraft to replace the Britannia. There were to have been 21 Britannias on 31/03/1974 so it looks as if 2 ASR.364 replace 3 Britannias. That also fits in with other documents I have saying that 15 C-5 Galaxies were planned to replace the 23 Britannias.

None of the 31 Andovers planned had been delivered at this point and in Plan P they were classed as Short Range Transports (SRT). At 31/03/1964 the fixed wing SRT force consisted of:

20 aircraft (4 Pembrokes and 16 Twin Pioneers) in 3 squadrons in AFME
19 aircraft (9 Pembrokes and 10 Twin Pioneers) in one squadron in FEAF​

The planned fixed wing SRT force for 31/03/1975 was:

8 aircraft (4 Andovers and 4 S.R.T.V.T.O.L.) in one squadron in Transport Command
16 aircraft (8 Andovers and 8 Twin Pioneers) in 2 squadrons in AFME
16 aircraft (8 Andovers and 8 Twin Pioneers) in one squadron in FEAF​

The MRT and Strategic Transport forces that existed on 31/03/1975 were remarkably similar from the force planned in March 1964. There were:

5 strategic transport squadrons (2 Britannia, one Belfast, one Coment and one VC.10) in No. 46 (Transport) Group, RAF Strike Command, but there were more Britannias than planned and no Strategic Transport Replacements;
6 C-130K Hercules squadrons (5 No. 46 Group and one HS.681) instead of 5 HS.681 squadrons and one Argossy squadron. However, 66 Hercules aircraft had been delivered (65 C Mk 1 and 1 W Mk 2) against the 62 HS.681 required to support 52 aircraft in the 7 squadrons and the 6 aircraft needed by the OCU.​

The fixed wing SRT force had fared less well. There was only one Andover squadron and there were no Twin Pioneers because they had been withdrawn from front-line duties at the end of 1968.

This was 3 years after the East of Suez pullout was completed. All that remained (apart from the forces in Hong Kong) were one infantry battalion and supporting units (which with Australian and New Zealand battalions and supporting units formed an infantry brigade), a Whirlwind SRT helicopter squadron and a detachment of Nimrods which were the British contribution to the ANZUK Force in Singapore; one Royal Navy submarine providing the ANZUK naval force's submarine in rotation with the RAN, 6 Royal Navy frigates (2 ANZUK/SEATO, one Persian Gulf, one Beria Patrol, one Hong Kong guard ship and one to allow for refits, leave and time on passage); and the 5 converted Ton class minesweepers that formed the Hong Kong Patrol Squadron.

All these transport aircraft (and the 3 Victor tanker squadrons) were needed to send reinforcements to Malaysia and Singapore from the UK Strategic Reserve as part of the 5 power defence agreement between those two countries, Australia, New Zealand and the UK. IIRC there were several exercises to practice this in the first half of the 1970s. The British naval forces permanently based East of Suez were supplemented by twice yearly deployments of a task force with one Tiger class cruiser or County class destroyer, some frigates and a nuclear hunter-killer submarine. This was partly why the Royal Navy's commando carriers and Fearless class LPDs survived the East of Suez pullout although they had also found a new role, which was to reinforce NATO's flanks.

In fact the rapid reinforcement of British forces overseas from a strategic reserve located in the British Isles was the reason for the expansion of the RAF's transport force and the modernisation of the Royal Navy's amphibious forces under the 1957 Defence Review.

The UK abandoned its remaining East of Suez commitments (apart from Hong Kong where the forces were reduced) under the Mason Defence Review of 1974. This also led to the disbanding of 7 of the 12 fixed wing transport squadrons (leaving one VC.10 and 4 Hercules squadrons) and one of the 3 tanker squadrons. The Royal Navy's amphibious forces were also cut back. Plans to build 2 new commando carriers were abandoned and the 2 existing ships were to be paid off (but it was decided later to keep them as ASW carriers while the Invincible class was being built). Meanwhile one of the Fearless class became the cadet training ship at Dartmouth replacing the frigates in the Dartmouth Training Squadron and was rotated with the other one which was in refit/reserve.

The Mason Review also resulted in the withdrawal of most the forces permanently based in the Mediterranean. Near East Air Force at Cyprus (which at that time had 2 Vulcan squadrons, a Canberra PR squadron, a Lighting squadron, a Hercules squadron and a Wessex SAR squadron) was disbanded. The Vulcan, Canberra and Lighting squadrons were withdrawn to the UK. The NEAF Hercules squadron was one of the 2 Hercules squadrons that were disbanded. The Nimrod squadron at Malta was also disbanded. The destroyer and 2 frigates that were permanently based in the Mediterranean were also withdrawn.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

What about the short range VTOL transport? Was that subsumed by advances in helicopters?

No. See above.

 

[Riain]

Part of the reason for the reduction in the number of Britannias, Comets, Belfasts (from the 10 ordered) and VC.10s (from the 14 ordered) is that no backing aircraft were provided for the Unit Equipments they were therefore patterned as wasting assets by applying S.D.98 wastage rates.

Yes, that's why I keep banging on about getting 30 Belfasts, a decent sized fleet will survive.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

This is an extract from an Air Staff paper called The Future Shape and Size of the Royal Air Force. The covering loose minute is signed by Air Vice-Marshal D.F. Spottswood and is dated January 1964, which is about 2 months before the Plan P squadron patterns referred to in previous posts.

The Strategic Transport Force
48. The strategic transport force planned for the late Sixties is based on the Chiefs of Staff requirement (COS(61)21) to move reinforcements from Britain to the Far East in 10 days (following four days warning period). This assumes the use of one of the direct routes through the Middle East and covers reinforcements necessary to bring Naval, Army and Air Force units up to war establishment; the move of medium bomber and all-weather fighter squadrons to the Far East; the reinforcement of FEAF with MRT aircraft; and the movement of internal security forces to the Far East. The aircraft required to fulfil this commitment are: -

21 Britannias
10 Belfasts
5 Comet 4s
11 VC.10s

47 Total​

49. It cannot be assumed that the Britannia and Comet element of this force will be useful after about 1972. Additionally, by this time some wastage in the VC10/Belfast element can be expected. While it is perhaps too early to determine the replacement aircraft required, it is evident that a phased programme must be drawn up as a matter of urgency if we are to maintain the strategic lift required. Our aim should be to maintain the force at the minimum size necessary only if an aircraft on the lines of the current Air Staff target (payload of up to 100,000lbs. or 200 passengers, over 5,000 nautical miles) is proved, the force might reduced to some 30 aircraft by the end of the period.

The Medium Range Transport Force
50. The present establishment of the MRT force is based on the Chiefs of Staff requirement (COS(61)21) for a simultaneous two Parachute Battalion drop, plus sufficient aircraft for internal security operations in another theatre and essential routine tasks. This gave rise to a planned establishment of: -

48 Hastings
32 Beverleys
50 Argosies

130 Total​

(N.B. Wastage and essential loans to M.O.A. for development work have reduced this total by 4 Beverleys and 2 Argosies).

51. These aircraft are scheduled to be replaced by the HS.681 in the late Sixties and early Seventies. The proposed establishment of 52 UE is planned to provide for a modified two Parachute Battalion drop, which allows for a follow-up move within 8 hours. Thereafter, the fully assembled HS.681 force would have the capability to build up the para-battalion assault to brigade strength at light scales, together with essential combat air forces, in 7 days over a radius-of-action of 1,000 nautical miles, and to proved logistic support for 30 days until sea/land line of communication can be established. It should be noted, however, that this proposed UE of 52 does not make specific allowance for internal security operations elsewhere, for routine theatre tasks, nor for the movement for the small helicopters which the Army is currently proposing to introduce at unit level. It must therefore be regarded as a minimum figure and, in view of the limitations of the present force, the time factor for its introduction to be the latest which is acceptable if our commitments are to be met. It is considered that, with a force of this size, half of the UE should be based each side of Suez, and so provide for both rapid reinforcement East of Suez and for joint training.

The Short Range Transport Force
52. The currently planned SRT force, based upon approved inter-Service criteria for troop-lift and logistic support, will consist of a troop-lift helicopter component and a composite helicopter and STOL fixed-wing light cargo force, deployed as follows:-

(a) Troop-Lift Helicopters
27 Whirlwind U.K.
13 Wessex Germany
14 Wessex FEAF

54 Total

(b) Light Cargo Force - Helicopters
2 Belvederes (training) U.K.
8 Belvederes AFME
7 Belvederes FEAF

17 Total

(b) Light Cargo Force - Fixed-Wing
8 HS 748/MF U.K.
8 HS 748/MF AFME
8 HS 748/MF FEAF

24 Total​

53. Future SRT Force. The SRT Force will begin to need replacement in the early Seventies. It is generally accepted that a helicopter component will still be needed, and that the type required must be small enough to fly tactically in the battlefield area. Such a helicopter will not have enough ferry-range for inter-theatre reinforcement. To meet the tactical requirements while retaining the flexibility essential if the total front line is to be economically feasible, the solution appears to be a combination of fixed-wing VTOL aircraft with inter-theatre ferry range, and helicopters readily portable in other transport aircraft. The fixed-requirement might be met by a type such as the Do.31, a jet VTOL project with Rolls Royce lift engines, in which the Germans, Italians, and M.O.A. are currently interested. Such an aircraft would have economic advantages and an interdependence project. (In this and other comparable connections, it is well to bear in mind the considerable production capacity, built up on the Continent as a result of the F-104G Consortium, which should become available for interdependence (or national) projects by about 1970.) The helicopter requirement might be met by a type such as the SA.330, which with very little dismantling would be transportable in the HS.681. This aircraft, in which Westlands have an interest, is alreadly being developed to meet the French army, and therefore hold out economic advantages. The Army have made recent new proposals (CDC/G(63)17 pf 22 Nov. 63) for their short range lift requirements. Operationally these appear to be met by the Do.31 and SA.330 proposals, except for crane lift, for which (if accepted) a small number (perhaps 8) of a larger helicopter would be required. In terms of numbers, the Army's proposals (which have not yet been considered by the Joint Warfare Committee) include two very large tasks involving simultaneous lifts, one of which would require 65-75 Do.31s and the other 135-200 SA.330s. These figures are clearly impracticable and a more realistic figure, obtained by spreading the lifts over a number of sorties and relying on inter-theatre support, would amount to 36 Do.31s and 36 SA.330s. This would also meet all other tasks postulated, including the logistic support task.

54. The Long-Term SRT Force. The long-term SRT Force, which would be capable of inter-theatre redeployment and reinforcement, would therefore be: -

36 Do.31 type
36 SA.330 type
8 large helicopters

80 Total - deployed similarly to the MRT Force.​

 

[Just Leo]

British procurement policy wasn't always just right. Transall C.160 might have come with considerable benefits for industry vs Hercules. A slightly biased Belfast specification could very well have turned into a better Hercules, maybe. A tactical Belfast vs a strategic Belfast. Can a strategic transport do it on the dirt?

 

[Simon]

Shorts Bermuda? Oh that's just bad.

 

[Riain]

I think a more powerful Belfast was mooted as a tactical aircraft, but I think it would be better to ditch the 3 tier transport aircraft model for a 2 tier model.

I think the best way to react to the 64-65 Sterling crisis would be to ditch the entire NBMR22 requirement when the AW681 is cancelled and expand the Belfast buy. Then extend the Argosy fleet out for a few years while organising something to cover the tactical spectrum as the RAF would have a surfeit of heavy lift, I suggest the G222 or DHC5 Buffalo with good STOL characteristics.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

As air-to-air refuelling is one possible role for the VC.7 this is the relevant section from AIR20/11465/68076 which is where the information from Post 76 came from.

The Tanker Force
41. Authority has been given for the conversion of 24 Victor 1s to the tanker role. This is the minimum force required to flight refuel two squadrons of Lighting 3s from Britain to the Far East within 10 days laid down as a Chiefs of Staff requirement. These aircraft could also be used to assist ferry flights by TSR2s, fighter/ground attack/reconnaissance aircraft and the transport fleet. It can be argued that in certain circumstances both Lightning and other types of aircraft could require tanker assistance at the same time, thus raising the requirement for more tankers. However, it is considered that, in the circumstances being considered, it should be one more calculated risk that the planned strength of tankers will suffice, the possible shortfall being overcome by passing reinforcement flights in the event, in the interests of maintaining a minimal operational capability.

42. Particularly as the fatigue life of the Victors in the tanker role will permit their use well into the Seventies, the aim should be to maintain a minimum UE of 24 throughout the period covered by this paper.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Some more background information.

Plan J Stage II - Date 30th June 1952 - Source: National Archives File AIR20/8714/31265

This covered the period from 30th June 1952 to 31st March 1958 and like all the other documents referred to in this post shows the planned positions at 31st March, 30th June, 30th September and 31st December.

At this time the V.1000/VC.7 was known as the Valiant Long Range Transport (Valiant L.R.T.) and the Beverley as the B.G.A.L. Freighter.

39 VC.7s were to be delivered in the 1956-57 (12) and 1957-58 (27) financial years (ending 31st March).

54 Beverleys were to be delivered in the 4 financial years from 1954-55 to 1957-58 (3, 31, 17 and 3)

A front line of 24 VC.7s in 4 squadrons and 32 Beverleys in 4 squadrons (all of 8 aircraft) were to be formed so it looks if the planners thought that about 13 aircraft were needed to maintain each squadron at a strength of 8 aircraft.

The first Beverley squadron was to be formed by 30th June 1955 and the fourth by 30th September 1956.

The first VC.7 squadron was to be formed by 31st March 1957 and the third by 31st December 1957.

The next squadron patterns that I have are Plan J Plus 8% (dated 18th August 1952) and Plan J Stage IV (dated 12th September 1952). They both show that 39 VC.7s were planned to support a front-line of 24 aircraft in 3 squadrons of 8 aircraft and that 54 Beverley's were planned to support a front-line of 32 in 4 squadrons of 8 aircraft. The delivery dates were the same as the Plan J Stage II as well.

Plan K - Date 6th February 1953 - Source: National Archives File AIR20/8714/31265

The plan was still for 24 VC.7s (still referred to as the Valiant L.R.T.) in 3 squadrons and 32 Beverleys (now referred to as such) in 4 squadrons. However, the number of aircraft planned and the delivery dates had changed slightly.

42 VC.7s were now to be delivered in the 1956-57 (12) and 1957-58 (30) financial years. The first squadron was still to be formed by 31st March 1957, but formation of the third squadron had slipped to 31st March 1958.

50 Beverleys were now to be delivered in the 3 financial years 1955-56 to 1957-58 (26, 22 and 2). The formation of the first Beverly squadron had slipped a quarter to 30th September 1955, but the fourth squadron was still to be formed by 30th September 1956.

Plan K (Star) - Date 15th April 1954 - Source: National Archives File AIR20/15110/30150 Plan K

In common with all the other sources referred to so far these squadron patterns cover the period up to 31st March 1958. Except that the page for Transport Command only goes up to 31st March 1955. So we don't know what the plans for the VC.7 and Beverley were in early 1954.

Plan L - Date 15th January 1955 - Source: National Archives File AIR20/15110/30150

These squadron patterns cover the period from 31st December 1954 to 31st March 1960 and are the last squadron patterns I have that were produced before the cancellation of the V.1000.

The aircraft is now referred to as the V.1000, but the planned force had been cut from 34 aircraft in 3 squadrons to 8 aircraft in one squadron.

There was to be a half-squadron of 2 aircraft on 31st March 1958 and it would reach its full strength of 8 aircraft by 30th June 1959. A grand total of 12 V.1000s were to be delivered in the 3 financial years from 1957-58 to 1959-60 (2, 4 and 6).

However, this never happened because the VC.7 was cancelled and an eventual total of 23 Britannias were purchased in its place.

The Beverley force had been cut from 32 aircraft in 4 squadrons to 24 aircraft in 3 squadrons. There was to be a half squadron of 4 aircraft on 30th September 1955 and the full force of 24 aircraft in 3 squadrons by 31st March 1957. However, a grand total of 52 Beverleys were now to be delivered over the 3 financial years 1956-57 to 1958-59 (17, 18 and 17).

No. 47 Squadron, RAF the first Beverley squadron actually entered service in March 1956. That is nine months later than was planned in June 1952. 47 production aircraft were actually built.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

View attachment 361795
British procurement policy wasn't always just right. Transall C.160 might have come with considerable benefits for industry vs Hercules. A slightly biased Belfast specification could very well have turned into a better Hercules, maybe. A tactical Belfast vs a strategic Belfast. Can a strategic transport do it on the dirt?

With better decision making in the late 1940s-early 1950s I don't see why the RAF couldn't have had a tactical Belfast using Clyde or Proteus engines instead of the Beverley. A Mk 2 with Orion or Tyne engines could have followed instead of the Argossy. Then instead of the OTL HS.681/C-130K Hercules saga there could have been a Mk 3 version with more powerful Tynes.

That's a potential production run of 175 Bermudas (47 Mk 1, 56 Mk 2 and 72 Mk 3) for the RAF plus civil sales and exports. That would be enough to maintain a front-line of 130 medium range transport aircraft into the 1975-80 period, rather than the 58 (52 HS 681s and 6 Argosys) planned for 1975 in early 1964 IOTL.

If the Bermuda had been built by Shorts there's no need to cancel the VC.7 in favour of Shorts built Britannias to prevent unemployment in Northern Ireland that would otherwise be created by the cancelled Comet and Swift orders.