TLIAW: Walking Back To Happiness

Nice, Hogg is underused in TLs (imo).

And funnily enough, I was just going to post 'I think there'll be debates in this 1964' before I saw the last update...

EDIT: Does the better result for Labour mean that Patrick Gordon Walker (PATRICK GORDON WALKER) defeats Peter Griffiths in Smethwick?
 
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The Conservative Party needed something to cling onto, and they got their chance when, at the prompting of Anthony Wedgwood Benn and the reluctant consent of Richard Crossman, Anthony Greenwood offered to debate the “pressing issues of the election” in a BBC television debate. The Prime Minister agreed wholeheartedly and the time and date of the debate was fixed at 6:05pm on the 1st October, exactly one week before polling day.

Meadow just dieded

The 8th October was a grim day for the Conservative Party. Labour rose to 347 seats from 258, with the Conservatives falling to 276 seats. Even the Liberal Party saw a slight rise, as they had secured four more seats and brought them into double digits (at exactly 10 seats) for the first time since 1945.

Ooh, a stable majority. Can't wait to see where this is going to go.
 
Nice, Hogg is underused in TLs (imo).

And funnily enough, I was just going to post 'I think there'll be debates in this 1964' before I saw the last update...

I definitely agree on the first point. Though, he's not as underused as Anthony Greenwood - I've never seen someone make him PM (or featured him in noticeable way, come to think of it) in a timeline.

EDIT: Does the better result for Labour mean that Patrick Gordon Walker (PATRICK GORDON WALKER) defeats Peter Griffiths in Smethwick?

Sadly (though not as sadly as Peter Griffiths winning the seat), PGW does take Smethwick. That, of course, means little when he's probably last on Greenwood's list to be appointed Foreign Secretary.

Meadow just dieded

Look on the bright side - no self-respecting Prime Minister in the future of this Britain could ever consider a television debate with the LotO based on Hogg's experience.

Ooh, a stable majority. Can't wait to see where this is going to go.

A stridently left-wing Labour government with a stable majority and a Prime Minister who is handsome, charismatic and effortlessly effective in self-promotion. Britain is in for fun times ahead...
 

Thande

Donor
So what's the actual POD here that makes Wilson not go for it?

I see my relative has become PM, though his views on defence fill me with horror!

Also, that Helen Shapiro song always makes me think of Torg's "WOH-PAH!" battle cry from Sluggy Freelance.
 
So what's the actual POD here that makes Wilson not go for it?

The PoD has come from me reading Red Queen, Barbara Castle's biography, where there's a fair explanation of the 1960 leadership crisis on the Left. Essentially, Wilson went into a sulk for about a week when Greenwood, Castle and Crossman met to decide on a leadership candidate IOTL because he genuinely didn't want to fight with Gaitskell and risk his position. He was pretty much bombarded with pressure, but he continued to stay silent on the issue. Greenwood readied himself to stand and certainly had the ambition (as we know from his 1961 challenge IOTL).

ITTL, Wilson comes to the decision that he'd rather not risk it and sever his ties on the Right. In the eyes of Greenwood, Crossman and Castle IOTL, this would have constituted a betrayal of the Left - hence the "prisoner of the Right" quote that is totally OTL. Wilson sulks longer and takes the opportunist stance of keeping quiet and loyal to Gaitskell.

I see my relative has become PM, though his views on defence fill me with horror!

The reaction to him ITTL would be akin to the modern reaction to Corbyn (though, of course, Greenwood's position has a lot of PLP support).
 
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Pound In Your Pocket

In the aftermath of the election, Greenwood set about building a cabinet of both allies and enemies from across the internal political spectrum of the Labour Party. The most important appointment of all was Chancellor of the Exchequer. It was a position coveted by one man in the shadow cabinet ever since his hopes for the leadership were dashed.

Harold Wilson was made Chancellor of the Exchequer and he was determined to set the country back on course. Still, the early optimism of those first few days was forgotten in an instant when the government was faced with the terrifying balance of payments deficit and the only option before Wilson was the most dreaded of all: devaluation. Labour had devalued sterling in 1949 and the Attlee government never lived it down, with many believing Labour lost the 1951 general election as a result of this “attack on British national pride”. Wilson was determined not to see Labour tarnished like that again. However, his was not the only ministerial voice that needed to be heard. Richard Crossman (Home Secretary), Anthony Wedgwood Benn (Minister of Technology), Barbara Castle (Minister of Housing and Local Government) and Tony Crosland (Chief Secretary to the Treasury) were all of the opinion that devaluation of the pound would cheapen Britain’s exports, make British businesses more competitive in foreign markets, and thus rid the country of the balance of payments deficit that Labour had inherited. Greenwood listened to his colleagues on both sides of the argument, but the final decision to pressure Wilson into devaluing gained the backing of a cabinet majority.

Wilson’s private secretary, Marcia Williams, recorded in her diaries that “he [Wilson] felt completely trapped”. Wilson certainly felt a creeping paranoia overtake his thinking by the time he announced the devaluation of the pound on the 7th November 1964, leading him to believe that he’d been backed into a corner his fellow ministers in order to get rid of him if the policy proved unpopular. To save his own position to some extent, he took the initiative of announcing the policy on a Saturday to stop the Sunday papers printing the story in time whilst also allowing the City to recover from the shock of devaluation in time for the opening of the markets on Monday morning.

Presented in public as a “radical, yet proportional response” to the economic mess left by the Conservative Party, the devaluation was met by fierce criticism by the very man who’d necessitated the measure in the first place: Quintin Hogg’s Shadow Chancellor, Reginald Maudling. These criticisms fell on deaf ears, however, and Maudling soon quietened his criticisms when he realised that the public had little respect for Maudling’s authority on the subject of sound economic management. The row over the “emergency budget” Wilson introduced the week after the devaluation of the pound, for example, turned into an embarrassment for the Conservatives. Wilson increased income tax, petrol tax, and introduced a capital gains tax, but the arguments of the Conservative frontbench against the budget were once again roundly ignored for the irony of the situation. In private, Lord Cromer (Governor of the Bank of England) made his criticisms known to the Treasury and he felt his feelings on the matter were adequately expressed by the Shadow Chancellor in Parliament. The rest of the country was less enthusiastic about Maudling’s lectures on the economic situation, a feeling that spread to the Tory leadership and forced them to replace Reggie Maudling with Iain Macleod in the role of Shadow Chancellor in the January of the following year.

Maudling’s sacking would not be the only major fall from grace in 1965, however.

Despite the instability of the British pound abroad settling down by the spring and the monthly trade figures improving to the point where Britain was projected to be in a balance of payments surplus by the end of 1965, Wilson felt himself compromised by the decision to devalue sterling. It had been a point of pride for both him and the country at large, but the cabinet had forced the issue and even some of his own advisers in the Treasury took the side of Greenwood, Crossman and Castle. Threatening resignation over the issue in December 1964 had gotten Wilson nowhere, aside from making him appear a melodramatic schemer who was trying to undermine the confidence the Prime Minister was held in. Anthony Greenwood was naturally suspicious of Wilson’s motives – memories of Wilson’s betrayal of the Left in 1960 were still fresh in his mind – and so didn’t countenance accepting Wilson’s resignation in case the debacle blew up in the government’s face after Wilson’s departure. The humiliation of reneging on his own resignation threat, being undermined within the Treasury and failing to uphold sterling as a point of patriotism all conspired to place Harold Wilson in a desperate emotional state. Only his secretary, Marcia Williams, was able to receive his confidence on the situation and, because of that, she was the only one who could possibly resolve the situation.

On the 8th March 1965, Marcia Williams met with the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary to discuss Harold Wilson’s position within the government. She revealed that Wilson had drawn up plans – a pipe dream, even – for a Department of Economic Affairs to better co-ordinate the planning of Britain’s nationalised industries and the fulfilment of productivity targets. Greenwood and Crossman were intrigued – this could be their way of neutralising Wilson whilst also keeping him within government. Before Williams could make a passionate appeal of screaming and heartfelt loyalty for Wilson, Greenwood swiftly agreed to make Wilson the new “Minister of Economic Affairs” and thanked Williams for her visit. Within three weeks, the Department of Economic Affairs was created with Harold Wilson at its head. The former Chancellor was obviously suspicious at first, fully aware that this was part of a plan to side-line him, but he was thankful that he was able to build a government department all of his own with full control over his secretarial and junior official appointments. Here, he could carve out a ministerial fiefdom without the pressures of his Bevanite former allies.

In his place, Barbara Castle was made Chancellor of the Exchequer; in her place, Bob Mellish was made Minister of Housing and Local Government. Another right-winger (though, a right-winger with allies on both sides of the Labour Party) was brought into cabinet whilst a stalwart of the Left was given a Great Office of State. Unnerving to some on the Right of the Labour Party, Castle’s move was greeted with applause by social liberals of all political affiliations.

Britain had its first female Chancellor, though Mellish himself would later rudely joke that Wilson, with the emotional drama surrounding his resignation threats and final displacement to the DEA, “already passed that particular milestone”.​
 
Just caught up: very good work Comisario.

I really like the idea of Election debates coming 46 years early (could it be anyone other than a Dimbleby hosting it?), and how plausible the downfalls of the two Chancellors (Wilson and Maudling) due to not much more than being in the wrong place at the wrong time.

That said, biting the bullet of devaluation (one that could have screwed the career of whoever was unfortunate to be the Chancellor responsible) could help the Greenwood Ministry in the long run.

Britain had its first female Chancellor, though Mellish himself would later rudely joke that Wilson, with the emotional drama surrounding his resignation threats and final displacement to the DEA, “already passed that particular milestone”.

Is it bad that I laughed a bit at that?
 
Just caught up: very good work Comisario.

Thank you very much.

I really like the idea of Election debates coming 46 years early (could it be anyone other than a Dimbleby hosting it?), and how plausible the downfalls of the two Chancellors (Wilson and Maudling) due to not much more than being in the wrong place at the wrong time.

I couldn't think of anyone better to host such a debate. He really would have excelled had they occurred in our timeline.

Ah, I'm glad you liked their downfalls. I think Maudling (and to a greater extent, the rest of Hogg's old cabinet) will have a tough time overcoming the defeat in '64 - how the Conservatives will deal with Opposition will come up in the next few updates.

On Wilson's fall, I just have to say that I loved writing the irony of his move to the DEA. He's become the Gaitskellite liability instead of OTL's George Brown, which would have destroyed the Harold Wilson of our world. Good thing he's got Marcia, eh?

That said, biting the bullet of devaluation (one that could have screwed the career of whoever was unfortunate to be the Chancellor responsible) could help the Greenwood Ministry in the long run.

Indeed. It won't be an easy ride, but the economy will see some improvements as the Sixties wear on.

Is it bad that I laughed a bit at that?

Same here.

Likewise. Filler.

If you didn't laugh, I wouldn't be doing my duty! :D

Seriously, I'm really glad you're enjoying it.
 
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Fighting On The Home Front

Richard Crossman had hoped for the Foreign Office, but that particular Great Office of State was reserved for the staunch Gaitskellite, Michael Stewart. At the Home Office, however, Crossman would come to dominate an era of social progress at a pace unknown since the Second World War. That, at least, would become the official history of the “Crossmanite reforms”. But, behind it, the nature of Britain’s progress in the Sixties was much more akin to Tory economics – “stop-go”.

His early days as Home Secretary saw Crossman dump most of his civil servants, including his Principal Private Secretary, Head of the Press and Publicity Department, and Permanent Under-Secretary. Labour’s reforming agenda couldn’t be impeded by civil service obstinacy and Crossman was more than willing to ease the way for new, liberalising acts of Parliament. This was, of course, in spite of his own debatable opinions on equal rights for homosexuals and relaxed immigration laws. Still, the progressive, forward-looking thrust of Britain’s new Labour government was to cover all areas. This included social reform.

Under his leadership at the Home Office and the campaigning of Sydney Silverman (Labour’s most prominent and most colourful opponent of capital punishment), the death penalty was temporarily suspended in 1965 and then formally abolished for murder and corresponding crimes in March 1966. This was the first major piece of social reform to be passed with Crossman’s steering through the Commons, though it wasn’t to be the last.

Before long, abortion was on the agenda.

In November 1965, the young director Ken Loach had directed a television drama for the BBC called Up the Junction. Providing British audiences with a brutal depiction of the struggles of three young women from North Battersea and Clapham Junction, this television play provoked a public debate on the horrors of illegal abortions. Legalising abortion and providing the procedure on the NHS was the next logical step if the danger of illegal, backstreet abortions was to be ended for the women of Britain. Morality campaigners on one side were filled with revulsion at the idea of young women being given the choice to terminate, what they saw as, human life; social progressives, however, were adamant that the choices and physical health of Britain’s women had to be protected from the outdated interference of the state. The number of reported abortions in 1959 had been 1,880 – by 1965, that number had risen more than tenfold.

The Abortion Act passed in February 1967 after a year-long battle between the pro-choice and pro-life sides of the national argument. It was almost one year and three months since the original broadcasting of Up the Junction.

What drove Crossman’s reforming zeal, especially in the case of the Abortion Act of 1967, was his belief in aiding working-class communities beyond what was known as “metropolitan elitism”. Those people in Labour’s heartlands who, even though their hearts were socially conservative and their heads were firmly with their hearts, could benefit from some of the liberal changes in Westminster were the main concern of Crossman. That is why homosexuality and immigration became such bugbears for Crossman in the latter half of Greenwood’s premiership and would come to frustrate Labour MPs’ relationships with their constituents for over a generation.

Crossman’s battles were not the only ones in the public sphere, it must be noted.

Fred Peart had been made Education Secretary by Greenwood immediately following the 1964 general election, a move that secured the primacy of left-wing thinking at the Department of Education and Science. An anti-EEC left-wing Durhamite, Peart was a man with limited experience in government: his only appointment prior to 1964 had been as Parliamentary Private Secretary to the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries in Attlee’s government, Tom Williams. Still, he had the grand ambition of bringing the many tiers of Britain’s education system in line with one another and this was attractive to the Prime Minister. His father, Arthur Greenwood, was effectively a self-made man who’d risen from West Yorkshire to become a graduate of Leeds University, then educator, and then a major Labour politician from the late 1920s to the 1940s. Anthony hadn’t risen in such a way, admittedly, and his rise from Leeds to President of the Oxford Union was eased considerably by his attendance at Merchant Taylors’ School (a public school in the South of England).

Greenwood, in the time between Merchant Taylors’ and becoming Prime Minister, had evidently moved on from his public school days and was not so infected by the patrician conservatism that changed the minds of so many of his peers. When Peart suggested bringing the old public schools of the United Kingdom into the state sector, Greenwood backed him with the fullest sincerity.

In January 1965, Peart came to blows with his cabinet colleagues over the proposal to end the public school system. Richard Crossman, just as Bevan and Gaitskell had before him, felt uneasy at such an “interference with the liberty of the people”. It was argued that the choice should remain for Britain’s parents to send their children to public school: the means to send them came first, according to Peart’s rivals. Thankfully, the removal of Harold Wilson from the Treasury allowed for a new consensus to build up within the cabinet. Government Circular 10/65 had passed around the many Local Education Authorities since the first cabinet arguments, urging the LEAs to start converting their secondary schools to the comprehensive system introduced by Peart to begin streamlining the education system. Tony Crosland, who remained Chief Secretary to the Treasury throughout 1965, recorded that the news was “fucking fantastic” in his diaries. Though he was opposed to Peart’s more radical reforms, he was more than happy to see the end of the two-tier education system that had routinely failed working-class children due to the dreaded 11+ primary school examinations.

The new consensus was created by a feeling of jubilation at the economy’s first strides towards recovery in the summer of 1966 and the confused nature of the Conservative leadership since Quintin Hogg’s departure in the winter of 1965. The Public Schools Act of 1967, passed in the May of that year by a slight margin caused by many Labour abstentions, began the process of integrating Britain’s smaller public schools (with the provision that the larger schools, such as Eton, Harrow and Westminster, would enter the state system at the end of the timetable for practical reasons) into the wider state education system. Effectively, it was the end of hundreds of years of privilege and power concentrated in a handful of educational institutions. The Conservatives and the right-leaning press condemned it as an attack on British tradition and warned that “national integrity”, the House of Lords, and even the monarchy would not be safe in future.

Britain was changing, but not everyone believed it was for the better.
 
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guinazacity

Banned
Wow, the government is actually taking steps to end the british tradition of public school educated perverse conservative upper class sons of bitches.

I love it, subscribed!

keep it up!
 

Sideways

Donor
Nationalising Eton? Excellent. I love how it's seen as just a precursor to Lords reform. Will these institutions still be selective?
 
Wow, the government is actually taking steps to end the british tradition of public school educated perverse conservative upper class sons of bitches.

I love it, subscribed!

keep it up!

Many thanks!

Nationalising Eton? Excellent. I love how it's seen as just a precursor to Lords reform. Will these institutions still be selective?

It was a genuine proposal by Fred Peart, funnily enough. But, naturally, it didn't get very far as an idea under Gaitskell and Wilson's leaderships.

The former public schools? Well, they'll be subject to the same integration over time as the rest of the education system. So, selective for the time being - the larger, more significant institutions especially - but subject to change with the rest of Britain's schools.
 
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The Awkward Opposition

In the month following the election defeat, Hogg set up a committee under Party Chairman, Lord Blakenham, to look into reforming the party structure and creating a new system for determining the leadership of the party. Though this appeared to undermine his own integrity as leader somewhat, especially among those who were itching to oust him at the first opportunity, Hogg had been brought to the realisation that the manner in which he was made leader of the Conservative Party was still a major hindrance to his credibility. A former peer who was still outside of the Commons when he was hand-picked by Tory grandees to become Prime Minister, Quintin Hogg was the symbol of the old order being swept away by Anthony Greenwood’s reforms on a national scale. Within the Conservative Party, the same thing was about to happen.

The comfortable majority of Greenwood’s government ensured that there wouldn’t be a general election before 1968 at the very earliest, meaning that Hogg couldn’t hang on for much longer before calls for a renewal in leadership were made public. This fact forced him and his allies to get the new rules – election by MPs, no official role for the grandees and a majority of the votes cast (plus fifteen percent to ensure a clear mandate) to finally decide the leader – devised by Lord Blakenham passed at the earliest possible juncture. This effort was successful, leading the way for a 1965 leadership election – the first of many within the Conservative Party.

Hogg formally stepped down in May 1965. But, he also promised that he would stand in the subsequent leadership election. He hoped for a vote of acclamation rather than a well-fought contest. He didn’t expect Reggie Maudling.

Maudling had been swiftly dropped as Shadow Chancellor in favour of Iain Macleod, but he still held some sway within the Conservative Party. For the grandees, the traditionalists and old “One Nation” Tories, Maudling had been the leading light of the Macmillan and Hogg governments. Despite the circumstances of his removal from the post (and then his awkward shuffling to Shadow Defence), Maudling still retained an aura of personable charm and likeability that made him into the “prince across the water” for those who’d had enough of Hogg’s alienating personality. Maudling staked out his position against Hogg and offered to contest the leadership election against him. This sent shockwaves throughout the party and forced many who’d believed that there would be no substantial challenger to Hogg to now consider their options.

On the first (and only) ballot of the election, held on the 20th May, Hogg struggled to secure more than a quarter of all votes cast. With 71 votes to Maudling’s 201, it was clear that Hogg no longer had the confidence of his own MPs. The leadership passed to Maudling – the down-to-earth personality that, in the minds of Conservatives, could connect to the lost working-class voters who distrusted the patronising attitude of Hogg – and his vision for the country. His vision was a return to the days of easy-going affluence, an interventionist stance on the economy, and a Britain free from the reach of the European Economic Community. Fears of Maudling’s obvious connection to the economic state Britain was in by Hogg’s ascendance in 1963 were discarded by Conservative MPs in favour of focusing on the defeat of Hogg. The party hoped the country would do the same.

Maudling forged ahead to construct a truly Conservative alternative to the radical socialism of Greenwood’s government. Improving industrial relations, for example, became an important part of Maudling’s party programme once he appointed the former Minister of Labour, Edward Heath, to become Home Secretary. The appointment was seen as a positive one by trade unionists: Heath was a conciliator at heart and his redirected focus on domestic affairs kept him away from the controversial question of Europe. Iain Macleod remained Chancellor, signalling a firm commitment to the post-war consensus of government intervention and targeted growth. In terms of social reform, the Conservatives were inevitably divided on the issues of abortion and capital punishment, but Maudling made sure to keep his MPs in line enough to vote through the progressive changes. A coalition of compassionate One Nation Conservatives on the one side and right-wing libertarians on the other arose to aid their leader in keeping the party together at some of its toughest moments of moral questioning. However, egos and foreign affairs would clash in the party and lead to the period of Tory opposition commonly referred to as “the awkward opposition”.

Rhodesia’s unilateral declaration of independence in 1965, proclaiming its freedom as a white minority-run state outside of the British Commonwealth, saw strong reaction from the Labour Party and total condemnation of Ian Smith’s white settler government from various sectors of British society. Conservatives such as Macleod and Heath were understandably appalled by the racial conflict flaring up in southern Africa, but their outrage meant little when Alec Douglas-Home was Shadow Foreign Secretary. The skeletal Lord Home saw grey areas in Rhodesia’s UDI, viewing the development of African society as too “backward” and “helpless” to form a black majority state in Rhodesia when the economic and political power was exclusively held in the hands of the white Rhodesians. He lacked a well-coordinated response to the crisis, prompting many within the party (and the voting public) to resign from his position on the Opposition frontbench. Douglas-Home refused to do so and the public debacle over the Conservatives’ apparent lack of a policy on Rhodesia was an embarrassing mess for Maudling to deal with.

Lord Home would eventually resign in 1966, but only after a series of internal battles that left many Monday Club members feeling alienated and outside of the party mainstream. Even Quintin Hogg’s 1963 campaign manager, Julian Amery, wrote that he’d been “shut out of the party” by the bombardment of criticisms against Douglas-Home and his associates. Effectively, this set Maudling against the right-wing grassroots of his own party and made him appear beholden to the One Nation left-wingers in cabinet. He attempted to soothe passions, but the powerful personalities surrounding him wouldn’t allow their grievances to die away. 1966 and the year of the slow recovery saw the Shadow Defence Secretary, Enoch Powell, begin making speeches in direct contravention of Macleod’s economic policies. Powell argued that more intervention in the economy, seemingly with the “lax support” of Macleod in the case of the re-nationalisation of steel in May 1966, was only going to perpetuate the problem of Britain ignoring market forces and attempting to enforce control over human liberty. Philosophically, these ideas frustrated Powell and placed him against the unflappable Maudling in a way that led a multitude of newspapers to speculate that a leadership challenge would spring up before the next general election. Powell denied that he was going to make such a challenge, despite receiving thousands of letters in support from like-minded conservatives across the nation. His eloquence in speech and in writing led Maudling to reconsider the influence he had outside of the direct decisions on economic policy. Within the party, Maudling provided Powell with the co-chairmanship of a committee on reviewing Conservative economic policy to keep his opinions confined to the private realm.

These attempts to suppress right-wing rebellion failed to account for Maudling’s pro-European rebels sprouting up behind his back. Edward Heath, despite his chief priority of home affairs, made it his mission to convince Reginald Maudling of the “European Dream”. This, however, meant little to Maudling as he tried to adapt the Conservative Party to the public’s government-promoted hostility to the EEC. Heath, on the 28th October 1967, attempted to undermine his own leader and the leader of the nation in a Commons speech on the dangers of turning away from Europe’s open hand (the death of Charles de Gaulle in early 1967 meant that the glimmers of British entry into the Common Market were appearing). “We are sailing into open waters, battered by wind and sea, and with no land in sight. We must turn to safety. We must turn to Europe to save this fine British vessel,” Heath boomed in the Commons chamber as he made a swipe at both his own leader and the Prime Minister. He was subsequently laughed at for his “ridiculous” sailing references and his dream appeared to die with the one speech he’d made to save it.

There was a general election on the horizon in 1968 and Maudling needed a miracle to save his slim electoral chances from the backbiting and infighting from both sides of his party.​
 
The end of public schools (What's the policy of grammar schools with this, if I might ask?), Heath serving as a martyr for his own European cause to little avail, and Enoch being Enoch.

This is making me really want to live in this world you're making, though then rather than whatever now may be like as a result!
 
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