The Battle of Midway goes according to plan for the IJN

[BlondieBC]

With sufficient delay US may not have bases in August 1945 enabling it to drop the nuclear bombs on Japan, or at least enabling sufficient security of such mission. 9 months behind OTL makes US take Saipan in April 1945 I believe that this alone may slightly delay nuclear bombings since US airforce would have to first gain knowledge and experience with bombing Japan before pdropping nukes.

I think FDR may be willing to take a risk and bomb anyway. I can see one of the first air raids being a huge B-29 raid on Tokyo with one of them carrying the A-bomb. Americans attacked without fighter support into Germany which had a much better air defense system, so IMO, the bomb is still used in August 1945 as long as any runway is available to launch the attack from.

 

[SergeantHeretic]

Blondie, I dissagree, even if Japan gets the battle of Midway they want and best case, sinks two out of three AMerican carriers, The following fact does not changed,

I tell you three times, I tell you three times I tell you three times, the U.S> can and will build new carriers, and escort cruisers and Escort carriers (Thank you COmmander Frank Wead) and planes and logistics ship and troop ships and so on and the Japanese are not going to hold the Central pacific past the back end of 1942.

It's just not going to happen.

We have more men more factories, more money and more resources than the japanese and we have the entrenched logistical transport network to exploit it all.

 

[Alcatur]

t was not so much idiotic, but based on one assumption that both the US Army G-2 and the Japanese Army agreed upon in late 1941. Russia would be knocked out of the war. If this assumption had happened, and FDR was looking at the Pacific war where Russia makes peace in mid 1942, a negotiated peace becomes possible. You have to think about what would be happening on the other side of the world. The Germans likely switch a great deal of resources back to the Navy and Army. The old Panzer and other equipment are plenty good enough for occupation duty, counter insurgency, and mass executions. The Germans likely start to place some divisions in reserve status to free up needed skill laborers. Franco could easily join the Axis. If combined with a reasonable peace offer from Japan, the USA might accept.

The Japanese lacked quality fighters, but what if the Germans used the TransSiberian railroad for its own Lend/Lease type program? What happens if FDR decides only Marine divisions are to be used in the Pacific until after the Nazi's are defeated. What if the Axis are producing 2-3 times more U-boats? What happen if Malta and Gibraltar fall in 1942, and the Italian Navy is able to sortie into the Atlantic?


It takes the right butterflies and wins for the Axis, but it is understandable how the Japanese believed they could win.

I was refering largly to Japaneese minor decisions on ship dislocation and force allocation. I agree that from thier perspective starting the war in 1941/1942 looked like an act with reasonable chance of success. What bothers me are all those minor decisions - see the issue of Guadalcanal forces. I never understood why they couldn't send Yamato, Mutsu and Nagato instead of Kongos on November; the decisive battle is after all impossible because US already lost too many BBs (btw what were Japaneese reports from PH attack? Judging by those of the later war they should be overmy optimist)

I think FDR may be willing to take a risk and bomb anyway. I can see one of the first air raids being a huge B-29 raid on Tokyo with one of them carrying the A-bomb. Americans attacked without fighter support into Germany which had a much better air defense system, so IMO, the bomb is still used in August 1945 as long as any runway is available to launch the attack from.

Maybe, but such a large raid would be difficult. Crews prepared for atomic bombs were specifically trained for a very tight turns to escape being caught in the explosion, something that was impossible for a formation. Other B 29s could turn back before the city, but then the lone nuclear B 29 is very vulnerable for potential fighter attack if there is anything defending city in question; US being months behind schedule means Japan will have much more aicraft defending Home Islands and much more fuel to them. I am not saying its impossible, but definitly much more difficult and with risk that the plane may be shot down.

 

[SergeantHeretic]

Alcatur you are presuming an industry and roduction capacity that Japan does not have as they would still be fighting the U.S> who can produce more and fast.

 

[sharlin]

I never understood why they couldn't send Yamato, Mutsu and Nagato instead of Kongos on Novembe

Basically it was fear of air attacks that stopped the IJN from using its bigger guns. The Kongo's were pritty darn fast, able to go with the cruisers and destroyers under cover of night and get out again barring battle damage at high speed, they were also quite economical.

The Yamato was a fuel hog and a maintenance nightmare, her turrets needed constant oiling due to the weight of them on the runners straining them as well as being limited in manouverability due to her size. She had a far bigger turning circle than the much smaller Battlecruisers and the fighting in those waters needed manouverability, something the Yamato lacked.

The Nagato was also fairly slow, her slower speed would mean she'd be more exposed to air and sub attack as well as her escorts. The IJN was also dedicated to a big show down with the USNs battle line, keeping its biggest and best guns out of what in naval terms was knife fights in phone boxes for when the USNs warships finally came out to play at a place of the IJN's choosing was central to their strategic planning. Sadly for the IJN the USN never played along.

Also if the Yamato had been present instead of the Kirishima against the South Dakota and Washington she would have been just as vulnerable as the Kirishima was. Even her armour would not save her against 16 inch shells fired at a range of several thousand yards and the US destroyers would have had a huge target to hit with their torpedoes.

If the Yamato was to ever come out for a surface brawl it would be for something like the TL Leyte Gulf. When there was a chance for a full blown surface battle, a clash of fleet vs fleet.. She'd not be wasted in smaller engagements.

 

[Alcatur]

The Nagato was also fairly slow, her slower speed would mean she'd be more exposed to air and sub attack as well as her escorts.

Nagatos coud pull out 25-26 knots. I understand your point, but its hard for me to believe that 3-4 knots would make that much of difference. Also at this time US subs had only one serious victory - heavy cruiser Kako; I do not think that IJN command was considering them to be a serious threat in 1942.

The IJN was also dedicated to a big show down with the USNs battle line, keeping its biggest and best guns out of what in naval terms was knife fights in phone boxes for when the USNs warships finally came out to play at a place of the IJN's choosing was central to their strategic planning. Sadly for the IJN the USN never played along.

I know, and thats my problem. At this time US battleline is already sunk in Pearl Harbour. IJN has to realise there will be no decisive battleship battle not because US doesn't want to play along but because US doesn't have any force which can fight it. Only way IJN can fight battleship battle is if they wait for the US to build new ones; sounds like dumb doctrine

Alcatur you are presuming an industry and roduction capacity that Japan does not have as they would still be fighting the U.S> who can produce more and fast.

Where am I presuming something like it? I just say that at the beginning of air offensive there still will be fighters in Japan homeland; US greater industrial output will not make them go away without any fight. And with US offensive 9 months behind Japan will have larger industrial capacity tahn OTL and therefore more planes; especially if they do not loose hundreds of BRT in Salomonas campaign.

 

[sharlin]

Modern warships can run at full speed day in day out but even they have machinery stresses after such abuse, and a warship would not run around at full speed, it drastically cuts into the fuel onboard and puts great stress on the machinery, especially for the time.

Those 4 -5 knot differences between the Nagato and the Kongo's did matter, the BCs and their escorts approached at high cruising speed and then would speed through at flank speed, get in as fast as they could and get out just as fast. Take a Nagato along and you're slowing the whole formation down to their speed and if she takes damage to her engine spaces or waterline that speed difference is more pronounced and it means she's going to spend longer hours in daylight within range of aircraft.

The USN battle line was also not totally destroyed, they knew they sunk some ships perminantly, but others were salvaged and repaired fairly fast and could have been a threat and the IJN probably knew about US new builds. Both Washingtons were undergoing trials on the Atlantic coast and would have been ready for action in the solomons, combine those with the survivors from Pearl and you've still got a formidable surface fleet. Yes the Japanese were dumb by not altering their doctrine, but thats how they were, they had plans and kept to them even when it was glaringly obvious that the plan would not work or needed to be changed. Just look at Leyte Gulf. The Fuso and Yamashiro went to their deaths against a massively superior force of US warships when in reality once they knew of the failure of the attacks to the North they should have turned around and gone home instead of going into a fight they had no chance of succeeding.

 

[Lurksalot]

The targets and timing of the nuclear strikes interests me. Would the US have used nukes on targets outside of the Japanese home islands?

If so would the Japanese still be able to use that as some kind of victimization technique that the WWII generation use in OTL to excuse their war attrocities?

 

[sharlin]

I'd say the whole Japanese Attrocities issue IE 'What do you mean the rape of Nanking? We went there for sugar...thats all...' which in some cases would make a holocaust denier blush and the refusal to appologise over the treatment of POW's was more a cultural thing rather than a 'oh look at us poor innocent victims..who got nuked. Twice. Did we mention you dropped atomic bombs on us. Twice. F**kers...' form of vitimisation.

Basically I see it as them admitting they did those things, and treated people that way would be admitting they were wrong, admitting they did things wrong that would not be acceptable by any other nation ranged against them and thus loose even more face after loosing a war which they truely belived they could win. And loosing face and admitting you're wrong is a no no in the Japanese culture of the time.

 

[BlondieBC]

Blondie, I dissagree, even if Japan gets the battle of Midway they want and best case, sinks two out of three AMerican carriers, The following fact does not changed,

I tell you three times, I tell you three times I tell you three times, the U.S> can and will build new carriers, and escort cruisers and Escort carriers (Thank you COmmander Frank Wead) and planes and logistics ship and troop ships and so on and the Japanese are not going to hold the Central pacific past the back end of 1942.

It's just not going to happen.

We have more men more factories, more money and more resources than the japanese and we have the entrenched logistical transport network to exploit it all.

In understand the USA building schedule. You should learn to accept that sometimes two people can look at the same data, and reach different conclusions. And you should also read what I posted, instead of attacking positions I did not take. I did not say Japan wins. I did not say Japan necessarily last longer. I did say the pace of the war would likely be behind the pace of our war, but if you look at the full range of dates, I said from 3 months FASTER to 12 months SLOWER through JULY, 1945.

Now as to carrier battles, where literally one or two hits can sink a ship or dozen or bombs can just miss, it is extremely hard to predict what would happen. Again, i you read my post, I simply said the most likely result was Japan sinks more carriers than it loses. I then went on to examine the best case scenario for Japan, which is need to examine the limits of what the Japanese could have hopped to achieve.

 

[BlondieBC]

I was refering largly to Japaneese minor decisions on ship dislocation and force allocation. I agree that from thier perspective starting the war in 1941/1942 looked like an act with reasonable chance of success. What bothers me are all those minor decisions - see the issue of Guadalcanal forces. I never understood why they couldn't send Yamato, Mutsu and Nagato instead of Kongos on November; the decisive battle is after all impossible because US already lost too many BBs (btw what were Japaneese reports from PH attack? Judging by those of the later war they should be overmy optimist)

It is my understanding that the Japanese had an accurate assessment, and that the bulk of the film/assessment/paperwork was on the carriers at Midway, along with most of the intelligence people doing the work, so we will never fully know.

I agree the Japanese had a different perspective on the Solomon Island campaign than the rest of the war. I have not read a good explanation of why the surface ships were not committed more aggressively, especially the capital ships. It was either a battle that should get a max naval effort, or the Japanese should have retreated to a different location to fight.

Maybe, but such a large raid would be difficult. Crews prepared for atomic bombs were specifically trained for a very tight turns to escape being caught in the explosion, something that was impossible for a formation. Other B 29s could turn back before the city, but then the lone nuclear B 29 is very vulnerable for potential fighter attack if there is anything defending city in question; US being months behind schedule means Japan will have much more aicraft defending Home Islands and much more fuel to them. I am not saying its impossible, but definitly much more difficult and with risk that the plane may be shot down.

What you say is true, but IMO, it is easier than the Doolittle raid, and so Truman would have still ordered the attack. Now it would make an interest part of a "Japan wins Midway" TL to have the first two bombers lost due to combat/mechanical issues. I read one story where the Enola Gay crashed a few days/weeks before the attack, so a backup crew did the attack a few weeks later. The bombardier decided to miss on the first one due to moral issues and was shot a week or so later. The second bomb missed due to bad aim/weather and landed in the ocean near a city. Japan still surrenders, and the attitude towards nuclear weapons is much different with many seeing the bombardier who intentionally missed as a saint.

I always though another good POD would be the USS Indianapolis sunk on the way to the islands, so the USA does not use any bombs in August. War can really be just that random. We write TL and argue about what can happen, but few TL put the incredibly random, bizarre, and powerful butterflies that happen in OTL. There is a thread from a few months ago where we go over a Midway win for Japan was that the USA commanders would remain aggressive, and I argued that is was possible that FDR sacks his third straight Central Pacific 4-Star Admiral, and the next Admiral spends more time worry about how to be prevented from being fired than winning the war, much like Generals under Stalin were famous for. But Bizarre things happen in life all the time. Imagine if Napoleon died in the first siege battle he fought. How different would history be.

 

[BlondieBC]

The targets and timing of the nuclear strikes interests me. Would the US have used nukes on targets outside of the Japanese home islands?

If so would the Japanese still be able to use that as some kind of victimization technique that the WWII generation use in OTL to excuse their war attrocities?

Sure, if there was there was the right target. The issue is you have 3 years of a TL to write to find the target. But lets say somehow the Japanese still have the bulk of their fleet anchored in Taiwan, I could easily see B-29 being used to try to nuke them in port. I have trouble seeing a tactical land target being important enough, but maybe the right logistical hub colocated with an Army HQ might be enough. This become even more likely if the attack on Japan is deemed too risky for some reason such as Japan has more/better high level interceptors.

 

[Ivan1GFP]

Uh, no they didn't.

The TBF was the best torpedo plane of the war. The U.S. made the Dive Bomber obsolete with the Hellcat and Corsair, although the SBD was a far better aircraft than the D3A, and the later SB2C was actually an excellent, if unnecessary due to events, aircraft.

Japan tried to improve but they lacked the industrial capacity.

edit: Let me make that best carrier torpedo bomber of the war. I have to give best to the Beaufighter (hell of a nice aircraft).

The B5N Kate wasn't the last development of Japanese torpedo bombers. Check out the B6N Tenzan, C6N Saiun, B7A Ryusei for Torpedo bomber types. The D3A also wasn't the last development of Japanese dive bombers. The D4Y Suisei was a pretty fair plane.

All of the above were notably higher performance than their USN counterparts.

- Ivan.

 

[CalBear]

The B5N Kate wasn't the last development of Japanese torpedo bombers. Check out the B6N Tenzan, C6N Saiun, B7A Ryusei for Torpedo bomber types. The D3A also wasn't the last development of Japanese dive bombers. The D4Y Suisei was a pretty fair plane.

All of the above were notably higher performance than their USN counterparts.

- Ivan.

They were all good aircraft in design. They were also only made in very limited numbers and were of very low reliability. in a number of cases they didn't even make it to the carrier force.

The B6N was no where near as capable (or survivable) as the TBF.

The B7N was not deck capable on anything except the Taiho class. The Taiho (the only ship of the class tht was ever completed) was sunk in mid 1944, well before the B7A was available.

The D4Y would have been a great aircraft in 1941. By the time it reached service it was a deathtrap on the scale of the G3M. The D4Y had a max bomb load of 1,100 pounds, the SB2C (which, interestingly, had the same sort of teething issues) was close to three time that (with 2,000 pound just in the internal bombbay). The SB2C could also carry a torpedo. Even the much earlier SBD, whice was the contempory of the D3A had double the bomb load of the D4Y. Both U.S. designs also had more range. The F6F also had a larger bomb load than the D4Y.

The C6N was recon aircraft with very good speed. There was proposed C6N1-B which would have been a torpedo bomber, but the addition of a 1,800 pound torpedo would have dropped its performance to the level of the B6N. Much like the B6N it would not have been the equal of the TBF.

The bottom line on all of these designs, much like the N1K and A7M, is that they arrived too late, in insufficient numbers, and quality to impact any engagement as late as late 1944.

Bringing them up is something like bringing up the F7F (an aircraft that was only capable of operating from the Midway class) and saying it was the best torpedo bomber ever (or at least the fastest at 460 MPH and most heavily armed, with 4 .50 cals and 4 20mm) or discussing the much lamented F8B (which, BTW could be discussed as the best carrier fighter, torpedo plane, dive bomber, and fleet interceptor design of the WW II era), or F8F. They were terrific aircraft but they were too late to the party.

 

[Alcatur]

Those 4 -5 knot differences between the Nagato and the Kongo's did matter, the BCs and their escorts approached at high cruising speed and then would speed through at flank speed, get in as fast as they could and get out just as fast. Take a Nagato along and you're slowing the whole formation down to their speed and if she takes damage to her engine spaces or waterline that speed difference is more pronounced and it means she's going to spend longer hours in daylight within range of aircraft.

I realised few other issues I have with the alleged fear of US airforce in potential battleship raid on Guadalcanal.

1. Source of the planes. There are basically two potential - Henderson and US carriers.

Carrier based aircraft - IJN believed they have achieved crushing victory at Santa Cruz. Wildest reports talked about 5 sunk carriers and 2 battleships, more mitigated and accepted still claimed 3 carriers sunk. Since Enterprise was send for repairs, it was not present between Santa Cruz and November 11; therefore Japanese should have realised there are no carriers in the area. With the Santa Cruz reports and previous US looses they should believe that US have no CV left in the area, or at all, therefore they should not include carrier threat in their estimations.


Henderson - entire point of the mission was to render it inoperational. With shelling from several battleships US planes based there should not be a serious problem the next day

2. Japanese fighter cover

Guadalcanal itself was in range of Zeros from Rabaul (see Saburo Sakai memoirs). So any force that would be threatened by US planes while retreating could be covered by their own aicraft, and thus the threat would be eliminated.

Also if the Yamato had been present instead of the Kirishima against the South Dakota and Washington she would have been just as vulnerable as the Kirishima was. Even her armour would not save her against 16 inch shells fired at a range of several thousand yards and the US destroyers would have had a huge target to hit with their torpedoes.

I am not arguing it, but Japnese commanders propably didn't take i into considerations. Besides one can dream that Yamato would score more than Kirishimas 1 hit and would in result put South Dakota to its rightful place at the sea bottom

 

[Caspian]

What if there had been a third strike against Pearl Harbor that took out the Navy Yard and fuel storage. Pacific fleet would not be able to operate out of Pearl Harbor at all....

A third strike simply wasn't possible - the Kudo Butai couldn't hang around Hawaii long enough to do it the next day, due to fuel shortages and concerns about being attacked by the US fleet, and they couldn't do it the same day because the day wasn't long enough.

 

[Ivan1GFP]

They were all good aircraft in design. They were also only made in very limited numbers and were of very low reliability. in a number of cases they didn't even make it to the carrier force.

The B6N was no where near as capable (or survivable) as the TBF.

The B7N was not deck capable on anything except the Taiho class. The Taiho (the only ship of the class tht was ever completed) was sunk in mid 1944, well before the B7A was available.

The D4Y would have been a great aircraft in 1941. By the time it reached service it was a deathtrap on the scale of the G3M. The D4Y had a max bomb load of 1,100 pounds, the SB2C (which, interestingly, had the same sort of teething issues) was close to three time that (with 2,000 pound just in the internal bombbay). The SB2C could also carry a torpedo. Even the much earlier SBD, whice was the contempory of the D3A had double the bomb load of the D4Y. Both U.S. designs also had more range. The F6F also had a larger bomb load than the D4Y.

The C6N was recon aircraft with very good speed. There was proposed C6N1-B which would have been a torpedo bomber, but the addition of a 1,800 pound torpedo would have dropped its performance to the level of the B6N. Much like the B6N it would not have been the equal of the TBF.

The bottom line on all of these designs, much like the N1K and A7M, is that they arrived too late, in insufficient numbers, and quality to impact any engagement as late as late 1944.

Bringing them up is something like bringing up the F7F (an aircraft that was only capable of operating from the Midway class) and saying it was the best torpedo bomber ever (or at least the fastest at 460 MPH and most heavily armed, with 4 .50 cals and 4 20mm) or discussing the much lamented F8B (which, BTW could be discussed as the best carrier fighter, torpedo plane, dive bomber, and fleet interceptor design of the WW II era), or F8F. They were terrific aircraft but they were too late to the party.

I will have to politely disagree with you here.

Regarding B6N, total production was around 1200 units which in the scheme of Japanese aircraft production is pretty good. It can carry one torpedo just like a TBF and is about 25 mph faster. Its gun armament is lighter, no doubt about that. The engine on this aircraft was the Mitsubishi Kasei which was well developed and quite reliable. The H8K and J2M both used the same basic engine without issues.

If adding a torpedo to a C6N drops its speed by 100 mph, then perhaps you are right. Otherwise, I would have to disagree. Regarding reliability, this one wasn't. Its engine was the Nakajima Homare which was way too compact of a design and paid for it. A 450 unit production run isn't great but it is pretty typical of many Japanese designs.

B7A had the same unreliable Homare engine but performance-wise was pretty good: 75 mph faster than the TBF. Regarding carriers capable of operating this aircraft, there was also the Shinano, but in reality, the IJN had no fleet carriers by this time no matter how fine the aircraft.

D4Y wasn't a world beater, but it was a fairly hot dive bomber. Here is a Bomber that pretty closely matches the A6M Fighter in straight line performance.

I didn't bring these up, but since you did: The A7M never made it into the war. No question there. It was also the only potential successor to the A6M Zero. All the other Japanese fighters were land based only.

The N1K on the other hand DID make it into operations in significant numbers. The N1K Kyofu doesn't count here. The N1K1-J Shiden had a production run of about 1000 and the redesigned N1K2-J / Ja had a production run of about 400. Both aircraft had the unreliable Homare engine but when operating properly were easily superior to a Hellcat and about even with the -1 Corsair. (N1K2-Ja had a bit less speed but about 1000 fpm better climb and very good guns.) US Pilots were so superior in training by this time that the aircraft quality didn't really make a difference.

Regarding SB2C Helldiver as a worthy successor to Dauntless, I believe it wasn't. It wasn't a nice handling plane and was bad enough the Royal Navy canceled orders for it. I guess that is what comes from trying to make a full size "box scale" airplane. It also was quite prone to structural failures. My understanding is that it wasn't well liked by its pilots.

The F8F also was quite prone to structural "failures" which is probably why it never achieved what was expected by its straight line performance.

- Ivan.

 

[CalBear]

I will have to politely disagree with you here.

Regarding B6N, total production was around 1200 units which in the scheme of Japanese aircraft production is pretty good. It can carry one torpedo just like a TBF and is about 25 mph faster. Its gun armament is lighter, no doubt about that. The engine on this aircraft was the Mitsubishi Kasei which was well developed and quite reliable. The H8K and J2M both used the same basic engine without issues.

If adding a torpedo to a C6N drops its speed by 100 mph, then perhaps you are right. Otherwise, I would have to disagree. Regarding reliability, this one wasn't. Its engine was the Nakajima Homare which was way too compact of a design and paid for it. A 450 unit production run isn't great but it is pretty typical of many Japanese designs.

B7A had the same unreliable Homare engine but performance-wise was pretty good: 75 mph faster than the TBF. Regarding carriers capable of operating this aircraft, there was also the Shinano, but in reality, the IJN had no fleet carriers by this time no matter how fine the aircraft.

D4Y wasn't a world beater, but it was a fairly hot dive bomber. Here is a Bomber that pretty closely matches the A6M Fighter in straight line performance.

I didn't bring these up, but since you did: The A7M never made it into the war. No question there. It was also the only potential successor to the A6M Zero. All the other Japanese fighters were land based only.

The N1K on the other hand DID make it into operations in significant numbers. The N1K Kyofu doesn't count here. The N1K1-J Shiden had a production run of about 1000 and the redesigned N1K2-J / Ja had a production run of about 400. Both aircraft had the unreliable Homare engine but when operating properly were easily superior to a Hellcat and about even with the -1 Corsair. (N1K2-Ja had a bit less speed but about 1000 fpm better climb and very good guns.) US Pilots were so superior in training by this time that the aircraft quality didn't really make a difference.

Regarding SB2C Helldiver as a worthy successor to Dauntless, I believe it wasn't. It wasn't a nice handling plane and was bad enough the Royal Navy canceled orders for it. I guess that is what comes from trying to make a full size "box scale" airplane. It also was quite prone to structural failures. My understanding is that it wasn't well liked by its pilots.

The F8F also was quite prone to structural "failures" which is probably why it never achieved what was expected by its straight line performance.

- Ivan.

The B6N was a significant death trap, something that has to be considered when calculating the worth of any aircraft (otherwise the F-104 was the best fighter of the 1960s and early 70s). A strong wind would kill the B6N, unlike the Avenger, a plane that, like all Grumman designs of the era, was almost insanely robust.

Regarding the C6N: If adding a torpedo to an aircraft that was never meant to carry anything more than a two man crew, one 7.7mm mg, and a camera didn't have a massive impact on its performance it would be a miracle (as an example the TBD, which was built from the first drawing as a bomber, was almost 50 MPH faster without a torpedo than with it).

The same sorts of issues existed with pretty much every Japanese design, they were either fragile, unreliable, or both. The range figures for most IJN aircraft are also, unlike at least some U.S. designs, wildly optimistic for any sort of real world use, relying on "clean" aircraft being flown at the leanest possible engine settings and ignoring "form-up" and other issues like idle time on deck (Interestingly, the U.S. went the other way when considering range. As an example the P-38, when pilots were trained to play the same sort of range tricks employed by IJN flyers had close to 40% more endurance. The P-80 has an often repeated range of 1,200 miles (although some source will show as low as 750 miles), yet a clean model managed an unrefueled LA-NYC flight of 2,500 miles at an average speed of 548 MPH.)

The same hold true for speed figures, although in this American designers tended to be as... hopeful as their Japanese counterparts. The most common max speeds quoted for the F6F is 380 MPH, with the F4U at 417 mph, while the N1K1-J is generally quoted at 363 MPH and the A7M at ~390 MPH. It is worth noting the the top speeds for both of these aircraft (as well as most other Japanese and Luftwaffe designs) were achieved during testing by U.S. engineers post war, with the aircraft having the advantage of higher octane fuel than was ever available to the Axis, something that was worth 10-20 MPH and comparable improvements in climb. Again, both aircraft are very good designs, illustrating that Japanese designers took a back seat to no one in WW II, but they were made in scant numbers and had such long gestation periods as to be little more than footnotes.

 

[M79]

*Japan sinking 2-3 carriers will force the remainder to guard Pearl Harbor

*Japan is likely to offer a peace shortly after Midway, likely rejected. They will also likely capture examples of American aircraft at Midway, perhaps a B-17, TBF avenger, F4F hellcat, or any number of other aircraft. These could be sent back to Japan for further analysis and used to improve their own designs.

*US will have to reinforce the West Coast because of percieved threats against California, Pearl Harbor will also be under paranoia

*Japanese will move to control Espiritu Santo, Fiji, New Caldonia, and Samoa (operation FS) with the airfield at Guadalcanal will likely be completed. They will also likely try to move against Port Moresby with bombing of Australian targets increased afterwards. This will free up some Japanese manpower and might cause them to consider objectives elsewhere, though where would be uncertain. Victory fever would remain so Australia, New Zealand, Ceylon, or maybe even Pearl Harbor itself would be considered.

*There might be plans for another strike against Pearl Harbor itself to damage the shipping facilities there, or against Portland OR or San Francisco shipyards/industry.

*This threatens supply routes into Australia, putting Brisbane and Sydney along with Wellington and Auckland into range of Japanese bombers. New Zealand would worry about potential invasion and Australia would be under threat as well.

*Impact on 1942 elections would be interesting with possibility of a few doves elected to the Congress

*Redirection of efforts into the PAcific is likely to see a "Japan First" strategy, slowing supplies to the USSR. The USSR needed American material, trucks, boots, and other supplies to function - if denied these their ability to counterattack is reduced. It's also going to anger Stalin to see his army take a backseat to the US needs and might delay or eliminate Torch as US manpower is redeployed elsewhere. This gives the Germans the potential to regroup in Tunisia and makes a landing in Sicily that much more difficult.

Overall effect:

-Difficult to surmise details but likely delays the war 5-6 months in Europe while 4-6 months shorter in the Pacific. It *might* make Australia and New Zealand amenable to peace proceedings for Japan only as the US will be unable to field a fleet for 6-9 months and Japan could bomb their cities with littel resistance.

-US still takes fight to Japan but will bypass Phillippines and go straight for Saipan, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa. Likely an invasion by mid 1944/early 1945 where Japan still has much of its peripheral Empire intact. Possible that the Chinese never truly succumb to Communism as Manchuria is never invaded by the USSR

-Without additional American material the USSR effort slows, permitting Germany 5-6 months of additional existance as D-Day is delayed in the West and Eastern Europe becomes a killing field. Without as much strategic bombing and without Italy bogging down their troops the Germans have more resources to focus in the east...to no avail. The Mp44 is distributed in larger numbers and the overall additional wartime funding might result in the transistor being discovered in 1946 or late 1945 instead of 1947, and the M-26 is deployed to Europe but sees little combat.

-By Christmas 1945 Berlin, if not all of Germany, Denmark, and perhaps Italy too, are flying Communist flags. France and the Low Countries are only spared as Germans just about beg the Allies to land and put up no resistance.

-Presuming the Atomic Bomb development goes on course this might swing the other way and leave Berlin a radioactive crater with Czechloslovakia, Hungary, and Yugoslavia free nations since the USSR would not have had time to reach them yet. NATO is larger and has Czech military/industrial talent at its disposal making for a more interesting Cold War.

 

[Ivan1GFP]

The B6N was a significant death trap, something that has to be considered when calculating the worth of any aircraft (otherwise the F-104 was the best fighter of the 1960s and early 70s). A strong wind would kill the B6N, unlike the Avenger, a plane that, like all Grumman designs of the era, was almost insanely robust.

Regarding the C6N: If adding a torpedo to an aircraft that was never meant to carry anything more than a two man crew, one 7.7mm mg, and a camera didn't have a massive impact on its performance it would be a miracle (as an example the TBD, which was built from the first drawing as a bomber, was almost 50 MPH faster without a torpedo than with it).

The same sorts of issues existed with pretty much every Japanese design, they were either fragile, unreliable, or both. The range figures for most IJN aircraft are also, unlike at least some U.S. designs, wildly optimistic for any sort of real world use, relying on "clean" aircraft being flown at the leanest possible engine settings and ignoring "form-up" and other issues like idle time on deck (Interestingly, the U.S. went the other way when considering range. As an example the P-38, when pilots were trained to play the same sort of range tricks employed by IJN flyers had close to 40% more endurance. The P-80 has an often repeated range of 1,200 miles (although some source will show as low as 750 miles), yet a clean model managed an unrefueled LA-NYC flight of 2,500 miles at an average speed of 548 MPH.)

The same hold true for speed figures, although in this American designers tended to be as... hopeful as their Japanese counterparts. The most common max speeds quoted for the F6F is 380 MPH, with the F4U at 417 mph, while the N1K1-J is generally quoted at 363 MPH and the A7M at ~390 MPH. It is worth noting the the top speeds for both of these aircraft (as well as most other Japanese and Luftwaffe designs) were achieved during testing by U.S. engineers post war, with the aircraft having the advantage of higher octane fuel than was ever available to the Axis, something that was worth 10-20 MPH and comparable improvements in climb. Again, both aircraft are very good designs, illustrating that Japanese designers took a back seat to no one in WW II, but they were made in scant numbers and had such long gestation periods as to be little more than footnotes.

Can you quote a source for your comments on the B6N. I am curious because I haven't heard this kind of structural weakness mentioned before.

Regarding C6N, Perhaps a couple 550 pound bombs (or perhaps a single 500 kg bomb) would not impact performance as much. This plane at just a bit below 400 mph had the surplus performance to waste this way.

Regarding range estimates, the Japanese were the early long range experts. Flying missions against the Philippines from Taiwan isn't trivial. FWIW, the USN completely discounted the range information that they received from Grumman for the Hellcat because they were unable to come anywhere near reproducing it in practice. In practice, US planes flew on either Auto-Rich or Auto-Lean without a pilot tweaking the mixtures.

I will hold comments regarding the jets because as you pointed out earlier, they are irrelevant to discussions on wartime aircraft.

There are LOTS of misconceptions regarding the performance of Japanese WW2 aircraft. I know I am not the authority on this subject, but here goes anyway:

First of all, increasing octane isn't going to do anything for an engine that isn't tuned for it. Remember this wasn't the era of computer controlled ignition that automatica retards when it detects knocking. Also 10-20 mph needs a LOT of extra power. Consider that the speed increase is the cube root of the power increase assuming nothing else (altitude especially) has changed. Japanese fuel was typically 91-92 octane which is a little lower than US fuel, but German C3 fuel at 96 / 100 octane nominal was MUCH better quality than US fuel as stated in the tests of the FW 190 that now sits at Udvar Hazy. The question is how the octane number is calculated. Is it Research, Motor or (R+M)/2 and is it under rich or lean conditions. Don't group all the Axis together in this regard.

Japanese tended to document "maximum speed" as that achieved with "Military" power and not War Emergency Power. Consider that the official maximum speed in the manual for the A6M2 was only 316 mph and the USN test of Koga's Zero achieved 332 mph in a plane that wasn't in perfect shape. Saburo Sakai believed it was 345 mph with "overboost" which would have been the equivalent of our WEP which is how US aircraft are tested.

Typical sources list the maximum speed of the J2M3 Raiden 21 as 371 mph. The US tests of a J2M2 Raiden 11 achieved 407 mph and the J2M3 Raiden 21 achieved 417 mph. If you look at photographs of the J2M3 (Tail Code S12), you will note that it did NOT have the "High Activity" version of the propeller that can be seen on a photo of a Yokosuka plane that has its tail propped up.

One of the factors that I hinted at earlier is the rather poor performance of the Nakajima Ha-45 Homare engine. This little tiny (1940 Cubic Inch) engine could in theory put out 1990 hp at take-off. It probably actually did this if built and maintained correctly, but under field conditions, 1300 hp was more typical if it ran reliably at all. Consider that the Japanese even worked on replacing the "1990 hp" Homare with a 1500 hp Ha-112 on the Ki-84 Hayate. Sounds like a silly idea if you didn't know about the problems operational aircraft were having. The famous 427 mph Hayate probably was able to perform that well because it had some pretty good mechanics and good spare parts in the post-war USA to keep the Ha-45 up to its design performance.

One other surprising thing I found is that many if not most of the late war Japanese designs had laminar flow airfoils which may account for some performance gains. What is interesting is plotting engine power graphs against maximum speed. If you do this, you find that either the planes built by the Japanese were incredibly draggy or something else is going on to account for the lack of claimed speed.

Regarding Fragility, the Ki-43 Hayabusa had that issue. The A6M Reisen had it also to some extent, but in general, later planes did not. Fragility in structural strength and load bearing really isn't the same thing as proper armour. On the other hand, the F8F Bearcat WAS fragile. Its wing tips were designed to break off at 6G or so.

- Ivan.