XXXVI. The Last Macedonian
An illustration of the medieval city of Ani, capital of Bagratid Armenia
The Southern Contest
The invasion of Salerno by the Armenian-Byzantine general
Basil Theodorokanos in 1046 was probably not imagined by either Basil or Emperor
George Maniakes as a first strike against the Italo-Roman Empire. Duke Leo had placed his duchy squarely within the Byzantine sphere and had been compensated well for it, and it is understandable how the treachery of his sons would have been seen in Constantinople not as aggression by an Italian vassal but as rebellion by disloyal subjects. Given his many other obligations, George may wall have ignored the defection of Salerno to the Tusculani had the new dukes
Gregory and
Leo Lupellus not already provoked a revolt in Apulia and endangered the Byzantine position in Sicily which had seemed on its way to recovery before the death of Duke Leo.
The initial moves of Basil and his army support this notion. After defeating Lombard rebel forces in Apulia, Basil marched into Lucania and recovered this province with little opposition. From there, the Byzantines marched on Salerno itself and besieged the city. They found it held by the younger duke, Leo Lupellus, and while the Salernitans were at a severe disadvantage Basil nevertheless hoped to avoid a prolonged siege. He opened negotiations with Leo, offering him court titles to return to imperial obedience; this may have been Basil’s terms to both brothers or an attempt to suborn the younger duke into Byzantine clientage in exchange for becoming the sole ruler of Salerno. Either way, Leo didn’t bite, and Basil was forced to proceed with an actual siege of the city.
The reason Gregory was absent was that he had already gone north to seek the aid of the emperor his father had abandoned,
Constantine II. Now in his ninth year of co-rule alongside his overshadowed brother
Theodorus, Constantine had yet to see battle; the only serious conflict the empire had been involved with in his reign had been the rebellion of Vazul against his cousin
Constantine of Hungary, which had involved the Italo-Roman empire only by way of Italian mercenaries in Hungarian service. Constantine, we are told, was enticed into action by the promises of Duke Gregory, who offered to be his vassal in exchange for protection. The very fact that Gregory could offer this is notable, as it suggests that the functional independence or Byzantine clientage of the Salernitan state was recognized even by the Italian emperor. The apparent autonomy of the southern dukes, which was not exclusive to Salerno, is pointed to by some as a criticism of the reign of Constantine and Theodorus. The south, however, had clearly been drifting out of imperial control even in the reign of Constantine I.
The elder Constantine had arguably erred by leaving his dynasty’s cadette branch, the Crescentii, ruling in Benevento and Capua. The emperor had some years earlier intervened to divide those states between rival brothers
Crescentius[1] and
Theophylact, but the death of Crescentius in 1020 (and the death of his only son, John, in the Sardinian expedition four years earlier) had allowed Theophylact to reunite the principality with no apparent opposition from Constantine. Theophylact died in 1038, a year after the elder Constantine, and the state was once again partitioned between his sons
Cencius,
[2] Demetrius, and
John (often titled in the chronicles as
Iohannes Parvus, “John the Small” or “Little John”). Miraculously this arrangement seems to have held – Cencius in Benevento, Demetrius in Capua, and John apparently holding lands around Melfi – but the death of Demetrius ended the family peace. Cencius and John agreed to a new two-way split to the disadvantage of the son of Demetrius, also named Cencius and differentiated at that time as
Cencius of Capua. After driving his nephew into exile, John assumed control in Capua but reneged on his bargain with his elder brother, which was apparently to surrender his lands in Melfi upon taking the Capuan duchy. The subsequent conflict between the two brothers ended only in 1043 with the death of the elder Cencius, at which point the family domains were reunited under John.
“Little John” had no direct involvement with the Byzantine campaigns in Sicily, but had joined Gregory and Leo Lupellus in their invasion of Apulia, no doubt to expand his own considerable domain. That provided an opening to Cencius of Capua, who had been in exile in Amalfi since 1039 or 1040 and now sought the support of Basil Theodorokanos in exchange for giving his fealty to Constantinople. Capua and Benevento had not been eastern dependencies for a century, but installing pro-Constantinople governments in the south did have the obvious advantage of creating a buffer between the Italians and Byzantine Italy. Whether Basil himself considered that worth the prospect of directly antagonizing the Italians is difficult to know, but the point was moot, for word soon reached him that an Italian army was on its way south with Emperor Constantine II at its head.
Quite contrary to the Byzantine point of view, Constantine II acted as if the southern duchies were possessions of the Tusculani monarchy which he was bound to protect. It was clearly an idea he had only come to lately, as the emperor had made seemingly no protest during the years in which Duke Leo was so far within the Greek camp as to be an imperially appointed catepan, and why exactly the emperor felt it necessary to take this step is still a subject of debate. Apart from the effect of the pleas of Duke Gregory, it may also be that Constantine saw this as an opportunity to assert his own power and martial might. This was, after all, still an age in which a king and emperor in the Latin world was required to be – or at least appear to be – a brave leader of men, and Constantine had never led an army in his life. This interest in proving himself, or perhaps just his pride, may be what inspired him to lead the army personally, something which his father had rarely done after the Burgundinian war of his youth; or perhaps he simply did not trust anyone else with command of the imperial army in the field.
Benedictus Azymus
There is also the chance that the emperor was influenced by his foremost ecclesiastical magnate. The death of the powerful and worldly Pope Demetrius in 1029 had been followed by a string of short-lived and rather unremarkable popes, all of them eminent old Roman or Italo-Greek clerics. Demetrius was followed by
John XII (1029-1031),
Romanus II (1031-1036), and the feeble
Isaac (1036-1037), a Lucanian monk who was in his eighties when he assumed the Papacy and lasted less than a year. Isaac survived Constantine I only by two months, and when Constantine II and Theodorus were faced with the choice of a successor the former turned in a wholly different direction than his father. His Carolingian empress,
Mathilde, prevailed upon him to select her confessor,
Anselm of Chartres, as Pope
Anselm. The choice was unpopular among the nobility and clergy of Rome, who barely tolerated the Italo-Greeks and considered anyone from further afield than Lombardy to be a barbarian, but Constantine II was trading on the considerable weight of his father’s influence and the Romans were convinced to go along with it. Anselm, lacking much talent for rule and surrounded by suspicious citizens and disdainful clergy, ran into obstacles at every turn. Eventually he resorted to importing French priests to fill important curial posts, which only further enraged the Roman clerical elite. One of his newly-appointed cardinal-deacons was beaten half to death by a Roman mob in 1039, and thereafter the pope was practically a man under siege in his own palace. He died in 1040, allegedly of apoplexy, although rumors persisted that the Romans had finally dealt with the interloper by poisoning him.
The emperor’s choice to replace Anselm was
Gilbert of Vertus, another of the empress’s circle of expatriate Franks. The Romans were even less pleased with a barbarian pope a second time around, but Gilbert was a more canny politician than his predecessor. At his coronation he selected the acceptably Roman moniker of
Benedictus as his regnal name, becoming Pope
Benedict V. Rather than importing foreigners to rule the church hierarchy, “Benedict” turned to the local Romans and attempted to drive a wedge between them and the more recent Italo-Greek arrivals. There was, truthfully, not much difference to work with, so the pope increasingly turned to small variations of doctrine which had over the centuries developed between the Latins and those churches more directly supervised by Constantinople. He authored a tract inveighing against the use of leavened bread in the Eucharist, which was used in the Greek rite but not by the Latins, and is the first pope to have introduced the
filioque – the phrase “and the son” to the Nicene Creed – which had previously been standard in most of the Carolingian world but had evidently not penetrated far into Italy. Although the many Greek monasteries in Rome and its environs were not closed, Benedict began placing restrictions upon them, including limiting the number of new novices they could add or attempting to enforce changes in the Basilian rite to “Latinize” their practice, even meddling in such trivia as the monastic diet. This predictably created tension within Rome, which was probably Benedict’s purpose, but it was also poorly received in Constantinople. It was either there or among the Italo-Greeks themselves that Benedict acquired one of the more unusual epithets of medieval popes,
Benediktos Azymos (“Benedict the Unleavened”).
For Benedict, the invasion of Basil Theodorokanos was heaven-sent. Like Demetrius, he longed to extend Rome’s rule to all of Italy, but Demetrius’ concerns were purely temporal – he does not seem to have begrudged any part of the Greek rite so long as the clerics who followed it in Italy were under his authority. In contrast, Benedict entertained notions of making the Latin rite – and the Frankish version of that rite which he favored – ascendant in all the south. Egidius of Florence gives him a prominent place among those who encouraged Constantine II to “rescue” Salerno, and the pope no doubt hoped that the emperor’s victorious army would take the rest of Byzantine Italy with it.
Alburnus
Constantine’s army probably represented one of the largest Italian forces fielded in decades, including imperial
milites, the emperor’s own
milites Ungarorum, Roman nobility, and civic militiamen from Tuscany. The dukes of Gaeta, Benevento-Capua, Salerno, and Naples joined the host once Constantine arrived in the south. Contemporaries claimed the force to be as many as fifty thousand strong, but even allowing for expected exaggeration it seems unlikely that a truly large force could have been mustered for what was must have been a hurriedly arranged affair. Every source indicates that this was not a campaign planned in advance, but a prompt reaction to an invasion; Basil seemingly had only a few weeks to besiege Salerno before he was faced with the emperor’s response.
Basil’s army was representative of typical 11th century Byzantine expeditionary forces in that it included a little bit of everything – veterans of Macedonian and Anatolian
tagmata as well as Armenians, Paulicians, Italo-Greeks, and southern Lombard auxiliaries serving either as mercenaries or under Cencius of Capua, who possessed some small military following of his own. A 200-strong detachment of the
exkoubitoi, an imperial guard cavalry regiment, accompanied Basil, but the
varangoi who had followed Maniakes to Sicily were notably absent.
Basil lifted the siege of Salerno and retreated some 30 or 40 miles east in the vicinity of the village of Sicinianum, in the shadow of the Alburni mountains. Greek and Latin chroniclers alike imply or state outright that he was retreating either out of fear of his adversary or a prudent amount of caution given the numerical superiority of his enemy (although even that is disputed), but as mentioned earlier it is unlikely that Basil had been ordered to start a war with Constantine and his retreat may have been as much an act of diplomacy as strategy. He eventually halted at a low hill near a river (probably the Sele).
Although accounts conflict, the most sensible narrative of the battle seems to be that Constantine’s Hungarians skirmished against the defenders with reasonably good effect, but failed to dislodge them from their position. Growing impatient, the emperor ordered a full attack. This succeeded in breaking the Byzantine right flank, which stood halfway up the hill, and threatened to roll up the whole Byzantine line. In in the moment of crisis, however, Basil committed his reserve of cavalry, including the
exkoubitoi, who smashed into the victorious but now-tiring Italian cavalrymen who had collapsed the Byzantine right. In the furious melee of cavalry that followed, the Byzantine heavy cavalry proved irresistible; the murderous effect to which they used their iron maces is noted in several sources, both Latin and Greek. The Italian
milites fell back into confusion and then routed
en masse, and the remaining Italian forces were put to flight. The emperor himself does not seem to have been heavily engaged, for which some chroniclers reproached him for cowardice; he retreated with his Hungarians upon realizing the battle was lost.
Although a wholesale slaughter of the defeated is not mentioned – many of the Italians seem to have escaped – Constantine’s army nevertheless seems to have dissolved in the wake of the Byzantine victory. Duke
John V of Naples and Leo Lupellus of Salerno were both captured, while Leo’s older brother Gregory was mortally wounded. With these eminent prisoners, Basil obtained the surrender of Salerno and Naples. Wasting no time, Basil then besieged Capua and defeated an attempt by John Parvus to relieve the city, being defeated and nearly captured at Caserta. Capua fell shortly thereafter to a Byzantine assault.
The effect of the Battle of Alburnus was to roll back a century of Tusculani encroachment into southern Italy. Basil failed to take Benevento, where John Parvus continued to rule a territory of considerable size, and little Gaeta continued to be a Tusculani client state, but the rest of the southern principalities now acknowledged George Maniakes as their sovereign. John V of Naples, who had assisted the Byzantines in Sicily and had not participated in the Apulian invasion of Gregory and Leo, made a seamless transition from Italian to Byzantine client, as did
John II of Amalfi who had come to power in a pro-Italian coup but was more than happy to flow with the current. The Gaetan dynasty of Salerno was replaced with a native South-Lombard prince,
Gisulf (or Gisulf II), whose name may imply some relation to the old princely family which the Tusculani had displaced, and Leo Lupellus was taken in fetters back to Constantinople.
The Giant Astride the Empire
The victory of Basil Theodorokanos brought the Byzantine Empire to the largest territorial extent it had enjoyed since the Arab conquests. Judged only by a map, the empire seemed ascendant and unassailable. Certainly there are good things to be said for Emperor
George Maniakes, who led the empire to considerable military success in his reign, but the giant himself stood on the shoulders of those much taller than him. The state, the army, and the finances which sustained them both had been kept well in order by Basil II, and the inertia which he left his successors continued to carry them for decades.
Despite his reputation as a warrior and a commander, the military accomplishments of George as emperor were fairly modest. His greatest personal accomplishment was the reduction of Serbian Dioclea, whose prince was an enemy of the empire but hardly an existential threat in the manner of the Bulgarian emperors. Pecheneg raids over the Danube, accelerating after 1045, were dealt with diplomatically rather than militarily, to decidedly mixed success. Victory in Italy secured that long-troubled frontier and restored the Lombard clients lost a century prior, but Sicily continued to be a vain exercise. Syracuse, Messina, and a handful of coastal fortresses still held out, but only by the constant exertions of Byzantine generals and the overstretched imperial fleet. It was, on balance, a liability to the empire, and one it could ill afford.
In matters of defense, the policy of Maniakes which was most distinct from his predecessors was the empire’s policy towards the Armenians. Since the reign of Basil II, the emperors had pursued a policy of gradual absorption in which the various independent principalities of the Armenians were made into clients and then annexed one by one into the empire. In modern scholarship this is sometimes portrayed as simple conquest, but there must have been considerable buy-in by the Armenian elites, as the
naxarar aristocrats of the Armenian petty kingdoms seem in many cases to have transitioned into Byzantine officials with relatively little fuss.
In terms of defensive strategy, this policy of annexation was reasonable only so long as the Armenians who were now within the empire’s borders remained loyal. After the death of Constantine VIII in 928, however, the new emperor Romanos III Argyros had favored a more hard-line policy towards the non-Chalcedonian churches of the east which the conquests of the Macedonian emperors had returned to Byzantine control. According to legend, while Romanos passed near Antioch in his ill-fated campaign against Edessa in 1030 he had been appalled at the number of “heretical” monks in the mountains nearby (some of which were in turn conscripted into his army). Imperial-supported attempts at converting the Syriacs and Armenians followed, which for the most part succeeded only in creating further estrangement between the Christian communities of the east. George Maniakes returned to the more tolerant policies of the earlier Macedonians (at least with regards to the Armenians – the situation of the Syriacs seems not to have improved much), which has been seen by some as a wise policy of courting the empire’s Armenian subjects. It should be said, however, that there is little evidence that by the time of George’s coup any such religious controversy had grown dire enough to pose a material threat to the empire’s frontier.
George also reversed the aggressive stance of his predecessors towards the independent Armenians, in particular
Gagik II, the Bagratuni king of Ani. Gagik had only taken the throne recently, either in the reign of Michael V or late in the reign of his uncle, but had already fought off a Byzantine attempt to take his kingdom. Soon after the accession of George Maniakes, Gagik sent out an olive branch to the new emperor, offering to be his vassal (or “ally,” depending on the source). George’s acceptance was signified by his bestowal of the high court title of
kouropalates upon Gagik. This restored relationship bore immediate fruit: untroubled by the threat of Byzantine invasion, Gagik attacked the Shaddadid emir of Ganja
Ali ibn Musa in 1046 with support from the Byzantine governor of Vaspurakan and reconquered Dvin, which had been lost to the Armenian kings since 1022.
The emperor’s approach to the Armenian issue seems a likely product of his familiarity with both individual Armenians and the military importance of the Armenians in the empire’s defense. He had served in various command billets in the east, at Telouch, Mesopotamia, Edessa, and Vaspurakan, all of which had Armenian majorities or at least sizable Armenian populations. Armenian soldiers were present in his Sicilian expedition, including capable officers like Basil Theodorokanos. Not all, however, shared his views, and the religious establishment in particular was at best wary of the emperor’s coddling of the Armenians and other divergent sects.
Indeed, by the time of the Battle of Alburnus the emperor was well on his way towards alienating nearly every base of power in the empire. He had already embittered the mob against him with his handling of Zoe and the Varangian massacre in the capital, but more serious was his loss of support among the aristocracy. The cost of the imperial military continued to grow in George’s reign; any savings by passing on responsibility for defense to Gagik in the east was easily washed away by the cost of repeated expeditions to Italy and Sicily – prestige projects which did little to strengthen the state – on top of the already immense costs of defending the empire’s Danubian and Armenian borders against the Pechenegs and Seljuks, respectively.
More worryingly, the revenues of the empire were not only failing to keep up, but falling more and more behind. Basil II had kept a firm hand on the fiscal tiller, raising taxes and eliminating exemptions and privileges for the
dynatoi and the church alike while lifting burdens from the farmers who supplied him with his army. That uncompromising probity had been swiftly abandoned by Constantine VIII and revenue policy had only grown more lax since then. Realizing the dire situation the treasury was in, George attempted beginning around 1046 to claw back the privileges and possessions which the aristocracy had accumulated over the past two decades, but in doing so he only provoked resentment. An aristocratic revolt in Anatolia broke out in 1044, led in part by the emperor’s old rival
Romanos Skleros; as much motivated by personal animus as imperial policy, this rebellion was quickly crushed, but that did nothing to mitigate the growing hostility of the aristocracy towards the emperor.
The Last Macedonian
What George lacked most critically was legitimacy. George Maniakes is often compared to the earlier non-dynastic “general-emperors” of the Macedonian period – Romanos Lekapenos, Nikephoros II Phokas, and John Tzimiskes – but all of those claimed some formal association with the dynasty, either as the legitimate emperor’s stepfather (Phokas, Tzimiskes) or father-in-law (Lekapenos). Romanos III and Michael IV, maligned as they often are, were still married to the empress
Zoe. His farcical “adoption” by Zoe aside, however, George Maniakes had ultimately nothing behind him but force. The lesson that his coronation taught to the
dynatoi was that with ambition, ruthlessness, and an army, a disgruntled general of no extraordinary pedigree could aspire to the throne.
In 1047, the Seljuk prince
Qutalmish appeared in Ganja with an army, possibly summoned by the Shaddadid emir who had embraced Seljuk suzerainty after his ejection from Dvin by King Gagik II. Despite valiant resistance by the Armenians, Dvin was recaptured and much of Gagik’s eastern kingdom was laid waste. In the following year, bolstered by a large force of migratory Oghuz Turks who had come from Transoxiana in search of food and pasture, Qutalmish returned alongside
Ibrahim Yinal, the half-brother of the Seljuk ruler
Tughril, and led a raid by way of Vaspurakan which nearly reached the Black Sea. The devastation was significant, but while withdrawing towards Armenia with their plunder the Turks were attacked by the Armenian
sparapet Grigor Pahlavuni and the
strategos of Vaspurakan
Basil Apokapes (himself of Armenian descent). The ensuing Battle of Vaghashkert was the first serious engagement between the Byzantines and Seljuks and resulted in a clear defeat of the invaders, who were forced to leave much of their plunder behind in their flight. Nevertheless, the Seljuks had proven themselves capable of piercing the empire’s eastern defenses with little trouble, and they had no shortage of Oghuz tribesmen hungry for land and plunder.
The same year saw the death of Empress Zoe at the age of 69. Even from her convent she had constituted a threat, and with her passing the emperor could breathe a little easier. Her younger sister, Theodora, still lived, but Theodora had never married, had never exercised power, and did not seem to pose much of a threat. At the age of 50, George still had many potential years of rule before him, but was already looking ahead. Freed from deference to the Macedonians after the death of Zoe and buoyed by the recent success of his armies at Alburnus and Vaghashkert, George chose the following year, 1048, as the proper time to crown his adult son
Theophylact Maniakes as his co-emperor and heir.
The emperor had badly misjudged his position. Those that had tolerated his overthrow of the pitiful Michael V had not done so imagining that he would then attempt to establish his own familial dynasty; it seemed like a gross display of arrogance. The centers of power which had already been waning in their support for the emperor now completely turned against him. He had alienated the aristocracy with his over-eager attempts to balance the imperial budget on their backs, he had alienated the court by his contempt for ceremony and his slashing of courtiers’ salaries (a cost-cutting measure), he had alienated the Church by his pandering to eastern “heretics,” and he had alienated the Constantinopolitans by his butchery. Lacking much in the way of personal diplomacy, he intimidated courtiers and roared at officials who displeased him; his great and terrifying visage gave him the respect of his soldiers but only evoked fear and resentment from the court.
In September of 1048, his enemies moved against him. While hawking with his son near Thessalonica, his party was attacked by armed men dispatched by the Macedonian nobleman
Leo Tornikios, who had been actively conspiring with George’s enemies at court. The emperor had made the fatal error of leaving his Varangians at the capital, and George’s guards present with him were either overwhelmed or themselves party to the conspiracy. Michael Psellos, who memorably described George as a superhuman giant, claims that the emperor was shot by several arrows to no apparent effect, and even when wounded and surrounded by armed men managed to kill four of his assailants with his bare hands before succumbing to their swords.
Theophylact escaped the ambush and fled to the capital. His support within the city, however, did not extend far beyond the Varangians, and it was clear that his rule would be short-lived. Yet although George’s opponents had been united in their opposition to him, there was no consensus as to who would replace him. Leo obviously hoped he would be that person, but his co-conspirators in the court were not a controlling majority. With a very serious chance of civil war on the horizon, the high officials in the capital pressured Theophylact to abdicate in favor of the last Macedonian, Theodora. Theophylact, seeing no other option, bowed to their will. The empress was taken from a convent to a coronation, while Theophylact replaced her in exile.
Feeling betrayed, Leo decided to seize the throne anyway, and marched on the capital with his soldiers. Now, however, George’s domestic of the east,
Isaac Komenos, arrived on the scene accompanied by a tagmatic army; summoned by Theophylact, he had arrived too late to save the career of George’s son, but faced with a choice between Leo or Theodora he elected to serve the latter. Isaac crossed over to Thrace and decisively defeated the rebels near Adrianople. Leo Tornikios fled, but in one of history’s finest examples of poetic justice he was captured by the Varangian Guard, who avenged the murder of their esteemed
Gyrgir by torturing him to death.
[A]
Despite his dynastic pretensions, George thus shared the fate of Nikephoros Phokas and John Tzimiskes as a militarily effective but short-lived caretaker for the Macedonian dynasty. Although reviled by many contemporaries, his later reputation was rescued by the diligent effort of Michael Psellos, who without excusing George’s faults promoted him as the epitome of bravery and martial vigor at a time when the empire had great need of men with such attributes. He was perhaps most beloved by the Armenians, whose medieval historians dubbed him
Gevorg Hzor (“George the Mighty”).
[3]
Sole Emperor
Constantine had little time to recover from his military setback, for in March of 1048 he abruptly died of a fever. His death at 43 was totally unexpected; later writers blamed his luxuriant lifestyle (and a few darkly whispered of poison, the go-to explanation when a seemingly healthy ruler dropped dead). Fortunately for the realm, the succession was once again straightforward. There was, after all, already an emperor, Constantine’s younger brother Theodorus. Mathilde of France, the widowed empress, had borne Constantine two daughters and no sons, and both daughters were as yet unmarried.
Theodorus, a shy and retiring man who had never sought glory or influence, was now thrust into power as the sole ruler of Italy and emperor of the Latin world. Despite the sudden death of Constantine and the debacle of Alburnus, the fact of Tusculani rule did not seem to be seriously imperiled; by now the family had ruled Italy for a century and there did not seem to be any serious alternatives. While on the rise, the new class of imperial
milites and bureaucrats could not produce a man from their ranks who could credibly aspire to the imperial throne. An absence of pretenders, however, did not mean an absence of conflict. Theodorus’ reign was troubled from the outset, pulled in different directions by several competing factions: the judicial-bureaucratic syndicate of the
calamarius Milus Olearius, the aristocratic old guard represented by the Roman nobility and some northern senatorial families, and a “Frankish” faction emerging around an alliance between Empress Mathilde and Pope Benedict.
Map of Italy and its environs in 1048 after the death of Constantine II
Next Time:
Overthrow[B]
Footnotes (In Character)
[1] This is the son of Crescentius the Younger, who is somewhat confusingly called Crescentius II by some and Crescentius III by others, as he was the third Crescentius of the family but only the second to rule as Duke of Benevento.
[2] Over the course of the 11th century, “Cencius” seems to have largely displaced “Crescentius” as a given name. The first evidence of this early in the century is in the vicinity of Rome, presumably among people unrelated to the Crescentii, but by the middle of the century even the Crescentii dukes are referred to in charters more often as Cencius than Crescentius. Cencius, son of Theophylact, is occasionally known as Crescentius IV or Cencius IV for this reason (or Cencius/Crescentius III of Benevento).
[3]A sad postscript to George’s fall is the fate of his son Theophylact. After his abdication, George’s son went into exile on the “Prince’s Islands” near the Bosporus. Theodora had originally promised him amnesty, perhaps solely to keep the Varangians pacified during the transition of power, but within a few months of her accession she reneged on her agreement. Theophylact Maniakes was blinded and castrated, and vanishes from the historical record thereafter.
Timeline Notes (Out of Character)
[A] Some people just have no luck in any timeline. Both IOTL and ITTL, Leo Tornikios rebels for the throne and gets killed in the attempt.
[B] The present update will be the last one of 2016. As an added Christmas bonus, I've set up threadmarks throughout the thread, so you can now easily navigate between all chapters in the thread (and a few non-chapter posts of importance). See you next year!