Operation Downfall 1945:US invasion of Japan

[Strategos]

...You have no idea, do you? They had severe and brutal shortages of ammunition, no oil, and even the school children, old men and women were being conscritped to fight eith fucking wooden spears.

The Japanese didnt really have much to fight with and were starving. In fact, just delay the operation for six months and let Japan starve some and keep firebombing them.



And many American soldiers had resorted to simply never taking any prisoners because of far too many incidents of false surrendering plus grenades.

This combined with total american fire superiority and you have and horrendously lopsided ratio of bloodshed with the possibility that American soldiers end up burning and blasting nearly everything and shooting everything else.

Its a brutal bloody curbstomp and the Japanese had decided to mobilize nearly there enire populace, even with just fucking knives and spears, to banzai charge the American lines or just hold the fight suicidally. This would have resulted in a horrendous slaughter that wouldnt have had any equal. And then there is the question of if America would start feeding them soon enough before mass die off due to the winter and starvation occur.

And with th maasive material and numerical superiority the American forces would have wnjoyed, not to mention being properly fed, itvwould have been a massacre.


A horrendous genocide brought on by Japanese refusal to surrender and ruthless use of firepower.



Four million American casualties at worst.


Now as far as the Soviets...by 1947, they will be starving and running out of oil and ammo and reenforcements and what industry they had left bombed to hell, nukes or no. Most American casualties will be when the Soviets are expending all the ammunition they still have left over and the food they have left over.

After that, they will have simply ran out of people to throw into the meatgrinder. While America has 10 million more left and plenty of logistics, tanks and firepower.

In fact, just securing beachheads and then letting the Japanese starve some more until the middle of Spring would be perfectly easy. Especially since the Japanese cant replace expended ammunition to any releva.t degree..

 

[phx1138]

...You have no idea, do you? They had severe and brutal shortages of ammunition, no oil...The Japanese didnt really have much to fight with and were starving.

In fact, just securing beachheads and then letting the Japanese starve some more until the middle of Spring would be perfectly easy. Especially since the Japanese cant replace expended ammunition to any releva.t degree..

In fact, just delay the operation for six months and let Japan starve some and keep firebombing them.

So, no strategic mobility & limited ammo. With this, they're going to inflict four million U.S. casualties?

Have you read Skates? I have. His estimate puts it closer to 250,000.

You don't even see the inherent contradiction here, do you? If the U.S. holds off, they can induce mass starvation. How long do you think the government is going to fight if people are dying in the thousands--even millions? It damn sure won't lead to four million U.S. casualties when the invasion comes--if it ever does.

And I have no clue?

far too many incidents of false surrendering plus grenades.

Early in the war, yes. By 1945, the psywar boys had figured out how to induce surrenders even among the hardcases, & had managed to persuade even MacArthur (who had little faith in psywar) to let them try. I see no reason the leaflet-dropping campaigns offering "honorable captivity" & "no need for Japan's extinction" would stop. Indeed, I expect they'd escalate.

the Japanese had decided to mobilize nearly there enire populace

That's the popular myth. How long would it take for the psywar effort to persuade civilians "death before dishonor" was unnecessary, because the victorious U.S. didn't demand death? Because the U.S. had no desire to extinguish Japan, just end the damn war...?

You say all this, & I have no clue?

A horrendous genocide brought on by Japanese refusal to surrender and ruthless use of firepower.

Which presumes an absolute refusal, which the evidence doesn't support.

Four million American casualties at worst.

That's so preposterous, it doesn't deserve an answer. Truman's claim of one million was absurd.

the Soviets...by 1947, they will be starving and running out of oil and ammo and reenforcements and what industry they had left bombed to hell, nukes or no.

Like the Japanese, who were starving & out of oil by 1945, yet will by some miracle inflict four million casualties? What makes you think the Sovs wouldn't fight just as damn hard?

You don't even see the inherent contradiction here, do you? You say this, & I have no clue?

 

[lionhead]

Maybe Strategos means 4 million US inflicted casualties

I mean they won't even be landing 4 million americans onto the island in total i think. Let alone die.

Also Strategos, what you keep on saying about the Soviet Union going to war with US and loosing; not going to happen over Japan. They won't go to war against the USSR just to kick them out of Japan. That proposturous(sp?). Not would the USSR risk going to war against the US in Europe. Certainly not after the USA has demonstrated having the atomic bomb.

 

[phx1138]

Four million American casualties

Maybe Strategos means 4 million US inflicted casualties

IMO, lionhead, you're being way too charitable. I don't see how you can read this any other way than casualties among U.S. forces, which is sheerest nonsense.

Not would the USSR risk going to war against the US in Europe. Certainly not after the USA has demonstrated having the atomic bomb.

Agreed. In fact, it's been suggested that's why SecState Byrnes stalled Japan--so he could use the Bomb & frighten the Sovs. (He couldn't know Stalin knew all about it already...)

 

[lionhead]

IMO, lionhead, you're being way too charitable.

Well, it is Christmas afterall

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

I'd recommend reading Col Yaharas description of the Japanese side of the battle of Okinawa. Operations officer in the Japanese Army HQ on Okinawa Yahara was ordered to evade the Americans, return to Japan, and report on the experience of the Okinawan defenders. Yahara was only able to evade the US soldiers for a week, but he did eventually return to Japan and report. His report was eventually rewritten with assistance and translated into English.

A few random points from Yaharas account:

The Okinawan civilians were near useless as support for the Japanese Army. The Japanese civilians were marginally better, but they had negligable combat value despite some lip service to using them as supplementary soldiers. The civilians spent most of their time hiding & surrendered when the opportunity came.

Late in the battle desertion, malingering, and evasion of the combat zone became common. While the soldiers in the infantry battalions were killed off in combat, the support units had a less motivated men. Yahara describes large groups of soldiers hiding outside the imeadiate combat zone during the last weeks of the battle. This is supported by US Army records which show a noticable percentage of the original Japanese strength in the PoW cages post battle. In the Pacific island battles it was rare for even 1% of the defenders to survive. The percent on Okinawa was far higher.

Yahara describes several smaller & one major example of poor military leadership wasting significant opportunities to extend the battle and cause larger casualties to the US soldiers. In the most aggrivated case the Japanese Army commander approved a plan in the later half of the campaign to execute a large scale frontal attack on the US Army. Execution of this attack required the use of the best remaining infantry division as the center piece, with the best regiments of the other formations in support. In three days of assualts the best remaining Japanese artillery & infantry battalions were destroyed in frontal attacks by US firepower. Yahara judged that strength could have extended the battle at least four weeks and raised US casualties by a similar proportion.

Yahara also referes to significant demoralization after this failed offensive. Officers became increasingly appathetic, failing to take action. Evasion of the combat zone seems to have increased afterwards as well.

Yaharas account suggests strongly that the Japanese fanatacism was not as deeply seated as popularly suposed. Even in the case of fanatics suicide was often chosen over dying in the effort to kill a few more enemy. The deep seated fanatacism seems to have been among the Army infantry, with the Naval and Army support personnel much less likely to fight as aggresvely & suicidally as the better indoctrinated infantry.

 

[UrbanRedneck]

I'd recommend reading Col Yaharas description of the Japanese side of the battle of Okinawa. Operations officer in the Japanese Army HQ on Okinawa Yahara was ordered to evade the Americans, return to Japan, and report on the experience of the Okinawan defenders. Yahara was only able to evade the US soldiers for a week, but he did eventually return to Japan and report. His report was eventually rewritten with assistance and translated into English.

A few random points from Yaharas account:

The Okinawan civilians were near useless as support for the Japanese Army. The Japanese civilians were marginally better, but they had negligable combat value despite some lip service to using them as supplementary soldiers. The civilians spent most of their time hiding & surrendered when the opportunity came.

Late in the battle desertion, malingering, and evasion of the combat zone became common. While the soldiers in the infantry battalions were killed off in combat, the support units had a less motivated men. Yahara describes large groups of soldiers hiding outside the imeadiate combat zone during the last weeks of the battle. This is supported by US Army records which show a noticable percentage of the original Japanese strength in the PoW cages post battle. In the Pacific island battles it was rare for even 1% of the defenders to survive. The percent on Okinawa was far higher.

Yahara describes several smaller & one major example of poor military leadership wasting significant opportunities to extend the battle and cause larger casualties to the US soldiers. In the most aggrivated case the Japanese Army commander approved a plan in the later half of the campaign to execute a large scale frontal attack on the US Army. Execution of this attack required the use of the best remaining infantry division as the center piece, with the best regiments of the other formations in support. In three days of assualts the best remaining Japanese artillery & infantry battalions were destroyed in frontal attacks by US firepower. Yahara judged that strength could have extended the battle at least four weeks and raised US casualties by a similar proportion.

Yahara also referes to significant demoralization after this failed offensive. Officers became increasingly appathetic, failing to take action. Evasion of the combat zone seems to have increased afterwards as well.

Yaharas account suggests strongly that the Japanese fanatacism was not as deeply seated as popularly suposed. Even in the case of fanatics suicide was often chosen over dying in the effort to kill a few more enemy. The deep seated fanatacism seems to have been among the Army infantry, with the Naval and Army support personnel much less likely to fight as aggresvely & suicidally as the better indoctrinated infantry.

Are we talking about actual Japanese soldiers fighting in Okinawa or Koreans and others forced to fight for Japan? They used alot of Koreans in the Philippines.

You might have a good point about how aggressive US soldiers and marines had become. They had been indoctrinated about these horrible yellow people and wanted revenge for the killings of their freinds and family.

Plus hand a man a weapon and he will want to use it so your right, US soldiers would have shown little mercy.

 

[phx1138]

Well, it is Christmas afterall

Bah. I'm stealing the toys from Whoville.

Japanese fanatacism was not as deeply seated as popularly suposed.

Nice summary of the situation. This quote captures what the psywar teams had figured out, & were exploiting--& would continue to exploit, if Downfall had gone ahead. Leaflet missions over Japan had already been ongoing for months. Add famine...

 

[The Red]

Agreed. In fact, it's been suggested that's why SecState Byrnes stalled Japan--so he could use the Bomb & frighten the Sovs. (He couldn't know Stalin knew all about it already...)

The major weakness of this theory is that its proponents tend to ignore what Brynes actually said and did at the time.

 

[lionhead]

Such a shame someone new like Strategos gets banned so early(bit of an overreaction by Ian IMHO) and we will never know what he/she actually meant to say. Or help him/her to understand.

 

[phx1138]

The major weakness of this theory is that its proponents tend to ignore what Brynes actually said and did at the time.

Oh? I confess almost complete ignorance, here. Got any suggestions what I should read?