Napoleonic victory with the invasion of Russia?

[Mikestone8]

The average serf had no great loyalty to Russia or the Czar.

They took their Priests seriously, though. And the Russian Orthodox Church was one of the most xenophobic organisations on earth. To the average Russian Priest, Napoleon was an agent of Satan merely for being Catholic, never mind anything else about him.

This goes double, of course, when he's coming as the ally of the Poles, Russia's hereditary enemy from way back.

Perhaps Napoleon would find it easier to just carve Russia back into a series of individual principalities. Give local Russian nobles enough power to be able to squabble among themselves, plus a nice tribute bill to pay each year. The key thing, from his point of view, is that Russia must never be a threat again.

How does he get the power to do any carving? Even when he was occupying Moscow, did anyone make the slightest move to set up such a principality anywhere in Russia? And even if he leaves the whole Grand Armee in Russia (which he can't), it's still too small to occupy more than a fraction of the place.

I could imagine states of that kind set up on the Baltic, or in areas where the landowning (ie ruling) class included a lot of Poles, but all of that together is only a small fringe. Over 90% of Russia will be unaffected because he simply hasn't the physical power to dominate it. And it will be a threat again as soon as it get's its breath back.

If we're talking about the Russian army being mauled enough that it's a year or two longer before they turn the tide, well, maybe. But the idea that there could be anything permanent about it is surely ASB.

 

[Yorel]

I wonder if he might even had planted one of his brothers on the throne and left a sizeable army to enforce this until things calmed down a bit.

I don't believe placing a Bonaparte on the Russian throne would work... Besides, I'm not sure he has any Bonaparte left to take the throne :
-Joseph is nominally King of Spain
-Louis was King of Holland, but his relationship with Napoleon grew cold
-Lucien has cold relationships with Napoleon and is prisonner in England
-Jerôme is King of Westphalia
-Elisa is Grand Duchess of Tuscany
-Pauline is Duchess of Guastalla and Princess Borghese (by marriage)
-Caroline is the wife of Joachim Murat, making her Queen of Naples

Of course, they all have children, but placing a child on the Russian throne would be suicide. He could also swith thrones for one of his brothers or sisters, but I don't believe they would do very well in Russia.

The better plan for Napoleon if he wishes to overthrow Alexander is to place the latter's brother, Constantine, on the throne. Constantine was largely pro-French and an admirer of Napoleon at the time. He heavily criticized the war when it occured.

Perhaps Napoleon would find it easier to just carve Russia back into a series of individual principalities. Give local Russian nobles enough power to be able to squabble among themselves, plus a nice tribute bill to pay each year. The key thing, from his point of view, is that Russia must never be a threat again.

No offense, but I believe he CAN'T do that.
Sure, he can impose a harsh peace, forcing the Czar to give back Finland and the Polish lands in Russia as well as form one or two puppet states in the Baltic and maybe Ukraine, not to mention placing a puppet czar in Russia. However, I'm not sure he is willing to or can do more than that.
Besides, the Russians worked very hard to realize their unity a while back : this is probably more than enough for the Russians to refuse to be separated in several countries yet again.

Would Napoleon have eventually used all of Europe's resources to create a massive fleet for the invasion of England?

He could as he would have dozens of shipyards under his control.
Yet, to create a fleet, you don't need ships alone : you need a crew for each and every ship. I'm not sure he would have the time to form experienced seamens, or at least form a navy which would be able to rival the Royal Navy.

Besides, if Napoleon wins in Russia and crushes the Spanish, Portuguese and English in the Iberian Peninsula, the Continental Blockade is effective in all of Europe, meaning the British have no access to European ports. This would be dramatic for their economy, and will probably force them to sign peace even if they don't want to. Thus, an invasion is useless.

 

[Grey Wolf]

I've wondered the same thing. But how long would a Russian branch of the Bonapartes would have lasted?

I read somewhere that Davout was going to be set up as ruler, either of Moscow or of Smolensk, my memory is rather holy.

Could not a simple POD for this thread be what if the victory at Borodino had not been such a pyrhic one? If the Russians had been smashed, would it have made any difference?

Best Regards
Grey Wolf

 

[Alonicus]

Could not a simple POD for this thread be what if the victory at Borodino had not been such a pyrhic one? If the Russians had been smashed, would it have made any difference?

Best Regards
Grey Wolf

That would make it a much easier thread to work with ! The original idea certainly left it very open to us how the campaign would go. I must admit, I really like the idea of a Battle of Gatchina, though

In terms of Bonapartes for Russia, the ideal choice would be Louis, because I think he's the only one who could have made a difference (the Dutch still celebrate his rule), but I appreciate the it would have needed he and Napoleon to start talking again.

The debate is really breaking down into two key points;
1. Whether Napoleon could have won, and
2. Assuming he wins, what does he do next.

Looking just at the first point, although it would have been a hard campaign, I think it is quite possible that Napoleon could have won.

The key premise is that the Russia field army is effectively destroyed. If that happens, and St Petersburg & Moscow are captured, Alexander will have great difficulty creating a useful new field army without their armouries and administrative functions.

Russia just didn't have the strategic depth in 1812 that it had in WW2. Although it may have claimed pretty much the whole northern part of the Asian continent, in reality there wasn't the density of population, administrative and (more importantly) industrial capacity in the hinterland. Even in 1812, the Russian army relied on Britian to supply 60,000 muskets, and the native ones produced at Tula were shockingly poor. Take away Tula, which is rather close to Moscow, and you have an army reduced to using bows, pikes and prayers. Fine for a peasant revolt, but not for modern (for those days) war.

Alexander would never emancipate the serfs; it was utterly the opposite of everything he and his class stood for. If he somehow broke centuries of conditioning and decided that was the thing to do, his nobles would very soon have eliminated him to prevent the loss of their workers. So I think we can rule out a country-wide peasants revolt, even if there would be a few outbreaks in isolated areas.

 

[TheNordicBrit]

If we saw Russia take on a much more offensive approach which ends up allowing the Napoleonic army to crush the Russian forces, what sort of peace might we see then? The Russians wouldn't have a good army to fight with, while Napoleon would likely still have a huge well-trained army.

 

[Monty Burns]

If we saw Russia take on a much more offensive approach which ends up allowing the Napoleonic army to crush the Russian forces, what sort of peace might we see then? The Russians wouldn't have a good army to fight with, while Napoleon would likely still have a huge well-trained army.

I'd say all territories from the Polish partitions are up for negotiations - which does not necessarily imply that Russia looses them all.

Furthermore, the question is how Napoleon wins. If he takes the Baltic strategy (going for St. Petersburg close to the sea to ensure supplies) and the Russians accept one - or more - decisive battles in which they are utterly defeated, then Livland, Courland and Estland might be part of the deal as well. Once Napoleon is in St.Petersburg, we might also see Swedish involvement in the war, which makes Finland part of a deal.

So, depending on the defeat the Russians go, Finland, former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Baltics might be part of what'S negotiated about. This implies that Russia proper is still untouched.

I think we can take as granted that Napoleon enlarges the duchy of Warsaw, probably by Lithuania to gain them a port. The idea is to get an important and powerful ally in the east. Finland might go to Sweden to get them into the French team.

This, of course, reauires a major defeat of Russia and Napoleon probably reaching St.Petersburg and still having a good supply base. 'The most probably French victory I'd say would be an early defeat of the Russians in a field battle and a status-quo-peace which leaves Napoleon a free hand in Europe.

 

[Mikestone8]

Furthermore, the question is how Napoleon wins. If he takes the Baltic strategy (going for St. Petersburg close to the sea to ensure supplies).

Except that he does not control the Baltic. The RN does, in the person of a gentleman named Admiral Saumarez, commanding its Baltic Squadron.

Indeed, had this not been so, Napoleon and Alexander might not even have been at war. A principal casus belli was Alexander's refusal to enforce the Continental System. Had the French Navy controlled the Baltic, this would not have mattered as he would have been unable to trade with Britain even if he wanted to - bar maybe the occasional ship to and from Archangel - since the merchantmen could easily have been intercepted.

This doesn't, of course, mean that the odd supply ship might not have run the blockade, but the GA couldn't have been supplied by sea on any regular basis. Nor, FTM, could it have been evacuated by sea. Assuming that the occupation of St Petersburg is as barren of results as that of Moscow OTL, there would be two options.

1) An overland retreat much like OTL's but with the additional hazard of having the (less than trustworthy) Prussian army across its lines of communication.

2) A march into northern Finland and thence either to Sweden (if the Emperor thought Bernadotte could be trusted) or else to north Norway and back home via Norway and Denmark.

Neither sounds much improvement on OTL.

One more possible disadvantage. A GA in the Baltic Provinces is much nearer to Europe, and a Moscow-style debacle cannot be kept hidden. OTL, the GA was "over the edge of the world", out of touch with Europe, and Napoleon was able to make it back ahead of the news of the catastrophe. This would be a lot harder if it had happened on the Baltic. Saumarez would quickly have got the news, and passed it on the the Swedes and Prussians, if Alexander had not already done so. Napoleon would run a high risk of capture on the way home.

 

[Alonicus]

Assuming that the occupation of St Petersburg is as barren of results as that of Moscow OTL, there would be two options.

Moscow was primarily symbolic, St Petersburg was the centrepoint for the administration. Why would disrupting the administration of Russia be considered barren ? Combined with a decisive field victory (likely unless the Russians decide to abandon St Petersburg as they did Moscow), it's far more likely to win Napoleon the war than the pointless gesture of occupying only Moscow while the field army is still in being.

 

[Mikestone8]

Moscow was primarily symbolic, St Petersburg was the centrepoint for the administration. Why would disrupting the administration of Russia be considered barren ? Combined with a decisive field victory (likely unless the Russians decide to abandon St Petersburg as they did Moscow), it's far more likely to win Napoleon the war than the pointless gesture of occupying only Moscow while the field army is still in being.

One question. If St Petersburg was really, and so obviously, so much more vital than Moscow, then why the [expletive deleted] did Napoleon not go there?

From what I can gather, his knowledge of Russia was sketchy, but even he knew that the Tsar lived in St P and not in Moscow. After all, between 1807 and 1812 they presumably had diplomatic relations, so the Emperor would have known which city his own Ambassador was in. And given that capturing the enemy capital was normally a priority objective in Napoleon's campaigns, we can safely assume that he at least considered it. So why not?

The answer, surely, is that, even at his most deluded, he could see that it wouldn't work. Capital city or not, it was geographically on the fringe of the Russian Empire, and Alexander would still have ample space to fall back into. Its being the administrative centre might make its loss a heavier blow than Moscow's, but hardly a fatal one. The Russians would hardly be dopey enough to leave their government in the city to be captured, and, at a time when armies numbering hundreds of thousands were being shunted around every day, is it really credible that a few thousand bureaucrats and their files couldn't have been evacuated if necessary?

There might also be personal benefits for Alexander. Russian Tsars were always in danger from palace coups, and if the people who might make one were refugees, scattered on their country estates, they were probably less of a menace to him than gathered together in the capital.

In short, occupying St Petersburg wouldn't have settled a thing. Alexander would just have pulled out, presumably to Moscow, and Napoleon would have had to follow him there. Foreseeing this, he presumably concluded that, in the end, he would have to march on Moscow anyway, so he might as well do that first.

As for a "decisive" victory over the Russian army, he probably thought he could get that as well in one place as the other. And in a sense he was probably right. When your enemy has unlimited space to fall back on, a truly decisive result won't be easily obtained anywhere.

 

[Monty Burns]

Except that he does not control the Baltic. The RN does, in the person of a gentleman named Admiral Saumarez, commanding its Baltic Squadron.

Damn the RN, I always forget about it...

So, in preparation of the Russian campaign, could Napoleon try to clean the Baltic from the RN? Denmark was allied, Sweden might be induced to join as well to get back Finland. Then the French will have to build a fleet - again - yet this time for the sole purpose of blocking the Baltic. Can the French rule teh Baltic sea before the Russian campaigne starts?

 

[Yorel]

So, in preparation of the Russian campaign, could Napoleon try to clean the Baltic from the RN? Denmark was allied, Sweden might be induced to join as well to get back Finland. Then the French will have to build a fleet - again - yet this time for the sole purpose of blocking the Baltic. Can the French rule teh Baltic sea before the Russian campaigne starts?

Denmark had no longer a fleet : the British had destroyed it at Copenhague.
As for the Swedes, it's not sure they will go : Bernadotte viewed himself as Napoleon's equal (or rival) and he was certainly not going to follow him if he had nothing to gain. Finland is an option, but as was mentionned several times, it isn't that much of a good bargain for the Swedes as it would lead later to another war with Russia and is far less interesting than Norway.

There is also a huge problem with the French fleet : the British were also blockading French ports. Even if the French create a fleet, they will have first to made it leave its ports, meaning battling the Royal Navy.

 

[Mikestone8]

Damn the RN, I always forget about it...

I expect that, or something like it, is what Boney often said.

So, in preparation of the Russian campaign, could Napoleon try to clean the Baltic from the RN? Denmark was allied, Sweden might be induced to join as well to get back Finland. Then the French will have to build a fleet - again - yet this time for the sole purpose of blocking the Baltic. Can the French rule teh Baltic sea before the Russian campaigne starts?

We'd already taken care of the Danes.

As for Sweden, incredible though it sounds, I'm sure I read somewhere that Saumarez was able to revictual his ships with supplies from Sweden, even when the two countries were technically at war. Not sure of all the ins and outs, but I suspect that "ships' stores" were such an important export that the Swedes just couldn't live without this trade, and that whatever the political situation, a blind eye had to be turned.[1] This makes me rather sceptical of Sweden ever coming in against us in more than the most token way.


[1] They were certainly a major Russian export, which probably explains a lot about Alexander's attitude toward the Continental System.

 

[stevep]

I expect that, or something like it, is what Boney often said.

We'd already taken care of the Danes.

As for Sweden, incredible though it sounds, I'm sure I read somewhere that Saumarez was able to revictual his ships with supplies from Sweden, even when the two countries were technically at war. Not sure of all the ins and outs, but I suspect that "ships' stores" were such an important export that the Swedes just couldn't live without this trade, and that whatever the political situation, a blind eye had to be turned.[1] This makes me rather sceptical of Sweden ever coming in against us in more than the most token way.

I think also that the Swedes were at war because Napoleon insisted on it, rather than any desire on their own part. As such they had no interest in fighting and as you say had plenty of economic interests in trading with Britain rather than being blockaded by it.

[1] They were certainly a major Russian export, which probably explains a lot about Alexander's attitude toward the Continental System.

Very true again. As well as that virtually all imports to Russia would have been by sea, again controlled by Britain. Both British manufactured goods and trans-shipping of items from beyond Europe. This is what made the Continental system so deeply unpopular throughout Europe.

Steve

 

[Mikestone8]

I think also that the Swedes were at war because Napoleon insisted on it, rather than any desire on their own part. As such they had no interest in fighting and as you say had plenty of economic interests in trading with Britain rather than being blockaded by it.

Indeed. I suppose if they had refused to sell supplies to Saumarez he could have made it very difficult for them to sell to anyone else

 

[RGB]

Napoleon would have come at Petersburg himself; his generals proved incapable of not only beating the Russians decisevely in 1812, but even so much as clear a wider advance path or chase away the shadowing North and South forces. And the Russians gave them plenty of opportunities to engage, actually, it wasn't all retreats.

And even Borodino was by no means a crushing French victory.

Going north is a better chance to force the Russian army to stand firm and beat them, but I would even disagree about how inevitable Napoleon's victory is at the Battle for Gatchina.

---

RE: RN, Russian naval supplies (more vital to RN than British muskets were to the Russians, even), and the Russian navy command's pro-British sentiments are all great reasons why the Continental system could not hold and why Napoleon can't just advance in the Baltic at will and why Sweden will not come to his aid.

 

[Mikestone8]

Napoleon would have come at Petersburg himself; his generals proved incapable of not only beating the Russians decisevely in 1812, but even so much as clear a wider advance path or chase away the shadowing North and South forces. And the Russians gave them plenty of opportunities to engage, actually, it wasn't all retreats.

And even Borodino was by no means a crushing French victory.

Going north is a better chance to force the Russian army to stand firm and beat them, but I would even disagree about how inevitable Napoleon's victory is at the Battle for Gatchina.

He can probably win the battle, as he did at Borodino. The question is whether any victory could be decisive enough to compel Alexander to sue for peace. Given that doing so would probably cost him his life (both his grandfather and father had been overthrown and murdered for less) this seems inconceivable as long as he had a single soldier anywhere. After all, if he continued to resist the worst that could happen was that he might be killed in the war, and that was a rare event for a reigning sovereign, whereas giving in would make his death both more likely and more ignominious. He had quite literally nothing left to lose.

The irony is that Napoleon himself acknowledged the problem in another context, but apparently failed to recognise its applicability here. He reportedly told Metternich "Your sovereigns who were born to their thrones cannot comprehend the feelings that move me. To them it is nothing to return to their capitals defeated. But I am a soldier. I need honour and glory. I cannot reappear among my people devoid of prestige".

What he failed to spot was that while his comments were valid for the Western monarchs - Britain, Prussia, Austria, Spain etc etc - they did not hold good for Russia. The latter, politically, was a more backward version of Napoleonic France, ie it had some of the forms and fripperies of hereditary Monarchy, but when the chips were down its system of government was simply despotism tempered by revolution. Alexander's situation was essentially the same as Napoleon's, the only important difference being that Napoleon had at least some chance to go on living if he were deposed, but Alexander almost certainly did not. So in the end Alexander would always "bid higher".

---

RE: RN, Russian naval supplies (more vital to RN than British muskets were to the Russians, even), and the Russian navy command's pro-British sentiments are all great reasons why the Continental system could not hold and why Napoleon can't just advance in the Baltic at will and why Sweden will not come to his aid.

Agreed

 

[Matteo]

Well,as has been previously written, the conflict between France and Russia was unavoidable after the peace of Tilsitt. It was even unavoidable because of the peace of Tilsitt which was much too mild given Alexander's enduring hostility against France and Napoleon. But Napoleon, who was not very good at diplomacy, completly mistook the intentions and personnality of his russian partner.

In 1812, almost everybody thought Napoleon was going to be victorious against Russia. And he probably would have been if he had stuck to the initial plan which was a 2 years campaign, the first being dedicated to liberating Poland and Lithuania from the russian yoke, the second to preventing an offensive return of the russian army.

The disproportion of ressources made Russia's prospects almost hopeless if Napoleon had not abandoned any coherent plan. One never wins a war if he doesn't have clear and coherent political goals in the conflict, and if he doesn't implement a sound strategy coherent with these political goals.

If Napoleon had dedicated his grand army to expelling the russian army out of Poland-Lithuania and to restoring a great Poland, then he would would not have had to chase the russian army up to Moscow in only one season, which caused the disastrous attrition of his army.
And the russians would have been forced either to to come back and offer him the pitched battle he desired, or to negotiate even without fighting. I favour the first hypothesis.

But anyway, Russia could not wait infinitely because the drain on its ressources was more demanding than the drain on Napoleon's coalition.

Conquering all of Russia never was part of the plans of Napoleon. It would have made of course no sense. And besides it was useless because, though Russia was almost as gigantic as today on the geographic level, most of its ressources and population was in the western part of the empire.

I don't think Napoleon would have liberated the serves because he wanted to reach an agreement with the russian ruling elite whose power and wealth depended on serfdom. But the russian nobility clearly feared it and was very pessimistic on the outcome of the war because of this fear : that's even one of the reasons why so many russian generals, except Barclay, wanted an offensive fought in the grand duchy of Poland and in Germany.

After all this, and supposing that Napoleon won this limited russian campaign of 1812-1813 and reestablished the kingdom of Poland, what could be foreseen ?

He would have traded Illyria against the restitution of austrian Galicia to Poland.

He would probably have dealt with Bernadotte's Sweden : Bernadotte, at this time, would almost have been dead meat.

Then, of course and at last, he would have had to settle with the UK. In which way ?
I think he would in any way have sent a big enough army to expell the British out of the iberic peninsula.

I don't believe he would have wanted to continue endlessly the war against Britain, taking time to build and train some kind of european war fleet. It would have been too long and too risky. And the european people wanted peace.

History is of course written by the victors, but when the british wrote and said that Napoleon could not help waging wars and was incapable of making peace, it was a propaganda which told more about themselves than about him.

Britain would never settle for a continental Europe dominated by one power and would endlessly wage war on any power dominating the continent, even if this power was willing to have peaceful relations with Britain. It has been for centuries and remained the basis of british foreign policy.

From 1688 (when the glorious revolution enabled again Britain to conduct a very active foreign policy) to 1815, Britain's goal was to destroy/weaken the french power. It began when Louis XIV annexed part of the Spanish netherlands through the reunions policy. Then its goal was to destroy the french colonial empire because Britain (like France and any other power of the time) was mercantilist and could not tolerate open competition : so it used its sea domination to destroy competition.
After 1815, the main threat to the british power was imperial Russia. So Britain wourked to contain Russia and was the leader of the coalition of the crimean war.
In the late 19th century, the rival became Germany, and I am not speaking of nazi Germany but of the recently united Germany.

But if in 1813 or 1814, Napoleon dominated all of continental Europe, then I think the UK would have been willing to conclude a peace treaty. Oh, maybe just a test like the treaty of Amiens in 1802, just to see if Napoleon's control over Europe remains firm or if it begins a processus of disintegration. But with time, if napoleonic control over Europe lasts, then Britain would have got used to it and peace could have lasted.

 

[cimon]

ET

A total victory such as you suggest would be too wankish. Russia is too large and populous and communications and logistics too primitive for something like that to work. Even as it was, having defeat the Russians on one bloody battle and occupying Moscow the French found they hadn't broken the Russian resistance and quickly had to retreat because their army couldn't be supplied.

About the only way you might be able to do something would be to trigger a war in which Russia is persuaded to come to you and the French can defeat them in the border regions. Then it might persuade the Russian leadership to make a new peace with France and keep them paying at least lip service to the continental system. Even then the situation is so unstable because none of the established great powers wanted to have their politics and economic dictated by Paris. Hence there would continue to be unrest until either France changes its policies or Napoleon goes down.

Steve

Totally wrong! wankish why? because you say so? that is essentially what you are writing,since your second paragraph is not even for consideration since it has already happened, and the first paragraph is completely without foundation!

...communication and logistics? If Russian infrastructure is primitive,it hurts both sides and even more so the Russians because their army services were not up to date in the field of service,organization and supply.
Russian defeat was a matter of what Clauzevitz termed later 'distruction on the enemy forces, someting easier for the French to accomplish than the Russians to avoid;their army was inferior to the French on the fields of organization,training and equipment.Populous country doesn't mean greater army....in fact after Borodino the French had absolute numerical and qualitative superiority which existed from the beginning of the campaign since behind
the Grand Armee were allied armies waiting to enter Russia.

The occypation of Moscow,practically cut Russia into two something which would negate the demographic Russian advantage and would magnify its army recruiting and supply problems resulting in the rapid disintergration of the Russian army from within.

Napoleon met with bad luck at Vistula which decided the campaign in the end:his supply train carried vegitables and other perishables for 25 days,
but due to bad maintainace they became rotten magnifying his supply problem tenfold and forced the use of emergency supplies or alternatively
feed the army from local resources which was impossible as it turned out;
Had that not happened the Russian army would have been disolved after Moscow since Napoleon would have broadened his front,he would have cut access to Volga port locations rendering them prohibitive to reach from a place west of Moscow etc.
If Napoleon had stopped in Poland(or what he would consider Poland) Koutouzow would not have taken the bait this time;he had very vivid in his mind the disaster at Austerlitz and knew that Napoleon was a lot stronger in Poland than Napoleon before Moscow and if he was forced,he would resign;Russia could not replace him...

 

[cimon]

Napoleon would have come at Petersburg himself; his generals proved incapable of not only beating the Russians decisevely in 1812, but even so much as clear a wider advance path or chase away the shadowing North and South forces. And the Russians gave them plenty of opportunities to engage, actually, it wasn't all retreats.

And even Borodino was by no means a crushing French victory.

Going north is a better chance to force the Russian army to stand firm and beat them, but I would even disagree about how inevitable Napoleon's victory is at the Battle for Gatchina.

---

RE: RN, Russian naval supplies (more vital to RN than British muskets were to the Russians, even), and the Russian navy command's pro-British sentiments are all great reasons why the Continental system could not hold and why Napoleon can't just advance in the Baltic at will and why Sweden will not come to his aid.

It was not Napoleon's generals who fought Borodino but Napoleon,without a plan(arrogance?) so the battle developed into a frontal assault with enormous casualties.Borodino was certainly a French victory but Napoleon failed to destroy the Russian army,which inside Russia and before Moscow imposed additional campaigns for the French.

Napoleon would have won easily in the North because Koutouzow had already pointed(correctly OTL) that Napoleon's aim would be Moscow;
If he marched North,he would have the entire Polish cavalry protecting his right flank and they could harass the Russians in their approach...

 

[Matteo]

The problem with Saint Petersburg is that it is not easily accessible by Landry routes. And given the supremacy of the royal navy, it would not have been possible for the french to provide fresh supplies by sea to the army.