Malê Rising

1878 is a long ways off from the 1840s, and with 'revolutionary' 'republican' ideas filtering into the Arab and Islamic worlds so early on we can't reasonably say at all what will happen in 30+ years. Especially considering the Turkish Empire's reactions to the 1848 Revolutions, especially in Serbia & Romania, or the 1850 Romanian Uprising, could be completely different ITTL.

Monarchism has been too deep entrenched in the Middle East so I'm skeptical that any sorts of Male influence will be able to boot it of, not in less then a long term anyway, though at least it will make the alternative idea you suggested seem less unthinkable and Christian. The main effects of Male influence in Ottoman domains will be about the spread of, let's call it "Bello-ism" for now, and also more impetus for movement agitating for wider political participation, for wider extent of the populace (illiteracy will hamper it however, especially in Arab part of the empire). TTL's equivalent of Young Ottomans will may be less elitist. Back to monarchism, IOTL it took chaos of WW1 and the following European rule that employed client monarchs to largely eject it from the region. Though maybe should a WW1-esque chaos be rampaging the region ITTL as per OTL, the Arabs will immediately take up Islamic 'republicanism' as their resistance ideology. The more interesting part of that will the possible absence of Arab ethnic nationalism in that movement, which IOTL was exclusively Christian thing prior to colonial regimes. But Arab christians will still pick up nationalism from Europe and it will remain an existing factor in the region.

Related to the last sentence of the previous paragraph, there's something more interesting to look at in West Africa. Male revolution seems to lack the element of ethnic nationalism. In fact, it's already mentioned that Abacar was inspired by Napoleon-style expansionism and universalism. That, combined with the on going formation of British-Male symbiosis, gives me hints about the future of the region. First, that the future of the French expansion in the Sahel is bleak. And that British presence will be much larger. I think a Unified Sahel Country is a real possibility in the future of this TL.
 
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Isn't the Ottoman defeat in the 1877-78 war easy to butterfly away by having the assassination of the defense minister just prior to the war either not occur or fail? IIRC it was his replacement with an incompetent old man that ruined the Ottoman ability to use their advantages vis a vis Russia properly.

Very easy. But let's let the author decide for it on his own.
 
I wasn't suggesting that the Ottomans would be expunged from Istanbul by some sort of Turkish Revolution à la the French or ITTL's Malê, simply that the mere existence of that influence, especially cast in Islamist terms, makes it impossible, or at least incredibly difficult, for us to predict what will happen ITTL in thirty years or more. We can't count on there even being a Russo-Turkish war in the late 1870s, let alone on the Turks losing. Jonathan Edelstein has already made reference in-text to the 1848 Revolutions, and honestly I'm not sure how he could potentially butterfly them away altogether considering his POD, but he can influence them, and with this latest chapter I certainly think there's an opening for him to change up how the Turks respond to the revolutions in Serbia and Romania, let alone border regions like Hungary and Croatia, or even for there to be an 1848-esque revolution by Arab elements within the Ottoman's dominion. A change in any of those situations or a hundred more could radically alter the situation in the Balkans to such an extent that the chance for an exact repeat of OTL thirty years down the line is borderline ASB, and poor AH writing IMHO.

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I wasn't suggesting that the Ottomans would be expunged from Istanbul by some sort of Turkish Revolution à la the French or ITTL's Malê, simply that the mere existence of that influence, especially cast in Islamist terms, makes it impossible, or at least incredibly difficult, for us to predict what will happen ITTL in thirty years or more. We can't count on there even being a Russo-Turkish war in the late 1870s, let alone on the Turks losing. Jonathan Edelstein has already made reference in-text to the 1848 Revolutions, and honestly I'm not sure how he could potentially butterfly them away altogether considering his POD, but he can influence them, and with this latest chapter I certainly think there's an opening for him to change up how the Turks respond to the revolutions in Serbia and Romania, let alone border regions like Hungary and Croatia, or even for there to be an 1848-esque revolution by Arab elements within the Ottoman's dominion. A change in any of those situations or a hundred more could radically alter the situation in the Balkans to such an extent that the chance for an exact repeat of OTL thirty years down the line is borderline ASB, and poor AH writing IMHO.

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I see your point, even though I'm inclined to think that the change that will be brought to Ottoman dominions by both direct and indirect Male influences will be less radical and unpredictable then you might be thinking. Tanzimat will inevitably going to give born to a reaction movement protesting against its authoritarianism, since Tanzimat was there to prepare the empire for modern constitutionalism in the first place. However, it's intriguing to think how Male influences will sip into that process. OTL's Young Ottomans movement was an elite movement stimulated by links to European centers of learning, but also a reaction to uncritical westernization of the empire. It aspired to apply modern ideals within the existing Ottoman culture, which Islam is undeniably integral part of. Still, it's not grassroot, if bottom-up and agitate for (somewhat) wider political participation. How will Male revolution affect the formation of TTL's reaction movement against the prolonging of Tanzimat autocracy ?

I suspect it will be mostly indirect. Indeed, we will see Sahelian pilgrims visitting Mecca in incoming years, maybe some will be transiting in Egypt first, bringing Male revolutionary ideals with them. But how will their influence disseminate within Ottoman dominions ? Basically it will be coming to Istanbul from the south, through Arab territories. But how much the Arab provinces will be affected and how immediate ? It's important to note that Arabian provinces of the empire are the more rural parts then Anatolia and certainly the Balkans. Lower literacy and less urbanism are factors that work against the proliferation of populism. Then, there are the cosmpolitan nature of Islamic intellectual culture and the unitary structure of Ottoman state to consider. It seems that the ideas will arrive in Konstantiniyye faster then they will take root into Arab populace. Considering the PoD of this TL, we can discard the possibility of Arab movement happening in 1848, especially since the region would certainly be less urbanized and literate in that year then it will be 30 years later.
The biggest and most immediate changes to inflict Ottoman Empire out of the PoD, I think, will be the spread of Bello theology which will render secularization of Ottoman Empire and later the Islamic world at large smoother, and the chance of TTL's Young Ottomans having sort of populist trappings in their ideology, or at most minimal, the spread of democratic populism will be faster vis a vis OTL after the dawn of constitutionalism.

I don't see much changes will happen on how the Ottomans will deal with continental European affairs. The biggest factor of Serbian and Romanian independence was European intervention to force their will on the Ottomans to grant those states self-rule out of Christian-centric bias, and that won't change. I don't know how will the colonial affairs effect diplomatic tables in Europe out of this Male factor, and how will it later effect Ottomans, but I don't think we will see any of this before reaching the later parts of 19th century.

As for Egypt question, it's up to the author whether he wants to have the Male eventually succumb under the British rule for a period, or to blossom from exploiting whatever they can from Ottoman offer of Pan-Islamist aid, whose interest will be primarily about keeping away the Europeans as far as possible from their own borders. Either scenario to emerge later down the line, I will anticipate any with keen interest ! :)
 
What? You speak as though populism was some sort of urban, bourgeois, ideal. Populism has almost always sprung from rural communities, from the usually semi-educated or self-educated, and often times many members of the group were illiterate. Hell even during the exact time period were talking about this is true. The Hungarian and Sicilian Revolutions, and most of the German ones, in 1848-49 were populist, rural, and made of mostly of the under- or uneducated. EDIT: As well the Irish agitation in Britain, and the Croatian counter-revolution were agrarian/rural populist in nature.

There's absolutely no reason to state that an 1848-esque Arab revolution couldn't take place, especially considering the ideas that are filtering into that area, especially as Ali bin Bello's theology is about creating a de-facto Separation of Church & State in the Islamic world, and the Turkish Empire drew a lot of its legitimacy, and power, by mixing the spiritual and material worlds. Remember that not only was the Sultan an emperor but also the Caliph.
 
What? You speak as though populism was some sort of urban, bourgeois, ideal. Populism has almost always sprung from rural communities, from the usually semi-educated or self-educated, and often times many members of the group were illiterate. Hell even during the exact time period were talking about this is true. The Hungarian and Sicilian Revolutions, and most of the German ones, in 1848-49 were populist, rural, and made of mostly of the under- or uneducated. EDIT: As well the Irish agitation in Britain, and the Croatian counter-revolution were agrarian/rural populist in nature.

There's absolutely no reason to state that an 1848-esque Arab revolution couldn't take place, especially considering the ideas that are filtering into that area, especially as Ali bin Bello's theology is about creating a de-facto Separation of Church & State in the Islamic world, and the Turkish Empire drew a lot of its legitimacy, and power, by mixing the spiritual and material worlds. Remember that not only was the Sultan an emperor but also the Caliph.

Well, not as much urbanization as literacy and basic education, which will increase along with increasing urbanization. But you can't really compare densely populated arable countries of Europe (which was, you know, the cradle of modern populism itself) with sparsely populated and arid lands of Levant and Iraq which had been fairly backward since Mongol rampage. Recentralization and development of the empire after Sick period only has just begun in 1830s, so it will be a while before modern idealism can take root in Arab provinces.

The process of dismantling the Caliph from temporal power has already begun with Tanzimat, and yes Bello's teachings will contribute to accelerate the process. Any equivalent of Hamidiyan era will may end earlier, for the better or worse.

Factor of modern Arab nationalism is non existent in this period. Prior to colonial mandate, there arguably was no coherent Arab identity among the Arabic-speaking muslims. They were muslim first, city/province of origin second. Calling a settled Arab speaking person "Arab" before modern Arab nationalism was just asking for a fist to your eye since it meant Bedouin nomads, just like calling an urban Turkish-speaking Ottoman "Turk", which meant Anatolian mountain rednecks. Should there be any 1848-esque revolution happening in OE, it won't be Arab-exclusive movement, and it certainly won't gonna happen in 1848.
 
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The discussion of possible Ottoman consequences is fascinating. It's also very helpful since, frankly, I haven't yet thought through all the long-term implications outside West Africa. Allow me to make a few observations:

1. West Africa is a peripheral part of the Islamic world, and religious movements that start there don't often expand outside Africa. There were a number of interesting movements in the 19th-century Sahel, many of them Sufi-based - the Mourides of Senegal, for instance, are pretty awesome - but there aren't many Mourides outside Senegal and the Senegalese diaspora. Part of the problem is geographic isolation, part is that West African Muslims follow a different madhab (most of them are of the Maliki school, which isn't widely followed elsewhere), and part is the way many Arabs and Ottoman Turks of the time looked upon Africans. This is why I envision the African diaspora, rather than the center of the Islamic world, as the primary vector for expansion of Malê theology.

2. With that said, I do intend "Belloism" (which I'll have to find a name for) to have a wider influence throughout Islam than the Malê philosophy. As you point out, it meshes well with Ottoman secularism. Also, while individual Malê will make the hajj and discuss their beliefs with fellow pilgrims, Bello will actually live and preach in Mecca for more than a decade, and will have a better chance to spread his doctrines to influential people throughout the Islamic world. There will be a secondary wave of interest in Malê doctrines as a tool of resistance to colonialism and other forms of oppression, but this will mostly take place in the twentieth century.

3. As to Ottoman ambitions in Africa, I suspect that Egypt would be a major obstacle. At the time of the POD, Egypt already had de facto independence under Mehmet Ali, with the British as guarantors of his dynasty. After that, the Sublime Porte was only able to interfere in Egyptian affairs when the great powers (particularly Britain) wanted them to do so. The Suez Canal will still happen in this timeline, and the British will, as in OTL, protect their interest by maintaining an ongoing presence in Egypt. I don't quite see even a resurgent Ottoman state being able to project much power in Africa with a British client kingdom standing in the way. Also, the Mehmet Ali dynasty tried to expand southward and westward, annexing Darfur and invading Ethiopia, but were halted by the Ethiopians and found Darfur very hard to hold. Again, I don't quite see them being able to stop the colonial powers from doing whatever they're interested in doing in West Africa.

4. The Russo-Turkish War does seem fairly easy to avoid - I suspect many of the prelude events, such as the independence of the Balkan states, are unavoidable, but even a slightly more conciliatory policy in either St. Petersburg or Constantinople could have forestalled an outright great-power war. Even a modest Belloist boost to reformism in the Ottoman Empire could make a difference. I guess I'll decide when I get there.

5. Revolutions in the Arab world: I think 1848 is too early, for reasons which have been explored in your discussion. Later on, though, we may see more Muslim involvement in revolutionary movements, which will not be so Christian-dominated as in OTL. Egypt may be a place to watch.

6. Britain vs. France in Africa: France will definitely be checkmated in the eastern Sahel, and I doubt they'd be able to establish a presence in the areas that will become Chad and Niger in OTL. They'll also be kept out of Benin. The western Sahel, however, may be another story: the French already had a longstanding presence in Senegal, and their expansion into the interior and along the coast began fairly soon after the POD. A good deal will depend upon what Louis Faidherbe does in the alternate timeline, and also on the extent to which the British are willing to (or are forced to) parcel western Africa into spheres of influence. As a spoiler, I'm planning for there to be a Fashoda analogue, in West Africa rather than Sudan, which involves the Malê, but while France will be checked, it won't be counted out entirely.

7. The absence of ethnic nationalism in Malê theology - which you correctly point out - is inherent in the nature of the Malê themselves. They're a mixed people, descended from nearly all the Muslim ethnic groups which were taken to Brazil as slaves - the largest component is Yoruba, but there are also Hausa, Fulani, Mande and even Wolof. Most of those whose families have been slaves for more than one generation have mixed ancestry. Moreover, because the Malê who were deported to Brazil were a military group, men greatly outnumbered women, and most of them had to marry into the conquered populations. This prevented them from becoming a distinct ethnic group and developing their own nationalism (although there will be Brazilian cultural survivals and they'll develop at least some ethnic characteristics). Their theology will thus not be confined to or tailored for any one nation.

8. Finally, a note about presentation. Right now, I'm working with overview posts that cover two or three years of action, with "story" posts at about the same interval, sprinkled with an occasional literary or cultural sidenote. I have a series of 11 to 13 posts planned (depending on how many sidenotes I end up including), which follow this pattern, that will take the timeline through about 1854. After that, though, I'm planning to speed things up somewhat, at first to five-year intervals and eventually ten- and twenty-year intervals. I'm thinking that this will be more appropriate as macro-effects begin to take precedence, but at this point nothing's etched in stone, and any thoughts would be welcome.
 
I saw the thread title and thought this was a Maldives wank.

Sorry to disappoint you. :p

(Is a Maldives wank even possible? Maybe a Maldives-based dynasty wins control of the Chera kingdom through political maneuvering or marriage, and expands from there while keeping the capital on the islands? But no, let's not sidetrack the thread.)
 
I wouldn't mind the sped-up pace later on, but maybe you could spice it up with more detailed posts concentrating on specific events?

Also, might the absence of these slaves from Brazil lead to butterflies there?
 
The discussion of possible Ottoman consequences is fascinating. It's also very helpful since, frankly, I haven't yet thought through all the long-term implications outside West Africa. Allow me to make a few observations:

1. West Africa is a peripheral part of the Islamic world, and religious movements that start there don't often expand outside Africa. There were a number of interesting movements in the 19th-century Sahel, many of them Sufi-based - the Mourides of Senegal, for instance, are pretty awesome - but there aren't many Mourides outside Senegal and the Senegalese diaspora. Part of the problem is geographic isolation, part is that West African Muslims follow a different madhab (most of them are of the Maliki school, which isn't widely followed elsewhere), and part is the way many Arabs and Ottoman Turks of the time looked upon Africans. This is why I envision the African diaspora, rather than the center of the Islamic world, as the primary vector for expansion of Malê theology.

2. With that said, I do intend "Belloism" (which I'll have to find a name for) to have a wider influence throughout Islam than the Malê philosophy. As you point out, it meshes well with Ottoman secularism. Also, while individual Malê will make the hajj and discuss their beliefs with fellow pilgrims, Bello will actually live and preach in Mecca for more than a decade, and will have a better chance to spread his doctrines to influential people throughout the Islamic world. There will be a secondary wave of interest in Malê doctrines as a tool of resistance to colonialism and other forms of oppression, but this will mostly take place in the twentieth century.

3. As to Ottoman ambitions in Africa, I suspect that Egypt would be a major obstacle. At the time of the POD, Egypt already had de facto independence under Mehmet Ali, with the British as guarantors of his dynasty. After that, the Sublime Porte was only able to interfere in Egyptian affairs when the great powers (particularly Britain) wanted them to do so. The Suez Canal will still happen in this timeline, and the British will, as in OTL, protect their interest by maintaining an ongoing presence in Egypt. I don't quite see even a resurgent Ottoman state being able to project much power in Africa with a British client kingdom standing in the way. Also, the Mehmet Ali dynasty tried to expand southward and westward, annexing Darfur and invading Ethiopia, but were halted by the Ethiopians and found Darfur very hard to hold. Again, I don't quite see them being able to stop the colonial powers from doing whatever they're interested in doing in West Africa.

4. The Russo-Turkish War does seem fairly easy to avoid - I suspect many of the prelude events, such as the independence of the Balkan states, are unavoidable, but even a slightly more conciliatory policy in either St. Petersburg or Constantinople could have forestalled an outright great-power war. Even a modest Belloist boost to reformism in the Ottoman Empire could make a difference. I guess I'll decide when I get there.

6. Britain vs. France in Africa: France will definitely be checkmated in the eastern Sahel, and I doubt they'd be able to establish a presence in the areas that will become Chad and Niger in OTL. They'll also be kept out of Benin. The western Sahel, however, may be another story: the French already had a longstanding presence in Senegal, and their expansion into the interior and along the coast began fairly soon after the POD. A good deal will depend upon what Louis Faidherbe does in the alternate timeline, and also on the extent to which the British are willing to (or are forced to) parcel western Africa into spheres of influence. As a spoiler, I'm planning for there to be a Fashoda analogue, in West Africa rather than Sudan, which involves the Malê, but while France will be checked, it won't be counted out entirely.

1&2) Maybe I was a bit too enthusiastic on speculating the spread of Male ideals. Less chance of spreading doesn't mean zero chance, but without enough time for a visitor to transfer the idea then it won't take off (it doesn't have to be an African visitor who decided to stay as the main figure of spreading. It can also be his pupil or two). Thing is, it's pretty easy to happen, if random chance. And I'm not only considering Male-Hausa-Fulani visitors, but also from Kanuri and other Sahelian peoples. Also, maybe we pay attention to much on Mecca. How about Libya ? Which is near to Chad Basin and has had traditional trade links to the latter and also of Maliki madhab ? You can still go to Istanbul from there. How about a possible visit by an Ottoman citizen into Sahel which ends up befriending a local intellectual and influenced by him, and later goes back home with bringing what he got back in Sahel ?
I think there are many ways for Male ideals to spread into the empire. Though indeed, to make it into as much coherent movement as "Bello-ism" will likely become, one would need a figure to organize and lead it, and to get one is pretty much a Russian Roullete kind of matter, which Ali bin Bello himself is one, the single bullet that the trigger hits. Still, I think it will contribute to the process of democratization of the empire's society. At minimal, it will spread the seeds that will remain dormant until the time comes, after the dawn of constitution. At best, it will effect the formation of TTL's *Young Ottomans movement, by possibly granting it some populist trappings, or maybe that'd be stretching it ?

3) Indeed, Ottomans would only enter Egypt militarily when the British wants them to, and IOTL the British did asked the Ottomans to intervene in Egypt to stabilize the then chaotic country, which the Ottomans refused to do since they were just devastated by the last war with Russia. That led the British to directly occupied Egypt.

The question being, what will happen to Egypt ITTL ? Will they go through the similar route to wreckage as IOTL ? Or will they be able to keep themselves strong enough as a reliable client state to the British ? If the first, will the Ottomans then be on the position to be involved in Egypt ?

4) Indeed, the Russian leadership largely didn't really want the war back then, and 30 years of difference can certainly prevent it. I'm not sure how will Belloism role in the issue, however....

6) A good deal will depend upon what Louis Faidherbe does in the alternate timeline, and also on the extent to which the British are willing to (or are forced to) parcel western Africa into spheres of influence.

Which means it depends on whether Male theology will spread into Western Sahel or not, it seems ?
 
I wouldn't mind the sped-up pace later on, but maybe you could spice it up with more detailed posts concentrating on specific events?

This will definitely happen - the story posts will focus on specific events, for instance, and some of the book-excerpt posts will do so as well. A ten-year overview series, for instance, might consist of two or three "book excerpts," one of which would be a general discussion of the period while the others might deal with important events or specific regions.

Also, might the absence of these slaves from Brazil lead to butterflies there?

The greater success of the Malê revolt will lead to butterflies. One of the factors that has not yet been explored in this series is exactly why the Malê got the deal they did - i.e., being put on a ship back to Africa rather than being hunted down like dogs. Part of it is that the Brazilian authorities were often pragmatic in dealing with slave revolts - they eventually offered amnesty to the Cabanagem rebels, for instance, and deported many non-ringleader Malê to Africa in OTL - but part is also that, rather than being defeated in a single day in January 1835, the Malê hung on as guerrillas until after the Cabanagem started later in 1835, and were still there when the Sabinada revolt broke out in 1837.

This meant that the Brazilian government was facing four rebellions at once - the Malê and Sabinada in Bahia, the Cabanagem in Grão-Pará, and the Farroupilhas in the south (Santa Catarina and Rio Grande do Sul). They needed to make a deal with the Malê in order to free up troops to deal with the other revolts and to prevent the Malê guerrillas from linking up with the Sabinada.

It may well be that, in this timeline, the distraction posed by the Malê meant that the central government took longer to put down the other revolts. If so, once the Balaiada got started in Maranhão (1838), the fat would really be in the fire. It's possible that the ATL's Brazil would be missing one or more of its OTL provinces - Brazil was a very fragile state at that time, and the slightest change could make a big difference. We may see a bit of what happened to Brazil in the next update.
 
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This will definitely happen - the story posts will focus on specific events, for instance, and some of the book-excerpt posts will do so as well. A ten-year overview series, for instance, might consist of two or three "book excerpts," one of which would be a general discussion of the period while the others might deal with important events or specific regions.

The greater success of the Malê revolt will lead to butterflies. One of the factors that has not yet been explored in this series is exactly why the Malê got the deal they did - i.e., being put on a ship back to Africa rather than being hunted down like dogs. Part of it is that the Brazilian authorities were often pragmatic in dealing with slave revolts - they eventually offered amnesty to the Cabanagem rebels, for instance, and deported many non-ringleader Malê to Africa in OTL - but part is also that, rather than being defeated in a single day in January 1835, the Malê hung on as guerrillas until after the Cabanagem started later in 1835, and were still there when the Sabinada revolt broke out in 1837.

This meant that the Brazilian government was facing four rebellions at once - the Malê and Sabinada in Bahia, the Cabanagem in Grão-Pará, and the Farroupilhas in the south (Santa Catarina and Rio Grande do Sul). They needed to make a deal with the Malê in order to free up troops to deal with the other revolts and to prevent the Malê guerrillas from linking up with the Sabinada.

It may well be that, in this timeline, the distraction posed by the Malê meant that the central government took longer to put down the other revolts. If so, once the Balaiada got started in Maranhão (1838), the fat would really be in the fire. It's possible that the ATL's Brazil would be missing one or more of its OTL provinces - Brazil was a very fragile state at that time, and the slightest change could make a big difference. We may see a bit of what happened to Brazil in the next update.

Very interesting. So a Brazil possibly surrounded by seceded former provinces? I look forward to when this is covered.
 
Also, maybe we pay attention to much on Mecca. How about Libya ? Which is near to Chad Basin and has had traditional trade links to the latter and also of Maliki madhab ? You can still go to Istanbul from there.

Libya's a possibility, if it's ready for that kind of movement - the Libyans were tribal, and considerably less sophisticated than the urban Hausa and Fulani.

How about a possible visit by an Ottoman citizen into Sahel which ends up befriending a local intellectual and influenced by him, and later goes back home with bringing what he got back in Sahel ? I think there are many ways for Male ideals to spread into the empire.

That's mainly what I had in mind - individuals would spread Malê doctrines, but any organized movement would require time, critical mass, and suitable conditions.

Though indeed, to make it into as much coherent movement as "Bello-ism" will likely become, one would need a figure to organize and lead it, and to get one is pretty much a Russian Roullete kind of matter, which Ali bin Bello himself is one, the single bullet that the trigger hits. Still, I think it will contribute to the process of democratization of the empire's society. At minimal, it will spread the seeds that will remain dormant until the time comes, after the dawn of constitution. At best, it will effect the formation of TTL's *Young Ottomans movement, by possibly granting it some populist trappings, or maybe that'd be stretching it ?

I'd suspect that at least some powerful people in the Ottoman empire would be influenced by Belloism, the Malê theology, or both. I also suspect that these people will self-select for liberal movements. If so, then we'll likely see these doctrines playing a part in the modernization process, either through the Young Ottomans or some other group - in other words, there wouldn't be a Malê or Belloist movement as such, but there might be liberal movements with a few Malê or Belloist features.

3) Indeed, Ottomans would only enter Egypt militarily when the British wants them to, and IOTL the British did asked the Ottomans to intervene in Egypt to stabilize the then chaotic country, which the Ottomans refused to do since they were just devastated by the last war with Russia. That led the British to directly occupied Egypt.

The question being, what will happen to Egypt ITTL ? Will they go through the similar route to wreckage as IOTL ? Or will they be able to keep themselves strong enough as a reliable client state to the British ? If the first, will the Ottomans then be on the position to be involved in Egypt ?

I expect that, if the Ottomans are able to successfully intervene in Egypt, they'd have a protectorate relationship going forward, in which they'd have the power to make or break khedives and to control foreign policy, but not to rule directly. Also, they'd be co-protectors with Britain, because the UK would be willing to use Turkey as its local "sheriff" but not to surrender its control of the Suez Canal. I suspect that there will be an intervention of some sort, since I don't think anything in this timeline will affect the Mehmet Ali dynasty's fiscal policies or the Ethiopia invasion.

6) A good deal will depend upon what Louis Faidherbe does in the alternate timeline, and also on the extent to which the British are willing to (or are forced to) parcel western Africa into spheres of influence.

Which means it depends on whether Male theology will spread into Western Sahel or not, it seems ?

To a considerable extent. You'll notice that the jihadist kingdoms in the western Sahel, including Masina, Futa Jallon and Umar Tall's upcoming empire, have mostly rejected Malê doctrines - their kings and religious leaders have seen the effect of Abacar's liberation theology, recoiled from it in horror, and are using the lead time to inculcate their populations against it. This could end up opening the door for the French in that part of the Sahel, although supply lines and the interests of the colonial powers will have at least as much to do with the outcome.
 
I expect that, if the Ottomans are able to successfully intervene in Egypt, they'd have a protectorate relationship going forward, in which they'd have the power to make or break khedives and to control foreign policy, but not to rule directly. Also, they'd be co-protectors with Britain, because the UK would be willing to use Turkey as its local "sheriff" but not to surrender its control of the Suez Canal. I suspect that there will be an intervention of some sort, since I don't think anything in this timeline will affect the Mehmet Ali dynasty's fiscal policies or the Ethiopia invasion.

Actually, should Egypt become as messy as IOTL when the British moved in to occupy the country, I think any stable regime will do to replace the failing Khedivate. British retained the monarchy as puppet since 1) de jure rule by non-muslims will be hard to accept by Egyptian populace, and 2) to avoid offending other powers by erasing the Khedivate as a separate state. But I don't think Ottomans will need to do that, being muslims and the caliphate. Khedival regime had just pretty much lost its credibility, so I think Egyptians will readily accept direct Ottoman rule. Egypt was also legally an Ottoman domain anyway, so imposition of Ottoman full control won't symbolically change anything. All the British would care about is their interest are to remain undisturbed, and Ottoman reoccupation of Egypt must work in their favor, and the Ottomans would understand that. It won't be a co-dominion, since British will be glad to leave the management bill to Ottomans while profiting from undiscounted revenue of their business in Egypt. Ottoman later expansion in Africa will also serve as a convenient vehicle to expand their economic interest in Africa as far as the Ottomans can reach, and doing so will be cheaper then embarking on a conventional expansion project by yourself. In the long term however, Ottomans and African muslim entities will be grossly benefited by Ottoman Egypt. Once the Ottomans have reached Chad Basin, they will be in the position to disturb any European incursions into the Sahel especially that of France. The Egypt-less, devastated post-1878 Ottomans of OTL could've had influenced the Tuaregs to sabotage and significantly hamper French expansion effort in West Africa (Ever heard of Flatter's misson ?). What will a stronger Ottoman Empire that has presence in Chad Basin be capable to do ? Adding the Male factor in the picture, and one can only wonder how the things will may end up become....
 

Ceranthor

Banned
I've been seeing plenty of discussion about how the Male are going to affect the development of the Islamic world, but to what extent are their ideals going to affect the non-Islamic portions of Africa? Are we going to see Male ideals enter the Congo? Or what about Zanzibar(though it too is largely Muslim), or maybe the Zulu kingdom in South Africa?
 
I've been seeing plenty of discussion about how the Male are going to affect the development of the Islamic world, but to what extent are their ideals going to affect the non-Islamic portions of Africa? Are we going to see Male ideals enter the Congo? Or what about Zanzibar(though it too is largely Muslim), or maybe the Zulu kingdom in South Africa?

Perhaps the secular bits, but the overriding theme of the Male ideals seems to be uniting Western liberal ideals (women's rights, freedom of speech, separation of church and state, etc.) with Islam. Minus the Islam, it's just a rehashed version of Western liberal ideals; still useful, but not exactly unique.
 
Perhaps the secular bits, but the overriding theme of the Male ideals seems to be uniting Western liberal ideals (women's rights, freedom of speech, separation of church and state, etc.) with Islam. Minus the Islam, it's just a rehashed version of Western liberal ideals; still useful, but not exactly unique.

I think an additional punch the Malê movement will have outside of the Muslim world is that it isn't coming from a bunch of white people, some of whom may think of themselves as non-racist but are still thoughtlessly condescending and have a narrow cultural idea of what is good and what is bad, others of whom are quite frank in their racism and state clearly that liberal progress is for whites only. No, it's coming not just from black people, but self-liberated ex-slaves! It therefore has a lot more authority for the majority of the population on Earth, certainly for other Africans.

In this context the Islamic context actually offsets and limits some of the impact, except among people on the cusp of converting to Islam anyway; for many Africans and other Third World people, Islam is something that has been pressuring them for some time which they continue to resist, and the Rights of Man coming in an Islamic guise would actually be less acceptable to them--unless they consider the objective fact that ITTL the Malê did well at least for while; that might motivate them to separate out the Islamic content and re-relate it to their own world views.

I do think it is a bit more than late 18th century radical liberalism with Islamic flavoring; what matters is, the ideologue is not some aristocratic dilettante nor a perpetually marginal professional revolutionary but someone who actually made their revolution work, someone who came out of nowhere to wind up running a former Caliphate.
 
By the way it's not clear to me how much "women's rights" is part of the standard packet of 19th century radical liberalism. It develops along with the progress of the liberal agenda--but because women jump onto the bandwagon and keep on insisting, against considerable resistance from within the progressive movement, that all this fine talk applies to them too. It's a rare male progressive visionary who thinks to put women's rights in the forefront. Some do of course, some out of a sincere and natural, to them, belief in women's actual equality (John Stuart Mill, I gather), others (thinking of Marx and Engels here) because the logic of their theories make that a compelling conclusion, despite a certain personal inclination to go right on taking advantage of male privilege as it comes to them.

But it wasn't the radical Godwin who wrote Vindication of Rights of Women, it was his partner (I honestly don't know if they were legally married or not) Mary Wollstonecraft who did, on behalf of her own sex. American feminism tended to hit stone walls, and the progress of the status of women in America practically seems to have emerged from the pragmatic realities of the frontier and pioneer settlements, where women were so highly valued no one questioned their right to vote and hold offices, not if they knew what was good for them!:eek::p Feminism is intertwined with other forms of social progress but has rarely progressed as an obvious, integral part of the progressive agenda without a lot of agitation by women on their own behalf--for which they are shamelessly reproached by male "leaders" of the movement, for "betraying" it by failing to devote all energies and attention to what is "important."

Thus, Malê "feminism" does not have to be very radical or even adequately liberal by modern standards to stand out strikingly as profoundly progressive, not just compared to the traditional societies it radicalizes, but the "best" established standards of European progressivism too. In Sokoto, it is the women speaking for themselves who make sure that gets put in, and Abacar is one of those men who accepts their perspectives and issues as relevant and important with no demurral, so he integrates it.

The real feminism of the Malê movement is that we have reason to believe it will be women who advance it through crucial phases. So, adding to this already remarkably even-handed template, the Malê radical message will be infused with feminist perspective, which will be seamlessly integral with it. There may still be that dynamic of male leaders trying (often without even noticing what they are doing) to shut down women's concerns as peripheral, but they can hardly appeal to the text they are handed to emphasize the justice or necessity of doing so; the movement's basis will rather support those who rebuke these men for doing so.
 
Actually, should Egypt become as messy as IOTL when the British moved in to occupy the country, I think any stable regime will do to replace the failing Khedivate. British retained the monarchy as puppet since 1) de jure rule by non-muslims will be hard to accept by Egyptian populace, and 2) to avoid offending other powers by erasing the Khedivate as a separate state. But I don't think Ottomans will need to do that, being muslims and the caliphate. Khedival regime had just pretty much lost its credibility, so I think Egyptians will readily accept direct Ottoman rule. Egypt was also legally an Ottoman domain anyway, so imposition of Ottoman full control won't symbolically change anything. All the British would care about is their interest are to remain undisturbed, and Ottoman reoccupation of Egypt must work in their favor, and the Ottomans would understand that. It won't be a co-dominion, since British will be glad to leave the management bill to Ottomans while profiting from undiscounted revenue of their business in Egypt. Ottoman later expansion in Africa will also serve as a convenient vehicle to expand their economic interest in Africa as far as the Ottomans can reach, and doing so will be cheaper then embarking on a conventional expansion project by yourself. In the long term however, Ottomans and African muslim entities will be grossly benefited by Ottoman Egypt. Once the Ottomans have reached Chad Basin, they will be in the position to disturb any European incursions into the Sahel especially that of France. The Egypt-less, devastated post-1878 Ottomans of OTL could've had influenced the Tuaregs to sabotage and significantly hamper French expansion effort in West Africa (Ever heard of Flatter's misson ?). What will a stronger Ottoman Empire that has presence in Chad Basin be capable to do ? Adding the Male factor in the picture, and one can only wonder how the things will may end up become....

This is incredibly incorrect. The British 'retained' the Muhammad Ali Dynasty because when they originally invaded in 1882 it was nominally to restore order and to protect the Suez Canal. They thought it would be a relatively short intervention, not the occupation that it became. There's basically no way the Egyptians could be conditioned to re-accept Turkish rule under any circumstances short of an all-out conquest that the Turks simply don't have the resources, the time, or the allies to do so. Hell even the British had a very hard time holding down Egypt and Sudan, and they certainly were better positioned for the tasks than the Turks were. If Istanbul made any such move toward Egypt the British, the French, and the Russians would on be on them like white on rice. Regarding Egypt let us remember that the British both wanted to keep Turkey strong to resist Russia and to keep her weak so that the British could carve out her own spheres of influence and protectorates from former Turkish vassals and provinces. Basically they not only wanted to have their cake and eat it too, they wanted to prevent anyone else from even getting a crumb of the cake.

Secondly, even if ASBs came down from the stars in their spaceships and directly intervened in the matter, the Turks wouldn't move in any sort of way into Africa. Remember the conquest of Sudan and of Darfur was done under the Khedivate, who were being blocked out of North Africa and Syria by European intervention and already had a strong sphere of influence in Arabia, not by the Ottoman Sultanate, who cared more for Europe and Mesopotamia than they ever did for North Africa. And why should they? The logistics of trying to stretch a supply train across the Sahara would be immense and costly, and for little to no gain. Hell even the French had a hard time doing it, and there were far more industrialized, more populous, richer, had a better supply situation to begin with, and had some fifty years of solid scientific advancement over what you're proposing. It simply will not happen short of Allah himself coming down and declaring all of the Sahel and North Africa to belong to the Ottoman Sultan.

How do you even remotely propose for the Turks, having conquered Egypt, somehow, and put down the many rebellions they'll face, somehow, and defeated the Russians in the Caucuses and in Romania, and fought off the British and French in Egypt, the East Mediterranean, and the former in Arabia and Mesopotamia, and potentially even the Persians also in Mesopotamia, again somehow, the Turks would then push even further south along the White Nile, then suddenly break west, cross through the Sahel, defeat and conquer the Ouaddai Empire, somehow, defeat the rebellions from there, somehow, then push on even further into the Sahel conquering the Bornu Empire, the Sokoto Republic, and many other states, somehow, and then take complete control of the Lake Chad basin, all the while supplying this massive army over incredibly distances far away from their core lands for absolutely no gain at all. How do you propose for that to happen, hmm?

I'm sorry if I'm coming across as brash but really what you're describing is simply impossible short of a genuine miracle from on high.

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@ Jonathan Edelstein re: Brazil; the Argentinian and Uruguayan Civil War are ongoing in this time, and the Platine War is quickly coming up. With a Brazil that is weakened, or forced to turn inward for the time, that's going to have serious butterflies on the region. Namely without Brazil to stop him the Rosas regime in Argentina is going to succeeded in making Argentina the hegemon of the entire Rio de la Plata Basin.
 
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