M1 series cancelled, M60A4 project instead

[ranoncles]

There are always exceptions to the rule: the B-57 being the AF's. But buying LeClerc? As they said on The Sopranos, fugadaboutitt. Why would we in the first place when it's not going to be available until 1991 at the earliest. Hell, Krauss-Maffai tried selling a 105-mm version of the Leo 2 to the U.S. Army in 1976-77, and was told "thanks, but no thanks." There was just too much already invested in the program to cancel-in Congress as well as the Army, so killing the M-1 is just a pipe dream. And even if Mr. Carter did cancel it, Reagan would just restart the program in the FY 82 DOD budget, and that's that.

Nothingnow: you're forgetting one thing: Congress getting involved and telling the Army and the USMC "You shall buy an American designed and built tank." No ifs, ands, or buts. All it takes is a few Congresscritters in districts affected by potential cancellation of the M-1 to do just that. Most amendments just sail through Congress, and that would be it.

Again, I won't dispute that this could happen but there are just as many real life examples of it happening.

America wouldn't buy French tanks (in this particular example) but they certainly wouldn't have any qualms about building a French designed tank, substituting French parts with American stuff where necessary. The US Harrier/AV8 program would be a good example of this.

By the same token, the Pentagon has closed down numerous programs which went over time and over budget. Despite the cries of anguish from arms dealers, arms manufacturers and their pet congressmen. At the moment, the F35 program is under similar threath. So again, it has precedent....

Sure, the LeClerc didn't exist in the late 1970s and thus isn't the best example in this timeline. So substitute it for any other decent foreign made tank. If the protracted M1 program ran into trouble and let's say Carter decided on a foreign design (but made in America), Reagan certainly wouldn't halt it if production had already started. He might allow another design program (which could take 20 years to produce a new tank) to start but halting a production run to work on a new design? Meanwhile robbing the army of a modern tank while old M60 models plodded on? Bloody unlikely.....

 

[Matt Wiser]

The West Germans did try pitching a 105-mm variant of the Leo 2 to the U.S. Army in 1978. They were turned down. There's only one other alternative: Challenger. And the U.S. Army had committed to going from the 105 to the 120 Smoothbore. But still, Mr. Carter in 1980 knew that he was being bashed politically for his "wimpy" attitude on defense, so why would he hand Reagan another thing to use against him in the campaign? If Carter wins, he can kill the M-1 and go with a 120 smoothbore version of Challenger (but built here) as a stopgap until a new tank is built. If Reagan wins (and M-1 is cancelled by Carter before the election) he reverses the decision in his FY 82 defense budget. Just as he did with the B-1. It's simple as that: and even most Democrats in Congress would go along with it: a tank is not as controversal as say, the MX missile.

Bottom line: even if Mr. Carter cancels the M-1, Reagan reverses the decision, foreign tank or not. Congress would've been howling bloody murder to Mr. Carter, and it's a strong possiblity that Congress would restore M-1 funding even if Carter doesn't want any. The program survives. Period.

 

[Commissar]

No. The M60 was replaced by the M1 because the M60, even in upgraded form could not and did not meet the needs of the newly developed doctrine of Air-Land Battle. The M1 was a major advance in all three categories that define a tank's fighting ability: tactical mobility, firepower and armor. And while we could debate ad nausea the benefits of gas turbine vs. diesel engine, I have talked to many Abrams drivers (many of whom also drove M60s in the PA National Guard) and they to the man agreed that the M1 was far superior.

At the cost of a greater logistics burden that slows down operations which is a more important consideration.

The US after Vietnam returned its attention back to the confrontation in Central Europe. Political forces were such that the West Germans were beginning to demand that NATO disavowed first use of nuclear weapons and develop a plan to defend West Germany as far forward as possible. To do this the US needed a tank that could fight a vicious defensive "first contact" battle while performing local tactical withdrawals to keep from being overwhelmed. As this was going on pre-positioned material manned by flown in REFORGER personnel would make its way to the front along with whatever reinforcements could be sent across the Atlantic in time to stop the Soviet advance.

Then that begs the question of why build a 70 ton monster that cannot ford most rivers or cross most bridges and does not have indirect fire, plus has to refuel three times as much?

Once NATO forces gathered enough forces in theater, a strategic reserve would be formed. With that reserve NATO would then launch a series of fast moving counter attacks intended to disrupt Warsaw Pact rear areas and throw off the pace of their attack. To do this a mobile hard hitting tank and matching IFV were needed. Neither the M60 or M113 could fulfill these new requirements.

Except at this point nuclear warfare has taken its toll and logistics will be spotty, so a Tank that consumes three times as much fuel and can use fewer of the remaining bridges is a liability, not an asset.

What may be good tactically can also be a disaster operationally and strategically.

To do the job they were now politically forced to accept the US Army needed the M1. If the enemy already has a butt load of Shermans and you know your government will only fund a certain number of tanks (regardless of the quality of the tank) than you need that new tank to be a Tiger. Britain, West Germany and the US all knew this, which is why the Challenger, Leopard II and Abrams are so similar.

No, you don't as the Tank becomes a hindrance operationally and the terrain and built up nature of Europe negates the range advantage and allows the successor T-34s to outflank you.

Also need I point out the Shermans inflicted lopsided kill ratios against German Tigers.

Third Army lost 1,367 Tanks mostly to AT Guns while the Germans lost over 2,500 tanks, 856 of them Tigers and Panthers, and mostly these losses were to Shermans.

The Army literally fell for the myth of 5 Shermans for a Panther when it was pretty much lopsided in the favor of the Shermans who spent most of their time doing CIS and fired AP rounds rarely.

 

[Commissar]

There is no major guerrilla war in the 1980's. Insisting that the US needs a tank for a guerrilla war in the 1980's is like insisting we need a 140mm gun MBT tomorrow.
You're replacing the demands of the 1980's with those of today's.

Beirut ring a bell? Lets not forget, that Europe is built up negating long range fire advantages and a Hot War there will go nuclear, forcing units to spread out and make use of existing bridges, most of which cannot support the weight of a M1 and can only with difficulty support the weight of a M60.

And how is a 120mm rifled gun better? Have the British use of rifled guns been really that much better? And HESH are much less effective for modern Soviet tanks of the 1980's.
And it isn't always a matter of long range, but also armor penetration as Fin stabilized sabots perform better with smoothbores.

More variety of rounds can be used including dedicated HE which the M1 lacks Tank vs Tank engagements are rare though, but a Challenger1 scored the longest tank on tank kill ever in the Persian Gulf War with a kill at 5.1km with HESH.

Any case even if a HESH round fails to cause spalling, the impact is enough to stall the engine, fuckup the gyroscope, electrical system, and hydraulics system, Mission Killing the tank.

However, the gun can still fire APFSDS, its loses some penetration power, but it will still go through any tank it hits if capped with DU or Tungsten.

Smoothbores are fine Tank Killers, I'll grant you that, but again, the Tanks job is ultimately to support the Infantry with direct fire and a Tank will rarely enjoy wide open spaces to shoot LOS to max range and even then CAS is all over the place claiming the kills.

 

[benjamin]

At the cost of a greater logistics burden that slows down operations which is a more important consideration.

This was debated at length within the US Armor community. It was decided that the gas turbine's increased performance out weighed the increased logistical burden. There were immediate plans to install an under-armor auxiliary power unit (along with the HK commanders sight), but these were both delayed due to budget considerations until the M1A2. The APU allows the tank to shut down the gas-turbine while retaining electrical power to all systems. This greatly reduces fuel use. Overall, the US came to the decision that so long as the Atlantic lifeline held they would get enough supplies to keep the armor mobile and continue combat operations. If the Atlantic was closed than the war was as good as lost anyway.

Then that begs the question of why build a 70 ton monster that cannot ford most rivers or cross most bridges and does not have indirect fire, plus has to refuel three times as much?

Post-WWII most West German bridges were rebuilt to very high standards. I read that about 80% or so of all West German bridges could support the Abrams. On top of that a large effort was made to develop rapid bridging techniques using armored bridge layers for narrow water barriers and pontoon bridges for larger bodies of water. Fording was never really an option for the US and even the M2 gave up on the idea of being amphibious when the M2A1 came out.

Indirect fire is handled by the M109 and MLRS. That has never been a tanker's job.

Except at this point nuclear warfare has taken its toll and logistics will be spotty, so a Tank that consumes three times as much fuel and can use fewer of the remaining bridges is a liability, not an asset.

What may be good tactically can also be a disaster operationally and strategically.

The Air-Land Battle doctrine was developed specifically to give NATO commanders the ability to halt the Soviet drive without resorting to a nuclear response. Soviet doctrine until the mid-1980s was such that conventional forces, supported by chem warfare, would advance along a wide front with a few points of concentration. Numbers would overwhelm the NATO defenders and the Rhine would be reached before nuclear use. This did not change until after the introduction of the M1 and Air-Land Battle. Post Cold War documents show that the Soviets were worried enough by the new build up by the US that they once again integrated nuclear first use into many of their war plans.

As for the M1 as a liability...that was debated by many people with far more knowledge than we have. They made a decision based upon what was known at the time. Given that there was no war in Europe, I can't find reason to fault them.

No, you don't as the Tank becomes a hindrance operationally and the terrain and built up nature of Europe negates the range advantage and allows the successor T-34s to outflank you.

Also need I point out the Shermans inflicted lopsided kill ratios against German Tigers.

Third Army lost 1,367 Tanks mostly to AT Guns while the Germans lost over 2,500 tanks, 856 of them Tigers and Panthers, and mostly these losses were to Shermans.

The Army literally fell for the myth of 5 Shermans for a Panther when it was pretty much lopsided in the favor of the Shermans who spent most of their time doing CIS and fired AP rounds rarely.

The Abrams was not a hindrance to a nation who's war fighting expertise has long been that of overwhelming logistical support. The M1 is modular and easier to repair in the field than the M60. You can remove the turbine power pack in less than an hour and reinsert a new turbine in about twice that time. If the situation permitted the damaged turbine would be sent back to a depot for real repairs, if not it would be scrapped for parts. Other pieces could be replaced in a similar manner. The key was getting spares across the Atlantic, and as I have said, if the Soviet Navy is able to close the Atlantic than the war is lost regardless how the first battles go.

The Abrams took not only the Sherman vs. Tiger combat into account but also the lessons learned by the Israelis in 1967. To defeat the Soviets and their allies one needed a tank that could kill 3-5 enemy tanks before being destroyed. To do this one needed a tank that could find and engage the enemy at long distances and have far better trained crews. The Abrams and the Armor School at Fort Knox do this.

The Abrams was designed and built to fight an enemy that largely no longer exists. It is expensive and complex, especially when used to fight insurgents and third world armies. But even so it does this well.

But to again respond to the OP...losing the M1 / M2 combo was not an option for the US Army. The US Army sacrificed a decent armored cavalry vehicle, a new self-propelled artillery vehicle and a new scout helicopter to ensure that the Abrams and Bradley were built in large numbers. Giving these up would have been a major problem for the Army.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Orr, Kelly. King of the Killing Zone: The Story of the M-1, America's Super Tank. W. W. Norton and Company, Inc.; 1980.

Hofmann, George F. and Starry, Donn A. From Camp Colt to Desert Storm: The History of U.S. Armored Forces. The University Press of Kentucky; 1999.

Benjamin

 

[Matt Wiser]

Benjamin, this guy is so anti-M1 that nothing that doesn't fit his notion will convince him otherwise. He just doesn't get it that canceling the M-1 was not an option in 1980-81, and even if Carter did kill it, Reagan would restart the program. You know, Carter "soft on defense" and all that.

As for Ivan's war plans: they actually had two versions: a nuclear-first from the outset, and a conventional-only version. The East German archives only had the nuclear-only one.

Projecting today's war into a 1970s-80s scenario is just plain folly. No one in 1982 (when the M-1 was first fielded) expected what became OIF. Everyone was expecting the big one in Europe, along the Central Front. With maybe a little expeditionary combat in the usual hot spots, but other than that....

 

[Commissar]

Benjamin, this guy is so anti-M1 that nothing that doesn't fit his notion will convince him otherwise. He just doesn't get it that canceling the M-1 was not an option in 1980-81, and even if Carter did kill it, Reagan would restart the program. You know, Carter "soft on defense" and all that.

I'm not anti-M1, it is just a Tank geared to a fight that rarely comes up. It is in the class of heavy breakthrough Tanks and more appropriate for independent battalions as a Corps asset, but as a mainline Tank, is a disaster logistically and operationally which trump and always must trump tactical advantages that would rarely come into play in a fight that would rarely come up.

Again if on an open Field with clear lanes of fire and a horde of Tanks facing me, I'll take the M1. Closed, built up, forested, urban, and restricted terrain where weight is at a premium and bridge weight restrictions are in force which equals most of the world, an advanced M60 weight class tank is what I'll take as it can manuever better in such terrain and go more places and can better support the Infantry who rule these areas and more importantly requires less vulnerable fuel tankers to keep me running.

Your problem is you and Benjamin are wedded to a system that just inspires fear and awe without looking at its severe drawbacks or the flawed rationale in its conception.

 

[Matt Wiser]

When the scenario was the Central Front in the 1980s, the M-1 is what the Army wanted and needed. A tank that at first with the 105-mm, could equal Soviet tanks. When the 120 smoothbore was added, it dominates Soviet armor. When your cav troop on the Fulda gap (9 tanks plus Bradleys) is facing a Regiment (95 tanks), you want to hold them off as long as possible. M-1 or M-1A1 lets you do that. No one in the 1980s was thinking of a campaign in the desert similar to OIF. Though CENTCOM was, of course, thinking of scenarios there, such as a Soviet invasion of Iran, where the M-1 would be committed to combat. (and said invasion of Iran will in all likelihood kick off the Central Front scenario at some point) In 1980, there was no acceptable substitute to the M-1, and retaining the M-60 in any form until the 1990s was not an option, politically or otherwise.

Projecting today's issues with the tank (the logistics) into 1980-81 decision-making doesn't cut it. It was the tank needed at the time.

 

[benjamin]

I'm not anti-M1, it is just a Tank geared to a fight that rarely comes up. It is in the class of heavy breakthrough Tanks and more appropriate for independent battalions as a Corps asset, but as a mainline Tank, is a disaster logistically and operationally which trump and always must trump tactical advantages that would rarely come into play in a fight that would rarely come up.

Again if on an open Field with clear lanes of fire and a horde of Tanks facing me, I'll take the M1. Closed, built up, forested, urban, and restricted terrain where weight is at a premium and bridge weight restrictions are in force which equals most of the world, an advanced M60 weight class tank is what I'll take as it can manuever better in such terrain and go more places and can better support the Infantry who rule these areas and more importantly requires less vulnerable fuel tankers to keep me running.

Your problem is you and Benjamin are wedded to a system that just inspires fear and awe without looking at its severe drawbacks or the flawed rationale in its conception.

Not to get into an argument over proper armor doctrine or tactics vs. strategic thinking with regards to logistics, but your argument seems to completely disregard the geopolitical situation that existed when the Abrams was designed and built.

The North German plains have plenty of proper killing zones in which accurate long range fire would decimate an advancing enemy force. NATO built much of their forward defense and IGB deployment around these well laid out positions. The 2nd and 11th ACRs had this job for much of the later portion of the Cold War. Given that both NATO and the Warsaw Pact built their armor doctrine around avoiding urban warfare your arguments hold little weight. It has long been known that taking a tank into an urban setting is very dangerous. But this is true in all modern warfare...armored forces without proper infantry support are very vulnerable. Conversely, infantry without armor are at risk when enemy armor appears. The two branches need each other, but this doesn't mean tanks need to sacrifice long-range firepower and become over glorified infantry support vehicles (that's the job of the M2, no offense to any Bradley drivers).

But if we look at the M1's service record since the end of the Cold War it shows that the M1 remains an asset even when out of its element.

Desert Storm - M1 dominated the battlefield and proved extremely difficult to mission kill even when hit multiple times. Failures due to mechanical issues were relatively rare and easy to fix.

Somalia - In theater commanders begged for armor support but were denied this in order to avoid the perception that they were "escalating" the conflict. Just a few tanks would have completely changed the equation that led to Black Hawk Down.

Bosnia - M1, Leopard 2 and Challenger proved crucial in cowing Serbian forces and enforcing the various cease-fires that ended the Yugoslav Civil Wars.

Iraq - M1 again dominated the battlefield. Losses due to insurgents were/are rare and often the US forces destroyed tanks that were only disabled in order to prevent their capture by local forces. Only extremely large IEDs could disable an Abrams and crew casualties were rare when compared with other vehicles.

Afghanistan - A light tank would have been nice, but the XM8 was cancelled in order to divert funds to the not so impressive Stryker family of vehicles. The M1 was not deployed there until late 2010 when the Martines deployed a company worth to give much needed firepower.

As for versatility in various combat situations the Abrams has both a guided indirect N-LOS missile capability (though I'm not sure if its been fully fielded as I've been out of the business for almost a decade) and a nasty bee-hive round for anti-infantry/anti-foliage use. Either way the Abrams, despite being designed for a very specific combat operation, has proven to be an excellent combat vehicle in numerous conflicts. It's few shortcomings have been largely due to budget and political issues.

Benjamin

 

[Matt Wiser]

Concur fully with the above. The tank was built for the Central Front in Germany, but has proven itself on other battlefields.

Then there's export customers who don't seem to mind the shortcomings of the tank: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq (post-Saddamist), and Australia. Having a vehicle that's combat proven is a good seller as far as GDLS is concerned. And the ROK's K1 and K1A1 use the M-1 as a basis for that tank, but tailored to the customer's requirements.