I am very pleased and happy to have you here; I was thinking your knowledge and expertise would be valuable and was wondering about PM'ing you
Thanks for that; knowing your prominence on the boards, that's a real honor. Feel free to PM me at any time.
I was thinking of a scenario where the provinces etc were used for the electoral college but didn't get self-rule. IIRC some of the US states even in 1796/1800 apportioned electoral college votes according to popular vote, rather than state legislature vote, and its this model I was looking at
Ah, that could work, though there's still a lot of question to be answered. First, Pennsylvania did apportion its electors according to a popular vote in the 1790s. Some New England states may have, but I know PA did. South Carolina did not 'til after the Civil War, however.
On only really having the provinces as electoral vote groupings, that's fine. But if so, then the powers defined in the constitution might need to go into more depth. Those enumerated by the US Constitution assume the states under the federal government can take on responsibilities not granted to the US Gov't.
The frontier republics would be de jure independent, however much that comes to rely upon France
Makes sense.
I am always impressed by historians who know all the things nibbling at my memory ! I seem to learn things, assimilate the IDEA of them, but forget the details and then a few years later revisit them and wonder why I can't compete.
You're not alone. I've just been doing a fair amount of research on the topic of Spain for my new TL. (Shameless plug; see sig).
As DuQuesne suggests a US-Spanish war might be already on the cards, but if it DOES break out it will be a limited one, with limited objectives - presumably New Orleans and West Florida. It ought also to be a hard-fought one if it does occur. Spain is not distracted elsewhere and would have a battlefleet available and thus presumably also an expeditionary army. Would the USA really DARE to take all this on, and if it does can it win ?
Well, the USA wasn't really prepared to take on Great Britain, and yet it did anyway. I think the foolhardiness of the effort is mostly to be judged on the attitude of Great Britain toward the exercise: if they tacitly support it, then it's probably a fair risk. If they are against it, it's the utmost folly. I'd expect them to show their favor by swooping in to negotiate a peace treaty at a time most favorable to the side they favored.
A DEFEAT to Spain in c 1804 would be a massive blow to the young USA and would send its internal politics off on an entirely new direction. Even if it wins by default, I would assume it to be a hard and costly war, and many especially in the N would ask if the prize was worth the cost
Indeed, but I think it depends on the manner of the defeat. If it's a military defeat that results in little loss of territory, but merely a check on the ambitions of the young republic, it could actually make the Americans all the more determined. If on the other hand it does result in a palpable loss at the peace treaty, then things could get a whole lot worse. Either way I agree it could have huge import for the USA: it will take the place of the War of 1812 by either cementing or confirm the Union.
It will also be interesting because it will probably force Jefferson into much more of an overt turn-around from his professed policies in 1800 and those he will support in order to achieve victory. And of course, it's liable to be just as interesting for Spain and her empire.
My reading is that L'Ouverture is governor for Paris, and whilst this is basically autonomy verging on independence no one wants the latter. Carnot may do to him as Istanbul did to Ali Pasha of Janina, ie let him get on with it, and intervene only when he dies, or his rule falls apart.
Makes sense.
I'm certain that there's a conflict with the Shawnee in the offing, and as DuQuesne points out the initial Creek Wars arose from internal problems and not outside considerations. However, I am certain that US considerations on both included a subconscious factor based on the Louisiana Purchase - ie this latter affected the strategic reality and thus how things elsewhere were viewed. Just not sure how this would play out
I think you have a good point -- that the purchase definitely affected the strategic reality. Unfortunately, I can't think of too many politicians in the 1800s who offered a realistic counter-option besides relentless warfare. A few decades later Sam Houston might be around to support more of an accommodation, but he's too young as of yet.
On the other hand, Washington's dealings with the Indians in the 1790s does suggest what the alt-calculations might have been: then, he calculated that the military force necessary to subdue the Creeks (or the Shawnee) would bankrupt the US. Furthermore, he needed to win the loyalty of the Creeks who had been dealing with the Spanish in New Orleans in order to ensure the US held its border per the Treaty of Paris of 1783. Thus, he dedicated himself to diplomacy and wanted to create viable Indian reservations wherein the Indians could learn Western ways but whose borders were not so large that they invited White encroachment, since the US Gov't as well could not afford to keep white settlers out of Indian lands. And of course it turned out that the Creeks (or rather their wily chief Alexander McGillivray) used the concession won by the Treaty of New York to win more concessions from the Spanish.
I'd expect the general pattern to continue: the Native tribes will play the Americans off the British in the North and off the Spanish in the South. What's changing is the ability of the USA to solve the crisis through military means because as white settlement nears Indian lands, there's a bigger militia pool available to confront the Indians (since of course Jackson during the Creek War was using a lot of Tennessee militia).
I'm thinking it depends on what one means by 'power'. Quite possibly, though, if there's a US-Spanish War in c1804 this will define politics for a long time to come, and involve other people than the 1812 generation. If its a DEFEAT then it will be even weirder still !
True. The argument in my mind was that Jackson is fairly good general for the times (and for the field of American generals) and was certainly politically inclined. He'll be looking for an opportunity to allow his military success to translate to political office. Of course, he could be unsuccessful in either endeavor. If expansion and Jacksonianism are both blunted, then East - West tensions could become more and more problematic for the USA.
Interesting, very interesting. I was reading that in OTL Calhoun ending up at State was only due to a dual accident (Harrison's death making Tyler president, and a gun explosion killing his original Sec of State) so even in OTL he was two steps away from the influence he ended up having. Here, he could be more...or if the c1804 war with Spain is a defeat, or a relative defeat, he may come in on the second stage reaction to this...?
That's true of how Calhoun ended up as Sec State in the 1840s, but not of how he rose to national prominence. He was also VP under JQA and Jackson's first term, for example.
I was kind of intending him to be dead...
Well, that solves everything! I wonder though, would his brothers remain political and if so, what were their loyalties be. Some have always struck me as better administrators than Napoleon.
Looking forward to more.