Abwehr
Admiral Canaris attention for the morning is focused on the question of the intelligence from the London area. Specifically if the RAF is concentrating its defenses over the greater London area or still in its earlier deployment. The Luftwaffe was frantic to know, and had come knocking for a cup of Tea and wisdom. This was really not the sort of thing his agents usually produced, but a inquiry had been sent, and Canaris had some analysts sifting recent reports for anything that might help. What they had come up with through the morning was preciously little. Rumors really, about antiaircraft cannon batteries , and that was over a week old, weeks more likely. Canaris would have liked to produce something useful for the Luftwaffe. It was over a month since that idiot Schmid had departed as Fat Dickies intelligence chief. Now Canaris had a bit of sympathy for the new guy, and no longer felt like anything he sent to the LW intelligence office was entirely wasted. Canaris set aside the thought on Londons defense and considers two other items on his desk. One is the matter of selection of a new intelligence chief enemy forces East. The entire set up there needed to be reorganized, and a fresh outlook as well. Gelens work had been mixed and now his ‘product’ was near useless. If the Abwehr was to retain its role Canaris needed better results in at least some sectors, and the eastern front certainly needed improvement in intelligence work. He’d reorganized the Middle eastern region over the previous three months. That seemed to have some early results with some decent information flowing in, and some possibilities for penetrating into Siberia and finding out what the Reds were really up to.
The other item is a analysis of the Allied air war. Particularly the long term projections for 1943. Its not pleasant reading. While on the surface the Luftwaffe has held its own in the West and South the victories have not been the deeply decisive sort. Nothing like what the German air force claimed against the French their allies in the west in 1940, or the destruction of the Red Air Force in 1941. Smart looking tactical victories have been trumpeted, but others like the dismal performance over Malta, or the indifferent support of the submarine fleet are much less well known. What really matters are the predictions for enemy air strength as the year advances. Germany was expected to match the previous years production of 11,000 combat aircraft, but a late year series of directives increased single engine production at the expense of many older twin engine models. A actual production of 17,000, 18,000 or 20,000 might be reached. Unfortunately the RAF is likely to exceed the previous years 16,000 airframes. Just counting airframes is deceptive tho. The English are not cutting back on bomber production, and that construction includes the super heavy four engined models. For the USA the numbers that matter are the aircraft deployed to the UK and Africa. Mid 1942 it was estimated they had as many as 900 aircraft deployed to the UK. 600 being the lower estimate. Now it appears that has been doubled to as many as 1,800 aircraft, of which some 500 are now in Tunisia. That brings with the RAF 4,500 aircraft in range of Axis territory and capable of combat. the total air strength of the enemy from Syria, across Africa, and the UK to a bit over 6,000 operational combat aircraft. The Luftwaffe claims a equal number. But, Canaris analysts have their own count which places it at 4,440, including the residual Fligerkorps remaining in the East. RAF production is by the thin information falling a little behind losses in the ongoing air battle. That has more than made up by the deliveries from the US. At the present loss rates the Americans would in a few months have at least 4,000 aircraft in the UK and Africa, on top of a projected 5,000 RAF. At the end of 1943 the US Air forces in Africa and England will double again to 8,000. If the RAF continues building the heavy bombers as many as 6,000 will be operational. If the RAF reduces heavy bomber production in favor of single and twin engined aircraft it might match the Americans in combat aircraft flying each day. At the present loss rates its unlikely more than a third of the projected 1943 German production will be flying next January 1944. Six or seven thousand air frames perhaps. That assumes to improvement in enemy methods or aircraft. Information about new American and English models is filtering in. Improvements in aircraft, tactics and everything else are certain.
When the fighting in the east wound down there had been great expectations when the German air force turned west. Again the propagandists claimed great victories. The reality Canaris saw from the loss reports his organization had filched was the losses per sortie in the West were more than double those against the Red air forces in the East. For all its mistakes the RAF was simply better than the Bolshevik air forces. A lot better. Carried forward through 1943 that had very negative implications for both the loss of air frames and more important the loss of air crew. While there were changes in production to boost the number of new aircraft Canaris judged the improvements in aircrew or pilot training as falling far short. At this loss, sustained through 1943, the Luftwaffe would have more operational aircraft than air crew at the end of the year.