I am sensing a anti-Norwegian racism here. That or someone who is unfamiliar with the history of the area and might prefer to right his own timeline where the Danes refuse to allow Germans a degree of control in their country, followed by the, miraculously allowing the French and British to win the war before the Germans leveled Copenhagen as they threatened.
Invasion of Norway fails in April 1940-what next?
- Thread starter rip89
- Start date
Uff Da the optimist
Donor
I''ve read enough to achieve what I believe to be a general picture of the situation.
You are right about the King, his actions is one of the reasons the monarchy remained a unifying factor throughout and after the war.
The only reason Norway lasted longer than France or Poland was the terrain.
If Norway had the same terrain as Poland it would have been overrun pretty fast.
Roger Keyes had plans for attacking Trondheim and tried getting Churchil interested, luckily events overtook it - summary below.
Force A – 2 Battleships and a flotilla of Destroyers
Force B – 1 Cruiser, 1 Destroyer and 1 small vessel of shallow draft carrying 200 Marines
Force C - 1 Cruiser, 1 Destroyer and 1 small vessel of shallow draft carrying 100 Marines
Force D - Target ship Centurion carrying 2 battalions of Infantry, 2 Q ships each carrying 1 company of infantry, 1 AA Cruiser and 6 Destroyers.
An Aircraft Carrier was also planned to be assigned.
Z-2 hours
Aircraft drop parachute flares over Trondheim Fiord 5 miles south of the forts.
Force B proceeds into Skjorn Fiord keeping the north shore away from the forts.
RAF carried out heavy bombing of Varenes airfield.
Z hours
Force A Battleships anchor in berths north and north-west of Storfosen Island in previously buoyed positions and are protected from submarine attack by the destroyers of Force A. Commence bombardment of forts at Brettingnes and Hysenes. Ranges 22,000 and 25,000 yards respectively. Aircraft spotting
Force B Cruiser anchors north-west of Galten Island and bombards Selvenes Fort. Range 12,000 yards. Aircraft spotting.
The small vessel carrying 200 Marines runs itself ashore in Fevaag Cove supported if necessary by the firs of the destroyer.
200 Marines land. 1st Objective Brettingsfjeld.
Force C. Small vessel carrying 100 Marines runs ashore at Rodsten. 1st Objective – capture high ground westward of Selvennes Fort.
Force D. Assemble south of Storfosen Island.
By this time forts should be damaged – if not destroyed. Marines of Force A advance to their second objectives – namely to capture Brittingsnes and Hysnes Forts. Marines of Force B advance to their second objectives to capture Selvenes Fort.
Force D is joined by the crusier of Force C and proceeds towards the mouth of Trondheim Fiord. At the mouth of the Fiord Force D is also joined by the crusier of Force B and after passing through the narrows into Strind Fiord.
Centurion anchors as close as possible to Elve harbour and dominated the railway swing bridge
1 Q-ship enters outer basin and secures alongside
1 Q-ship enters inner basin
Destroyers’ act as required and ferry men ashore from Centurion.
Force A – 2 Battleships and a flotilla of Destroyers
Force B – 1 Cruiser, 1 Destroyer and 1 small vessel of shallow draft carrying 200 Marines
Force C - 1 Cruiser, 1 Destroyer and 1 small vessel of shallow draft carrying 100 Marines
Force D - Target ship Centurion carrying 2 battalions of Infantry, 2 Q ships each carrying 1 company of infantry, 1 AA Cruiser and 6 Destroyers.
An Aircraft Carrier was also planned to be assigned.
Z-2 hours
Aircraft drop parachute flares over Trondheim Fiord 5 miles south of the forts.
Force B proceeds into Skjorn Fiord keeping the north shore away from the forts.
RAF carried out heavy bombing of Varenes airfield.
Z hours
Force A Battleships anchor in berths north and north-west of Storfosen Island in previously buoyed positions and are protected from submarine attack by the destroyers of Force A. Commence bombardment of forts at Brettingnes and Hysenes. Ranges 22,000 and 25,000 yards respectively. Aircraft spotting
Force B Cruiser anchors north-west of Galten Island and bombards Selvenes Fort. Range 12,000 yards. Aircraft spotting.
The small vessel carrying 200 Marines runs itself ashore in Fevaag Cove supported if necessary by the firs of the destroyer.
200 Marines land. 1st Objective Brettingsfjeld.
Force C. Small vessel carrying 100 Marines runs ashore at Rodsten. 1st Objective – capture high ground westward of Selvennes Fort.
Force D. Assemble south of Storfosen Island.
By this time forts should be damaged – if not destroyed. Marines of Force A advance to their second objectives – namely to capture Brittingsnes and Hysnes Forts. Marines of Force B advance to their second objectives to capture Selvenes Fort.
Force D is joined by the crusier of Force C and proceeds towards the mouth of Trondheim Fiord. At the mouth of the Fiord Force D is also joined by the crusier of Force B and after passing through the narrows into Strind Fiord.
Centurion anchors as close as possible to Elve harbour and dominated the railway swing bridge
1 Q-ship enters outer basin and secures alongside
1 Q-ship enters inner basin
Destroyers’ act as required and ferry men ashore from Centurion.
Uff Da the optimist
Donor
I'm sorry you are sensing racism towards the Norwegian people, but I don't understand why exactly.
I might be not as familiar with the history as I should be, so please correct me on arguments that are incorrect.
There has been no arguments made regarding Denmark in my posts, so please explain what you mean.
What I feel there should be little debate about however is the indecisiveness of the Norwegian government in the months before the invasion.
While I understand that expressing neutrality and mobilizing at the same time are conflicting actions, the constant breeches of the territorial waters of Norway was a clear enough sign that the UK and Germany was not going to respect Norway's territorial integrity, and sooner or later draw them into the war.
And just to clarify, I'm Norwegian, so I don't really see how I'm being racist to my own people.
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Except that the S & G were very lucky OTL IIRC, since they were basically trapped between the Renown and her two DDs to the north and the main British fleet to the south, only to have the british sail north-west thinking the Germans were trying a break-out into the Atlantic. They could easily have been sunk or badly damaged if the RN had deduced their intentions correctly.[/QUOTE]
The HMS Renown was operating ahead of her nine (not two) destroyer consorts, as these could not follow their flagship in the rough seas. These DD's never came anywhere near the target, simply because the heavy artillery of Renown opened fire at long range, warning the germans of their presence. With just the four guns of Renown available (Aft turret could not be used in a chase fight) Remown was much weaker than her opposing opponent Gneisenau (Scharnhorst was not engaging at the early stages)
That means a simple thing: One capital ship facing two opponents of equal size and more modern constrcution, both equipped with radar, while Renown had none at that time. If the germans wanted to fight back, which Marshall did not, it woudl have been HMS Renown sinking and not the German ships, before the DD's could catch up. (Renown was upgraded with more horizontal armor, but still had her original 6 inch side, with a narrow thicker 9 inch strip below it. The 28cm shells of the Germans were more than capable of defeating this sidearmor, possibly at all places, except the deck at short to medium range.) With 18 guns available against just six at best of Renown, the end result is clear.
In the OTL Gneisenau was hit by two 15 inch and one 4.5 inch shell, the later destroying her radar. A 15 inch shell disabled the aft turret, whie the other one went through the foretop. Gneisenau hit HMS Renown twice, both were 28 cm shells (duds), that did little damage. Marshall decided to run away, as he had no intelligence of what forces he was fighting, due to the loss of his own radar adn the poor visability. Had he understood HMS Renown was alone, he might have ignored his orders and fought to win.
The HMS Renown was operating ahead of her nine (not two) destroyer consorts, as these could not follow their flagship in the rough seas. These DD's never came anywhere near the target, simply because the heavy artillery of Renown opened fire at long range, warning the germans of their presence. With just the four guns of Renown available (Aft turret could not be used in a chase fight) Remown was much weaker than her opposing opponent Gneisenau (Scharnhorst was not engaging at the early stages)
That means a simple thing: One capital ship facing two opponents of equal size and more modern constrcution, both equipped with radar, while Renown had none at that time. If the germans wanted to fight back, which Marshall did not, it woudl have been HMS Renown sinking and not the German ships, before the DD's could catch up. (Renown was upgraded with more horizontal armor, but still had her original 6 inch side, with a narrow thicker 9 inch strip below it. The 28cm shells of the Germans were more than capable of defeating this sidearmor, possibly at all places, except the deck at short to medium range.) With 18 guns available against just six at best of Renown, the end result is clear.
In the OTL Gneisenau was hit by two 15 inch and one 4.5 inch shell, the later destroying her radar. A 15 inch shell disabled the aft turret, whie the other one went through the foretop. Gneisenau hit HMS Renown twice, both were 28 cm shells (duds), that did little damage. Marshall decided to run away, as he had no intelligence of what forces he was fighting, due to the loss of his own radar adn the poor visability. Had he understood HMS Renown was alone, he might have ignored his orders and fought to win.
I don't think a win is guaranteed for the Germans. They could loose both ships and only damage the Renown or they could sink her and a bunch of destroyers as a bonus. Could probably go a lot of ways.
I remember Devolved had the Scharnhorst sunk by the destroyers and the Gneisenau damaged , while the Renown was heavily damaged in his TL.
That scenario was mentioned with better weather conditions, allowing the Glorious to operate her aircraft as well, if I remember it. The OTL conditions were much worse, as the DD's could not travel faster savely than 18 or so knots, before endagering themselves too much to the heavy seas. Any German commander, equipped with large ships less prone to these sorts of nuicances little ships had to face, woudl engage only, when forced to do so, with no alternative. If he had an alternative, he would simply run away, using the main asset of the larger hull, its speedadvantage. The basical rule is that the Renown was outgunned in both numbers of riffles and rate of fire of individual guns too heavy to be succesful on her own, as the DD's simply could not put in their weight, due to the elements. (And in the OTL case, only Gneisenau engaged Renown, as Scharnhorst at first could not locate her target (and for some reason the Captain was thinking that Renown was Admiral Hipper at first.)
Two days is a bit much. It is unlikely the Allies could have intercepted the German forces moving against Oslo, Kristiansand, and Stavanger, which means the Germans could have established themselves at least in southern Norway.
However, the Allies could have intercepted and destroyed the forces moving against Bergen, Trondheim, and Narvik, which would have kept the Germans out of western Norway.
Norwegian forces in this area could mobilize to fight the Germans, and Allied reinforcements could enter Norway through major ports. (OTL the Allies tried to use minor ports and could not move in enough troops to make a difference.)
There was Norwegian resistance around Oslo for about two days, IIRC; this resistance soon collapsed for want of support. With far more Norwegian forces mobilized and Allied forces arriving in strength, I think that the Germans would be in very great trouble, and would be defeated in about a week - but not two days.
It would delay the replacement of Chamberlain by Churchill. OTL, it was the trigger. But Chamberlain was already dying of cancer, though it was not detected until July.
It is a morale and prestige boost for the Allies, and damage to Hitler and Germany. It breaks Hitler's winning streak. The OTL outcome was yet another dazzling, surprising success for Germany, though not a big one. A nasty setback instead takes away much of that aura of infallibility and invincibility.
However, it probably does not affect the outcome of the Battle of France.
It might deter Mussolini from jumping into the war; he won't be quite as confident of Hitler's complete victory.
It may prevent Britain from launching Operation CATAPULT against the French fleet at Oran. OTL, Britain was fairly worried that if the French battle fleet fell into German hands, then with the German and Italian fleets, the Axis could seriously challenge Britain's control of the Channel and other critical sea areas, and perhaps invade Britain when her army was all but wrecked. TTL, the only German attempt at amphibious invasion was crushed, and the German navy was smashed up even worse than OTL. So Britain would be less fearful, and may just let the French fleet sit. CATAPULT, which resulted in open combat between British and French forces, with thousands of French casualties, turned a lot of Frenchmen against Britain; it was a huge handicap to De Gaulle in winning over French colonies. No CATAPULT, and more French colonies may join Free France.
It would restrict German access to the Atlantic; German ships would have to run a gauntlet between Norway and Scotland before trying to slip through the Greenland-Iceland-Faeroes-Scotland line. OTL the Germans did the latter fairly regularly for a while; the remoteness and generally bad weather made it possible. Add Norway as an Allied base, and the Germans have a much harder task.
It will deter Finland from joining Germany against the USSR in 1941. With Norway as an Ally, attacking the USSR with Germany also commits Finland to war with the western Allies, and Finland doesn't want that at all. Also, Finland's entire Arctic sector is open to attack, with no support.
Might, might not. I don't see any direct effect, other than a possible delay from the shock of a defeat.
Allied convoys to the USSR will all go by Murmansk. OTL the Murmansk route was so grim that the Allies shipped aid via Vladivostok (with the accompanying very long rail haul) and around Africa to Iran (with the accompanying demand on shipping and long rail haul). Murmansk is better all ways round. Plus, if Finland is neutral, then Leningrad is not besieged and there is a direct rail connection to the rest of the USSR.
As for the air war: Norway is actually no closer to Germany than eastern England, which is where Bomber Command and later Eighth Air Force operated from. It does provide an additional axis of attack: the Germans would have to deploy substantial air defense forces in Denmark.
Sweden will remain neutral if possible. The Allies will lean on Sweden to cut trade ties with Germany. Sweden can trade with the rest of the world if its ships can pass from its west coast S of Norway; which would be tricky with opposing forces to each side. However, Sweden can also trade via Norway and overland; access to this trade is probably worth more to Sweden than trade with Germany. Germany can't do anything about this, except try to invade Sweden from Denmark.
Just for fun - suppose Germany does try to invade Sweden in the winter of 1940-1941. Much of the Baltic Sea freezes over in winter, which means there could be a good-sized battlefront on the ice...
One question is that of just how Norway obtains adequate weaponry for the mobilized reserves.
Norway in 1940 hardly had an army and that would be the crucial thing to play with. It simply is not possible to raise an army (and Navy as well) from almost scratch, as that would be the case. The total number of men under arms in april 1940 in Norway was below the 40,000 mark, indicating that there were few modern weaponsystems which required larger numbers of personel. Most armed forces were drafted men and reserves, all of them poorly trained and equipped. Morale was low, due to lack of instructions and training. Often in the OTL, men deserted form their possition, when under attack. That could not just change in less than a year. It would take several decades in peacetime at least to alter the culture of the Armed forces in what used to be passifist Norway.
Uff Da the optimist
Donor
While this is on some levels true, I would like to state that you fail to comprehend the battlefields in Norway.
There are no "tank heavens" or areas suited for Blitzkrieg as in France.
There are alot of mountains, a small and easily destroyed infrastructure where light infrantry will be key in every part of the country.
That being clarified, alot of Norwegians were active members in rifle-clubs where marksmanship was a common trait.
So again, few modern weapons, bad communications and overall a very inferior army compared to the Wehrmacht.
BUT, the terrain of Norway on most levels equate these advantages and could potentially make the invasion a nightmare for anyone wishing to conquer the country.
Think Afghanistan, just much less populated with less infrastructure, and it rains... all the time.
If a POD after February 1940 Norway could not hope to defeat the German invasion, but they could very well be able to ensure the Germans do not win.
Germany did not use tanks in the first place for the Invasion of both Danmark and Norway, as these all were to be used for the invasion of France and the Low Countries. The Wehrmacht, Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine used infantry only, and lots of specialised units for Mountain warfare, sucn as the Alpen Jägers troops.
Modernisation of Norwegian troops would have been limmited to equipment like radio's and communitcation systems, which they up to then lacked and did not even know how to use, due to lack of training and political will to invest in defence. The main problem would be the quality of the Norwegian armed forces still, as Norway had no tradition of warfare and defensive thinking. That alone would take decades to alter.
If the main problem is how to defeat the German assault on southern Norway, would it be possible to have the Danes resist for a few days say 3-4 therefore delaying moving troops across the straits to Norway? Thus if the Northen and Central forces are caught at sea, this allows the Allies and Norwegians to concentrate against the south where the German attack will be behind schedule.
Finland not fighting the Continuation war would be interesting, without the finnish on one side would we see a different siege of Leningrad?
Finland not fighting the Continuation war would be interesting, without the finnish on one side would we see a different siege of Leningrad?
One problem with the Swedo-Finnish alliance even ITTL would be that both the Germans and the Soviets wanted to keep Sweden and Finland as isolated and thus more easily manipulated nations. Germany would want to enlist Finland as an ally, as IOTL, and the Soviets would have designs for finalizing the conquest they started in the Winter War during an opportune moment. The MR pact's secret provisions were still in effect, especially in Stalin's view.
Both Hitler and Stalin knew that Finland was hurting from the loss of Karelia and that the nation was desperate for foreign support. And both have good reason to think that if the Swedo-Finnish alliance happens, it would mean both the creation of a new, more independent-minded power centre in the north as well as possibly Sweden and Finland moving to the enemy camp together. These are prospects neither Hitler or Stalin would want to see - a policy of divide and conquer would suit both just fine.
IOTL the alliance failed because the Swedish set so strict terms for it. I think Norway turning an Ally would have to make the Swedish to change their mind over these terms, because it is unlikely Finland would immediately renounce their (arguably valid) claim to the 1920 borders. And it is quite possible that Stalin and Hitler would still oppose the alliance for the above reasons, still understandable ITTL. Finland would have more pulling factors towards a neutral Nordic alliance in these changed conditions. Add more Swedish understanding for the trauma caused by the lost Karelian territories and some backbone towards the Soviets and the Germans and the deal might well happen.
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Danmark on her own was not going to stop, or temporarily slow down the germans, as it already had politically accepted, it should surrender, when Germany invaded the state. So Danmark was out and not longer a player in the war. (no matter how much wishful thinking about some resistance against the German advance.) The only force capable of at least slowinmg down the German Attack on Southern Norway was the Royal Navy, with her submarine force, which at the time was still very small. Offensive minefields could aid this, but time was too short to lay them at short notice. By the way, Norway also deployed quite a lot of minefields prior to the German Invasion, but these were mostly deployed more to the North.
Hypothetically, the invasion of Norway could be intercepted by the handful of submarines of the British, but these first had to locate their targets and therefor intelligence was crucial. This short notice of the Invasion planning did not bring this intelligence, as the germans actually reacted on teh Allied invasion of Norway, rather than the opposite.
The most effective solution to slow the invasion of South Norway would be a more serious threat from the USSR, forcing the Germans to look to the east however, but that was still out of the question. A more agressive attitude of France was possible, but would not have helped much, since the German build up in the East for the invasion of France already was completed more or less, so in the West the Germans were ready for action. In the East they were not.
I am resurrecting this thread after having returned to the sources on the Norwegian campaign during the last couple of days. Anyway, based on the Norwegian official history of the armed forces (unfortunately available in Norwegian only) as well as Henrik O. Lunde's excellent "Hitler's Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940" and a reprint of a 1959 Center of Military History Study available on Amazon for close to nothing, I would believe that the apparent consensus that the fall of Norway was inevitable is somewhat mistaken.
Initially, it is important to note that the total number of troops in Phase I was extremely small and divided into minute penny packets, half of which were sent outside any possible air cover (Group 1 and 2):
Regarding air cover and communications, the Germans attempted to attack across a 105 mile wide stretch of very nasty sea. Especially during autumn and winter, but the spring storms are not to be trifled with either. That is 10 miles more than the distance between London and Calais, with the Skagerak sea measured at its narrowest. The bombers might operate from the closest air base at Aarhus in Denmark and reach Oslo (200 miles) and Bergen (284 miles) within their ordinary combat radius but if the Germans do not capture an airfield in Norway on day one, they will be operating without any fighter cover at all. And the weather will mean that there is no way the bombers can ensure continuous cover for the forces in Norway or the ships trying to reinforce them.
Well, the Germans did of course understand that and decided to capture both the airfield at Sola/Stavanger and at Fornebu/Oslo by paras on the morning of the 9th. That went beyond all expectations OTL, but the airfield at Kjevik/Kristiansand was left to the army on the Karlsruhe and that went very badly as the coastal fortress of Kristiansand kept the invasion force at bay.
Now, what else could go wrong?
Initially, one might go with the weather – the commander of the paras attacking Oslo/Fornebu actually forced the pilot to land despite a solid overcast and opposition from Norwegian Gladiators. If the pilot had held his opinions more strongly, the paras would have returned to Denmark. With Blucher sunk at Oscarsborg in the Oslo fiord, the mobilization of the Norwegian forces around Oslo would have been unimpeded, the loss of leadership as the government fled to Lillehammer would not take place and the Germans would have to fight from their toehold in Stavanger and Bergen while the Trondheim landing could be left to starve and the 6 Division in Troms would be sufficient to handle the 2000 in Narvik – far from any supplies or support.
Then, what if the Norwegians do get their act together – slightly? No magical increase in officer training or sudden appearance of modern fighters beyond the 20 Curtiss Hawks that were lying in crates in Oslo harbour on 9 April. If the warnings of the Norwegian diplomats on 1 April and 5 April were believed, the increased readiness ordered on 8 April would take place on the 1st and the mines would then be laid following the repeated warnings on the 5th. This would provide 4 days in order to get the mines deployed and the convoy systems through the fields operational.
And that would create an entirely different situation.
The Norwegian costal defences were designed around defensive mine fields with the forts intended to prevent sweeping. The mines were old, but maintained and mechanically so simple that they were very reliable (contact mines). And the approaches to the defended ports; Oslo, Bergen, Trondheim and Kristiansand are all covered by islands and at the end of fjords that makes them easily defended by mines.
If the Germans learn that the fields are now being laid (another big if) the Kriegsmarine had less than 70 minesweepers in 1940. They will need to assemble as many as possible and form them into new Groups. That takes time, and the other ships were assembled as early as 22 March. Maintaining secrecy would be a nightmare. Meanwhile, more bombers would be required to suppress the forts while the sweepers are doing their job. The Norwegians are also operating torpedo boats, which perhaps will require the sweepers to be escorted by destroyers? In that case, will Scharnhorst and Gneisenau take the invasion force to Narvik? The entire planning will be a nightmare, especially as the mine fields must be traversed before the Norwegians can mobilize as there is still no more room for extra troops onboard the fleet. I would believe that the Germans would have cancelled the operation at that stage. The risk would be too great and the timing would be impossible.
If the warning comes too late, it would be radioed to the various Groups and the question would then be "what next?" Trying to traverse a minefield at night without sweeps sounds like a very stupid way of committing suicide. However, the invasion of Denmark would be ongoing and the paras would be on their way to Stavanger and Oslo so what would the navy do? Let the paras be and return? Or try to force the fields? Not a good set of options, but I would not believe that they would have much of a choice. Group 5 has 8 minesweepers but they are up against the most modern of the Norwegian forts. And that is outside Oscarsborg at the inner rim of the fjord. The rest of the Groups have none. The Germans would lose some very skilled soldiers, the Norwegians would be (formally) allied and the Kriegsmarine would retain some dubious light cruisers and Blucher. What would happen with the destroyers in Narvik or Scharnhorst/Gneisenau is anybody's guess but OTL would be probable.
Initially, it is important to note that the total number of troops in Phase I was extremely small and divided into minute penny packets, half of which were sent outside any possible air cover (Group 1 and 2):
- Group 1: Scharnhorst & Gneisenau escorting 10 destroyers carrying 2000 troops to Narvik
- Group 2: Hipper and 4 destroyers carrying 1700 troops to Trondheim
- Group 3: Köln and Köningsberg with 7 minor vessels carrying 1700 troops to Bergen
- Group 4: Karlsruhe and Tsingtau with 8 torpedo boats carrying 1100 troops to secure the ports of Kristiansand and Arendal (one company to secure the telegraph line, the main thrust against Kristiansand)
- Group 5: Panzershiff Lutzow, cruisers Blucher and Emden and 13 light vessels carrying 2000 troops to Oslo
- Group 6: 4 minesweepers carrying 150 troops to Egersund.
Regarding air cover and communications, the Germans attempted to attack across a 105 mile wide stretch of very nasty sea. Especially during autumn and winter, but the spring storms are not to be trifled with either. That is 10 miles more than the distance between London and Calais, with the Skagerak sea measured at its narrowest. The bombers might operate from the closest air base at Aarhus in Denmark and reach Oslo (200 miles) and Bergen (284 miles) within their ordinary combat radius but if the Germans do not capture an airfield in Norway on day one, they will be operating without any fighter cover at all. And the weather will mean that there is no way the bombers can ensure continuous cover for the forces in Norway or the ships trying to reinforce them.
Well, the Germans did of course understand that and decided to capture both the airfield at Sola/Stavanger and at Fornebu/Oslo by paras on the morning of the 9th. That went beyond all expectations OTL, but the airfield at Kjevik/Kristiansand was left to the army on the Karlsruhe and that went very badly as the coastal fortress of Kristiansand kept the invasion force at bay.
Now, what else could go wrong?
Initially, one might go with the weather – the commander of the paras attacking Oslo/Fornebu actually forced the pilot to land despite a solid overcast and opposition from Norwegian Gladiators. If the pilot had held his opinions more strongly, the paras would have returned to Denmark. With Blucher sunk at Oscarsborg in the Oslo fiord, the mobilization of the Norwegian forces around Oslo would have been unimpeded, the loss of leadership as the government fled to Lillehammer would not take place and the Germans would have to fight from their toehold in Stavanger and Bergen while the Trondheim landing could be left to starve and the 6 Division in Troms would be sufficient to handle the 2000 in Narvik – far from any supplies or support.
Then, what if the Norwegians do get their act together – slightly? No magical increase in officer training or sudden appearance of modern fighters beyond the 20 Curtiss Hawks that were lying in crates in Oslo harbour on 9 April. If the warnings of the Norwegian diplomats on 1 April and 5 April were believed, the increased readiness ordered on 8 April would take place on the 1st and the mines would then be laid following the repeated warnings on the 5th. This would provide 4 days in order to get the mines deployed and the convoy systems through the fields operational.
And that would create an entirely different situation.
The Norwegian costal defences were designed around defensive mine fields with the forts intended to prevent sweeping. The mines were old, but maintained and mechanically so simple that they were very reliable (contact mines). And the approaches to the defended ports; Oslo, Bergen, Trondheim and Kristiansand are all covered by islands and at the end of fjords that makes them easily defended by mines.
If the Germans learn that the fields are now being laid (another big if) the Kriegsmarine had less than 70 minesweepers in 1940. They will need to assemble as many as possible and form them into new Groups. That takes time, and the other ships were assembled as early as 22 March. Maintaining secrecy would be a nightmare. Meanwhile, more bombers would be required to suppress the forts while the sweepers are doing their job. The Norwegians are also operating torpedo boats, which perhaps will require the sweepers to be escorted by destroyers? In that case, will Scharnhorst and Gneisenau take the invasion force to Narvik? The entire planning will be a nightmare, especially as the mine fields must be traversed before the Norwegians can mobilize as there is still no more room for extra troops onboard the fleet. I would believe that the Germans would have cancelled the operation at that stage. The risk would be too great and the timing would be impossible.
If the warning comes too late, it would be radioed to the various Groups and the question would then be "what next?" Trying to traverse a minefield at night without sweeps sounds like a very stupid way of committing suicide. However, the invasion of Denmark would be ongoing and the paras would be on their way to Stavanger and Oslo so what would the navy do? Let the paras be and return? Or try to force the fields? Not a good set of options, but I would not believe that they would have much of a choice. Group 5 has 8 minesweepers but they are up against the most modern of the Norwegian forts. And that is outside Oscarsborg at the inner rim of the fjord. The rest of the Groups have none. The Germans would lose some very skilled soldiers, the Norwegians would be (formally) allied and the Kriegsmarine would retain some dubious light cruisers and Blucher. What would happen with the destroyers in Narvik or Scharnhorst/Gneisenau is anybody's guess but OTL would be probable.
If Norway turns out to be a disaster for the Germans then Chruchill would become PM because of Norway rather than in spite of it.
Well, if Winston managed the combination of Operation Wilfred and R4 - the mining of Norwegian costal waters and the invasion of Narvik, Bergen and Trondheim, he might go down in history as the First Lord who lost the world's forth largest merchant marine for the allied cause and ensured that the Germans would be invited to Norway. I have no idea how close R4 actually was from getting operational, but I would believe that if the British stopped at the mines (Wilfred) the pro-allied sentiment in Norway would let them get away with it. Soldiers on Norwegian soil would be an entirely different matter.
So, wouldn't it be ironic if a better Norwegian defence would get the Germans to cancel the invasion only to be invited in as allies in order to defeat a British invasion?
So, wouldn't it be ironic if a better Norwegian defence would get the Germans to cancel the invasion only to be invited in as allies in order to defeat a British invasion?
Scharnhorst and Gneisenau did actually not participate in the invasiopn itself, but wer essentially a coverforce, in case the Allies did intervene, so their pressence in the invasion, or not would not matter, as all troops were transported in DD's. The two battleships were also suggested to try to get into the Atlantic Ocean at a given time, if they could do so undete4cted, after the Narvik invasion had been succesfully concluded by the DD's of Kapitän zur See Bonte.
It should be noted that the Norwegian Navy only had three old torpedoboats in a servicable condition and only one had a crew on board. The other dozen or so boats were unservicable and lacked crew. The three small coastal submarines were also undermanned, with only one of them actually operational. The only ships of the Norwegian forces with some potential and manned previously were the two coast defence ships near Narvik, which both were torpedoed and sunk by Bonte. The majority of Norwegian Naval activity was doen by armed fishermen and other small auxilliaries. Norway also had three old destroyers near Bergen, but these were unserviceable too. Only two new Sleipner class small Destroyers were in service and at sea near Oslo, but surrendered to the germans early on.
This would mean the Norwegians at best could put into service a few more ships than in the OTL, as on short notice, most of the ships were never going to be operational, or crews could be gathered.
As for the Norwegian army, it was very porly equipped and not all soldiers carried a weapon, due to shortages of riffles and ammunitions. The soldiers were not so well trained and not able to operate as a unit, due to lack of command capabilities. At best they could defend specific points under local control, but not much more.
Germany by the way aslo used the Sperrbrecher type of vessel, which basically was an old merchantship, stowed with empty barrels and cork to increase bouyancy and making them as good as unsinkeble. By april 1940, the Kriegsmarine at least had about a dozen or so of these vessels, addapted for deployement in minefields.
Norway could affect the campaign in the west in a few ways.
1. A few more tanks could be sent to help the troops in Norway, perhaps a regiment. This will probably not have that much of an effect on the campaign in the west.
2. Another or two infantry divisions could be sent to help the troops in Norway. These could probably come from the general reserve, and would not affect the outcome of the campaign in the west much. Perhaps Fall Rot is a bit slower?
3. OTL the Germans sent a parachute battalion and airglided in a mountain battalion to help the troops at Narvik. If they have more problems at more places, it is quite possible that they will commit more of the 22. Luft-lande and 7. Flieger-division to the fighting, leaving those formations unable to attack the Netherlands and perhaps even Eben Emael. This will slow the German attack on the Netherlands, allowing it to hold out for far longer, and occupying the German 18. Armee (4 infantry, 1 cavalry, 1 SS motorised, 1 armoured division, plus numerous support elements) and the 22. Luft-lande and the 7. Flieger-division for far longer.
This means 18. Armee is not available as the extreme right of the German forces holding the Dunkirk pocket - other forces must do that, and that means less German troops to the south. It could just be enough to let de Gaulle's counterattack 17-19th of May or the counterattack by the BEF on the 20th of May to succeed and re-establish contact between the main Anglo-French force in the Dunkirk pocket and the forces to the south. It would also cut off the German Panzergruppe Kleist (3 motorised, 3 armoured divisions).
1. A few more tanks could be sent to help the troops in Norway, perhaps a regiment. This will probably not have that much of an effect on the campaign in the west.
2. Another or two infantry divisions could be sent to help the troops in Norway. These could probably come from the general reserve, and would not affect the outcome of the campaign in the west much. Perhaps Fall Rot is a bit slower?
3. OTL the Germans sent a parachute battalion and airglided in a mountain battalion to help the troops at Narvik. If they have more problems at more places, it is quite possible that they will commit more of the 22. Luft-lande and 7. Flieger-division to the fighting, leaving those formations unable to attack the Netherlands and perhaps even Eben Emael. This will slow the German attack on the Netherlands, allowing it to hold out for far longer, and occupying the German 18. Armee (4 infantry, 1 cavalry, 1 SS motorised, 1 armoured division, plus numerous support elements) and the 22. Luft-lande and the 7. Flieger-division for far longer.
This means 18. Armee is not available as the extreme right of the German forces holding the Dunkirk pocket - other forces must do that, and that means less German troops to the south. It could just be enough to let de Gaulle's counterattack 17-19th of May or the counterattack by the BEF on the 20th of May to succeed and re-establish contact between the main Anglo-French force in the Dunkirk pocket and the forces to the south. It would also cut off the German Panzergruppe Kleist (3 motorised, 3 armoured divisions).