How Terrifying is it to fend off elite heavy cavalry (such as Knights,Samurai,dragoons) with Spears?
- Thread starter Griffith
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Well... by modern definition most Late Medieval generals were idiots. However you got to remember since almost all victories were based around besieging and capturing a strategic castle, the placebo effect meant that an army taking 6-10% casualties in a battle would qualify as a loss worthy of a shattered retreat. And a well placed cavalry charge even straight into the middle of high morale, well armed and well prepared pikemen/bill men in a hypothetical scenario could incur from 2-5% onto the infantry army. Sure the nobles and Knights will get butchered but even if they're retreat all they need to do is regroup, which Western European armies with heavier cavalry contingents were known to do. I remember there was this once case involving the Duchy of Brabant but I forget which one.
In such a case all they need is to make another charge right in the reforming pikemen where they hit the last time and chances are it will trigger an enemy rout. So was it a wasteful strategy in manpower? Yes. Was it a wasteful strategy in costs? Yes. Was it a wasteful strategy in a long term campaign? Yes. Did it work? HELL YES.
People forget that by the High Middle Ages Knights and Men at arms were so well armoured in full to semi plate that to kill them you needed to either get a fully loaded shot in with a pavise crossbow, for a bill to hack at their chaenmail coifes or to get them onto their backs and stick a dagger between their visors. The first only worked at a distance and was hard to manoeuvre and aim, the former only worked at a 3+ metre distance from you and that too when you're in a group eg. Schiltrom. The latter required you to get dangerously close and weigh them completely down which was a 3 man effort at best for every Sargaent versus a Man at arms.
Gunpowder is what caused the end of the domination of the mounted warrior class. Refined muskets and pistols were easier to aim even though they misfired, dent mail and wind the rider, kill their horses and could be used both from afar and up close (Albeit harder). If pikes could actually defend against cavalry charges that well they might as well have made a 2-man, 12 metre (around 36 feet) long stick with a pointy bit and handed it to a bunch of peasants!
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Medieval generals were very definitely not idiots. They often came up with competent plans that fell apart because they weren't dealing with a professional army-they were dealing with Men-At-Arms who were either money-grabbing mercenaries or glory seeking extreme athletes turned soldiers, supported by town militias who didn't want to get hurt. The generals that could enforce discipline and keep control of their troops, like the better crusader forces or the English, where capable of considerable tactical sophistication.
Men-at-arms would often dismount to avoid getting their vulnerable horses shot up by archers. It wasn't heavy cavalry that dominated the medieval battlefield, it was the heavily armed and armoured man-at-arms who could serve as both cavalry and infantry as the situation demanded.
You are right that pikes couldn't stop a cavalry charge. That's why a pike block would have men with shorter weapons like goedenags or halberds at the centre of the formation, to knock any Men-at-Arms who made it past the pikes down then kill them on the ground.
I think the fight you're thinking about with Brabant is the Battle of Bouvines.
Saphroneth
Banned
For what it's worth, in the Napoleonic era it was quite common for cavalry to charge squares, and if there was some kind of weakness - the muskets being emptied at the wrong time, wavering - they absolutely would charge home. The view we have in English histories is often distorted because the British army was largely made up of people who managed to stay brave.
But there were some really ballsy moves by the cavalry, too - I remember reading about a cavalry commander who walked his horse right up to the bayonet points and tried to scare the infantry by giving them a tongue-lashing!
But there were some really ballsy moves by the cavalry, too - I remember reading about a cavalry commander who walked his horse right up to the bayonet points and tried to scare the infantry by giving them a tongue-lashing!
I completely agree. To clarify I was replying to the poster who called any general charging cavalry straight into the middle idiots. By modern standards, yes it's a stupid thing to do, but by the tactics and reality of the time it was completely justified. I know that Crecy is a bit overplayed in discussions like this but what people have to remember is yes, the English infantry were proficient in killing their French noble foes and yes the Longbow was crucial in the battle, but the English and Brittanic (?) Knights charging smack bang into the French forces is what really win the battle in the end, and let's not forget the French still had double the number of English on the field even though they were short on missile superiority since their 4,000 crossbow men weren't able to perform.
Also didn't dismounting of men at arms and Knights to fight as heavy infantry only begin in the High Middle Ages? I know for sure that it was never practiced in the Early Middle Ages or the Late period but yes for sure men at arms and their versatility was what helped dominate Western European battlefield for the better part of the 14th and 15th centuries.
I had no idea that goedendags were a thing (crushing and stabbing. Classy) but yeah I knew that often there were Billmen and Halberdiers spread amongst the pike levies so that they could mop up any Men at Arms that happened to get 'turtled' onto their backs.
And yes, thank you, Bouvines was the conflict I was looking for.
Didn't say it was always a bad idea just that your default strategy with cavalry really shouldn't be frontal charges against infantry
Well duh.
To be serious you're completely correct, but it was often hard to coordinate the whole army (especially on the continent) who would often follow their own liege lord rather than the Marshal of England or the Constable of France. So often in periods of decentralisation simple plans were often the best plans.
Saphroneth
Banned
The archetypical example of infantry standing against cavalry (Tours) strongly suggests to me that until that point infantry weren't able to manage it on a large scale even against the charge of light melee cavalry. Since heavy cavalry could be far better protected and much heavier...#
ED: Didn't Charlemagne have some troops who acted as mounted infantry?
I have to wonder if part of the value of the knight was a lot of concentrated hitting power, mobile and small enough in number to not overstrain campaign logistics, which could be commanded much more easily than a large infantry force.
ED: Didn't Charlemagne have some troops who acted as mounted infantry?
I have to wonder if part of the value of the knight was a lot of concentrated hitting power, mobile and small enough in number to not overstrain campaign logistics, which could be commanded much more easily than a large infantry force.
I can name several occurences for the Early medieval period only : Tours, Hastings, probably the Battle of Trans, maybe (altough it's hard to be in any way definitive) Vouillé,etc.
It seems that armies with a strong influence from both Late Roman tactics ( fulcum or cuneus formations)and Northern Europe's (mostly issued from a rrlative lack of cavalry tactics between the Vth and the VIIIth) seems to have favoured the shieldwall, no matter the weapons used (or even generally using "popular" weapons such as axe and throwed spears).
It's pretty much obvious with Maurice's Strategikon, how was concieved the shield-wall in post-classical Romania.
The engagement itself mostly involved a traditional space between fighters (around three feet) which allowed them to keep enough space to throw missiles and swordfight, including against cavalry.
Most of speared heavy infantry up to the classical Middle Ages seems to have been made importantly of mounted infantry or polyvalent units as scarae. (I'm mostly speaking with spears not used as missile weapons, tough. And any levy in the era is bound to raise a lot of spears/angons, etc. light infantry tough they tended to sue them at least as much as missile weapons)
It's to be noted that early medieval cavalry didn't systematically used armours or, at least, heavy armours even if whole cavalry groups did (it became much more widespread by the IXth and Xth century)
That's a really caricatural description of classical medieval armies, while it could (but far from entierly so) describe a bit more Late medieval armies.
First this is ignoring the heavy mix of social and tactical role of miles which in order to justify their (very relatively) higer social standing as being a trained and fighting group. More than any can imagine of miles or lower nobles family get back to the lower part of the social stair by being undistinguishable on this manner from the rest of the population.
Or, telling things simpler : the miles way-of-life and self-justification depended of them being quasi-professional fighters. It's only with the XIIth, when they get identified with nobility and with the rise of monetarisation (among other factors) that you have a growing wave of dessafection, which tended to be compensated with the rise of mercenaryship, more use of non-nobiliar levies and a general new wave of nobiliar levies but centered around the royal authority. (Which caused several issues on command, tough).
One could argue that the highest point (but as well the end) of classical knigthood was reached at Bouvis, as you pointed, where the sub-tactical development reached an high point thanks to better covering and protecting passive weaponery, but also where miles were put in a position of either getting directly under royal tactical stratrgy or remaining home.
First, you'd have as much trouble fiding occurence of dismounted knights in early Middle Ages as fiding occurences of motorized infantry in WW1. While you certainly had precursor or early primitive appearance, it wasn't a thing.
Second, if something, the use of mounted/dismounted and polyvalent fighters seems to have been pretty much prevalent for most of western early Middle Ages (something that might have confused Byzantines chroniclers as Procopios or Agathos, that can't agree if Franks had few-to-none cavalry or heavyly mounted fighters for the same period). You had a lesser take on dismounted cavalry/mounter infantry for most of the classical Middle-Ages (at the exception, significant, of German miles which became one of their trademark tactics) until the Late MA.
Basically, more medieval warfare is about sieges and where open battles are more or less undecisive strategically, less use of mounted/dismounted units (it's not as simple, granted, but it have to be simplified : most of the more accurate models are awfully conjectural and regional).
And yes, thank you, Bouvines was the conflict I was looking for.[/QUOTE]
Only if you ignore equipment found in graves, and several mentions of Frankish tactics (which is, admittedly, scattered and incomplete, requesting to understand it was part of a larger strategical continuum, at the crossroad of mediterranean and North Sea situation)
Saphroneth
Banned
Fair point, though I meant more that the Arabian cavalry (Moorish by that point?) certainly seemed very surprised by the whole situation, suggesting that it was hardly something they were used to encountering.
We know very little out of the battles opposing Arabo-Berber forces against Gothic armies past the very first encounters : most of what we know of the invasion (tactically wise) could pretty much be fit into one paragraph and it would mention mostly sieges (as for the period between 714 and 720, it's almost unknown).
It's possible that the poor state of Gothic Spain, stuck in civil war and divided politically, prevented a real use of shieldwall tactics (that are mostly delaying and diverting tactics, allowing to hold the shock while missle throwers are protected for what matter the era).
That said, I'd be skeptical that Goths would have conventiently ignored tactics that were widespread in all the mediterranean basin : Wamba reforms are more or less in the same continuity of most western Europe (altough with pretty much important localisms) and it seems that Gothic infantry didn't that differed in equipment and use of what existed in southern Gaul : if form follows would it be only a bit function, I'd expect similar tactics.
As for "extremely surprised" Arabo-Berbers, I'm not sure how you got to this conclusion : the chronicle of 754 doesn't really mention it, just that Franks managed to hold their formation and that Arabo-Berbers forces leved the battlefield during night with most of the loot (which could point at an actual familiarity, and how useless it was to try again and again for no big asset to gain out of it, but I grant you that's essentiall speculative).
(As for what matter the composition of Islamic expeditions in the 720/750's : safe that Andalusian forces were probably crushingly made of Berber forces, with Arabs and possibly Gothic allies, the exact composition and equipment isn't that well known : it was probably similar to what existed in the whole of VIIIth Islamic west)
Saphroneth
Banned
Basically because the version of the battle I've heard of is probably best described as "the simplified version". It shows up as the battle which prevented Islamic spread up into France, and as a distinct thing.
That leads to a question I've been curious about, was Tours really vital to stopping Islam or the Umayyad caliphate from expanding or is that just Frankish propaganda of the battle?
Because I've seen the battle mentioned on here before with the idea it stopped Islamic spread in Europe being scoffed at and another battle was named as a better candidate for that.
I only remember Tours from what I read a few years ago, so I don't really recall the political situation prior to it very well.
It's less the "simplified version", for what I can tell, than the "proto-nationalist version" (in the sense it appeared early on to create a dynastical narrative at the benefit of Carolingians, and it was inflated and maintained to devellop a national narrative since the XVIth century in France) which disappeared from universitarian or scholarly versions since decades by now
The Battle of Tours was part of a big razzia as you had in Gaul between the 720's up to the 970's (altough it was less a problem in Aquitaine during the Xth), and there's nothing pointing out that it was a campaign of conquest, at the contrary.
The battle itself had not a great historical importance, but was a part of an ensemble of battles (Toulouse/Tours/La Berre) that had a marco historical one. Battle of Tours' importance was basically inflated by Carolingian hagiographs in order to point out Peppinids were truly the defeders of religion and France and were totally justified to overthrow Merovingians.
For instance the very successful raids of 725/726 that plundered all the Rhone valley and reached up to Sens (much northern than Tours is) are barely mentioned because they obviously not led to an occupation, and that Charles Martel didn't cared much about it.
This battle wasn't much different from the others that took place in early VIIIth Gaul (and would continue for centuries, altough not this far). It would hardly have caused a wave of occupation for mainly two reasons :
- The campaign was more of a political point : Eudon of Aquitaine allied himself with rebelling Berbers and the wali of Al-Andalus was certainly not going to let that unpunished, as with a very uneasy situation between crushingly majoritary Berbers and an Arab elite (which would end up with the Great Berber Revolt of 739/740), it would be a dangerous strategical weakness.
- Really limited forces. Arabo-Berers represented maybe 20 000 people for the whole of Al-Andalus. In the Pyrenean regions, most of Islamic garrisons seems to have been limited to some proto-ribât and towns.
For what matter Gaul (as in Aquitaine, Frankish Gaul and the old Gothic province of Gaul), we have only mention of garrisons in Arbûna (Narbonne) during all the period until 740's, and (but much more ponctually and probably heavily reliant on local support) Karkashuna (Carcasonne) and Avignon.
The rest being let massively to local Gothic nobility which doesn't seem to have supplied much Islamic rezzous.
I digress a bit, but the several campaigns in Spain and Gaul (as well the relative familiarity of Arab commanders against Africano-Romans) doesn't really lead me to think you had much strategical surprise at work there (altough the Frankish formations seems to have worked as a distractic action allowing Eudon to attack the rears).
Come to think of it, I think you're right about the Anglo-Saxons preferring to throw their spears. I'd convinced myself Anglo-Saxons mostly used their spears hand to hand from the Bayeux tapestry, which has masses of fighters with spears overarm-but that's also a throwing position. Viking and high medieval Scandinavian sources show lots of use of spear in close combat, but I suppose assuming that the anglo-saxons did the same is a bit like assuming legionaries fought like hoplites because they're both heavy infantry from similar cultures.
The battle of Maldon poem describes spears used for throwing and swords used hand-to-hand, which definitely supports your assertion of a pseudo-roman fighting style for the Anglo-Saxons.
So I can add early medieval western Europe to my list of cultures that threw their spears then used swords. Thanks.
I'd be tempted, to consider them mostly a throwing position : if you compare the scene of the siege of the castle of Dinan, you'd find some similar gestures along the use of the fustibali.
I'm saying mostly because it's still fairly obvious that some of the Norman charge were recieved by pointed spear positions (scene 29 left) as well as hand weapons (scene 29 right) : but scene 30 and 31 still mostly depict Saxons handling axes against Normans.
That said, we could argue that Bayeux Tapesty is less about providing that an accurate description, than a narrative. I rather think the Song of the Battle of Hastings, is reliable, tough.
I'd rather think it was a mix of Northern Germanic tactics (according the Song, Anglii came in number massed on a hill, as was understood by the author as their custom, armed with spears) and continental (trough Frankish influence trough the Xth and XIth centuries)
While one could speculate that the mention of distinct wings could either be coming from either fulcum or svinfylking, altough I don't think either was immune to influence I'd favour the latter.
The Song author precies that both sides of the wing (again, making me think at a sophisticalted shieldwall) had brandished spears (so neither hurling them, or rooting them in the ground as it happens with the fulcum), but when the contact is made, he mentions how Angli met Franci "missile with missile, sword-stroke with sword-stroke" and how the Anglii "peasants" (probably freemen IMO) charged Normans with swords, and how Anglii could make a whole goring mess with sword fight.
Sooo...I wonder how much spears weren't actually part of the ground preparation, and how much they were handed.
Eventually, I'd think of a mixed influence : Scandinavian, Northern Germanic and Frankish (partially issued from a mix of Roman and Northern Germanic influence) trough Norman influence in late AS England.
It seems that, at least Franks (but I'd be surprised if they were the only ones) usually prepared melee trough spear (or axes*, but that's another matter) before using swords and such. The use of angon, specifically, might interest you as it's a weapon that is supposed to be throwed THEN used in melee, but you might already know it from the Song of the Battle of Maldon.
*Roughly speaking, while fransiscae seems to have been used as a throwing awe that litterally bounced their way behind shield formations, it may have been an identitarian weapon at least as much as a genuine one, meaning it was used in order to distinguish Frankish freemen from basically everyone else, being abandoned in the VIIIth when this distinction became less relevant.
The Angon seems an awful lot like a northern European take on the Pila, which is more support for the idea that continental early medieval tactics were loosely based on Roman tactics.
I love the idea of throwing the Angon into an opponent's shield then forcing the haft down to expose them described by Agathius of Myrna.
One of the perks of using a medium length spear in an overhand grip is that it can be effective for both throwing and stabbing as the situation demands, which would suit the Anglo-Saxon fighting style(and convince me they were fighting like bargain basement hoplites!)
I'm much more focused on late medieval and renaissance warfare, so this has been a good education for me
I love the idea of throwing the Angon into an opponent's shield then forcing the haft down to expose them described by Agathius of Myrna.
One of the perks of using a medium length spear in an overhand grip is that it can be effective for both throwing and stabbing as the situation demands, which would suit the Anglo-Saxon fighting style(and convince me they were fighting like bargain basement hoplites!)
I'm much more focused on late medieval and renaissance warfare, so this has been a good education for me