How does the Western Empire do with an Elbe-Danube frontier?

Hecatee

Donor
Well we know that the Romans never shied away from some huge work, after all Marius' legionaries did dig a canal (Fossae Marianae) and it was in 103-102 BCE, it was 20 to 30 km long (the exact path seems unknown, although recent archaeological discoveries may provide new clues). In order to build it Marius could use the manpower of six legions, although presumably rather few slaves (indeed I do expect slaves were rare in the roman camp as they were expecting to fight a numerous enemy, to which we must add the preference of Marius for a lighter baggage train).

I know of no other major successful work of similar type and scope in the Empire which we could use to compare it with (except maybe all the work around Ostia in the imperial period). Now we need to look at maps to see if canals of similar scale (and complexity) might be realistically dug to help with the settlement process.

Now from what I gather, the Rhone-Rhine canal is around 375km long and was built between 1784 and 1833 (of course the Revolutionary wars did slow the work down...) : Saone and Doubs rivers were linked in about 20 years (with interruptions) and Doubs was linked to the Rhine in some 30 years of discontinuous work. I do not have figures on the manpower required, but it seems that war prisoners from the Peninsular conflicts were used during the Napoleonic era.

In any case this seems to be an awful lot of work, I can only see the emperors Claudius, Trajan, Hadrian or Constantine order such work, and it would be a very long shot. If we use Marius's numbers, we could count on some 30 to 40km dug every two years with a total available manpower of some 40 000 men. I don't see the Romans mustering so many men so let's have a manpower of some 15 000 men (around three legions, the same as for Hadrian's wall), so we have around 10km dug per year : if I count 400km in total, it gives me some 30 to 40 years of investment, far beyond any work done by the Romans. So I'd consider this canal a no-go.

About the Rhine-Danube connection, we know that Charlemagne ordered in 793 the digging of the Fossa Carolina, a 3km long canal in the Nurenberg area, which called upon some 7000 men to be dug, according to medieval sources (some of which claim that the project was a failure, a claim archaeology seems to disprove). Thus I can see this being done by the Romans if they control the areas.

At least that's my take on it.
 
Well the Romans proposed building a Rhine Rhone canal (more specifically a Saône-Moselle canal, but that completes a Rhine-Rhône canal as you can use rivers for the rest).

I always assumed that the problems were political and economic - would they really propose such a canal if they couldn't possibly build it? But it turns out that there is no firm evidence for proper canal locks until almost 1000AD, and that in China. So, maybe the scheme was a total fantasy.

If the Romans DID have usable locks, then the Rhine-Rhône canal might not have been built because the Rhine was the border, and there wasn't that much trade going that way.


Heh. Let's use this as an excuse for early containerization! :):p:D
 
So, I've been reading Adrian Goldsworthy's biography of Augustus, and I came across something I found highly interesting. I'll quote it:

"Before Julius Caesar arrived in Gaul, a wide area of central Germany closely resembled the lands west of the Rhine, boasting large hilltop towns with similar signs of industry, trade, and organization as the Gaulish oppida. There was much contact between these areas, and whatever political relationship the cultural similarities are striking, both belonging to what archaeologists call La Tene culture. During the first half of the first century BC, these towns in central Germany are all either abandoned or shrink dramatically in size and sophistication. In at least one case there is evidence for violent and bloody destruction of the town, and in general weaponry becomes far more common in the archaeological record. The destruction was not wrought by the Romans, who had yet to reach these lands, although it is possible that a contributing factor was the ripple effect caused by the impact of Rome's empire, whether through shifting trade patterns or direct military action. It is unlikely that the Romans were ever aware of what was happening so far from their empire; they naturally assumed that the situation they encountered when they did reach the area was normal, and that the local peoples had always behaved in this way.

These German towns and the societies based around them had probably already collapsed before Julius Caesar arrived in Gaul. How this happened is impossible to know, and the evidence could equally be interpreted as internal upheaval causing destructive power struggles, or as the arrival of new, aggressive peoples. Migrations are often difficult to trace archaeologically, but the repeated talk in our sources of large groups moving in search of new lands must at least in part reflect reality. Tribal and other groupings also frequently defy the best attempts to see the in the archaeological evidence, and are likely to have been complex, with recently formed and short-lived groups mingling with older ties of kinship. Linguistic analysis of our surviving names based on later Celtic and Germanic languages does suggest real distinctions at the time, but still does not make it easy to establish the ethnic and cultural identity of particular peoples. There is a fair chance that the Romans did not fully understand the relationships between named groups like the Sugambri, Cherusci, Chatti, Chauci, or Suebi, and it is more than likely that these changed fairly rapidly as leaders rose and fell"

So maybe we are looking at the wrong POD. Assuming the quoted is true (and given that Goldsworthy isn't an archaeologist, that's not a given), maybe what we should be focusing is on...how to prevent that collapse of German society in the first half of the first century BCE.
 
Didn’t they recently discover signs that parts of pre-Varus Magna Germania were more developed than they had thought? I think I remember reading about a town being excavated that had a basilica in it.
 
Rome pushes its Rhine frontier eastward until they're at the Elbe, shortening the western edges of its European frontier significantly. The Empire is later divided on roughly historical lines, somewhere along the Danube.

Is the Western Empire better off, having more territory and a shorter frontier to protect? Enough so to hold out for longer?

The problem is that the Eurasian plain is indefensible. The Elbe is not an impressive river and is less defensible than the Rhine.
 

Faeelin

Banned
So maybe we are looking at the wrong POD. Assuming the quoted is true (and given that Goldsworthy isn't an archaeologist, that's not a given), maybe what we should be focusing is on...how to prevent that collapse of German society in the first half of the first century BCE.

I don't know. In the Barbarians Speak, Peter Wells attributes their decline to the collapse of Gallic civilization and the disaster wrought by Roman rule. This makes a fair bit of sense to me, because many of the sites show signs of relatively peaceful abandonment. Manching looks like it just decayed, for instance.
 

GdwnsnHo

Banned
See, looking at the pre-Teutoburg campaigns, it looks like they'd pretty much managed to conquer the territory in question, but it went awry due to pay problems. The easiest way(s) to achieve his IMO would be to

a) Butterfly those pay problems (pre-Teutoburg - huzzah!)

b) Use someone less brutal, and perhaps less trustworthy of "foreign officers" than Varus

c) Prevent the Illyrian revolt and have mega-legions!
 
The problem is that the Central Eurasian plain and steppelands will swallow up Roman manpower. It was extremely easy for Rome to invade what would one day become Germany, but more difficult to hold it, since Rome would inevitably be drawn further and further east while needing to hold what they had gained.

Also, these areas were underdeveloped and poor, and were thus a liability for the Empire. Rome did manage Germany well through manipulating the local tribes, and the Germanics also benefitted from that (for example there were cities in Germany in 400 AD).
 
The problem is that the Eurasian plain is indefensible. The Elbe is not an impressive river and is less defensible than the Rhine.

What does the Eurasian plain have to do with the Elbe? It's hardly much closer to it than the Rhine. Dacia and the Danube frontier are under greater threat from the steppes than Northern Germany.
 
So, I've been reading Adrian Goldsworthy's biography of Augustus, and I came across something I found highly interesting. I'll quote it:

"Before Julius Caesar arrived in Gaul, a wide area of central Germany closely resembled the lands west of the Rhine, boasting large hilltop towns with similar signs of industry, trade, and organization as the Gaulish oppida. There was much contact between these areas, and whatever political relationship the cultural similarities are striking, both belonging to what archaeologists call La Tene culture. During the first half of the first century BC, these towns in central Germany are all either abandoned or shrink dramatically in size and sophistication. In at least one case there is evidence for violent and bloody destruction of the town, and in general weaponry becomes far more common in the archaeological record. The destruction was not wrought by the Romans, who had yet to reach these lands, although it is possible that a contributing factor was the ripple effect caused by the impact of Rome's empire, whether through shifting trade patterns or direct military action. It is unlikely that the Romans were ever aware of what was happening so far from their empire; they naturally assumed that the situation they encountered when they did reach the area was normal, and that the local peoples had always behaved in this way.

These German towns and the societies based around them had probably already collapsed before Julius Caesar arrived in Gaul. How this happened is impossible to know, and the evidence could equally be interpreted as internal upheaval causing destructive power struggles, or as the arrival of new, aggressive peoples. Migrations are often difficult to trace archaeologically, but the repeated talk in our sources of large groups moving in search of new lands must at least in part reflect reality. Tribal and other groupings also frequently defy the best attempts to see the in the archaeological evidence, and are likely to have been complex, with recently formed and short-lived groups mingling with older ties of kinship. Linguistic analysis of our surviving names based on later Celtic and Germanic languages does suggest real distinctions at the time, but still does not make it easy to establish the ethnic and cultural identity of particular peoples. There is a fair chance that the Romans did not fully understand the relationships between named groups like the Sugambri, Cherusci, Chatti, Chauci, or Suebi, and it is more than likely that these changed fairly rapidly as leaders rose and fell"

So maybe we are looking at the wrong POD. Assuming the quoted is true (and given that Goldsworthy isn't an archaeologist, that's not a given), maybe what we should be focusing is on...how to prevent that collapse of German society in the first half of the first century BCE.

They were not Germanic but Celtic or Proto-celtic, those La Tene towns.
 
They were not Germanic but Celtic or Proto-celtic, those La Tene towns.

Admittedly, the difference between Germania and Gaul was essentially geographical (at least deemed so by Caesar, that decided to define Ariovist as a German, in spite of evidence of at least mixed culture, because he wanted to introduce his conquests as homogenic and therefore easily turnable into a province).

As we have non-Celtic people called Gallic (as in Aquitaine, or lower Languedoc) because they dwelled in Gaul, I don't think calling Germans non-Germanic peoples because they dwelled in Germania so problematic.
 
Once the region between the Rhine and Elbe is pacified and controlled, the long term effects is that 1) the Western Roman Empiree has an expanded tax base, and 2) it has more strategic depth.

Even if the area is a net economic sink at first, I don't think it'll be too long before it at least breaks even or becomes a net contributor. The time period when it might be a source of loss is exactly the time period when the Empire can best afford to make that investment.

Even given the Elbe is a less defensible frontier than the Rhine, there is very little risk in the first two centuries of the Empire. Rome is strong and engages in multiple wars against the Germans during this time, and there is no break across the Rhine or Danube. I don't see how the barbarians could threaten Roman territory during this time.

There is likely to be the same problems ITTL that gave rise of the Crisis of the Third Century. However, most of the problems during this time were internal, and it is unlikely barbarians will be able to conquer the area between the Rhine and Elbe. The frontier should still exist until the Great Migrations occur in the late fourth century.

It's at this time that history will become interesting. Will the added strategic depth protect Rome better? If Rome had to give various barbarians land, it could so in the Rhine-Elbe territory, protecting - if not Gaul - Spain and Africa. This gives a much stronger core as the basis to revive Roman power.

Having this area not only gives Rome more taxes, more population, and more depth, it also deprives its enemies of that area. The trans-Elbian plains are even more poor, meaning the barbarians will have a smaller economic and population base when/if they invade the Empire. They could very well lack the strength to secure as much of the Western Roman Empire than they did.

Of course, given how close some of the battles were against the Huns, Goths, Vandals, and others, it is hard to say what exactly will happen given the butterflies. Overall, though, I think the Romans have a better chance.
 
I don't know. In the Barbarians Speak, Peter Wells attributes their decline to the collapse of Gallic civilization and the disaster wrought by Roman rule. This makes a fair bit of sense to me, because many of the sites show signs of relatively peaceful abandonment. Manching looks like it just decayed, for instance.
Is it possible then that we could keep the Roman conquest and prevent the decline in Germany?
 
Is it possible then that we could keep the Roman conquest and prevent the decline in Germany?

With a slower, gradual and less brutal conquest of Gaul?
Probably. The takeover of original transalpina doesn't seem to have provoked a crisis among gallic tribal states and confederations.

That said, it means that Romans would take a longer time to reach the Rhine.
 

FrozenMix

Banned
I think people might be looking at Germania being conquered for the wrong reasons. It would of course be awful to logistically handle and Romanize, as Britain was, but who says the Romans need to take it intact?

I understand that Gaul's success story was built up on a lot of cultural and economic factors already in place, but one thing Caesar did was simple genocidal brutality, and it worked. It made him incredibly rich.

I think a Roman Army that goes into Germania and starts exterminating tribes and plundering whatever they have in assets while rewarding others based on divide and rule, as well as taking a large amount of slaves and essentially terrifying the fuck out of the allied tribal elites in the new territory could be a lot more successful than trying to impose Roman laws and institutions on a culture distinctly not suited to them. It was like trying to lasso jello. There was nothing for the Romans to latch onto, at least not for the first hundred years of having a Rhine border, and afterwards, conquest became tougher due to the constant troubles with rebellious legions and the Parthians.

Septimus Severus might have been able to do this, and there is no doubt in my mind that if the Empire puts the full weight of its efforts to the task, a good portion of Germania could be sacked and exterminated much like Gaul was. After this, Romanization becomes in my mind a lot easier and the frontier can be moved up.

I realize its unpleasant, but really, Hispania was arguably taken this way towards the end.
 
I understand that Gaul's success story was built up on a lot of cultural and economic factors already in place, but one thing Caesar did was simple genocidal brutality, and it worked. It made him incredibly rich.

Nope. Caesar relied heavily on Gallic allied (Aedui) and dominated (most Belgi) peoples in Gaul. Long story short, a good part of his success was to build partially his strategy on rivalities between gallic peoples and states and use them as auxiliaries.

As for genocide there's simply no trace of a brutal fall of the population, Caesar's affirmation about having killing and enslaved millions being what De Bello Gallico is generally : a political pamphlet about how much Caesar rules.

Don't get me wrong, we're talking of a brutal conquest, but genocide is way far of what happened.
 

FrozenMix

Banned
Nope. Caesar relied heavily on Gallic allied (Aedui) and dominated (most Belgi) peoples in Gaul. Long story short, a good part of his success was to build partially his strategy on rivalities between gallic peoples and states and use them as auxiliaries.

As for genocide there's simply no trace of a brutal fall of the population, Caesar's affirmation about having killing and enslaved millions being what De Bello Gallico is generally : a political pamphlet about how much Caesar rules.

Don't get me wrong, we're talking of a brutal conquest, but genocide is way far of what happened.

I might have been overstating it, and yes, that book is all about how epic Caesar is, but the fact of the matter is that in a culture like Germania's, I do not think that simply extending the fruits of Roman trade and civic institutions is going to be conducive to Romanization and a successful integration of the province.

I think that heads need to roll, and lots of them, and the wealth plundered from the conquest has to justify its cost to at least a certain extent, and many slaves need to be taken. Germania needs to be depopulated not so far as to make the land no longer worth keeping and farming and taxing, but enough to prevent revolts of any significance from occurring, and they surely would.

Divide and rule is of course part of this, I get that, but in the end, what is going to allow for Germania to be Romanized is taking away its ability to resist. Success in battle and enforcing Rome's will over the tribes will probably lead to more German elites deciding to throw in with Rome, as they proved time and time again that they will get behind a winner. Brutality is what will allow this conquest to be successful.
 
I might have been overstating it, and yes, that book is all about how epic Caesar is, but the fact of the matter is that in a culture like Germania's, I do not think that simply extending the fruits of Roman trade and civic institutions is going to be conducive to Romanization and a successful integration of the province.
As it was stated above, most of western and southern Germania was celtized and close to what existed in Gaul.

Giving that Rome managed to export a lot of its feature and way of life trough trade and clientelism in Gaul (It's particularly obvious in the last century of independent Gaul, with decline of druidism, rise of vergobret, the lot of roman coinage and roman products), I don't see why it couldn't be done as well in these regions.

In a previous thread about Caesar failing to takeover Gaul, I suggested that a surviving Ariovist's confederacy, allied with Rome, and crossing Rhine to dominate Sequani and southern Germanic (in the geographical meaning) peoples, and *maybe* Helvetii, could form a strong entity comparable to which influence Aedui had in Central Gaul.
Such entities, with a following conquest/absorbtion, could be a good first step for what you search.
 
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