Grant at Gettysburg

Williamsport
July 9th
12:00pm


One Lone Young Soldier

Cadet George Gordon Greenough was filled with fear, frustration, and heartbreak. After getting his chance at a temporary posting in the Army of the Potomac during his summer off from West Point, and doing so much to aid in the seizure of the bridge at Falling Waters, he had to suffer this!

After having seen so many senior officers in XI Corps fall so quickly, Cadet Greenough no longer knew who to give any of the messages he had from General French. So the best he could think of was to try to get the best scouting report together that he could and take it back to VIII Corps.

Hanging on to the canal ironworks, he was able to see the Union XI Corps finally collapsing for good. Too much had been asked of those poor soldiers, after so many defeats, so many bloody actions in a row without rest or reinforcement. George couldn't tell where exactly it started, but clearly it was somewhere on the XIth's left flank, meaning most of the AotP's far left flank had been turned.

The Confederate advance had halted as they had become mixed up with the surrendering XIth Corps survivors. Other "Dutchmen" were running for their lives, using the downward incline leading towards Williamsport and the Potomac River to get away faster than the more encumbered Confederates could follow.

Greenough could see that the Confederates seemed to be making a somewhat indifferent advance against Williamsport rather than continue a turning attempt against the still massive AotP. 'Here they come' thought Greenough, not even giving a thought that his sitting on that canal framework made him a sitting duck at the hands of any long-range Confederate artillery fire or skulking snipers.

The Confederates seemed to be closing in using a more ragged formation than ever before. But in his inexperience, to Greenough they might as well have been British Regulars they looked so terrifyingly determined and disciplined. But there were still plenty of XIth Corps survivors as well as VIII Corps advance troops shooting from behind barricades, inside homes, and where possible rooftops. The Confederates temporarily hesitated, as they seemed to be unsure of what to do, like they were without leadership.

Then, they fell back about 20 paces while what appeared to be junior officers and noncoms tried to rally them into combat ranks. Then...

Purely on impulse, Cadet Greenough, at the top of his lungs, screamed out to the nervous troops below him:
"Here they come again!"
 
Special Note for any new readers: This was originally a Discussion Thread only created by Paul V McNutt. It quickly died out. As a new member, I asked for permission from Paul and Ian to take up the thread myself and turn it into a genuine ATL. After a hiatus of years, and thanks to Ian's patience, I hope now to start it up again.

The main purpose of this post is to alert new members that the fact that Paul V McNutt has been banned will have no effect on future updates
 
You actually came back!:D Hurrah! I was somewhat surprised that XI Corps collapsed that quickly, but I suppose that's what poor leadership and morale will do for these exhausted troops. BTW, where is XII corps in this mess? I recall they were on the flank of XI Corps, surely Slocum can see the need to save those men, right?
 
You actually came back!:D Hurrah! I was somewhat surprised that XI Corps collapsed that quickly, but I suppose that's what poor leadership and morale will do for these exhausted troops. BTW, where is XII corps in this mess? I recall they were on the flank of XI Corps, surely Slocum (2) can see the need to save those men, right?

AT this point I'll only say that once ANY military formation exceeds 70% KIA, MIA, or WIA they reach a point of disintegration in the field of operations. (1) Leave them strictly alone and they'll still exist. But put any pressure on them and they'll either surrender or scatter. Of course, this assumes you're fighting an opponent that takes prisoners. Which the Confederates do. Also, in these strategic circumstances, with the Potomac River and the massive VIII Corps between Lee and home, the tired shell-shocked veterans of the XIth have to figure that they won't be PoWs for long...:cool:

As to leadership, most of the leadership of the XIth Corps was killed or wounded in the most recent Confederate attacks, so its mostly a matter of NO remaining leaders, save for a lone recently and rapidly promoted immigrant Polish-American officer and future American Founding Father of Alaska...

1) This is as opposed to a siege, where it is not unheard for defenders to hold out to the last, provided that they have the supplies to hold out AND can reasonably expect rescue.

2) Slocum wasn't called Slow Cart for nothing.

And this time the weather and terrain is on the side of the Confederates in terms of who can (laterally) reinforce faster. Or it would be, if Southron casualties hadn't been so catastrophic. The Confederates face the same problem now that Lee did in the Overland Campaign: "If I lengthen my line to prevent being flanked, he will break me. If I shorten my line to create a reserve, he will turn me." The only reason Grant can't do it is because of the Mud. The #1 reason he WON'T do it (launch a general attack) is because ITTL he has what he never did IOTL: The Interior Lines and a solid blocking force against Lee no matter what direction he takes:

West, he slams into the Alleghenies. The highest mountains west clean to the Rockies! Absolutely nowhere to go.

South-West, more mountains, and his army breaks up under assault on his left by French and his rear by Meade.

South, he slams into the Potomac and beyond that, French.

South-East, he slams into Meade.

East, he goes over the South Mountain to nowhere, with the AotP rolling up his army from its right and rear.

North-East, he goes back the way he came, with no possible escape route and Grant, Meade, and even Couch in a position to hammer his army into annihilation.

North-West, he goes into terrain scarcely any better than due West or South-West. And again, nowhere to go.

North? Grant sez: Oh please.... Believe it or not, I've seen people on this very thread argue that Lee's whole objective was to attack and destroy Pennsylvania's coalfields. Silly.

Indeed, IOTL when Lee realized at Appomattox that the only escape route he had open to him led directly north, that was when he knew it was time to surrender.



The fact that Grant has been "calling in the clans" ever since he arrived has finally been able to make a marked difference on the battlefield in terms of numbers. Not just in regards to the now almost army-sized VIII Corps (which would have probably been called the Army of the Susquehanna or the Army of the Shenandoah if there had been time to organize the force properly) backing up the AotP by blocking the Potomac River directly, not just by forcing the deployment of the New York State, (some of the) Maryland, and Pennsylvania Militias to clean up the mess at Gettysburg post-battle, but most importantly the IX Corps now being in line as a part of the AotP itself right in the line of battle.
 

burmafrd

Banned
Special Note for any new readers: This was originally a Discussion Thread only created by Paul V McNutt. It quickly died out. As a new member, I asked for permission from Paul and Ian to take up the thread myself and turn it into a genuine ATL. After a hiatus of years, and thanks to Ian's patience, I hope now to start it up again.

The main purpose of this post is to alert new members that the fact that Paul V McNutt has been banned will have no effect on future updates


it is GREAT that you are back. Now stop teasing us and drop the nuke!

Forlorn Hope- this attack is a great example of that. Sure the Confederates got some luck but it ain't enough. Not by a mile. They just do not have enough left to make it.

But this little bit was really juicy and really good.


MMMMMOOOOORRRRREEEEE!
 
Is the question really what would have happened AFTER the battle? Grant had no problem letting someone attack. Once the lines were stabilized, wouldn't it have simply been Shiloh redux? Grant has an entire corps that wasn't engaged. The three day battle got Sickles, Howard and Hancock out of action. Would a senior leadership team of Newton, Slocum, Sykes, Sedgwick and Gibbon have been able to do anything? Could Meade, under Grants supervision, but with Hooker's staff, been able to do anything?

Would Grant have counterattacked on July 4 or would he have pushed V, VI and XIICorps with a cavalry screen south to block Lee?
 
Great to see you back.

As to the question, it's really about Grant replacing Hooker, I think, so he starts before, gets promoted sooner. Speaking of Shiloh, that might be a logical POD, it was sort of done backward from the point of Grant being at Gettysburg and how that might have come about. A decisive victory rather than a bloodbath would cause Grant's stock to rise faster, maybe Vicksburg is taken a couple months earlier, and then Grant is therefore available to be transferred over after Chancellorsville.
 
Is the question really what would have happened AFTER the battle? Grant had no problem letting someone attack. Once the lines were stabilized, wouldn't it have simply been Shiloh redux?

It's difficult to compare Shiloh with either TTL's Gettysburg or OTL's. At Shiloh Grant wasn't physically present on site, while Sherman was. The Confederates enjoyed surprise because the Union officer immediately in the forefront of the main Southern line of attack, an officer who accurately surmised was was about to happen, was ignored by Sherman because he had no confidence in him. At Gettysburg, Buford and Reynolds saw what was happening clearly enough while it was the Confederates who were operating in the blind, despite that both at Gettysburg and Shiloh they held the initiative.

Grant has an entire corps that wasn't engaged.

Actually, the VIII Corps is nearly army sized now (though lacking much of the accoutrements of being an actual army, being more a mass of cavalry, infantry, and artillery units). Then there is also the IX Corps, but IX Corps is a relatively small one, not a monster like VI Corps.

The three day battle got Sickles, Howard and Hancock out of action. Would a senior leadership team of Newton, Slocum, Sykes, Sedgwick and Gibbon have been able to do anything?

Newton is a question mark, while Slocum and Sykes over all do not inspire confidence. OTOH Gibbon is a fine general, and Sedgwick is very good, if a bit on the slow side. How much that had to do with the unwieldy size of his OTL corps is up for judgement.

Could Meade, under Grants supervision, but with Hooker's staff, been able to do anything?

One of the quintessential differences between this TL and OTL is the command effect of Grant's taking over almost in mid-battle. Meade isn't going to be crippled by the councils-of-war that did so OTL. Such councils inevitably take on the mood of the most cautious line of thought. When such things happened under Grant OTL in the AotP, he quickly and angrily put down such thinking. (1)

Meade was also a newcomer in terms of command, but he certainly knew the AotP. OTOH, like all the generals of the AotP he was cursed with the sense of rivalry and unprofessional paranoia ingrained in them by the creator of their army. Namely, George B. McClellan.

1) IMO after the results of the Battle of the Wilderness Meade would probably have withdrawn north. Or at least not advanced until the entire AoNV was dug in at Spotsylvania Courthouse.

That happens, and the Battle of the Mule Shoe becomes a complete slaughter for the Union, and the second day overrun of the Mule Shoe (and total wiping out of the Stonewall Brigade) doesn't happen. Perhaps too the AotP's escape at the North Anna River doesn't happen, with the end result being Lee doesn't surrender until Sherman arrives. With all that that threatens to do to East-West national unity postwar.

Would Grant have counterattacked on July 4 or would he have pushed V, VI and XII Corps with a cavalry screen south to block Lee?

No one, not Grant, not Sherman, not Sheridan, no Union commander this side of Ambrose Burnside would have been foolish enough to counter-attack up against Seminary Ridge on July 4th.

As to Grant re-deploying South, that is what this ATL is about. And doing it much sooner than Meade did OTL. Because Grant followed his own counsel, not that of the thoroughly "Lee-whipped" AotP veteran generals. Grant has beaten Lee to Williamsport despite following the adjacent and opposite sides of a right triangle to Lee's hypotenuse because he left over half a day sooner than Lee (using some of his cavalry and the militias of New York, Pennsylvania, and Maryland as a screen), enjoyed the advantage of Lee not having gotten far before the torrential rains started, and for once it being the AoNV that was slowed down by a massive wagon train.

Great to see you back.

As to the question, it's really about Grant replacing Hooker, I think, so he starts before, gets promoted sooner. Speaking of Shiloh, that might be a logical POD, it was sort of done backward from the point of Grant being at Gettysburg and how that might have come about. A decisive victory rather than a bloodbath would cause Grant's stock to rise faster, maybe Vicksburg is taken a couple months earlier, and then Grant is therefore available to be transferred over after Chancellorsville.

One of the biggest changes, and I confess to Author's Preference here, was simply having Grant choose as his first strategy for taking Vicksburg what was actually the OTL THIRD and final strategy he used. Namely, build up a force of specialized riverboats, run the gauntlet of Vicksburg defenses, (2a) land on the (relatively undefended) WESTERN side of the Mississippi, (2b) build up a supply base, cross over to the eastern side of the Mississippi, (2c) build up another supply base, then break out in two separate columns: One to strike at and secure the capital of Mississippi (Jackson), the other column to lay siege to Vicksburg.

2) As OTL, using runaways to gain/provide vital information on avoiding sandbars/mudflats, swamps, and where would be the best hard ground areas for safe landings.
 
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Welcome back, I confess to being really nervous when I realized that I was 6 pages from the end and the posts were still 5 years old.

That said, I've found this to be a really interesting (and plausible) timeline. I was particularly interested to have one of my biggest personal what-ifs (Union attacks on the 4th) thoroughly debunked. Granted, it was primarily based on the movie but I never realized just how dominant a position that the ANV actually had defensively.
 
Welcome back, I confess to being really nervous when I realized that I was 6 pages from the end and the posts were still 5 years old.

That said, I've found this to be a really interesting (and plausible) timeline. I was particularly interested to have one of my biggest personal what-ifs (Union attacks on the 4th) thoroughly debunked. Granted, it was primarily based on the movie but I never realized just how dominant a position that the ANV actually had defensively.

Indeed, it would have been not unlike the Charge of the Light Brigade, except for using one-third full of the entire Anglo-French force!

EDIT: The trick to remember is that Shaara's work was for entertainment + light education (to get people INTERESTED in history). It's wasn't all about giving a detailed factual history of the battle. Too many things in that movie never happened, were never said, and worst, in the film were ignored or left on the cutting room floor, including Lee's critical meeting at the close of Day One with generals Hill, Ewell, Rodes, and Early. Especially Early, who truly did as the film portrayed dominate the meeting.
 
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burmafrd

Banned
Eagerly awaiting the next event. Superb story.

I will await any nitpicks or criticisms and then will happily gut and disembowel them.
 
So it's been a couple months but here are some thoughts.

1. Grant would have found a way to put underutilized forces (especially VI Corps) in a position to block Lee's retreat.

2. Failing that, Grant would have had Lee "out in the open" - which was an oft stated objective in 1864. There is NO WAY Gettysburg would have been over on July 3 if Grant was commanding AotP. He woud have counterattacked on the 2nd, 3rd, or 4th.

3. If Grant was commanding,we have to assume it is as army commander, not general-in-chief. As such, his corps commanders now include Meade, who was a very, very solid corps commander. No accusations of the slows like Slocum or Sykes. Meade's impact as V Corps commander could have been instrumental - potentially no wheatfield, peach orchard or devils den. Little Round Top could have been very different.

4. In short, Grant's innate aggressiveness would have resulted in a very different battle. I can't imagine him receiving attacks without serious attempts at counter punching. That's not a dig against Meade. He did a GREAT job and has been treated incredibly unfairly by Grant fans and the Lost Cause crowd. He just wasn't as aggressive as Grant.
 
So it's been a couple months but here are some thoughts.

1. Grant would have found a way to put underutilized forces (especially VI Corps) in a position to block Lee's retreat.

VI Corps was busy playing fire brigade. Plus the troops were exhausted. Though not as exhausted as Lee's men.

2. Failing that, Grant would have had Lee "out in the open" - which was an oft stated objective in 1864. There is NO WAY Gettysburg would have been over on July 3 if Grant was commanding AotP. He woud have counterattacked on the 2nd, 3rd, or 4th.

The only part of the battle that was fought "in the open" was Pickett's Charge and Meade's/Grant's open field counter-attack that destroyed Pickett's Division (literally to the point where it had to be disbanded) and led to a much worse mauling of Trimble's and Pettigrew's Divisions. As to the 4th, Grant's own ingenuity for the redeployment south and then west in the face of the enemy allowed him to steal a march on Lee, getting his army and VIII Corps (a now nearly army sized force) between Lee and home. The rains that started at 1300 would have nixed a protracted battle on the 4th day anyway.

3. If Grant was commanding,we have to assume it is as army commander, not general-in-chief.

ITTL, he's the general-in-chief. He's had a much different career in this world than IOTL. He lost at Belmont, but enjoyed crushing victories at Shiloh, and a blitzkrieg campaign on the Mississippi River (using his third strategy to take Vicksburg FIRST). He swept through Tennessee, just saving Rosecrans from ruin at Stone's River. By the time of Chancellorsville, Grant's enemies/critics in Washington could no longer prevent Lincoln's appointing him to take command of the whole army.

As such, his corps commanders now include Meade, who was a very, very solid corps commander. No accusations of the slows like Slocum or Sykes. Meade's impact as V Corps commander could have been instrumental - potentially no wheatfield, peach orchard or devils den. Little Round Top could have been very different.

V Corps was roughly handled, losing one whole division outright in the Devil's Den. But fresher reinforcements forced the Southrons to basically "bounce off" Little Round Top and take their chances with Big Round Top, high trees or no. It was there that they ran into two union regiments in an unassailable position. But it was close...

4. In short, Grant's innate aggressiveness would have resulted in a very different battle. I can't imagine him receiving attacks without serious attempts at counter punching. That's not a dig against Meade. He did a GREAT job and has been treated incredibly unfairly by Grant fans and the Lost Cause crowd. He just wasn't as aggressive as Grant.

True. But the real reason he wasn't so aggressive was because he was new to command. His campaigns later in 1863 were measured by his refusal to fall into two separate and very deadly traps set for him by Lee. Meade was also being crippled by expiring enlistments, which tend to make armies cautious regardless of their commander's orders. Any study of the Overland Campaign shows Meade had no problem with reckless aggressiveness when he had someone shielding him from Washington.

As to Gettysburg? I've said, and historians agree with me, that the side that attacks at Gettysburg LOSES. Grant attacking at any point either gives the enemy the advantage of terrain (Seminary Ridge, Gettysburg Town, the lower copses of trees below Culps Hill, and worst of all, attacking in a Reverse Pickett's Charge right into the Confederate Center, putting them in a three-way cul-de-sac of heavily concentrated artillery fire. And even if this is post-Pickett's Charge, the AoNV can still unload canister, double-canister, and even at the end triple-canister:eek: into Union ranks. Cold Harbor on steroids. I wonder if post-Pickett's Charge the AotP would even obey an order to repeat Lee's mistake. And the Union corps commanders would go apeshit.

Grant's target was Lee's Army, not Richmond. Of course. But he wasn't looking for a head on charge of annihilation between the two armies either. He wanted to flank out Lee OTL and get between Lee and Richmond. Hopefully to cut him off completely, if not, Richmond still made a good consolation prize. OTL he finally accomplished this at Five Forks, and closed the trap at Appomattox.

But ITTL, Grant only has to hold on.
 
This is so ironic, thought Allen. As he rushed on, he saw that the mistaken maneuver that advanced his men (and Ellmaker's) too deep beyond the planned sweeping operation had left the brigade in a perfect position to close with the troops approaching from the other side! If this charge goes on, we won't just sweep the enemy, we'll overrun them! As his men advanced at the quick march, Allen was pleased to see the lines of his regiment and the 119th Pennsylvania straightening out with the rest of the brigade, at last. So now...:mad:
[/QUOTE]

So Gettysburg has turned into Stalingrad in miniature ITTL? Intersting.
 
My apologies to Ian, but in response to repeated emails I felt it necessary to explain my inaction, and to try to give my remaining fans some small sense of closure.
I have been struck by several illnesses, forcing me to accept disability and move back in with my mother. I have lost all my notes and research material in the move (I've gone from a three bedroom apartment to a single small bedroom).
The best I can offer is a brief synopsis of where I intended to take this ATL, and leave to my readers three different choices of possible outcomes.

XI Corps is destroyed with only remnants making it across the Potomac bridge(s) to south of the River and safety. At great loss, Lee takes Williamsport but is halted by the river and French. Lee is trapped in a siege with Grant controlling every sensible route of escape for the AoNV.
Lee has the food, but NOT the ammunition, to hold out almost indefinitely (the Fall). In the end, short of a war of annihilating attrition, with no hope of rescue, he will be forced to surrender. HOWEVER, after having been burned at Vicksburg with Confederate dishonoring of their soldier's POW paroles, Grant will be seeing Lee's veterans off North, not letting them go on paroles that Davis will certainly dishonor.
That leaves Grant busy for weeks digesting prisoners while Davis is left with three choices:
1) Hold fast with forces in place. Virginia falls by the end of Summer, Grant advances down the Tideland States (gobbling up port cities as they go) and meet Sherman in Georgia as the Confederate Western armies collapse. Finally, the remaining CSA forces are crushed into the Appalachian Mountains and the War Ends. Original Anaconda Plan completed.

2) Disengage from the West and throw everything to Virginia. Sherman's March comes on their heels, Georgia and the Tideland States fall to Uncle Billy, and Grant, after brushing aside the historically battered western forces, meet Sherman in Goldsborough (last Confederate bread basket NW of Raleigh). Just a matter of opinion in this scenario when. the Confederates actually surrender.

3) Hold in the West and strip the port defenses to go North. Grant treats the garrison forces he encounters as a serious speed bump but that's all they are. Speed bumps. Grant is slowed, but that's it. Virginia falls by October, Grant continues down the Tideland States, quickly snapping up ports as support (logistics) as he goes. Demoralization in the CSA sets in in the West, desertion rates skyrocket, and Sherman (after some costly actions against die-hard Southern troops) slowly pushes forward, preventing any final redeployments East. Grant and Sherman link up in Georgia, but the Confederate Army surrenders first.

Again, I am sorry, Ian. But many readers have asked me to finish this, and this is the best that I could do.
 
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