Germany does not invade Belguim in 1914. What does Britain do?

Riain

Banned
The French were working on the assumption British warships did not have wheels - was this not correct? The Netherlands mobilized its military on 31 July 1914, but remained neutral for the duration of the war. I confess an early naval POD is also my preferred hand wave to ensure Britain gets to the party on time, but you can achieve almost anything with a decent naval POD.

My interest lies in the inertia that various mobilisation points, plans and decision have on subsequent events.

Once the button is pushed in France, Germany, Russia and AH, both with the plans of 1914 and with recent but superseded plans, the actions will be unchangeable for 2-4 weeks regardless of events on the battlefield because of the mechanics of railway mobilisation/deployment/offensive. (Incidentally this is why I disagree with you over the 'east first' thing) These 4 powers will be balls-deep at war regardless of what diplomatic or combat things occur in the opening days/weeks.

Britain isn't like the others, however she does have her own version of mobilisation inertia that could/would likely drag her balls-deep into war with similar effectiveness. The instructions had gone to the Med Fleet the better part of a week prior to the British DoW to undertake action, which in terms of Government decisions is akin to ordering the 16th Division to attack Liege. Milne′s instructions were "to aid the French in the transportation of their African Army by covering, and if possible, bringing to action individual fast German ships, particularly Goeben, who may interfere in that action. You will be notified by telegraph when you may consult with the French Admiral. Do not at this stage be brought to action against superior forces, except in combination with the French, as part of a general battle. The speed of your squadrons is sufficient to enable you to choose your moment. We shall hope to reinforce the Mediterranean, and you must husband your forces at the outset."

Unlike armies on railways ships zig and zag, so in the event the conditions for an exchange of gunfire between the British and Germans didn't occur. However the Goben and Breslau had just conducted a bombardment of Philippeville and Bone when they met the 2 RN BCs so the first part of Milne's instructions "....to aid the French in the transportation of their African Army by covering, and if possible, bringing to action individual fast German ships, particularly Goeben, who may interfere in that action....." had been met more or less. More convincingly the second part "......Do not at this stage be brought to action against superior forces, except in combination with the French, as part of a general battle. The speed of your squadrons is sufficient to enable you to choose your moment. ....." had also been met because 2 BC are superior to a BC and CL. Only the third part of his instructions hadn't been met, but this wasn't because of some premeditation on the part of the British; if the French had some warship react to the bombardments then all 3 aspects of Milne's instructions would have been met when he encountered the Goben at 9.30am 4 August 1914, a full day before these orders were rescinded and before Britain had issued her DoW.

So here's a scenario:

  • The RN mobilises and Milne gets his instrutions
  • Germany updates her 'east first' plan and enacts it on the same day as OTL WW1 occurs, the deployment pattern isn't known by the Entente in the earliest days.
  • Germany and France are at war on 3 August
  • A French cruiser and 2 destroyers react to the bombardments of Philippeville and Bone and are exchanging some desultory gunfire with the German ships
  • Milne encounters this minor running fight at 9.30am 4 August 1914 and seeing all 3 parts of his instructions being met opens fire.
  • 1 BC takes the Breslau, the other and 3 small French warships take the Goben. Much like Jutland the BC facing the Goben cops a shell in the magazine and explodes, while the other quickly sinks the Breslau. The other BC joins the French warships and between them sink the Goben by midday 4 August.
  • The British Cabinet, fully aware of the naval battle and losses in the Med, announces on 5 August that because Belgium hasn't been invaded Britain will not be declaring war on Germany. Germany does the same.
  • The British and German populace are in no way bothered by a naval battle with the loss of the better part of 1000 men and capital ships on each side.

 

BooNZ

Banned
My interest lies in the inertia that various mobilisation points, plans and decision have on subsequent events.
...
You have outlined a very articulate and credible POD that would work in a timeline, but it represents what is possible - not probable. As I have mentioned, a decent naval POD can achieve almost anything, but such PODs are ordinarily often thinly veiled hand waves.

With reference to your specific scenario, are we looking for a neutral but watchful Britain and Ottoman empire? If so, do the Ottomans still close the Straights, which OTL happened before the Ottomans were 'dragged' into the war?
 
You have outlined a very articulate and credible POD that would work in a timeline, but it represents what is possible - not probable. As I have mentioned, a decent naval POD can achieve almost anything, but such PODs are ordinarily often thinly veiled hand waves.

Exactly, the Germans going through Belgium is somewhat analogous to the Japanese bombing Pearl Harbor. It removes all doubt, in both cases Berlin and Tokyo made the decision for London and Washington. If Germany doesn't go through Belgium we can all contrive any number of scenarios that get Britain into the war or keep Britain on the sidelines for X number months. If Britain stays neutral at first does something happen on the high seas that finally drags them in? A very good chance but when and how that impacts public enthusiasm are two huge unknowns. Similar situation in 1941 - Japan goes south and leaves the US alone. FDR will look for a way to get the US into the war and the flow of US reinforcements to US Pacific bastions, US ships and aircraft tailing Japanese ships and sending position reports in the clear ultimately lead to an incident that drags the US in but again, when and with a level of public enthusiasm that isn't quite the same as the white hot rage following the attack on PH.
 

Riain

Banned
You have outlined a very articulate and credible POD that would work in a timeline, but it represents what is possible - not probable. As I have mentioned, a decent naval POD can achieve almost anything, but such PODs are ordinarily often thinly veiled hand waves.

While the tactical scenario is a hand-wave itself, its only the final piece of the puzzle because Milne had been given authorisation to begin hostilities on his own initiative on July 30 which in effect takes the decision point out of Government hands until the order was rescinded on 5th August. On the 5th the Government took back control of the decision point for war from Milne and made the decision to declare war itself as a result of, now well known and understood, events and proper diplomatic process.

With reference to your specific scenario, are we looking for a neutral but watchful Britain and Ottoman empire? If so, do the Ottomans still close the Straights, which OTL happened before the Ottomans were 'dragged' into the war?

I'm not looking for anything, I just used it as a sequence of events to illustrate that someone in Britain in a position of authority to do so had already made the decision to go to war on 30 June and that it didn't happen was merely the result of 'chance' more or less. In contrast Milne could have been instructed to be in position to assist the French and avoid contact with the Germans until advised that war has been declared, so to avoid inadvertently starting one. Therein lies the inertia I'm talking about.
 
While the tactical scenario is a hand-wave itself, its only the final piece of the puzzle because Milne had been given authorisation to begin hostilities on his own initiative on July 30 which in effect takes the decision point out of Government hands until the order was rescinded on 5th August. On the 5th the Government took back control of the decision point for war from Milne and made the decision to declare war itself as a result of, now well known and understood, events and proper diplomatic process.

Just wondering if the whole cabinet was aware of the July 30th decision to allow Milne freedom of action or was this a Winston special?
 

Riain

Banned
Just wondering if the whole cabinet was aware of the July 30th decision to allow Milne freedom of action or was this a Winston special?

I think it might have been a Winston special, however this may have been totally within his power as the First lord of the Admiralty.

Does anyone know what instructions were given to the Grand and Channel Fleets on 30 June? Maybe these commanders were also given authority to engage German ships in certain circumstances prior to the DoW.
 
Well, Churchill has form as he did order an attack on the Dardanelles following the opening of hostilities between Ottoman and Russian empires. The battlecruisers of the Mediterranean Squadron bombarded the outer forts 2 days before a formal declaration of war had been made by Britain against the Ottoman Empire. Total casualties during the attack were 150, of which forty were German.
 

BooNZ

Banned
Exactly, the Germans going through Belgium is somewhat analogous to the Japanese bombing Pearl Harbor. It removes all doubt, in both cases Berlin and Tokyo made the decision for London and Washington. If Germany doesn't go through Belgium we can all contrive any number of scenarios that get Britain into the war or keep Britain on the sidelines for X number months. If Britain stays neutral at first does something happen on the high seas that finally drags them in? A very good chance but when and how that impacts public enthusiasm are two huge unknowns. Similar situation in 1941 - Japan goes south and leaves the US alone. FDR will look for a way to get the US into the war and the flow of US reinforcements to US Pacific bastions, US ships and aircraft tailing Japanese ships and sending position reports in the clear ultimately lead to an incident that drags the US in but again, when and with a level of public enthusiasm that isn't quite the same as the white hot rage following the attack on PH.

Sure, if Pearl Harbor had happened in late 39, but by late 41 the US actions (lend lease and embargos) already approved by the US legislature were scarcely acts of a neutral power by any conventional definition. In contrast, 1914 the majority of the relevant British decision makers we not even familiar with the details of Grey's flirtations with the French. The British hawks were a still a vocal minority within the British administration, which is likely lose at least one of their number after Grey attempts to explain why he had ignored explicit directives of Cabinet to cease his flirtations with the French.

If the British do not initially join, it is reasonable to assume the Germans would be bending over backwards not to provoke Britain, while in Britain the Francophiles and Germanophobes would increasingly come under scrutiny. The British administration would be gradually moving to disentangle itself from Grey's legacy, which is the opposite trajectory to the FDR administration. It's possible Britain still falls into the conflict, but this becomes less likely over time.

I'm not looking for anything, I just used it as a sequence of events to illustrate that someone in Britain in a position of authority to do so had already made the decision to go to war on 30 June and that it didn't happen was merely the result of 'chance' more or less. In contrast Milne could have been instructed to be in position to assist the French and avoid contact with the Germans until advised that war has been declared, so to avoid inadvertently starting one. Therein lies the inertia I'm talking about.
You have illustrated it would have been possible for a naval engagement to break out between British and German forces in the initial days of the war, but OTL it did not happen and the proposed POD does not make it any more likely. You have accurately identified the period when it would be most likely for such an 'opportunity' to arise. However, it becomes more difficult to engineer an engagement if the Royal Navy is certain of its neutrality and the Germans become careful not to mess with British junk. Not impossible, but progressively less likely.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
I wouldn't be surprised if this one had been done before, with with an excellent ongoing thread on the Germans doing and East First strategy in 1914, I think what exactly Britain does in that event should get its own thread.

So what does Britain do if there is no German invasion of Belgium? Do they declare war on Germany anyway?

Some relevant points of consideration are the ongoing Irish crisis, the fact that two cabinet ministers resigned over the decision to go to war OTL even with the invasion of Belguim, and the fact that Britain had a minority Liberal government whose re-election prospects were not good. A new election would have had to have been held by January 1916 at the latest. Of course the Liberal leadership could have formed a coalition with the Tories, which happened OTL in mid 1915 anyway.

Also if the British stay out of the war do they deliver the two battleships to Turkey?

Yes, the British decision to go to war was made before anyone in the room making the decision knew the Germans had cross the border.
 

BooNZ

Banned
Yes, the British decision to go to war was made before anyone in the room making the decision knew the Germans had cross the border.

So the British had made the decision to issue Germany with an ultimatim to leave Belgium, before they knew the Germans had crossed the border? I guess the British would be looking rather foolish issuing such an ultimatim if no Germans were actually in Belgium...
 
What question are you answering with this ?

If it's regarding the 'seizure' of the ottpman battleships ... pls have a look at my post #4 of this thread. Ot was decided well before any "important" cabinet meeting regarding Britains participation in the war.


...the British decision to go to war was made before anyone in the room making the decision knew the Germans had cross the border.
What meeting of - I assume - the cabinet do you talk about ?
The one of 1st August ? the 1st on 2nd August or the seceond, the evening cabinet meeting on 2nd August ?

About the "conclusions" of the 2nd, the evening meeting let me cite the source I've linked above :
"It was agreed that Grey’s speech to the House the following day would make it apparent that a substantial violation of Belgian neutrality would compel British intervention. This concession was aimed at the likes of Lloyd George. The Chancellor had gone so far ‘as to urge that if Germany would consent to limit her occupation of Belgian territory to the extreme southerly part of Belgium ... he would resign rather than make this a casus belli … ’ ( C. P. Scott, diary entry for 4 August 1914, in Wilson (ed.), The Political Diaries of C. P. Scott, pp. 96-7.)"​

So : where is you "... decision to go to war was made ...", pls ?
 
You have outlined a very articulate and credible POD that would work in a timeline, but it represents what is possible - not probable. As I have mentioned, a decent naval POD can achieve almost anything, but such PODs are ordinarily often thinly veiled hand waves.

Exactly, the Germans going through Belgium is somewhat analogous to the Japanese bombing Pearl Harbor. It removes all doubt, in both cases Berlin and Tokyo made the decision for London and Washington. If Germany doesn't go through Belgium we can all contrive any number of scenarios that get Britain into the war or keep Britain on the sidelines for X number months. If Britain stays neutral at first does something happen on the high seas that finally drags them in? A very good chance but when and how that impacts public enthusiasm are two huge unknowns. Similar situation in 1941 - Japan goes south and leaves the US alone. FDR will look for a way to get the US into the war and the flow of US reinforcements to US Pacific bastions, US ships and aircraft tailing Japanese ships and sending position reports in the clear ultimately lead to an incident that drags the US in but again, when and with a level of public enthusiasm that isn't quite the same as the white hot rage following the attack on PH.

If the Japanese do not attack Pearl Harbor but do attack the British, as CinC, FDR can cut an order for MacArthur to support the British with his air and sea forces and reports to Congress what he's done and why. Happily, perhaps by lucky coincidence, MacArthur just happened to have the strong B-17 and submarine forces necessary to do so.
 
Just wondering if the whole cabinet was aware of the July 30th decision to allow Milne freedom of action or was this a Winston special?

Not sure about the date of July 30th, but Churchill stated that he cut the order after getting permission of Asquith - he said Asquith sort of grunted assention - to do so without cabinet's approval. That's the way the British system works - the PM called the shots.
 
If the British do not initially join, it is reasonable to assume the Germans would be bending over backwards not to provoke Britain, while in Britain the Francophiles and Germanophobes would increasingly come under scrutiny. The British administration would be gradually moving to disentangle itself from Grey's legacy, which is the opposite trajectory to the FDR administration. It's possible Britain still falls into the conflict, but this becomes less likely over time.

The Germans will bend over backwards while fighting France and Russia. Once Russia is knocked out, the Germans will cease their appeasement of Britain.
 
Not sure about the date of July 30th, but Churchill stated that he cut the order after getting permission of Asquith - he said Asquith sort of grunted assention - to do so without cabinet's approval. That's the way the British system works - the PM called the shots.


I've just started Castles of Steel and I've just read that part.

It was a Winston Special backed by Battenburg - Asquith found out several hours later and made them rescind the order (Winston subsequently sulked for the rest of the afternoon during a cabinet meeting knowing that they had probably missed the chance of sinking Goeben) - Milne was following them with his BCs at the time but Goeben had a slight speed advantage and eventually pulled out of sight before war was declared - with Milne receiving war orders 1 am the following morning (on top of a number of competing and ambiguous tasks that Winston had sent over the previous few days)

The Asquith 'grunt' as far as I am aware was several days previous - upon finding out that Winston and Battenburg had sortied the Home Fleet from Plymouth to their wartime stations in Scapa Flow and retained the reserves (who after their annual training were about to be disbanded and sent home). This was all precautionary and aimed to prevent any opportunity for a surprise attack on Plymouth and was the right and proper thing to do.

I'll go and find the dates etc later on today if I get time. But I recall that the 30th July was sortieing the fleet and retaining the reserves and 3rd of Aug was the Winston Special order to sink Goeben subsequently rescinded when Asquith found out.
 
The Germans will bend over backwards while fighting France and Russia. Once Russia is knocked out, the Germans will cease their appeasement of Britain.

How long to defeat Russia?

Because Britian can potentially deploy well over a million men by Christmas 1914 (OTL it had 150,000 ready to go out of a potential 700,000 men on 5th Aug 1914).

It would be folly to dismiss them
 
The Germans will bend over backwards while fighting France and Russia. Once Russia is knocked out, the Germans will cease their appeasement of Britain.
At the situation at hand ... depends AN AWFULL LOT on :
- when Russia has been knocked out
- on what conditions (what about the already or still to be completet war ships, esp the BBs)
- how "well" is France
- what happened in the meantime to the german fleet
- what happened in the meantime to the german colonies
and
- is Britain still "neutral" (however "unfriendly" to Germany)​

However, generally speaking, for the post-war, post-armistice time I would absolutly agree.

For many strategically thinking militaries (if they took the time to do so, instead "feasting" on tactical fantasy operations [like Schlieffen ;)]) (like my beloved Colmar von der Goltz :biggrin: or Friedrich von Bernhardi) Great Britain was THE MAIN obstacle to Germanys way to "a place under the sun" or being an, if not THE accepted Great Power. France and especially Russia were "merely" the "first" obstacles on the way to this "ultimate" struggle between Britain and Germany, fought with whatever means ( troops, ships, ... cheque-books, on the sea, on the continent, on some ... other continent ).

Though given the "just" ended war my best bet would be for the next generation at least a "cheque-book" or economical "dispute".
 
How long to defeat Russia?

Because Britian can potentially deploy well over a million men by Christmas 1914 (OTL it had 150,000 ready to go out of a potential 700,000 men on 5th Aug 1914).

It would be folly to dismiss them
A potential, that has to be ... "unearthed" somehow, as well as in a reasonable time to pose a threat to someone.

Not a simple task, if you've just declared yourself neutral, lack a powerfull porpagandistic impetus ("rape of Belgium") and have now an awfull lot of nasty domestic issues (Home Rule irish as well as perhaps scotish, women suffrage, trade unions/workers unrests), you now can't sweep under the war-carpet.
 
How long to defeat Russia?

That depends on the Russians. Best case for Britain would be about 2 years. Worst case - a diplomatic resolution scenario - would be about 2 months.

Because Britian can potentially deploy well over a million men by Christmas 1914 (OTL it had 150,000 ready to go out of a potential 700,000 men on 5th Aug 1914).

It would be folly to dismiss them

The Germans entered the war with about 90 divisions, the Austrians about 60. By the time of the defeat of Russia the Germans would have about 250 divisions, the Austrians about 80, the Italians (who probably enter the war on the side of the CP in this case), maybe another 50. The Franco-Russians started with about 80 French and 120 Russian. They have about 120 French and 0 Russian after the defeat of Russia. So, in summary -

Start, August 1914 - 206 Entente divisions vs. 150 CP divisions.
After defeat of Russia - 120 French divisions vs. 380 CP divisions.

So, let's say neutral Britain built its army up to 40 divisions for the BEF in the meantime, up from 6. That's 380 vs. 160 divisions. Germany is going to be deterred? I doubt it.
 
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