IOTL two of the main leaders of the Nationalists during the Spanish Civil War died due to plane crashes: José Sanjurjo in 1936 and Emilio Mola in 1937. So, WI Franco has also died in an accident in 1937, after Mola? What would be the consequences for the war? And who could take his place? Would he be Gonzalo Queipo de Llano?
Franco dies in 1937: consequences for the Spanish Civil War?
- Thread starter Gonzaga
- Start date
Well, there were two key elements in the nationalist side that were the result of Franco and Franco's entourage direct involvement.
On one hand, we have the german, italian and portuguese assistance, specially the german one, which was obtained personally by Franco and his close colaborators, and the portuguese collaboration negotiated directly by Franco's brother Nicolás. The other general with good external relations was Mola. In fact, when in that infamous meeting in October of 1936 in Salamanca Franco was proclaimed military and political head of the Nationalist side, having those personal contacts with the fascist powers helped him to convince the other members in the Junta de Defensa Nacional (except Cabanellas) to accept his leadership.
On the other hand we have the unification of the different militias and parties (well, only Falange was still a proper political party at that stage). In this case was his brother-in-law, the cuñadísimo Serrano-Súñer, who personaly met with different influent figures in the church, the traditionalists, Falange and Acción Popular (CEDA's backbone before the war) in order to pave the way towrds the unification, though it's also true that Franco's final decission was took without their knowledge. We have to remember that shortly before the Decree of Unification, there had been serious frictions between the different nationalist factions, specially between Falange and the Carlists, and inner disputes inside of the falangist ranks, including bloodshed, which was internally divided regarding their place inside the nationalist project(s) (some members wanted to be loyal to Primo de Rivera's national-syndicalist "revolutionary" ideals and the others preferred a more pragmatical approach, all this in the context of a wave of new "militants of fortune")
So, with Franco dead, there is several `possibilities. As Gonzaga says, the most likely succesor would be Queipo de Llano, who during the war was virtually the vicerroy of Andalusia, controlling directly the entrance of a good part of the supplies for the nationalists through the andalusian ports and the main city in nationalist hands. Alternativelly, Yagüe could be also a candidate, with large support and contacts both inside Falange and inside the army, an enthusiastic germanophile, and also an africanista with a metheoric career like Franco.
But I'm not sure if we should consider a one-man direction as given fact after this eventual death of Franco. Perhaps a new junta is created. There were several figures with strong personalities amongst the rebel generals, not only the aforementioned queipo and Yagüe, but also people like Kindelán and Orgaz (both of them fervent monarchists), all of them making their political calculations. Cabanellas is still alive (though old) and, as I said, he never liked the idea of Franco as head of the movement, we have also a bunch of unhappy falangists and carlists after the forced unification only a few months before, and all this could lead to a compromise for a less personalist direction.
In any case, we would see frictions inside the nationalists, but I couldn't say how deep those frictions would become. And we have also the aforementioned relations with Germany and Italy, as I said managed by Franco's close entourage. What happen with those relations if they are less enthusiastical without the perspective of generous sinecures in a future francoist Spain?
Also, if Franco dies after Mola, this is somewhen between june and december. If it's in the last months of the year, the shock in the nationalist chain of command could have effects over the terrain, even if those effects don't last too much. Though in northern front the Republic is probably doomed in any circumstance, in late 1937 and early 1938 the both sides were focused in Aragón, where the nationalists finally won, dividing the republican territory in two and triggering the Battle of the Ebro. Without a clear leadership, the republican offensive towards Teruel could be succesfull, relieving somewhat the pressure over Madrid and the threat over the republican territorial continuity and over Catalonia, depending of course on the level of confussion and friction inside the fascist camp. Perhaps if the republican situation is less desperated, Negrín's "Thirteen points" for the reconciliation have a different fate and are more seriously considered both by the nationalist leadership (whoever is in command) and in Munich.
Cheers.
On one hand, we have the german, italian and portuguese assistance, specially the german one, which was obtained personally by Franco and his close colaborators, and the portuguese collaboration negotiated directly by Franco's brother Nicolás. The other general with good external relations was Mola. In fact, when in that infamous meeting in October of 1936 in Salamanca Franco was proclaimed military and political head of the Nationalist side, having those personal contacts with the fascist powers helped him to convince the other members in the Junta de Defensa Nacional (except Cabanellas) to accept his leadership.
On the other hand we have the unification of the different militias and parties (well, only Falange was still a proper political party at that stage). In this case was his brother-in-law, the cuñadísimo Serrano-Súñer, who personaly met with different influent figures in the church, the traditionalists, Falange and Acción Popular (CEDA's backbone before the war) in order to pave the way towrds the unification, though it's also true that Franco's final decission was took without their knowledge. We have to remember that shortly before the Decree of Unification, there had been serious frictions between the different nationalist factions, specially between Falange and the Carlists, and inner disputes inside of the falangist ranks, including bloodshed, which was internally divided regarding their place inside the nationalist project(s) (some members wanted to be loyal to Primo de Rivera's national-syndicalist "revolutionary" ideals and the others preferred a more pragmatical approach, all this in the context of a wave of new "militants of fortune")
So, with Franco dead, there is several `possibilities. As Gonzaga says, the most likely succesor would be Queipo de Llano, who during the war was virtually the vicerroy of Andalusia, controlling directly the entrance of a good part of the supplies for the nationalists through the andalusian ports and the main city in nationalist hands. Alternativelly, Yagüe could be also a candidate, with large support and contacts both inside Falange and inside the army, an enthusiastic germanophile, and also an africanista with a metheoric career like Franco.
But I'm not sure if we should consider a one-man direction as given fact after this eventual death of Franco. Perhaps a new junta is created. There were several figures with strong personalities amongst the rebel generals, not only the aforementioned queipo and Yagüe, but also people like Kindelán and Orgaz (both of them fervent monarchists), all of them making their political calculations. Cabanellas is still alive (though old) and, as I said, he never liked the idea of Franco as head of the movement, we have also a bunch of unhappy falangists and carlists after the forced unification only a few months before, and all this could lead to a compromise for a less personalist direction.
In any case, we would see frictions inside the nationalists, but I couldn't say how deep those frictions would become. And we have also the aforementioned relations with Germany and Italy, as I said managed by Franco's close entourage. What happen with those relations if they are less enthusiastical without the perspective of generous sinecures in a future francoist Spain?
Also, if Franco dies after Mola, this is somewhen between june and december. If it's in the last months of the year, the shock in the nationalist chain of command could have effects over the terrain, even if those effects don't last too much. Though in northern front the Republic is probably doomed in any circumstance, in late 1937 and early 1938 the both sides were focused in Aragón, where the nationalists finally won, dividing the republican territory in two and triggering the Battle of the Ebro. Without a clear leadership, the republican offensive towards Teruel could be succesfull, relieving somewhat the pressure over Madrid and the threat over the republican territorial continuity and over Catalonia, depending of course on the level of confussion and friction inside the fascist camp. Perhaps if the republican situation is less desperated, Negrín's "Thirteen points" for the reconciliation have a different fate and are more seriously considered both by the nationalist leadership (whoever is in command) and in Munich.
Cheers.
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I was thinking somewhat along this lines: Franco was a medicore strategist but brilliant as a political unifier.
Without him the nationalist groups might become only loosely allied without much central cooperation.
A postwar spanish goverment might (if the nationalists still win) collapse earlier or even fall victim to an second, fascist coup.