Here's half of the next update, covering 1779 in Canada. The lakes campaign and the Battles of Fort Niagara and Fort Detroit will be covered in the next update.
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6. In the Fury of the Tempest: The Northern Campaigns, 1779:
(Excerpt From: Founding Family):
The Continental Army had four objectives in the northern campaign of 1779. First, in the east, they hoped to capture Halifax, thus removing Britain's last substantial naval base in the north. Second, they were prepared to launch a second invasion of Quebec, this time to be spearheaded by the Marquis de Lafayette. A third force would operate in western and northern New York, driving the British out of their strongholds in the Champlain valley, and moving all the way to the capture of Fort Niagara. Finally, substantial reinforcements were to be sent west to the Ohio country, with the ultimate aim of capturing Fort Detroit, and thereby ending the threat to the frontiers of Pennsylvania and Virginia. It was obvious that Lafayette would command the assault into Quebec, but it was less clear who would command the other expeditions. Washington's intent was to give command of the attack on Halifax to Nathanael Greene, the New York command to Hamilton, and the Ohio command to General Daniel Morgan. Morgan's command was approved without incident, but New England members of congress pushed to replace Greene with Horatio Gates. Resigned, Washington eventually consented, giving command of the New York campaign to Greene, with Hamilton as his second. Washington planned to keep the forces destined for Halifax and Quebec together for an initial assault on Penobscot, the last British outpost in Maine. This attack was launched in late March, 1779. After a bitter two week siege, Penobscot fell. Deciding it would be sensible for him to remain there in order to coordinate the two independent Canadian expeditions, Washington, and his now diminished staff, remained behind with a central reserve force that could reinforce either of the two northern prongs if needed. Washington would be very glad of this strategic reserve in the fullness of time…
(Excerpt From: Britain in the American Revolution):
Sir Guy Carleton remained in command at Halifax, reinforced by a strong garrison. After the fall of Penobscot, he expected the main patriot attack to reach him there, though he did warn Frederick Haldimand, the commanding general and governor of Quebec, to expect a possible renewed patriot assault. Carleton, however, would prove fortunate in his opponent. Gates moved north, encountering little resistance until he came to the Nova Scotia peninsula. Carleton elected to allow Gates to invest the city, which he did on June 1, 1779. Unfortunately for Gates, he had by this time so infuriated the French Admiral commanding his naval support that the two men were hardly on speaking terms. Gates also ignored the advice of his chief engineer, Thaddeus Kosciuszko, on the placement of his siege works. That Kosciuszko would go on to have a varied career of great renowned, while Gates is now a footnote of interest only to historians of the American Revolution, speaks volumes about the two men. Unaware of the way in which his position left him exposed, Gates' feuding with the French fleet reached a point that they withdrew in disgust, finding it "impossible to work with the man". This was the chance for which Carleton had been waiting. Embarking about half the garrison on British ships now no longer pinned in Halifax Harbor by the French, Carleton landed them behind Gates’ troops, attacking his ill-prepared siege works on the morning of July 1. Gates compounded his error by attempting to both hold off the assault and storm Halifax at the same time. As a result, nearly 1000 continentals, including Gates himself, were killed. As the highest-ranking senior officer, Kosciuszko was left with the unenviable task of extracting the remaining patriot forces from their trap. It is a testament to his skill that, not only was he successful, but he bloodied Carleton's relief force quite sharply on his way. The French squadron, having raided Newfoundland, returned in time to support Kosciuszko's march south. While Washington put the blame squarely on Gates, many New England congressmen spoke of the "French perfidy that betrayed our cause at Halifax". Various motives were imputed, from French bitterness that the patriots were unwilling to consider returning Quebec to it to a conspiratorial belief that France feared its ally was growing too strong, and wished to preserve a British presence in North America to keep the two Anglophone powers at one another's throats. Whatever the reason, New England soon became a hot-bed of anti-French sentiment, to the point that French naval vessels were advised to avoid making port in Boston due to fear of riots…
(Excerpt From: Founding Family):
Lafayette planned to recreate the two-pronged strategy used by Montgomery and Arnold, with a few modifications. First, he followed a new invasion route proposed by Moses Hazen, commander of the Second Canadian regiment. Hazen and his troops built a road through the Hampshire grants (now New Hampshire and Vermont), which could serve as an alternate route to the more arduous path taken by Arnold in 1775. Second, Arnold intended to bring more men, and attack in summer. "We must take Quebec City before the close of October, lest we suffer the same fate as Arnold and Montgomery," he wrote to Hamilton. Third, Lafayette hoped to be more successful in recruiting the French habitants, or tenet farmers, than Arnold and Montgomery had been. Due to long consultations with a rising young continental officer of Quebecois extraction named Clement Gosselin, he also understood the need to neutralize the opposition of the seigneurs and the Catholic Church, who dominated the province and remained loyal to the king out of fear of revolution, In order to achieve both aims, Lafayette engaged in sophisticated propaganda, letting the rumor be spread among the seigneurs that the colonists had agreed to restore French rule of Quebec, while encouraging the habitants to believe Quebec would become part of an egalitarian American republic. In effect, Lafayette promised all things to all people, in the hope that he might win at least some over to the patriot cause, and convince others to remain neutral. This strategy proved extremely effective…
(Excerpt From: Britain in the American Revolution):
Frederick Haldimand, governor and commanding General of Quebec, wrote anxious letters in the late Spring and early summer warning of foment among the "new subjects", as the French Quebecois were known. "Among the seigneuri, it is believed that France will come, while the habitants place their hope in the Americans. In neither case do they remain unswerving in their loyalty to the crown." Haldimand begged for reinforcement, but the crown had none to send. Lesley's forces in Florida were making preparations against a potential Spanish invasion, while Carleton could not spare any soldiers from the defense of Halifax. To the west, British and loyalist forces were experiencing their own difficulties due to Greene's lakes campaign. Thus, Haldimand found himself in the unenviable position of relying increasingly on local militias that, at the same time, he could no longer trust as fully. He initiated a wave of arrests and proscriptions, while at the same time promising more autonomy when the crisis had passed. This strategy might have worked, had the arrests not included a Catholic priest. The father in question, whose families were seigneurs, was accused of offering prayers to the king, but substituting Louis' name for that of King George. Though evidence is inconclusive, speculation among the new subjects was that this accusation came from an opportunistic Anglophone seigneur whose territory bordered that of the priest's family. Again, Haldimand was in a bind, needing to demonstrate British firmness and resolve on one hand and not antagonize the new subjects on the other. His compromise was to place the priest under house arrest and empower a commission to rapidly investigate the charges. Nevertheless, the Catholic church, previously a bastion of loyalist support, expressed their objection to "governmental interference in the church of Christ" in "the strongest terms possible". In the midst of this swirling chaos, Lafayette's invasion came as the breaking of the tempest…
(Excerpt From: Founding Family):
Lafayette went from success to success. In June, his main force marched up the Hazen Road, as it came to be called, and rapidly made progress toward Quebec. At the same time, a second smaller force under James Livingston's command marched to Montreal, investing and capturing the city. The two forces met up in Quebec's lower city, and laid siege to the upper city by July 29. Haldimand's appeals for more troops fell on deaf years, the Quebecois were by now alienated and in chaos, and a provisional patriot government was already forming at Montreal under the direction of Pierre Du Calvet, the Huguenot justice of the peace and prominent Quebecois liberal widely respected throughout the province. As the siege dragged on, Lafayette entered into covert negotiations with several prominent seigneurs, who desired assurances that their interests would be respected in the new dispensation, whatever that might be. Overjoyed, Lafayette made promises liberally. “I have made nearly all the seigneurs my friend”, he boasted in one letter for Hamilton. Lafayette’s love of popularity, admitted even by his friends to be his greatest weakness, would leave the young nation with a horribly tangled legacy in the war’s aftermath…
(Excerpt From: The British In the American Revolution):
A despondent Haldimand was left with no option but surrender by the end of September. On October 2, he and his remaining garrison were given generous terms, and Quebec City, at last, fell into patriot hands. The Quebec provisional assembly had, by this time, actually sent Valentin Jautard, John McCord and Fleury Mesplet as delegates to the continental congress, so in some ways the surrender of the garrison was a formality. Still, Haldimand would be unmercifully scapegoated for his loss in Quebec. Cashiered out of the British army for a situation many of his brother officers agreed was not truly of his own making, Haldimand would go on to have a colorful career outside British service…