Across the high frontier: a Big Gemini space TL

1972: NASA hell of a year (11)

Archibald

Banned
wings into space

May 16, 1972

... and then, at last, come winged shapes.

They were at first thought to be dead on arrival – if only because of the shuttle fiasco. Grumman courageously proposed a subscale shuttle orbiter model. While their proposal doesn't stand much chance of being picked up as NASA next manned vehicle, it could instead be fund as an entirely different project.

At the time when the shuttle was cancelled NASA Langley was pitching a subscale (1/4 the size) shuttle orbiter to be flown as a piloted, supersonic X-vehicle – the X-27. The military enjoyed Langley proposal – and shown interest in an unmanned, orbital variant of the X-27.

The latter bring us to the very major surprise that has come from Boeing. Incredibly, the Seattle company entered NASA manned craft bidding war bringing back a legend – DynaSoar ! The very same X-20 DynaSoar that was canned by SecDef McNamara nearly a decade ago, on December 10, 1963.

In the wake of their sale pitch to NASA Boeing made stunning revelations about the long lost space glider. Very few people realize that not only was there a full-scale X-20 mockup that was displayed in public, but also that the first flight article was well under construction by Boeing in Seattle and it was at least 60% complete at the time of cancellation in December 1963.

A full scale mockup of DynaSoar was build and it was proudly shown to the public in Las Vegas in September of 1962 during the Air Force Association annual convention.

A decade later it seems that Boeing had that DynaSoar mockup taken out of storage. It forms the nucleus of Boeing entry into NASA bidding war.

According to British aerospace journalist David Baker, somebody at Boeing told him last summer- about the time the Shuttle was running into trouble - that the front end of the DynaSoar mockup was to be cut off "soon" to be used for an ergonomic cockpit design applicable to a possible spaceplane proposal the company was mulling for NASA and the DoD at the time.

Which in turn mean that the mockup must have been in storage someplace at least until then, for as much as eight years (1963 to 1971). Baker Boeing source later told him the shuttle was canned before the DynaSoar mockup was actually hacked off.

Then Boeing found itself pitching a reborn DynaSoar as NASA next manned ship.

The real surprise however then come from a Boeing employee with the name of Andy Hepler.

Hepler had worked on DynaSoar. After he learned of the full scale mockup being brought back he guided puzzled Boeing managers to a remote hangar.

There, in a dusty corner, and covered with plastic tarps, stood the unfinished very first, unique DynaSoar prototype.

It was 60% complete and, in an alternate universe, might have been dropped from under the NB-52B wing as early as summer 1965.

It seems that NASA next manned ship competition (a winner is to be announced in August) might have an unexpected spinoff.

The winged shapes and lifting bodies entries may be diverted to a whole different program – a military unmanned space plane !

Competitors would be: Grummann subscale shuttle (as pushed by NASA Langley, either with Faget straight wings or the Air Force delta shape); Boeing revamped DynaSoar; Martin Marietta X-24 and Northrop HL-10 lifting bodies.
 
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Archibald

Banned
When in 2008 I started writting that TL I tried to save DynaSoar in 1963 - and failed.

These days Nixonhead Kolyma's shadow just did that - operationnal DynaSoar after 1965 and perhaps well into the 80's. Reading through his TL I badly wanted DynaSoar to return. Hence the last entry in my TL.
 
Boeing pull Dyna Soar out there Hat, now is that surprise ?

DoD and Boeing put allot effort and money into X-20 Project, to the moment SecDef McNamara killed it.
It's Logical that Boeing, now try to sell Dyna Soar to NASA and USAF.
That program is easy to restart, the Booster Titan III C is still there, first prototype 60% complete even the Pilots working on program are in NASA or USAF.
even one X-20 test pilot even walkt on Moon !

The Model no. (XX)s-53. this version comes closes NASA specification,
But is not perfect, it carry maximum 5 astronaut clenched into Glider and limit supply and is not extensible.
while McDD Helios is more flexible in that.
 

Archibald

Banned
a video I wanted to share

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7yIvOYFOm6c

Apollo 17 was the only night launch of the Saturn V (it was a matter of reaching Taurus Littrow at a certain moment)

Fast-forward to 2 minutes and 40 seconds into the video

Saturn V light the fire of the 5 big F1 rocket engines, in an explosion of white light.

With light travelling faster than sound and the Saturn more than 2 miles away (in the case it explodes !) there are a magical ten seconds where the Saturn is only bliding light, not sound, and the crowd cheers (listen carefully to the guy shouting OH MY GOD in a high-pitched, excited voice - give me chills everytime I listen it)

Then all of sudden at 2:51 come the sound - an enormous BRAAAOOOOOOMMMM that instantly "silence" the excited crowd :eek: for at least a minute, the time for the Saturn to climb away in the night sky.

Oh, and according to Wiki, people saw the Saturn light as far as 500 miles away :cool:
 
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you could hear the BRAAAOOOOOOMMMM for around 126 km or 78 miles

i had chance to talk to florida farmer living opposite to KSC and Launch pad 39
What he had to say about Saturn V

Each time those darn thing blasted off, it was like earth quake and all dishes fall out my cabinet in kitchen or window shatter !
NASA at least was honest to pay my damage

The Saturn V was a mighty Machine
I am glad to give this glorious machine, a TL were it's alive and remains the backbone of US space program
 
Found nice picture of HL-10
tumblr_neha1wZRTb1ttka3go6_1280.jpg


now on Display at entrance of Armstrong Flight Research Center at Edwards, California
 
1972: NASA hell of a year (12)

Archibald

Banned
talking about Saturn V future (this is straight out of OTL)

On the left a Saturn V lay on its side, its stages separated and mounted on wheeled trailers.Dave grinned when he caught Natalie York gawping at the Saturn.

"That's just a test article," he said. "The first one built. The story is that when it looked as if we might be canning Apollo altogether, there was talk of taking one of the flight articles and putting it on display here, or maybe at the Cape. A man-rated moon rocket as a lawn ornament." He chuckled and shook his head. "Can you believe it?"

(Stephen Baxter, Voyage)

---

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

GEORGE C. MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER
MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER, ALABAMA 35812
REPLY TO
ATTN OF: DEP-T May 24, 1972
TO: NASA Headquarters
Attn: Mr. Philip E. Culbertson
FROM: DEP-T/W. R. Lucas

SUBJECT: Long Term Storage and Launch of a Saturn V Vehicle in the Mid-1980’s

This is in response to your request of May 9 for information concerning the cost of maintaining present reliability of the Saturn V vehicle as a function of long time storage and the cost of storing and maintaining a capability to launch a Saturn V in the mid-1980’s.

First, it is extremely difficult to estimate the cost of maintaining the current reliability of the Saturn V launch vehicle for approximately 13 additional years since this time is so far beyond our experience. For example, a June 1985 launch of one of our available Saturn V’s would mean that the age of some of the critical components from start of stage assembly would exceed 18 years. We are prepared to state, based upon tests and other experience, that there is no significant degradation of some of the more sensitive components, for example engine soft goods, up to ten years, provided the storage environment is closely controlled. However, we do not understand quantitatively the effects of aging on our systems beyond the ten year period.

To gain confidence in components between ten and twenty years old, we would have to establish the requirement to do single engine static firings three years prior to launch, utilizing spare J-2 engines. The J-2 engine would be selected because it contains most of the commonly used softgoods (most likely to deteriorate) on the vehicle. In addition, selected electrical, electronic and mechanical critical components that were stored with the vehicle would be subjected to functional tests and teardown inspection. There would be no remove-and-replace activity on the vehicles unless determined necessary by this test program.

[2] In addition to the vehicle hardware reliability concern, there is another vital element to consider. The present Apollo and Skylab Programs depend on the full-time, dedicated involvement of carefully selected, highly skilled individuals within both contractor and Civil Service ranks. Many of the key individuals can trace their experience back to the beginning of the Apollo Program. Every Saturn V launch to date, particularly the Apollo 16, has required their real time decisions to convert a potential launch scrub or mission loss situation into a mission success.

By the 1980’s, this present capability will be practically nonexistent. It must be rebuilt with individuals possessing possibly more advanced technical knowledge of new vehicles but who would lack specific knowledge of the Saturn V systems. Therefore, these individuals must be provided the means and the time to become technically proficient with the Saturn V system. All records pertaining to design, qualification, manufacturing and assembly processes, handling, checkout, and launch preparation and launch must be preserved.


In addition to the above, there are other potential problem areas which deserve a brief comment:
Advanced computer processing systems may not be compatible with the developed Saturn software programs.
It is not feasible to environmentally control all critical components of the system. For example, the [Launch Umbilical Tower] and the stage transporters will be exposed to atmospheric conditions requiring possible major refurbishment.
Certain critical spare parts would be impossible to replace if an unforeseen problem required an unusual demand for replacement parts.

In summary, we have very little basis for extrapolating reliability of Saturn vehicles beyond the proposed six to fifteen year period of inactivity. Undoubtedly some degradation would occur. If it is intended to use a Saturn V in the mid-1980’s, the earlier the requirement is identified, the better will be our confidence in maintaining a reasonable reliability at a tolerable cost.

[3] In conjunction with [Kennedy Space Center], we examined the major factors influencing the cost of a program to maintain the capability to launch one of the two unassigned Saturn V launch vehicles (SA-514 and SA-515) with confidence in the mid-1980’s.

Comments and cost estimates from [Kennedy] are included. The examination was conducted in accordance with the guidelines and assumptions presented in enclosure 1.

The approach taken would require the present contractors to prepare the stages, spares and documentation for long term storage before their present contracts expire; store the stages and spares at [Kennedy]; maintain the documentation at [Marshall Space Flight Center]; and then identify the required post storage activities to be performed.


A summary of the cost and manpower phasing is presented in enclosures 2 and 3. You will note that the Post Storage and Launch Phase contains two options: the first option utilizes only Civil Service and support contractors; the other option utilizes a single prime contractor for this phase. This choice is left open because it is not possible to predict at this time the density of workload within the Civil Service ranks during the mid-1980’s. Depending on which option is chosen, the estimated total program cost for a Saturn V launch in mid-1985 will range from $206.0 M to $298.7 M.

William. R. Lucas
Deputy Director, Technical
Marshall Space Flight Center
 
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Soviets in space (7)

Archibald

Banned
straight out of OTL (Siddqi) A Buran soviet space shuttle ? what is that ?

27 May 1972

TECHNICAL PROPOSALS FOR THE CREATION OF THE N1-L3M COMPLEX APPROVED.

The first N-1 places a large 24-tonne lunar lander descent stage, the GB-1, based on block D, in lunar orbit.

Independently, a second N-1 delivers a three-man lunar lander and return spacecraft, GB-2, to link up with the descent stage. Together they descend to the lunar surface.

Initially, three cosmonauts works on the moon for a full lunar day (14 Earth days) but this is later extended to be a month or longer.
Eventually, four cosmonauts live on the moon for a year at a time. The ascent stage has a mass of 19.5 tonnes on launch from the moon and 8.4 tonnes during trans-Earth coast.

Launch is direct back to Earth without any manoeuvres in lunar orbit. The lander incorporates Soyuz within a cocooned habitation block, or OB, a sort of hangar. The crew can climb out of Soyuz into the hangar, put on their spacesuits there and use the hangar as a pressurization chamber before their descent to the lunar surface.

A new engine and new fuel are developed for the N1-L3M lunar module by Valentin Glushko's OKB-486 design bureau.
The L3M RD-510 engine has 12 tonnes thrust. The fuel is hydrogen peroxide, also called High Test Peroxide (HTP).

Like Glushko's favourite fuel, nitric acid, hydrogen peroxide can be kept at room temperatures for long periods.

Hydrogen peroxide has one advantage over nitrogen-based fuels: it does not require the mixing of a fuel with a oxidizer.

It is a monopropellant, requiring one tank and a means of igniting the rocket (metallic filings are inserted). There is no need to mix in the product of two tanks in a very precise ratio to get the desired thrust. Nor is HTP toxic.

The Americans may have been first to the moon, but the Soviet Union will build the first moon base. The dual N-1 mission could take place in the late 1970s. We should consider turning the moon base into the first military headquarters off the planet.
 
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Quick note; Catalyst for hydrogen-peroxide is usually (specifically after 1945) in the form of a wire grid "pack" of various types which the H2O2 is run through. Injected catalysts have never performed well in operation.

And technically you can mono-propellant some of the nitrogen propellants as well though your ISP is often less than mono-propellant H2O2 IIRC.

Bonus is after being broken down into steam and oxygen (through a catalyst) if kerosene is added it auto-ignites like a hypergolic propellant combination without most of the dangers of hypergolics.

H2O2 is arguably a pretty decent storable propellant it tends to lose out due to the existing infrastructure and operational inertia despite its advantages.
(And in the US there's been a very clear and historic bias against it from very early on)

Randy
 
Europe in space (7)

Archibald

Banned
In the case Big Gemini was to be launched by a Titan III, the pressurized cargo section would end strikingly similar to a Soviet Salyut space station in length, diameter and mass.

One thing is sure, there is no lack of bold concepts involving space stations, most of them derived from Skylab - one way or another. Saturn upper stages - the S-II and S-IVB - are quite voluminous thanks to hydrogen very low density. It is that immense volume space station designers intend to use.

(...)

Skylab option C is a single-launch space station. This configuration features a 92-foot-long, 23-foot-diameter core module launched as part of a Saturn V vehicle. The module would provide 26,000 cubic feet of pressurized volume, separated into 7 "decks" connected by a centralized passageway. Seven berthing ports would be located on the circumference of the module to place possible international modules and other elements.

(...)

Skylab is first and foremost a S-IVB stage turned into a space station; which mean the J-2 engine has been removed and the fuel tanks filled with an astronaut habitat. As such Skylab no longer can propel itself into orbit. There's no reason Skylab recipe couldn't apply to the even larger S-II. In both case the station ends so heavy and voluminous only a Saturn V can orbit it.
An alternate approach is the so-called wet workshop, where the rocket stage keep its engines and tanks hence the capacity to orbit itself. The obvious issue is that, since the tanks are full of propellants they can't be outfitted as a space station on the ground. It fell to astronauts doing that job once in orbit - and it is a totally different matter which led to the abandonment of the concept.

In the early days of Apollo however legendary Wernher von Braun proposed an intermediate solution - half Skylab, half wet-workshop.

The S-II and S-IVB are essentially similar - they feature a hydrogen tank on top and an oxygen tank below. A little know fact is that the hydrogen tank domes or bulkheads feature a 40 inch (1 meter) diameter manhole.

It is only used by Douglas and North American employees on the ground for quality control of the rocket stages. What von Braun suggested was to literally slide a Skylab or Salyut space station through that opening (the opening would have previously been enlarged, of course !)

One has to figure a 4.5 m diameter Salyut (or Big Gemini cargo section) encased into a 10 m S-II - resulting in an interval of 6.5 m between the two hulls.

Once the space station "slidded" into the rocket stage tank the aforementioned "interval" would be pressurised providing the astronaut with a truly immense volume to live in.

The combination of all the above results in a host of space station designs. The Douglas company noted the trick would also work with their 6.6 m S-IVB - in some way a Salyut could be slidded into a Skylab via the S-IVB opening !

The extreme logical end of this would have Skylab itself slidded into a S-II (provided the opening could be enlarged to 6.6 m, which is probably a bridge too far.)

So rigid modules could be slided through an S-IVB or S-II manhole. An interesting alternative might be the so called inflatable. The habitat would be folded, deflated, inside the hydrogen tank; then, once the stage in orbit with the propellants depleted, the module would be inflated, filling the tank better than any rigid module. NASA gave a limited contract study to ILC Dover, the company that currently manufacture the astronaut space suits.



***



"A meeting between American and European representatives took place in Washington from 14 to 16 June 1972. Behind the rhetorical requirements of diplomacy, both the opening and the concluding remarks by Herman Pollack (Director, Bureau of International Scientific and Technological Affairs of the Department of State) revealed the tense atmosphere of the gathering.

Cooperation on the tug was formally agreed on but at the same time ELDO involvement in space station modules was prohibited. While the final go-ahead on participation in the development of the tug had been expected, the veto on the modules came as a sudden surprise. The reason officially given were mainly technical. The station modules, it was said, were a moving target; it was not clear how, when and what would be built. The secondary literature gives additional reasons including:


1. American skepticism, widely shared in Europe, over Europe's technical ability to develop a full, large space station module on its own

2. Rejection of Big Gemini -based pressurised shell in favor of larger, Skylab-like modules

3. Johnson Space Center willingness to take complete control over the space station over Marshall and ELDO.

The European delegates were rightly worried, since NASA administrator James Beggs added that the tug now amounted to a modified Lockheed Agena. The only technological transfer would be the automated approach and docking system. Italy and Germany would build Agenas under licence - much like they had build F-104G Starfighters a decade earlier.

The Europeans were clearly dissatisfied, and sought a larger commitment. That's the moment when the sortie lab made a spectacular come-back. A pressurised module signified European willingness to enter the field of manned space activities and to pay its entrance fee.

After insertion into orbit by a classic rocket, the Agena would ferry and dock the module to the American space station. Called the Agena Transfer Vehicle – ATV - the unmanned European spacecraft would add its volume and cargo to the American orbital facility.

Both Agena and pressurised module were essentially off-the-shelf components, the later nothing more than a Big Gemini cargo section. This meant development belonged to American contractors; Europe work would amount to a build things under licence. As a compensation, NASA allowed the Europeans to eventually turn some Agena cargoes into little science laboratories that could be added to the American future space station.

Excerpt from: A history of the European Space Agency, 1958 - 1987
 
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1972: NASA hell of a year (13)

Archibald

Banned
Agena going big

Lee Sherer. had been named director of Dryden on October 11, 1971 but its tenure was quite short: new NASA administrator James Beggs, sworn early 1972, handpicked Sherer as the leader of the Agena space tug program, later renamed the Piloted Science Program.

Sherer was a visionary that recognized the Agena immense potential as early as 1972.
It was Sherer that negociated the selling of Thor Agena (Thorad) to Japan, giving that country access to the coming space station. A similar scenario happened with Canada.
 
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1972: NASA hell of a year (14)

Archibald

Banned
How NOT to build a space station - as done with 1984 Freedom

(the following is inspired by lectures on the origins of space station Freedom, on the period 1983 - 1986. NASA truly build a catastrophic organization)

June 25, 1972

NASA Headquarters, Washington DC


Together with external advisor Charles Townes, Homer Newell briefed his successor Noel Hinners.

The former director of NASA office of space sciences and applications (OSSA) was bitter, if not furious.

"Someone in Houston just leaked an internal memo to me. Here's engineers Faget, Piland, Covington and Louviere approach to a space station."

Newell dug a sheet of paper out of his pocket and red on.

"Listen to that. Here's how JSC consider science in the space station program.

"Every time we would try to do a big new advanced project we get all balled up with the user requirements.

So let's don't build a space station that caters to the users; we will build one that is an operational base, a facility, and then what we will do is just let users come on board and when they come on board they will have to make their own beds. Kind of transportation depot or node.

As for the cost, it only include the construction, not the missions.

What missions anyway ?

science ? entrepreneurship ? let's talk about them.

We asked us about things to be done in space. They answered with a so-called blue book, and it was as thick as a phone booth.

Thus at first glance it looks as if there is plenty of things to be done. Yet, we when we reached Phase B - the definition of the space station - there was noone left.

They said they did not supported the program, that a space station can not be justified by science.

Ok, so in discussing our future space station concepts, at some point we will vaguely say, "well, what about some laboratory module for science ?" and that will be it.

It will be deliberate: we will NOT list science as a major objective.
In turn that will make these scientists furious; then, we will look surprised and ashamed and tell them "ah, ok, so you see, you really wanted science to be a major objective of our project. Fine, welcome on board then !"

"They concluded saying we scientists prefer free-flying instruments and unmanned devices we control by ourselves. How surprising, when we are treated like this !" Newell shouted.

Townes and Hinners were apalled.

"It is no surprise the shuttle program ended the way it ended. That machine was a giant monument to Johnson arrogance and love for engineering, as shown here." Townes said with a cold voice.
"And don't think the other manned spaceflight center, Marshall, is better." Newell raged.
"Didn't they tried to be a little more science friendly those days ?" Hinner naively asked.
"You are talking about the Apollo Telescope Mount and their sudden interest for astronomy ? Sheesh. Opportunism, my dear. They went that way only because their big rocket business is winding down."
"So in some way we have two manned centers each with their own, suicidal obsession." Hinners said.
"Spot on. Johnson is obsessed with engineering, and Marshall with big space launching systems. No room for good science there, you see."

There was brief moment of silence before Hinners joked.

"If that true, then that decade is going to be frustrating for them."
"Why that ?" Newell was surprised.
"Well, if Marshall is NASA internal rocket designer, then they are currently out of job, since the agency is buying Titan of the shelf from Martin Marietta.

As for the Johnson Spaceflight Center - per lack of time and budget the space station modules will be of Skylab heritage.

For JSC this is twice an infamy, first, because they have to work with Marshall; secondly, because everything is incremental; it derives from proven hardware. Nothing new, expensive or technology-laden. An engineering heresy, you see."

As he heard these words Newell face betrayed mixed feelings.

"And do you think all those JSC engineers will be happy like this ? Will they stay with their arms crossed ? Their engineering virus won't surrender. At some point the infection will start again." Townes said.
"Sure. But Headquarters just threw them a bone in the shape of Big Gemini."
"Well, it is nothing like the shuttle. In three years it will fly, and Johnson engineers will cry for something else."
"And they will have that something else."
"What ?"
"The shuttle; and perhaps another space station. Or a package of the two."
"Another space station ?" Townes was surprised.
"The backup of the first. You'll never know, the Saturn V could have a bad day. So they are building two cores."
"I see." Newell slapped his forehead. "The Johnson engineers will fantasize at length on the shuttle and a much better space station to go with it. Their engineering virus will be somewhat channeled in that direction."
"Bingo." Hinners smiled. "JSC workshare so far is leading center on Big Gemini plus shared work on the space station with Marshall.

The space station is a JSC core module completed by a host of Marshall uprated Skylab.

Meanwhile Marshall is working on the Agena space tug with a newcomer, Goddard.

Again, JSC scorns the Agena, which is a far cry for the original space tug or nuclear shuttle. Their pet project is the Orbital Transfer Vehicle, and it is on par with the shuttle and backup station I mentionned"

"A bold engineering package to fantasize on." Newell said.

"Indeed. What JSC failed to appreciate is the Agena potential.

Very few people realize that, but Lee Scherer space tug may actually steal the show. We are just beginning to realize Lockheed ungainly rocket stage potential and potentialities.

I can tell you that thing is going to be huge, bigger than the shuttle or the space station itself. We are talking about a possible killer app; something that could turn the space program into a profitable industry." Hinners declared.

"Scherer call this the Agena Piloted Science Program, which is a bit long. Perhaps someone should coin a better accronym ?" Townes noted.
"Agena piloted science ? how about Apsis then? An apsis (Greek ἁψίς, gen. ἁψίδος), plural apsides (pron.:
/HYPERLINK "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Help:IPA_for_English#Key"ˈæpsɨdiːz/; Greek: ἁψίδες), is the point of greatest or least distance of a body from one of the foci of its elliptical orbit. In modern celestial mechanics this focus is also the center of attraction, which is usually the center of mass of the system."
"Oh, that's good - sharp and appropriate. I like it." Hinners approved. "I have to tell Scherer about that."
 
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Archibald

Banned
Some explanation here. David Portree perfectly nail the rivalry betwen JSC and Marshall. The two centers had very different views of the future space station, and that sterile rivalry completely screwed space station Freedom organization, leading to the June 1993 near-miss, when the space station nearly avoided cancellation. It was only saved by Clinton and Gore skilled diplomatic skills when they enlisted the bankrupted Russians and their stalled Mir 2.

http://spaceflighthistory.blogspot.fr/2015/08/evolution-vs-revolution-1970s-battle.html

JSC will hate the space station as flown - an evolved Skylab of Marshall legacy. No space shuttle either, and not OTV - Orbital Transfer Vehicle with reusable LOX/LH2 technology.

But the space station core will have a backup - Skylab had one, every Salyut had a backup, and so had Mir.

So JSC will focuse more on this backup core, doing engineering porn with it - a shuttle II and the goddam OTV. JSC know the space station core lifespan - ten years. If launched in 1980, then in 1992 the replacement core will be launched, and JSC will be led center, and turn it into their dreamed 50 man space base.

But don't think Marshall will triumph either. They will suffer, too, if only because their Saturn rocket business is reduced to upgrade of existing, stored launchers, nothing new. NASA is procuring Titans from Martin Marietta, courtsey of the OMB.

In fact ITTL NASA Headquarters can't afford OTL Freedom organisational mess, JSC and Marshall very stupid bickering - not after the shuttle fiasco, not with manned spaceflight future still in the balance.
Heaquarter will not hesitate to cut any pig-head if needed, using Rocco Petrone and Bellcomm to clean the mess.

Don't mess with Rocco. Really.
wpetrone.jpg


(the wikipedia picture is even... scarier ! He looks like a goddam Mafia boss - look at his eyes ! https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rocco_Petrone)
 
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1972: NASA hell of a year (15)

Archibald

Banned
Decision point - and the winner is...

As the name implies Helios is a scaled-up Gemini with a crew of three to nine.

The crew module extends the Gemini B exterior cone to back 13 ft diameter heat shield. The crew module could be a minimal modification of Gemini B or a more advanced design.

Basic mission is space station logistic support, typically entailing low earth orbits of 100-300 nm at 28-30° inclination and a system availability date of 1973 to 1975.

The program objective is space station logistic capability at minimum cost. Land landing in the continental U.S. is the preferred recovery option, with water recovery capability to be retained.

Recovery of the crew module is by parawing and a three skid landing gear extends from the bottom of the crew module. Design and analysis of the parawing and landing mode were accomplished by Northrop-Ventura under a subcontract.


Launch vehicles considered included the Titan IIIM, the Saturn IB, and the Saturn INT-20 or S-IC / S-IVB.

Orbital cargo delivery capability varies according to the launcher and inclination, from 3000 to 65 000Ibs. The design return cargo capability is 2,000 lbs.

Several recovery options were considered such as externally deployed parawing and bicycle landing gear supplemented by outriggers. Two-man-Gemini’s ejection seats and hatches have been deleted. The crew enters Big Gemini crew module through two large hatches set above the passenger section.

The crew compartment is flanked with a large, pressurised cylindrical cargo section. At the aft end a pilot's station is equipped with controls and windows for manual docking with the space station.

Orbital transfer, rendezvous and docking, attitude control and deorbit propulsion functions are all performed by a single liquid propellant system.
Launch escape is provided by an Apollo-type solid rocket escape tower mounted on the spacecraft nose.

A flight test Min-Mod vehicle could be launched 37 months from go-ahead and that the first operational vehicle could be launched 43 months from go-ahead. The Advanced Helios schedule add three months to these figures.

Parawing technology is considered "the pacing Item in the development program." Parawings have not been demonstrated with payloads above 6,000 lbs at this point, well below the 18,000 lbs required for Helios . Despite that McDonnell Douglas is reasonably certain that the required capability could be achieved.

Cost estimations are $1.5 billion for developing the Big Gemini capsule and its launcher, along with approximately $2.25 billion in recurring operational costs, for a total of $3.75 billion.”

“From 1967 onwards Big Gemini has grown from a logical need outside Apollo – the need for a twelve-man ferry to a space station in the early 70’s. The Apollo CSM maximum capacity was six men at best, while the (now cancelled) shuttle promises lot of technical uncertainties, making it unlikely before 1977 at best.”

(excerpt from ENLARGED GEMINI TO REPLACE CANCELLED SHUTTLE, Flight International, July 4 1972)



 
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Oooh. Wasn't suspecting the choice of Big Gemini. :eek:

I was expecting more-so the choice of the HL-20 here, although Big Gemini in retrospect seems a bit noticed (if that is the right word?).
 
Oooh. Wasn't suspecting the choice of Big Gemini. :eek:

I was expecting more-so the choice of the HL-20 here, although Big Gemini in retrospect seems a bit noticed (if that is the right word?).

Big G aka Helios is winner for several reason
based on existing flight proven hardware of the Gemini spacecraft.
much cheaper in R&D and construction compare to Grummann subscale shuttle, Boeing revamped DynaSoar; Martin Marietta X-24 or Northrop HL-10 lifting body.
who needed allot costly unmanned testing by rocket launch to check there hypersonic flight characteristic, what Helios capsule not need.
in contrast to the General Electric Limited hardware Design, Helios offer allot option of expansion.
like it's large, pressurised cylindrical cargo section could be used as Module for space station, a option the other don't have !

in simple words
NASA don't need a racing car, it need a Station wagon
 
Some explanation here. David Portree perfectly nail the rivalry betwen JSC and Marshall. The two centers had very different views of the future space station, and that sterile rivalry completely screwed space station Freedom organization, leading to the June 1993 near-miss, when the space station nearly avoided cancellation. It was only saved by Clinton and Gore skilled diplomatic skills when they enlisted the bankrupted Russians and their stalled Mir 2.

http://spaceflighthistory.blogspot.fr/2015/08/evolution-vs-revolution-1970s-battle.html

JSC will hate the space station as flown - an evolved Skylab of Marshall legacy. No space shuttle either, and not OTV - Orbital Transfer Vehicle with reusable LOX/LH2 technology.

But the space station core will have a backup - Skylab had one, every Salyut had a backup, and so had Mir.

So JSC will focuse more on this backup core, doing engineering porn with it - a shuttle II and the goddam OTV. JSC know the space station core lifespan - ten years. If launched in 1980, then in 1992 the replacement core will be launched, and JSC will be led center, and turn it into their dreamed 50 man space base.

But don't think Marshall will triumph either. They will suffer, too, if only because their Saturn rocket business is reduced to upgrade of existing, stored launchers, nothing new. NASA is procuring Titans from Martin Marietta, courtsey of the OMB.

In fact ITTL NASA Headquarters can't afford OTL Freedom organisational mess, JSC and Marshall very stupid bickering - not after the shuttle fiasco, not with manned spaceflight future still in the balance.
Heaquarter will not hesitate to cut any pig-head if needed, using Rocco Petrone and Bellcomm to clean the mess.

Don't mess with Rocco. Really.
wpetrone.jpg


(the wikipedia picture is even... scarier ! He looks like a goddam Mafia boss - look at his eyes ! https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rocco_Petrone)

No, no it's a complete misunderstanding! Both centers LOVE and CARE for each other greatly and there is nothing but unicorns and magic from both! Well, as soon as those "other" SoBs get it through their thick skulls they are WRONG and we are RIGHT anyway...

Really, we're just all Americans reaching for the same goal, (proceeding to kick each other in the shins under the table and push each other around) not like we're kids or anything, GET BACK ON YOUR SIDED OF THE TABLE! GET OUT OF MY SPACE! MOM!, er that is MR. PRESIDENT, THEY ARE VIOLATING MY SPACE (program) HERE!

Randy
 
Big G aka Helios is winner for several reason
based on existing flight proven hardware of the Gemini spacecraft.
much cheaper in R&D and construction compare to Grummann subscale shuttle, Boeing revamped DynaSoar; Martin Marietta X-24 or Northrop HL-10 lifting body.
who needed allot costly unmanned testing by rocket launch to check there hypersonic flight characteristic, what Helios capsule not need.
in contrast to the General Electric Limited hardware Design, Helios offer allot option of expansion.
like it's large, pressurised cylindrical cargo section could be used as Module for space station, a option the other don't have !

in simple words
NASA don't need a racing car, it need a Station wagon

So you're saying they will choose an advanced Apollo since it's meets all those goals and was designed from the start with those goals in mind, unlike Gemini :)

NOT GOING TO ARGUE THE TL! So as I'm clear here :)

However while Helios/BigG would seem to be a clear winner over the "other*" proposals in truth it's specifically not going to be as "easy" or "cheap" to implement as suggested and OMB were aware of this from no less source than McDonnell Douglas. While it "probably" would be cheaper than redesigning Apollo (and frankly NAA/NAR by the end of the Apollo program was only going to get another spacecraft contract if they partnered with someone more "reliable" which they did OTL due to issues with the Apollo spacecraft) but a key clue for BigG is the line "The crew module could be a minimal modification of Gemini B or a more advanced design."

Which in essence when asked specifically about BigG, Mc/D admitted would contain little or no actual of "Gemini" other than some very basic structural elements of the relatively tiny "cockpit" section of the spacecraft. The BigG would in fact be a "new" spacecraft except for the cockpit windows and general thruster layout.

(*Another "truth" here is that NASA never really needed a winged/lifting vehicle for an orbital ferry. That was/is really a hold over from everyone's assumption that a ferry spacecraft should/would look like an airplane because that's what everyone knew. Really space operations are better served by a "capsule" design that can also be used as a tug or maneuver vehicle which everyone {almost} finally admitted in the end of the OSP program)

At its most basic BigG could not do what Apollo could do, even with extensive modifications. It would barely be able to do SOME of what Apollo could already do. The entire "question" is obviously wrong in that NONE of the suggestions actually address what is NEEDED for an orbital ferry vehicle IF you include all the requirements. (Refer again to the OSP program final results... NOT of course the end result but what was actually written in things like the "lessons learned" and contractor papers) The problem is this effort asks the exact same "questions" as every other effort with a pre-determined outcome "justified" (and I'm not talking YOU Archibald :) ) by the process.

Really what was "needed" is a clean sheet design incorporating lessons learned from each and every previous system AND full realization and disclosure of the specific requirements needed for an orbital ferry without regard to cost or expected outcome. Rather obviously that's not going to happen, (and probably wouldn't be accepted even if it had been, again OSP program) and even more obviously "someone" (again not you Archibald) has already made all the pertinent decisions so the outcome is exactly what is desired.

And now back to our regularly scheduled update, (it's been a couple of hours at least so it's ready right? :) ) and away from my ranting :)

Randy
 
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