Economic Effects of No Thirty Years War

[John Fredrick Parker]

The question of "how" aside, supposing that the devastation wrought on Germany during the Thirty Years War was avoided, and that the "sovereignty" of the princes established by Westphalia, which weakened the unity of the Holy Roman Empire, is averted. How would this change the economy of Europe in the latter 17th and 18th Centuries? How would these economic changes, in turn, affect the social and geopolitical history of the west overall? And, given these broad changes, where do things go from there?

 

[carlton_bach]

West and South Germany will remain a protoindustrial economy on par with France and England, so there may be technological butterflies (but not that many since it remains politically divided and landlocked). More importantly, Germany will remain a net exporter of people at a very serious level. Where they will go is an open question. Unless you postulate a total Habsburg victory that turns Germany into a unitary state, colonial ventures are unlikely. Eastern Central Europe, on the other hand, could be in for serious changes. If the Habsburgs can use the greater weight of population and production for their purposes, they could win against the Ottomans earlier and more comprehensively, turning a larger part of the Balkans into German-dominated, Catholic land. Whether Germans would also move into Poland and Russia in larger numbers would depend on politics (is there a Deluge? a Swedish-Russian confrontation? Russian modernisation? Who needs loyal settlers for recently emptied lands?)

Macroeconomically, Germany is still fucked. The country faces inflation that undercuts its traditional mining industry, population pressures on scarce on scarce land, the forcible reintroduction of serfdom in the east and war in the west. It is cut off from most major new trade routes and has no chance of developing a banking centre on par with Genoa, Amsterdam, London or Paris for want of a unitary currency and geographic reach. But it is less fucked than IOTL. More parts of the country have the chance to thrive economically and retain local and regional dominance. The western provinces will not be lost to France (at least, not to the same extent). Germany has a better chance at staying linked into industrial development and profit early from a highly developed machine culture.

Another possible development is that this could strengthen the Netherlands greatly. The country always depended on German manpower for its merchant fleet, military, and colonial ventures. Its inland trade flowed mainly down the Rhine, a dangerous proposition IOTL with France on the left bank and hopelessly fractured uncertainty on the right. A stronger German state or states on the upper Rhine would be a better trading partner. Ultimately, we might see the coal of the Ruhr and the iron of Alsace feed the shipyards of Holland and the factories of Brabant. THat is, of course, assuming that unitary state is not a hostile Habsburg. That would be bad.

 

[Jürgen]

One element the 30YW caused the end to high cereal prices, in fact after the 30YW a century of low cereal prices followed. This was pretty much a disaster for the Baltic cereal exporters. So a effect would be that the large Polish magnates and state would be richer. Poland could maybe even avoid the Deluge.

As for Germany we would see a richer nobility especially in north Germany which was depopulated, but likely also weaker princes. Germany may continue to survive as an almost state with the imperial circles still mattering. The remnant of the Hanseatic League may also do better with a stronger export.

Denmark which avoid the disaster of the 30YW War and the Swedish Wars, while also having a better economy (Denmark was also a cereal exporter), would do much better. In fact with the Pomeranian dukes dying out, they may even expand their possessions in Germany. I expect the money Denmark makes being invested into colonial adventures (the Kalmar War showed that continued war with Sweden was meaningless), their success depend on luck and the Danes not being crushed by the Dutch.

The Swedes will be worse off and with the memory of the Kalmar War and without a success in Germany, they will likely focus on fighting Poland for the Baltic provinces. Of course on the other hand, the Swedes doesn't end up in permanent war with Denmark as in OTL, which mean that they can focus on keeping Livonia and maybe even expanding it. In OTL Livonia was the Swedish main source of income with 50% of the state budget coming from it, here with higher cereal prices it will be even more. So Sweden may have the same or higher income than in OTL even while lacking the other major sources of income (Bremen-Verden and Scania).

 

[John Fredrick Parker]

<snip>

So to summarize:

• Denmark is richer and stronger
• the HRE is richer, the princes weaker, and the Emperor stronger
• Sweden is weaker, but more securely holding a richer Livonia
• Poland is maybe richer, with stronger magnates, but likely weaker overall... all depending on if some alternate Deluge still happens

Considering that Russia is coming out of the Troubles just as the war began OTL, and following the war we got the Deluge in Poland; if Poland is indeed stronger TTL and avoids this calamity, even if Sweden is also weaker but holding Livonia, then would this combine to make a weaker Russia? If the reigns of Michael I and Alexis are weaker, it's doubtful TTL will see any Tsar as successful as Peter the Great by the dawn of the 18th Century.

Likewise, I wonder what this means for France's power in Europe.

 

[Deleted member 83898]

One element the 30YW caused the end to high cereal prices, in fact after the 30YW a century of low cereal prices followed. This was pretty much a disaster for the Baltic cereal exporters. So a effect would be that the large Polish magnates and state would be richer. Poland could maybe even avoid the Deluge.

As for Germany we would see a richer nobility especially in north Germany which was depopulated, but likely also weaker princes. Germany may continue to survive as an almost state with the imperial circles still mattering. The remnant of the Hanseatic League may also do better with a stronger export.

Denmark which avoid the disaster of the 30YW War and the Swedish Wars, while also having a better economy (Denmark was also a cereal exporter), would do much better. In fact with the Pomeranian dukes dying out, they may even expand their possessions in Germany. I expect the money Denmark makes being invested into colonial adventures (the Kalmar War showed that continued war with Sweden was meaningless), their success depend on luck and the Danes not being crushed by the Dutch.

The Swedes will be worse off and with the memory of the Kalmar War and without a success in Germany, they will likely focus on fighting Poland for the Baltic provinces. Of course on the other hand, the Swedes doesn't end up in permanent war with Denmark as in OTL, which mean that they can focus on keeping Livonia and maybe even expanding it. In OTL Livonia was the Swedish main source of income with 50% of the state budget coming from it, here with higher cereal prices it will be even more. So Sweden may have the same or higher income than in OTL even while lacking the other major sources of income (Bremen-Verden and Scania).

Why was Livonia so rich, or was Sweden just really poor?

 

[Jürgen]

Why was Livonia so rich, or was Sweden just really poor?

I'm not an expect on Swedish history, through better than most non-Scandinavians, some Swedish posters may give a more complex explanation. Sweden are a lousy place to have agriculture, most of it are a small layer of topsoil on the top of the "basement rock". There's area of former lake or sea button, drained swamp etc, where the layer is thicker. But at the same time the soil lack chalk, which means that the existing soil are sour. The climate are also on the absolute edge of where agriculture are possible. So the Swedish agricultural export was always small and only really became a good business when the Swedes began to focus on dairy. The cereal crops which do somewhat well in Swedish climate are also crops which there was little market for (rye, barley and oats). The wealth in Sweden always lay in the export of copper, iron, timber and pine tar. But the nobility and the mercantile elite controlled much of this export, and the Swedish state had a hard time capitalising on it. So the Swedish state got relative few money from its core territories, instead Sweden and Finland was where the Swedish state recruited its soldiers from. So the Swedes and Finns had low taxes, but instead delivered military service.

Livonia on the other hand have richer soil and better climate, but Riga are also a important trading port for export from Lithuania and Belarus, which was major agricultural areas. So not only did Livonia produce more, it was also a major trading centre. At the same time the Livonian nobility was in a much weaker position against the king/state than the Swedish one was, which made it easier to raise taxes in Livonia. In fact the Livonian nobility was in a worse position against the king than the Estonian was. Which we can see in the Swedish crown succeeding in abolishing serfdom in Livonia and not in Estonia. If the Swedes conquer Courland and Prussia, we will likely see the Livonian model being spread to those areas.

 

[Jürgen]

So to summarize:

• Denmark is richer and stronger
• the HRE is richer, the princes weaker, and the Emperor stronger
• Sweden is weaker, but more securely holding a richer Livonia
• Poland is maybe richer, with stronger magnates, but likely weaker overall... all depending on if some alternate Deluge still happens

Yes, I can see Poland go two ways, one Poland surviving as a somewhat coherent and function state, it would still be deeply dysfunctional, but it may be able to defend its territorial integrity. The other are that the magnates becomes true princes and Poland are reduced to mostly a polite fiction. More or less OTL German model. In OTL they fell between these two choices, with the magnates being to weak to defend their independence from external actors and too strong to allow for a Polish state which could defend itself.

Considering that Russia is coming out of the Troubles just as the war began OTL, and following the war we got the Deluge in Poland; if Poland is indeed stronger TTL and avoids this calamity, even if Sweden is also weaker but holding Livonia, then would this combine to make a weaker Russia? If the reigns of Michael I and Alexis are weaker, it's doubtful TTL will see any Tsar as successful as Peter the Great by the dawn of the 18th Century.

I think we will likely end up with some kind of stability between the three, if Poland are stronger and Sweden aren't a insane rogue state making war on all its neighbours. So we may end up with the three state keeping each other in some kind of cold peace. I think Sweden gaining Courland is likely, if it doesn't go into the 30YW. While in the longer run, we will likely see Polish control over the west Ukraine coast, while Russia gain control over the east Ukraine coast and trying to push down against the Turks in Romania. Russia will likely end up focusing more on expansion in the Caucasus, Central Asia and Persia. It may also have a few wars with China, but until the 19th century, the Russian power projection in East Asia will be weak to give anything but a few small border changes.

Likewise, I wonder what this means for France's power in Europe.

It won't happen, without the 30YW it's pretty impossible for France to expand into the HRE to the extent it did in OTL (I can still see them do well in Spanish Netherlands). If the Imperial Circles stay something more than a polite fiction, the HRE will also do much better. The main theater for the Habsburg-Bourbon conflict will end up Italy. The Austrians will likely end up the rising power in the 18th century, as they avoid wasting so much time being on the defensive against France. This give them the opportunity to attacking the Turks. In fact we can likely expect Austrians, Poles and Russians agree on one thing, and that's attacking the Turks. So we may see a collapse of the Turks in the 18th century.

 

[Deleted member 83898]

I'm not an expect on Swedish history, through better than most non-Scandinavians, some Swedish posters may give a more complex explanation. Sweden are a lousy place to have agriculture, most of it are a small layer of topsoil on the top of the "basement rock". There's area of former lake or sea button, drained swamp etc, where the layer is thicker. But at the same time the soil lack chalk, which means that the existing soil are sour. The climate are also on the absolute edge of where agriculture are possible. So the Swedish agricultural export was always small and only really became a good business when the Swedes began to focus on dairy. The cereal crops which do somewhat well in Swedish climate are also crops which there was little market for (rye, barley and oats). The wealth in Sweden always lay in the export of copper, iron, timber and pine tar. But the nobility and the mercantile elite controlled much of this export, and the Swedish state had a hard time capitalising on it. So the Swedish state got relative few money from its core territories, instead Sweden and Finland was where the Swedish state recruited its soldiers from. So the Swedes and Finns had low taxes, but instead delivered military service.

Livonia on the other hand have richer soil and better climate, but Riga are also a important trading port for export from Lithuania and Belarus, which was major agricultural areas. So not only did Livonia produce more, it was also a major trading centre. At the same time the Livonian nobility was in a much weaker position against the king/state than the Swedish one was, which made it easier to raise taxes in Livonia. In fact the Livonian nobility was in a worse position against the king than the Estonian was. Which we can see in the Swedish crown succeeding in abolishing serfdom in Livonia and not in Estonia. If the Swedes conquer Courland and Prussia, we will likely see the Livonian model being spread to those areas.

Thanks! If you don't mind me asking, how wealthy was Livonia in comparison to neighboring regions in the Baltic, such as Courland and Estonia, and how wealthy was it in comparison to other traditionally wealthy regions of Europe, such as Flanders or Northern Italy? Was Livonian wealth a product/feature of the early modern period, or did it extend back to the Middle Ages, in particular to the days when Livonia was pagan?

 

[Behemoth]

IIRC, the Hanseatic League established a trading post near what would become Riga around 1160. Riga would be established roughly 50 years later. I can't compare the relative wealth of Livonia to other regions of Europe but if the conflicts that took place there from 1160 onward to the Thirty Years War are any indication, then quite a few rulers wanted what Livonia had.

 

[John Fredrick Parker]

So the big winners are Austria and the HRE, followed by Denmark; big loser is the Ottoman Empire, possibly followed by France (at least in comparison to OTL).

 

[Gonzaga]

How much the lack of the war in the HRE would affect the conflict between the Netherlands and Spain? Also, it could probably lead to Spain being able to keep Portugal in the Iberian Union.

 

[John Fredrick Parker]

How much the lack of the war in the HRE would affect the conflict between the Netherlands and Spain?

Well, the Netherlands were already de facto independent and building their colonial empire by 1618, and their navy is powerful enough to hold against any Spanish attempts to contain them; plus, if Spain is otherwise occupied (holding Portugal, etc), they won't necessarily be able to spare the men and money. I'd say the Dutch hold out, doing at least as well as OTL through 1648; after that, not sure.

 

[Jürgen]

Thanks! If you don't mind me asking, how wealthy was Livonia in comparison to neighboring regions in the Baltic, such as Courland and Estonia,

Around the same, through slightly better off than Estonia.

and how wealthy was it in comparison to other traditionally wealthy regions of Europe, such as Flanders or Northern Italy?

Incredible poorer, it can't be compared. The Baltic states can at best be compared to Denmark, which was a pretty poor state (through Livonia was still poorer), but rich by Baltic states. While this sound incredible today in the past Scandinavia was pretty much the poorest part of Europe. The reason that the north did so well, was because of the development of a strong state, cheaper armies (also better) and the states focus on raising the wealth of their subjects to increase the states income form taxes. One way the Swedes did this in Livonia was removing serfdom, which made it easier for Sweden to collect taxes (it easier to get peasants to pay their full tax than noblemen).

Was Livonian wealth a product/feature of the early modern period, or did it extend back to the Middle Ages, in particular to the days when Livonia was pagan?

Livonia began to become more economical important with the Livonian knights, which brought the heavy plough and the Hanseatic League, which started created the trade routes. But it was only with the rise of the Netherlands in the very late medieval period and their need for cereal import to feed the growing urbanisation in the Low Lands, they became important.

 

[Jiraiyathegallant]

I wonder if a far more populace Germany will send more people to the New World.

 

[John Fredrick Parker]

Also, it could probably lead to Spain being able to keep Portugal in the Iberian Union.

I wonder if a far more populace Germany will send more people to the New World.

And I just realized something -- if Spain holds on to Portugal during the latter 17th Century, that could very well affect the Atlantic Slave Trade during this period, quite possibly making it harder for American colonies to grow their slave populations to the same extent as OTL. That, in turn, could be very important to the development of the colonies of Virginia and Carolina; in OTL, the latter was planted around this time with the initial intent (planned by Locke) for a colony based on small farmers, while the former was transitioning in this time from an indentured servitude based economy to one based on legally sanctioned, and racially based, chattel slavery. (There's also Georgia, which was also initially planted, this time in the early 18th Century, with the intent of slavery playing a much smaller role.)

All told, if Portugal remains part of Spain for several more decades, we could see the continental colonies practicing slavery far less, and being less reliant on it, than OTL. Which, in itself, could have some very interesting implications down the line.

 

[funnyhat]

I wonder if a far more populace Germany will send more people to the New World.

A very large number came in OTL. People of German ancestry are the largest ethnic group in the United States. I don't know if even more German immigrants would make a difference. What really matters is which country establishes/governs the colony.

 

[Jürgen]

I wonder if a far more populace Germany will send more people to the New World.

I think the vast amount of extra German emigrants would end up in eastern Europe. Hungary already got a massive influx of Germans as the Austrians reconquered it and "removed" any local Muslims. There's a good chance that Germans could end up a plurality in Hungary in the 18th century, and a significant minority in "Yugoslavia" and Wallachia. Of course most Germans will stay at home. Of course we will likely see a lot end up in the New World. I could see a Germany with a higher population send people to the Dutch "settler" colonies.

 

[John Fredrick Parker]

I think the vast amount of extra German emigrants would end up in eastern Europe. Hungary already got a massive influx of Germans as the Austrians reconquered it and "removed" any local Muslims. There's a good chance that Germans could end up a plurality in Hungary in the 18th century...

This, I imagine, would help with the longer term administration of the Austrian Empire, with less support for Hungarian semi-independence.