Barbarossa halted after Kiev: Opinions?

[Snake Featherston]

Hitler, IQ-wise, was not stupid, but he was ignorant, uneducated, impulsive, irrational, and insecure. I can believe that some of the generals around him did make some of the mistakes that he is attributed with, I also have no problem accepting that Hitler did make ridiculous mistakes all the time, militarily, politically, and economically. He often refused to make decisions until too late, pawned off responsibility for things on people like Goering, who had no ability to actually carry out their responsibilities , and then got angry about their failures before forgiving them and giving them more chances to screw up.

Hitler was a terrible leader who refused to listen to the advice of his professional advisors and made numerous bad decisions. The meme that the German generals were actually to blame for Hitler's mistakes is played out. Hitler screwed up regularly, though so did his advisors. However the general staff was handpicked by Hitler for being yes-men, rather than independent thinkers who would stand up to his bad decisions. Remember the stand fast was Hitler's idea and cost the Germans badly at places like Demyansk.

Actually Demiansk was an all-right example of it. Moscow, too. A German retreat as the generals wanted just at that time gives the Soviets an encirclement of all of Army Group Center and there goes the war. Stalingrad was the big Stupid-Virus moment and then Hitler actually had a better sense still of what soldiers were supposed to be doing (and it was not mountain-climbing).

The real Hitler actually had some talent as a strategist. I repeat that he was evil and it's because of this that people looked less closely at the second Dolchstosslegende than they should have done. German generals in WWII were craven, spineless, murderous thugs content to hide behind Hitler's greatcoat until it was clear the war was lost. The WWI generation was in every way the superior of the WWII one.

@Snake Featherston

This point cuts both ways as well though. When the Soviets seized the initiative, the Germans always imagined they were facing an enemy enjoying 3 to 4-1 strategic superiority and 8 to 16-1 tactical superiority wherever the Soviets decided to launch their next attack.

It's kind of hard to imagine what the OSS saw in intelligence head Reinhard Gehlen -- his figures were so wildly wrong the man must have been amazed he ever worked again. The 16-1 superiority was simply a projection of Nazi dogma. Soviet strategic superiority was in reality only 1.5-2.5 to 1 and operational superiority seldom more than 4-1 at best.

Certainly, though it really *was* 8:1 in certain areas in 1943-5, though this was a matter of the USSR making unapologetic use of its mobile superiority to achieve such concentrations. And also reflecting the USSR's adeptness in deception operations.

 

[Snake Featherston]

... the point being that (partial) defeat of the USSR ought to have been imaginable. It wasn't beyond the bounds of possibility for Germany to hamstring the Soviets so badly they could reduce their commitment in the East to 80-odd mostly infantry divisions. Cutting the Persian lend-lease corridor would have been a giant step in that direction.

Not in 1941 it wasn't. Nazi hubris means they start on a bad premise, and while they can improvise with some success it's precisely that: flying by the seat of the pants. That might get a battle won but in real life it's not remotely the means to win a war. So long as the Nazis sincerely think they can defeat the USSR on the borders and thus ends the fighting part of the war they will invariably encounter failure of their initial plans and from there have to make up on the spot what they do from there, which *will* buy the USSR precious time.

And if they fail earlier, then by the time they get around to Barbarossa it turns into an epic fail for the Germans in two weeks and with that the Germans are dead, it's a matter of where the USSR's armies stop.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Pretty minimal -- they don't go near Rostov, just poke out a modest salient of 100-200kms. It's handy for launching offensives even if the actual blow comes elsewhere as it will naturally suck in Soviet defenders.

Then the Soviets get to deal with the Autumn Rasputitsa, which hurt them just as much as the Germans. Propaganda has obscured Soviet difficulties with weather that were on par with the Germans. In fact 'general winter' cost the Soviets more losses than the Germans, but they could take the losses and keep on fighting, while the Germans lost major effectiveness because they were so far from their supply sources, with a smaller population and less production.

Letting the German front solidify and logistics catch up without trying to push forward the front in the middle of bad weather will help the Germans quite a bit. Letting Leningrad go is going to hurt the Germans later, but the Germans need to conserve strength, both in men and material. Let German airpower rip up the Soviets after Stalin forces his soldiers to come to the Germans vs. the other way around. In the long run the Soviets will benefit too, but the Germans relatively benefit more, especially as they need to conserve their best soldiers for fighting later on and to train up replacements. The Germans will avoid having to defend pockets that will occur later on, like Demyansk, which badly drained their flight training cadres, who had to man the transport fleet and were badly ground by by Soviet ground fire.

Seriously, overall the Germans stand to benefit the most. They have better, more defensible positions that they can fortify even earlier. IOTL the Germans in the center and north fortified in 1942 and the Soviets weren't able to budge them until 1944. Its not like the Soviets are going to sit back and build up, they are going to keep attacking and will grind themselves up on German defenses, until the German attack themselves. Turtle up until a favorable opportunity presents itself.

 

[Snake Featherston]

Then the Soviets get to deal with the Autumn Rasputitsa, which hurt them just as much as the Germans. Propaganda has obscured Soviet difficulties with weather that were on par with the Germans. In fact 'general winter' cost the Soviets more losses than the Germans, but they could take the losses and keep on fighting, while the Germans lost major effectiveness because they were so far from their supply sources, with a smaller population and less production.

Letting the German front solidify and logistics catch up without trying to push forward the front in the middle of bad weather will help the Germans quite a bit. Letting Leningrad go is going to hurt the Germans later, but the Germans need to conserve strength, both in men and material. Let German airpower rip up the Soviets after Stalin forces his soldiers to come to the Germans vs. the other way around. In the long run the Soviets will benefit too, but the Germans relatively benefit more, especially as they need to conserve their best soldiers for fighting later on and to train up replacements. The Germans will avoid having to defend pockets that will occur later on, like Demyansk, which badly drained their flight training cadres, who had to man the transport fleet and were badly ground by by Soviet ground fire.

Seriously, overall the Germans stand to benefit the most. They have better, more defensible positions that they can fortify even earlier. IOTL the Germans in the center and north fortified in 1942 and the Soviets weren't able to budge them until 1944. Its not like the Soviets are going to sit back and build up, they are going to keep attacking and will grind themselves up on German defenses, until the German attack themselves. Turtle up until a favorable opportunity presents itself.

This is where the Germans are damned if they do and damned if they don't. The USSR was outproducing them IOTL in December 1941 when Leningrad was walled off from the rest of the USSR. Add Leningrad's factories intact and avoid tying down multiple Soviet armies in the siege there and this just gives the USSR a real advantage over the Nazis, things like enabling Leningrad Front to smash the everloving Hell out of Finland and clear the USSR's northern flank.

The Germans also won't turtle up, but rather will do what Hitler originally wanted and build up for a renewed offensive, most likely in the Moscow sector.

 

[Life In Black]

This is where the Germans are damned if they do and damned if they don't. The USSR was outproducing them IOTL in December 1941 when Leningrad was walled off from the rest of the USSR. Add Leningrad's factories intact and avoid tying down multiple Soviet armies in the siege there and this just gives the USSR a real advantage over the Nazis, things like enabling Leningrad Front to smash the everloving Hell out of Finland and clear the USSR's northern flank.

The Germans also won't turtle up, but rather will do what Hitler originally wanted and build up for a renewed offensive, most likely in the Moscow sector.

Any chance in your opinion then, of halting and reinforcing Finland as well?

 

[dduff442]

This is where the Germans are damned if they do and damned if they don't. The USSR was outproducing them IOTL in December 1941 when Leningrad was walled off from the rest of the USSR. Add Leningrad's factories intact and avoid tying down multiple Soviet armies in the siege there and this just gives the USSR a real advantage over the Nazis, things like enabling Leningrad Front to smash the everloving Hell out of Finland and clear the USSR's northern flank.

The Germans also won't turtle up, but rather will do what Hitler originally wanted and build up for a renewed offensive, most likely in the Moscow sector.

Given that Germany did isolate Leningrad historically, then skipping Typhoon would surely have made it much easier. I don't imagine communications in Karelia were sufficient to support a Soviet strategic offensive, though I'm open to being educated on that point, so as long as Leningrad is isolated Finland should be safe.

 

[Julian]

Then the Soviets get to deal with the Autumn Rasputitsa, which hurt them just as much as the Germans. Propaganda has obscured Soviet difficulties with weather that were on par with the Germans. In fact 'general winter' cost the Soviets more losses than the Germans, but they could take the losses and keep on fighting, while the Germans lost major effectiveness because they were so far from their supply sources, with a smaller population and less production.

Letting the German front solidify and logistics catch up without trying to push forward the front in the middle of bad weather will help the Germans quite a bit. Letting Leningrad go is going to hurt the Germans later, but the Germans need to conserve strength, both in men and material. Let German airpower rip up the Soviets after Stalin forces his soldiers to come to the Germans vs. the other way around. In the long run the Soviets will benefit too, but the Germans relatively benefit more, especially as they need to conserve their best soldiers for fighting later on and to train up replacements. The Germans will avoid having to defend pockets that will occur later on, like Demyansk, which badly drained their flight training cadres, who had to man the transport fleet and were badly ground by by Soviet ground fire.

Seriously, overall the Germans stand to benefit the most. They have better, more defensible positions that they can fortify even earlier. IOTL the Germans in the center and north fortified in 1942 and the Soviets weren't able to budge them until 1944. Its not like the Soviets are going to sit back and build up, they are going to keep attacking and will grind themselves up on German defenses, until the German attack themselves. Turtle up until a favorable opportunity presents itself.

Except you ignore the fact that proportionally even the most lopsided defensive battles cost the Germans enormous amounts of manpower; Operation Mars for instance was a total disaster for the Soviets, with almost 300,000 killed or wounded, yet at the same time the Germans suffered some 30-40 thousand killed or wounded out of a total force of 100,000-ish. The Soviet Kotulban Offensives shredded German manpower strength just as much as the nearby Battle of Stalingrad did, despite achieving no gains; multiple motorized and panzer divisions went from being rated average or medium-strong to weak or average. Defensive fighting will wear the Germans down just as much as the Soviets. You also ignore the massive logistic problems Germany will perennially suffer from. Consider that even by 1943 they only had a couple major operable railroad lines carting supplies up to the southern front, and most units were perennially low on supplies. Consolidating for a couple months won't change the fact that Soviet guerrillas will constantly hamper rear area operations, as will the sheer scale of work needed to adequately improve the rail network.

 

[Snake Featherston]

Any chance in your opinion then, of halting and reinforcing Finland as well?

From the nation that screwed its Allies every chance it got? Hell, no. If they're not going to Moscow, then they sure the Hell ain't gonna slog toward Leningrad.

Given that Germany did isolate Leningrad historically, then skipping Typhoon would surely have made it much easier. I don't imagine communications in Karelia were sufficient to support a Soviet strategic offensive, though I'm open to being educated on that point, so as long as Leningrad is isolated Finland should be safe.

Actually they never fully isolated it. This was sealed at the Battle of Tikhvin. If the Germans halt after Kiev, which also means halting the attempt to encircle Leningrad as these were simultaneous, then the Soviets simply use Leningrad Front for what it was supposed to do in pre-war planning. Kick Finland's ass. It wasn't suited to fight Army Group North *and* Finland at the same time, but throw it at Finland and Finland no longer exists.

Except you ignore the fact that proportionally even the most lopsided defensive battles cost the Germans enormous amounts of manpower; Operation Mars for instance was a total disaster for the Soviets, with almost 300,000 killed or wounded, yet at the same time the Germans suffered some 30-40 thousand killed or wounded out of a total force of 100,000-ish. The Soviet Kotulban Offensives shredded German manpower strength just as much as the nearby Battle of Stalingrad did, despite achieving no gains; multiple motorized and panzer divisions went from being rated average or medium-strong to weak or average. Defensive fighting will wear the Germans down just as much as the Soviets. You also ignore the massive logistic problems Germany will perennially suffer from. Consider that even by 1943 they only had a couple major operable railroad lines carting supplies up to the southern front, and most units were perennially low on supplies. Consolidating for a couple months won't change the fact that Soviet guerrillas will constantly hamper rear area operations, as will the sheer scale of work needed to adequately improve the rail network.

Precisely. The idea that the Soviets are incapable of adapting their tactics and operations if the Germans sit there passively is the kind of nonsense that passes for "analysis" of WWII. The Soviets keep Leningrad and clear the northern end of their front, then they have a perfect means to start attacking the flank of a 1942 German drive on Moscow.

 

[dduff442]

Then the Soviets get to deal with the Autumn Rasputitsa, which hurt them just as much as the Germans. Propaganda has obscured Soviet difficulties with weather that were on par with the Germans. In fact 'general winter' cost the Soviets more losses than the Germans, but they could take the losses and keep on fighting, while the Germans lost major effectiveness because they were so far from their supply sources, with a smaller population and less production.

Letting the German front solidify and logistics catch up without trying to push forward the front in the middle of bad weather will help the Germans quite a bit. Letting Leningrad go is going to hurt the Germans later, but the Germans need to conserve strength, both in men and material. Let German airpower rip up the Soviets after Stalin forces his soldiers to come to the Germans vs. the other way around. In the long run the Soviets will benefit too, but the Germans relatively benefit more, especially as they need to conserve their best soldiers for fighting later on and to train up replacements. The Germans will avoid having to defend pockets that will occur later on, like Demyansk, which badly drained their flight training cadres, who had to man the transport fleet and were badly ground by by Soviet ground fire.

Seriously, overall the Germans stand to benefit the most. They have better, more defensible positions that they can fortify even earlier. IOTL the Germans in the center and north fortified in 1942 and the Soviets weren't able to budge them until 1944. Its not like the Soviets are going to sit back and build up, they are going to keep attacking and will grind themselves up on German defenses, until the German attack themselves. Turtle up until a favorable opportunity presents itself.

And the real life configurations of German divisions after 1941 lead to their depletion was crazy. Two understrength infantry regiments backed up by 4 Arty battalions (5-6 once corps units are included) but with only enough shells for 1, meaning supply hungry units with no staying power.

 

[dduff442]

I don't see why Germany can't opt to reinforce AG North to the extent necessary to push on to Lake Ladoga while halting elsewhere. Even with inadequate resources, Leningrad was isolated historically.

 

[Snake Featherston]

And the real life configurations of German divisions after 1941 lead to their depletion was crazy. Two understrength infantry regiments backed up by 4 Arty battalions (5-6 once corps units are included) but with only enough shells for 1, meaning supply hungry units with no staying power.

That's what happened after their "brilliant victories" IOTL, yes. Stopping at Kiev just leaves the USSR stronger.

I don't see why Germany can't opt to reinforce AG North to the extent necessary to push on to Lake Ladoga while halting elsewhere. Even with inadequate resources, Leningrad was isolated historically.

Because the Soviets are able to focus on Leningrad more, too, and have the prospect of actually crushing Army Group Center in the process? The Germans won't be the only ones focusing more on Leningrad here, and if they've clearly halted elsewhere, what, precisely, keeps the USSR from *also* funneling men into the Leningrad region? Or even getting a break in the siege in 1941, averting the horrendous losses there in the first place?

 

[dduff442]

That's what happened after their "brilliant victories" IOTL, yes. Stopping at Kiev just leaves the USSR stronger.



Because the Soviets are able to focus on Leningrad more, too, and have the prospect of actually crushing Army Group Center in the process? The Germans won't be the only ones focusing more on Leningrad here, and if they've clearly halted elsewhere, what, precisely, keeps the USSR from *also* funneling men into the Leningrad region? Or even getting a break in the siege in 1941, averting the horrendous losses there in the first place?

All the decisive battles took place on the steppes. The USSR only really got moving after Kursk, and the advance between Aug and Dec '43 was itself a very remarkable achievement. Open country was just as important to Soviet attacks.

 

[Julian]

All the decisive battles took place on the steppes. The USSR only really got moving after Kursk, and the advance between Aug and Dec '43 was itself a very remarkable achievement. Open country was just as important to Soviet attacks.

Really? Because the Toropets-Kholm Offensive was in some pretty horrible terrain and weather conditions, through forests and swamps, yet achieved marked gains even in the face of stiffening German resistance. Operation Suvorov also took place in terrain that was mostly forest and marsh.

 

[dduff442]

Really? Because the Toropets-Kholm Offensive was in some pretty horrible terrain and weather conditions, through forests and swamps, yet achieved marked gains even in the face of stiffening German resistance. Operation Suvorov also took place in terrain that was mostly forest and marsh.

It can't seriously be compared with the Aug '43 counter-offensive after Kursk, an undertaking more than an order of magnitude greater in scale and scope.

 

[Snake Featherston]

All the decisive battles took place on the steppes. The USSR only really got moving after Kursk, and the advance between Aug and Dec '43 was itself a very remarkable achievement. Open country was just as important to Soviet attacks.

So what happened with Operation Bagration and the Vistula-Oder Offensive?

It can't seriously be compared with the Aug '43 counter-offensive after Kursk, an undertaking more than an order of magnitude greater in scale and scope.

Erm..........that *is* the August 1943 counter offensive. It was two-part, one aimed at Orel, the other at Belgorod, both ending at the River Dnepr.

 

[Julian]

It can't seriously be compared with the Aug '43 counter-offensive after Kursk, an undertaking more than an order of magnitude greater in scale and scope.

Toropets Kholm actually was very similar in scale and scope. It involved a deep penetration into the German rear area, taking advantage of local weakness and overall strategic flatfootedness of the Germans to achieve a massive breakthrough which, at great cost for the Soviets and Germans, was eventually halted. Further, it tore a deep gash into the German lines which strategically cut off Army Group North from the southern two groups, essentially isolating it for the rest of the war with minimal transfers of resources compared to Center and South (The largest was the movement of several Crimean divisions to the Leningrad region). Operation Colonel Rudimstev roughly parallels that. Operation Suvorov was a followup operation to Operation Kutuzov involving Briansk, Kallinin, and Western Fronts in a coordinated attack on Army Group Center.

 

[dduff442]

So what happened with Operation Bagration and the Vistula-Oder Offensive?



Erm..........that *is* the August 1943 counter offensive. It was two-part, one aimed at Orel, the other at Belgorod, both ending at the River Dnepr.

I didn't see "Suvorov", only Toropets-Kholm. We're getting kind of far from the topic, but IIRC the push South-Westwards from Orel was over mostly decent offensive terrain? There may have been a short stretch of good defensive ground to cover, but basically once the breakthrough had been achieved the forces on the North shoulder of the Kursk bulge had to leg it at high speed.

 

[Snake Featherston]

I didn't see "Suvorov", only Toropets-Kholm. We're getting kind of far from the topic, but IIRC the push South-Westwards from Orel was over mostly decent offensive terrain? There may have been a short stretch of good defensive ground to cover, but basically once the breakthrough had been achieved the forces on the North shoulder of the Kursk bulge had to leg it at high speed.

Nope, the Battle of Orel was an attempt to reduce a German salient that proved very successful. Orel was starting while the Germans were still grinding forward in the South. Analyses of the USSR's role in the battle usually neglect this particular point as it means that Marty Tzu-I mean Manstein might have been talking out of his ass when he said he could have won the battle.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Except you ignore the fact that proportionally even the most lopsided defensive battles cost the Germans enormous amounts of manpower; Operation Mars for instance was a total disaster for the Soviets, with almost 300,000 killed or wounded, yet at the same time the Germans suffered some 30-40 thousand killed or wounded out of a total force of 100,000-ish. The Soviet Kotulban Offensives shredded German manpower strength just as much as the nearby Battle of Stalingrad did, despite achieving no gains; multiple motorized and panzer divisions went from being rated average or medium-strong to weak or average. Defensive fighting will wear the Germans down just as much as the Soviets. You also ignore the massive logistic problems Germany will perennially suffer from. Consider that even by 1943 they only had a couple major operable railroad lines carting supplies up to the southern front, and most units were perennially low on supplies. Consolidating for a couple months won't change the fact that Soviet guerrillas will constantly hamper rear area operations, as will the sheer scale of work needed to adequately improve the rail network.

10:1 casualties is really a highly favorable loss ratio that Germany could afford. I should make it clear though that the defensive would be only for the remaining months of 1941 and the winter of 1942. After the Spring thaw the Germans could then launch their operation blue and take the strategic offensive after that when feasible.
For the October 1941-May 1942 period Germany would only benefit from holding the line and launching operational offensives in November and December, with the aim of holding out until the weather improved to launch their next round of offensives. Sitting on the defensive forever can only result in Germany losing. I should have made that more clear.

The thing is that staying on the offensive after Kiev was a net loss to Germany, that is until fighting season in 1942. After that they should go on the offensive again against the southern front, going after Soviet oil. Of course it would be impossible to seize and use, so when Baku comes into range the Germans should focus on bombing it. Cutting off this oil would deprive the Soviet agriculture sector of its mechanization, which freed up millions of men for the army IOTL.

 

[dduff442]

Toropets Kholm actually was very similar in scale and scope. It involved a deep penetration into the German rear area, taking advantage of local weakness and overall strategic flatfootedness of the Germans to achieve a massive breakthrough which, at great cost for the Soviets and Germans, was eventually halted. Further, it tore a deep gash into the German lines which strategically cut off Army Group North from the southern two groups, essentially isolating it for the rest of the war with minimal transfers of resources compared to Center and South (The largest was the movement of several Crimean divisions to the Leningrad region). Operation Colonel Rudimstev roughly parallels that. Operation Suvorov was a followup operation to Operation Kutuzov involving Briansk, Kallinin, and Western Fronts in a coordinated attack on Army Group Center.

I know (at least in general terms) how things went around Leningrad, and also acknowledge that forested terrain *does* enable higher infantry concentrations than open ground. I don't see how AG North was isolated, though. Germany operated a lateral rail link -- the one the Velikiye Luki op was meant to cut.

There were few transfers because nothing decisive happened in the sector until the land corridor to Leningrad was opened up in Jan '44 and the Ger tank and Mot formations there had been "de-motorised", i.e. stripped of operational mobility, to make good the units intended for Fall Blau.