AHC: British strategic bomber

[Michel Van]

Operation Black Buck show that Avro Vulcan can fly long distance bombing, despite complex air refueling.
A advance Vulcan phase 6 (6 holder for air ground missile) with range of 8050 km, could be a solution.

 

[tofer]

Best bet for a late PoD? Refit Vulcans as ALCM shooters in the late 1970s as a more flexible adjunct to the Polaris force. Four squadrons would probably suffice. Major rebuild in the 1990s to relife the airframes and make them better suited to the post-Cold War world. RAF buys into the USAF's NGB/LRS-B program - remember, it's conceived as a low-cost, low-risk aircraft - to replace the Vulcans.

In a move considered typical of British military procurement, the Vulcans were withdrawn from operations the day after the LRS-B buy was announced.

Only problem with this is the recession and end of the Cold War. They would be more likely to withdraw them as part of defence cuts instead of throw money at them. Given the choice of keeping the Vulcan or the Tornado fleet I bet the RAF brass would go for the Tornados.

 

[BlueTrousers]

Only problem with this is the recession and end of the Cold War. They would be more likely to withdraw them as part of defence cuts instead of throw money at them. Given the choice of keeping the Vulcan or the Tornado fleet I bet the RAF brass would go for the Tornados.

No argument there.

Best guess for resolving it is that the Vulcan with conventional cruise missiles is seen as offering long range standoff strike capability. Probably means killing the RN's carriers.

 

[Just Leo]

I think the very name "Strategic Bomber" is up for a re-think. Things change.

 

[SactoMan101]

I still think my PoD of the RAF getting the F-111K makes the most sense.

Essentially the equivalent of the FB-111A in OTL, the F-111K could hit targets well behind the Iron Curtain with a fairly substantial weapons load from bases in England and forward bases in Germany--essentially most of the capability of the V-bombers but at a much faster speed. RAF ends up fielding about 120-125 planes, replacing all the V-bombers.

 

[Gerard-ABC]

There's a nice pic around of a Nimrod with 4 x Storm Shadow's on the wing pylons.....

http://s185.photobucket.com/user/RolandPulfrew/media/MRA4CombatISTAR2.jpg.html


Regards,
Gerard

 

[CalBear]

As is always the case, all it takes is money. Heavy bombers are expensive as hell, the training is expensive as hell, and they are just about useless in nearly all combat situations. They are utterly irreplaceable in some roles, but those are few and far between.

Every heavy bombers will need, at minimum, three tankers (there is a reason the USAF operates 500 of the things while the Russians have 19 and the French have 14) and they are hellishly vulnerable.

I will never forget a special that ABC ran back in the mid-80s regarding the actual way a nuclear war would work just for one line:

Launch detection plus 28 minutes, the last B-52 that will be getting off the ground, leaves the ground

The U.S. had around six more minutes of warning than the UK could count on. Assuming hot pad alert status, each potential RAF strategic bomber base would have time to launch, at most, 14 aircraft. With losses to the massive Soviet air defense network each base would probably manage two weapons on target. Unless the UK vastly increased its nuclear stockpile (there is that whole money thing again) a $50B (1985 dollars) investment would manage to put as many weapons on target as three Tridents.

Deterrents work better when they actually mean something.

 

[pdf27]

Every heavy bombers will need, at minimum, three tankers (there is a reason the USAF operates 500 of the things while the Russians have 19 and the French have 14) and they are hellishly vulnerable.

That's also a function of how far they are from their potential targets. For the US and UK (and indeed France), the target set is the same and mostly in European Russia - you need far fewer tankers to get there from Europe than from North America.

The U.S. had around six more minutes of warning than the UK could count on. Assuming hot pad alert status, each potential RAF strategic bomber base would have time to launch, at most, 14 aircraft. With losses to the massive Soviet air defense network each base would probably manage two weapons on target. Unless the UK vastly increased its nuclear stockpile (there is that whole money thing again) a $50B (1985 dollars) investment would manage to put as many weapons on target as three Tridents.

Bomber Command was well aware of this and practiced getting their entire deterrent force airborne within 4 minutes of getting an incoming raid warning, using a very large number of dispersal fields each of which had a handful of bombers. SAC could have done the same thing if they'd had to, but they never felt the need. Comparison to Trident is also a bit off - the real comparison was to Polaris, and that was vastly less capable (and more vulnerable) than Trident or Poseidon. Given the Moscow ABM system, that would have only got a handful of weapons on target too.

Actually, I'm wondering if we have to go a lot further back for the POD - heavy bombers are good for Armageddon or for Air Policing (the USAF in Afghanistan and the Russians in Syria). That's a very traditional RAF mission that only went away with the end of empire - they were certainly used in Malaya (Firedog), so if the Empire stuck around for longer (perhaps on the French model) then keeping one of the V-bombers (probably the Victor if they can get away without needing them as tankers) in the air policing role makes sense. They're expensive, but so is keeping and defending the bases you need for a smaller aircraft.

 

[Simon]

The newest B-52's dated from 1962, which would make them three years older than the Vulcans that the RAF was about to retire.

True, however they do appear to have either generally comparable or in the case of range and payload greatly superior capabilities. They had also gone through what look like some fairly extensive mid-life repair and upgrade programmes which the Vulcan never received.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

The U.S. had around six more minutes of warning than the UK could count on. Assuming hot pad alert status, each potential RAF strategic bomber base would have time to launch, at most, 14 aircraft. With losses to the massive Soviet air defense network each base would probably manage two weapons on target. Unless the UK vastly increased its nuclear stockpile (there is that whole money thing again) a $50B (1985 dollars) investment would manage to put as many weapons on target as three Tridents.

Deterrents work better when they actually mean something.

IIRC the RAF plan was to disperse it's V-bombers in flights of 4 over a large number of bases to reduce their vulnerability. Does the 14 aircraft make allowance for that.

Also the RAF did practice getting a flight of 4 V-bombers airborne in 4 minutes. I saw demonstrations, narrated by Raymond Baxter, several times on the Biggin Hill Air Fair TV programmes on Sunday afternoons in the 1970s.

However, still not as effective as a SSBN.

Finally is that 3 Trident missiles or 3 Trident submarines? I'm guessing that you meant the former.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

That's also a function of how far they are from their potential targets. For the US and UK (and indeed France), the target set is the same and mostly in European Russia - you need far fewer tankers to get there from Europe than from North America.


Bomber Command was well aware of this and practiced getting their entire deterrent force airborne within 4 minutes of getting an incoming raid warning, using a very large number of dispersal fields each of which had a handful of bombers. SAC could have done the same thing if they'd had to, but they never felt the need. Comparison to Trident is also a bit off - the real comparison was to Polaris, and that was vastly less capable (and more vulnerable) than Trident or Poseidon. Given the Moscow ABM system, that would have only got a handful of weapons on target too.

Actually, I'm wondering if we have to go a lot further back for the POD - heavy bombers are good for Armageddon or for Air Policing (the USAF in Afghanistan and the Russians in Syria). That's a very traditional RAF mission that only went away with the end of empire - they were certainly used in Malaya (Firedog), so if the Empire stuck around for longer (perhaps on the French model) then keeping one of the V-bombers (probably the Victor if they can get away without needing them as tankers) in the air policing role makes sense. They're expensive, but so is keeping and defending the bases you need for a smaller aircraft.

Sorry, for duplicating some of this. I started mine before you posted yours.

 

[Workable Goblin]

Bomber Command was well aware of this and practiced getting their entire deterrent force airborne within 4 minutes of getting an incoming raid warning, using a very large number of dispersal fields each of which had a handful of bombers. SAC could have done the same thing if they'd had to, but they never felt the need. Comparison to Trident is also a bit off - the real comparison was to Polaris, and that was vastly less capable (and more vulnerable) than Trident or Poseidon. Given the Moscow ABM system, that would have only got a handful of weapons on target too.

I have some doubts about that; what I've read indicates that the Soviets really didn't think that their ABM system was going to be very effective at all. Rather, they felt it would be the opposite: it would only stop a handful of weapons from getting on target. E.g. in a memo from the 1980s one analyst said,

The work [on missile defense] has began in the mid-1960s. The TsNPO Vympel of the MRP [Ministry of Radio Industry] has developed the A-35M Moscow ABM system that has been on combat duty since 1979. The system provides a capability to intercept a single ballistic missile from some directions and up to 6 Pershing 2-type missiles from the FRG.

Yes, the operational system in 1985 was expected to successfully intercept one warhead. One. Just one. The only way Polaris would have gotten only a handful of weapons on target would be if it had a failure rate approaching 100% (which, to be fair, was relatively possible). Even with upgrades the system was not expected to be very successful:

The work on a replacement system, an improved A-135 Moscow ABM system, will be completed in 1987 to provide protection from a strike of 1-2 modern and prospective ICBMs and up to 35 Pershing 2-type intermediate-range missiles.

A whole two, now! And further upgrades still wouldn't improve system performance all that much:

In accordance with the Decision of the Central Comittee and the Council of Ministers of 15 July 1985, the work has began on further modification of the Moscow ABM system - the A-235 system (intercept of 8-12 complex ballistic targets and up to 40 Pershing-2-type missiles).

Now we're talking, but it's still only twelve or so warheads with penaids (I assume this is what they mean by "complex"), and this system was never actually fielded.

So, in reality, Polaris was hilarious overkill against any of the ABM systems that the Soviets fielded, at least according to the Soviets, and virtually every warhead that was actually delivered to the vicinity of Moscow would have had a fair shake at blowing the hell out of it. I can't blame the Brits for overestimating the A-35's effectiveness, but if the balloon had gone up the ABM system would have been about as useful as an umbrella in protecting Moscow.

 

[CalBear]

True, however they do appear to have either generally comparable or in the case of range and payload greatly superior capabilities. They had also gone through what look like some fairly extensive mid-life repair and upgrade programmes which the Vulcan never received.

About all that is left of the original B-52s are the wing spars & basic air frame, and from what I have been told, the in flight toilet facilities. Every other part has been replaced multiple times, the avionics are ripped out and totally replaced every few years as tech advances. Even then, they are bomb trucks, not strategic platforms, they lost that role in the mid 1980s. They are, however, one hell of a good bomb truck and possibly the most intimidating platform the U.S. employs against ground troops, especially after the first attack.

Even with that, only 10% of the original force is still operational.

IIRC the RAF plan was to disperse it's V-bombers in flights of 4 over a large number of bases to reduce their vulnerability. Does the 14 aircraft make allowance for that.

Also the RAF did practice getting a flight of 4 V-bombers airborne in 4 minutes. I saw demonstrations, narrated by Raymond Baxter, several times on the Biggin Hill Air Fair TV programmes on Sunday afternoons in the 1970s.

However, still not as effective as a SSBN.

Finally is that 3 Trident missiles or 3 Trident submarines? I'm guessing that you meant the former.

Three launch bodies.

Regarding dispersal fields...

Most open source discussions regarding Soviet nuclear war fighting assume a double strike on SAC bomber bases a 25mT airburst AND a 25mT ground burst. Assuming a force of 160 aircraft (the number necessary to match the max potential of "surged" RN SSBN assets of two SSBN, the patrol boat and the along-side, prepping for patrol boat, with full load of the UK's deterrent stockpile) that would be 40 sites receiving 50mT of attention. Considering the fall-out from a 25mT ground Burst and the weather patterns, is there enough territory IN the UK to absorb that level of hit and have any reasonable number of survivors just from the counterforce strike?

The U.S. has lots of open space to put major assets where heavy fall-out will mainly land on nothing in the case of a counterforce strike (a full strike is, of course, an entirely different matter).

 

[pdf27]

I have some doubts about that; what I've read indicates that the Soviets really didn't think that their ABM system was going to be very effective at all. Rather, they felt it would be the opposite: it would only stop a handful of weapons from getting on target.

This is a fairly classic "other side of the hill" problem - the British were convinced that the Soviet system would work, and the Soviets were convinced that it wouldn't. In terms of the British decision making, it's what they believed which was important.

Most open source discussions regarding Soviet nuclear war fighting assume a double strike on SAC bomber bases a 25mT airburst AND a 25mT ground burst. Assuming a force of 160 aircraft (the number necessary to match the max potential of "surged" RN SSBN assets of two SSBN, the patrol boat and the along-side, prepping for patrol boat, with full load of the UK's deterrent stockpile) that would be 40 sites receiving 50mT of attention. Considering the fall-out from a 25mT ground Burst and the weather patterns, is there enough territory IN the UK to absorb that level of hit and have any reasonable number of survivors just from the counterforce strike?

The U.S. has lots of open space to put major assets where heavy fall-out will mainly land on nothing in the case of a counterforce strike (a full strike is, of course, an entirely different matter).

UK nuclear doctrine is very different from US nuclear doctrine. It isn't about fighting and winning a nuclear war - we know that in pretty much anything beyond a token nuclear exchange the UK will be rendered unrecognisable and about the only thing left of the original state will be the geography and probably the language. That's where you get things like Threads, When the Wind Blows and the CND - that reality affects the UK vastly more severely than it does the USA.
That means there is relatively little planning for fighting and winning a nuclear war - instead it's about ensuring that a limited nuclear war involving only the UK and one other country becomes a general one, explicitly with the US getting involved. The defence against a counterforce strike is not to be there when it lands (much easier for a bomber than an SSBN - you need more than 4 minutes to scramble one of those, so are more reliant on political warning of a threat).
This also feeds into the counterforce strike the USSR could use - they had relatively limited number of the extremely powerful, high accuracy missiles that were designated against SAC in the counterforce role. If they use them against Bomber Command, they're hideously vulnerable to a SAC counter-strike should the Americans become involved - and the British will be doing everything they can to get the US involved, up to and including shooting the American holders of dual-key weapons and firing them themselves (there was a plan in place to do exactly this with Thor, in the event of a nuclear war involving the UK but not the US).
Essentially you're assuming that the UK would have to replicate SAC in order to make use of bombers, and that just isn't true - they were both trying to do different things and have a different position from which to carry out their mission.

 

[WILDGEESE]

In An Illustrated Guide to Modern Fighters & Attack Aircraft by Bill Gunston 1980, it portrays the still-born FB-111H, an stretched version of the FB-111 double the range with 2 x GE F101 engines, the same used in the cancelled B-1A bomber.

Couldn't the Tornado be enlarged in the same way to give the R.A.F a so called "Strategic Bomber"?

Regards filers

 

[Workable Goblin]

This is a fairly classic "other side of the hill" problem - the British were convinced that the Soviet system would work, and the Soviets were convinced that it wouldn't. In terms of the British decision making, it's what they believed which was important.

Of course; like I said, I can't blame the Brits for thinking that it was going to work. Mostly, and to be fair this is nitpicking, you seemed to be stating it as a fact that only a few Polaris warheads would get through, when (assuming you trust the Soviet assessments of their own systems) it looks like virtually all of them would provided you discount failures in Polaris, i.e. causes presumably unrelated to the defense systems.

Also, and I just realized this, the Polaris might have been more like the Pershing 2 in this particular regard than like the "ballistic targets" they mention, but this still wouldn't affect the effectiveness of Polaris much.

 

[Julius Vogel]

and the British will be doing everything they can to get the US involved, up to and including shooting the American holders of dual-key weapons and firing them themselves (there was a plan in place to do exactly this with Thor, in the event of a nuclear war involving the UK but not the US).

Wow! Care to elaborate on this bit?

 

[andys]

Rebuilt or even new production Vulcans or Victors could have their range extended by the addition of conformal fuel tanks. By the mid-90s they'd be cruise missile carriers and by the turn of the century PGM-carriers, JDAM, Paveway, Diamond Back and, obviously, Storm Shadow.

With the retirement of Nimrod, perhaps they would even have a maritime strike role using Harpoon.

Fitted for aerial refuelling, they'd be very long-legged indeed.

 

[pdf27]

Wow! Care to elaborate on this bit?

For one of the IRBMs based in East Anglia (I think it was Thor), the British discovered that it was dead easy to bypass the US key in the dual-key panel (literally just pop the back off and wire around it). At some point (and it's unclear how official this was), the plan was that in the event of a UK-only nuclear launch warning where the US was exercising a veto the UK would launch the missiles anyway. That was assumed to need them to kill or incapacitate the USAF rep, the missiles being otherwise RAF-manned.

 

[SunilTanna]

After the fall of the Soviet Union, Britain becomes involved in a series of brushfire wars in remote locations - Belize, the Falklands II, Pitcairn (! those darn Kiwis attack), etc. - a Victor tanker is converted back into the bomber role for Falklands II, but proves inadequate for the role, and is in any case is ancient.

The need to a long range bomber is identified in the strategic defence review, although cost is a massive issue - fortunately Ukraine offers for sale the Tu-160s stranded on its territory in 1991...