Across the high frontier: a Big Gemini space TL

LIVING AND WORKING IN SPACE: A HISTORY OF SKYLAB
  • Archibald

    Banned
    14 May 1973

    Saturn V SA-513 launched the Skylab Orbital Workshop (OWS) space station into a 435-kilometer-high orbit about the Earth. It was America first space station, and it was marred by a host of technical glitches.

    On the eve of the launch all kind of “filler” plans were discussed – by filler, read, Apollo or Skylab missions to bridge the gap between the last Skylab flight in February 1974 and the planned first flight of Helios in spring 1976.

    There are talks of launching Skylab B and cross it with the ASTP mission in July 1975.

    Skylab B could also be used to bridge the “space station gap” that starts with the last Skylab mission and ends with the launch of Liberty core module in 1979.

    While Helios will fly in spring 1976, its capabilities will be limited. Adding the second Skylab would make for a spectacular bicentennial mission.

    ...

    The official NASA story of Skylab is SP-4208 LIVING AND WORKING IN SPACE: A HISTORY OF SKYLAB,by Compton, W. David, and Charles D. Benson published in 1983.

    CONTENTS

    PREFACE

    PART I. FROM CONCEPT THROUGH DECISION, 1962 - 1969

    PART II. DEVELOPMENT AND PREPARATIONS TO FLY, 1969 - 1973.

    PART III. THE MISSIONS AND RESULTS, 1973 - 1979


    14. SAVING SKYLAB.


    15. THE FIRST MISSION.


    16. THE SECOND MISSION.


    17. THE LAST MISSION.


    18. RESULTS.


    19. WHAT GOES UP - SKYLAB SECOND LIFE

    - Background: the space shuttle cancellation, a new manned program: Liberty, Helios, Agena

    - Skylab revival mission: a docking with a Big Gemini ?

    - A target for the Agena space tug

    - The Skylab revival mission

    - The Cosmos 954 crisis, January 1978

    - The Skylab desorbit mission - Europe and Canada enter the play

    - The end of an era

    - Skylab B: cancelled plans - a ground-based trainer for the next space station

    APPENDIXES

    SOURCE NOTES.

    INDEX.


    THE AUTHORS.


     
    Soviets in space (9)
  • Archibald

    Banned
    July 15 1973

    The OKB-1 design bureau, near Moscow


    Dmitryi Ustinov literally ran into Mishin, noting the surprise, if not terror, in the man eyes.

    Hardly surprising: he didn't even knew I was to visit him.


    Ustinov visit had been the result of some big dissension amid Mishin deputies: no less than four of them, all top-ranking, had written a letter to the upper echelons of the Party asking for Mishin removal. It was very much a de facto coup d'état; but the deputies griefs against their boss were too big to be concealed any longer.

    How can Mishin top deputies betray him like this ?

    Ustinov already knew the answer. The alliance with Chelomey was only the tip of the iceberg; the true reasons of the coup d'état reached much farther in time. Back to 1969. It all started that year. And I'm mostly responsible for the current revolution.

    Not that Ustinov felt any remorse !

    1969 had been the year when the soviets were desperately seeking a new direction for their space program - after Apollo 8 and before Apollo 11. Aelita was too big of an endeavour for the country; the moon was lost, and that left space stations. Similarly, NASA was planning Skylab at the time.

    So the Soviet Union needed a space station in a hurry.

    What happened was that Chelomey actually had a space station in his shop, dubbed Almaz; a military platform akin, not to Skylab, rather to the Manned Orbiting Laboratory that had just been cancelled. That Almaz was a military platform did not really mattered - after all the soviet space program was essentially run by the military.

    What really mattered was that Ustinov just hated Chelomey, so there was no way Almaz become the first soviet space station to reach orbit - even if it was the only option in hand to beat Skylab !

    What Ustinov did was to literally steal Almaz empty hulls from Chelomey and give that to Mishin bureau, which was supposed to fill the hulls with Soyuz life support systems.

    Yet Mishin had not been happy with the offer, because he just did not cared about Almaz or Salyut: he was first and foremost deep into Korolev old lunar program, and if he ever was to build a space station, he would build the immense MKBS complex. But it was way too far in the future to beat Skylab.

    So Mishin refused to take-over Almaz from Chelomey, not by charity, but because he had no interest in it. Since his deputies disagreed, Ustinov simply bypassed Mishin to reach them, and Salyut was created by Bushuyev, Chertok, Feoktistov and Raushenbakh.

    Needless to say, Mishin was furious, and that left a big scar among the once united Korolev bureau. It was that scar that bled again three years later.

    Even Mishin remaining supporters - Semenov and Okhapkin - recognized their boss was a little too obsessed with Korolev lunar program, and that he somewhat neglected Salyut. The problem was since the fall of 1969, both Breznhev and Keldysh had declared future belonged to space stations and not moon landings.

    Mishin did not cared about that fact. And he actively plotted with Chelomey to give him back the Salyut he had no interest in. In April 1972 the two chief designers had an informal pact.

    Chelomey taking back Salyut meant Mishin could concentrate on what mattered more to him: the MKBS of course, and, above all, fulfilling Korolev dream of landing a man on the Moon. IF - and that was a big if - he could ever make the fucking N-1 lunar rocket work someday.

    A fifth atempt was planned somewhere in the near future. Let's hope we won't rebuild the launch pad this time Ustinov thought warily.

    When in April 1972 Ustinov learned of the Mishin - Chelomey pact he was all rage. He actually had to destroy the nascent alliance, and fortunately Mishin rebelling deputies were helping.

    Korolev old bureau was literally on the brink of a civil war, and Ustinov really wanted to play both sides against each others for his own benefit and that of his lifelong friend Glushko, with its immense ambitions...

    But first, he had to find a reason to sack Mishin. The rebelling deputies had found him such a reason; it was too good to be tru
     
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    Soviets in space (10)
  • Archibald

    Banned
    July 31, 1973

    More reasons to sack Mishin. It was all a matter of failing space stations. So far USSR totaled four atempts - three Salyut, one Almaz - with extremely mixed record.

    Two years before the first Salyut actually worked, but the crew had died while returning from a record-duration flight.

    A year later the second Salyut did not even reached orbit and burned miserably in the atmosphere.

    Last but not least, that spring 1973 both third Salyut and first Almaz failed to beat Skylab. The former stupidly fired its orbital engines and exhausted its fuel supply; while the Almaz had literally been shot down by its launcher third stage !

    The space station program had an apalling rate of failures, at a time when NASA had saved a crippled Skylab and planned an even larger station.

    May marked the third failure in a row for Salyut, and Ustinov had already started a discrete campaign aimed at gathering support to find Mishin a successor. He had first assured backing from the deputies; then, from defence apparatchiks Grechko and Afanasyev, the latter making clear that, if Mishin and the lunar program were to go, the N-1 had to be kept.

    Ustinov also had support from Glushko - although predictible, it was not exactly a good news, if only because the N-1 was to survive. He had scanned the list of Mishin deputies to try and find a successor among them. He was ready to act. A meeting of the VPK would happen the next month. Mishin days were counted.




    ***


    August 14, 1973

    Top ranking officials and engineers and scientists had gathered near Moscow. There were Afanasyev and Grechko, Ustinov, Glushko, Mishin - with Chelomei a marked absent, but who cared? There were matematician Keldysh and Mishin deputies Bushuyev, Chertok, Feoktistov, Okhapkin, and Semenov. Mishin evidently knew the sentence was on the wall - but so far he had defended himself bravely. He will not give up his lunar dreams nor the head of his design bureau, not like this.

    And indeed, Mishin was fighting back

    "Last year you all approved my L3M lunar project. Even you, Valentin." he pointed his finger toward Glushko. "Listen. If we put all our energy on the L3M, we can start building a Moonbase as early as 1980. The N-1F will fly in exactly a year; it could adapt to both the MKBS and L3M programs. I have had excellent reviews for both. You can't dismiss me."

    "But those are paper projects. Your record so far with real world projects - Salyut - is not as good. Three stations lost, one crew dead, repeated docking failures. How could you build the MKBS then ?" Ustinov voice was glacial.

    Okhapkin and Semenov in turn defended their boss. Okhapkin had been the faithful deputy, Semenov had totally different reasons - his father-in-law was no less than the second most powerful man in USSR, Andrei Kirilenko. Mishin knew that better than anybody – in fact it was the very reason why he had hired Semenov in the first place. Daddy political clout was more important than his son engineering talents. Didn't Chelomei started that trend two decades before - hiring Krushchev son Serguey ?

    Soon Okhapkin and Semenov were overwhelmed, and silenced. It was Feoktistov that gave the final blow to Mishin.

    "What about Salyut second docking port ?" he asked innocently. "Weren't you asked repeatedly to place a second docking port on Salyut, so that crew rotations would be much easier ?"
    The argument was dishonest. Noone really knew how things had really happened, with Mishin sustaining that it was Ustinov that had forbidden to place the second docking port of all four first Salyuts; Ustinov saying the exact contrary; and Chelomei joyfully noting they were both wrong since he had build Almaz with two holes from the very beginning !

    All in all it was the usual mix of political infighting and old hatred reaching decades away. The two-docking port controversy soon bogged down into technical details that led nowhere, until the debate died of exhaustion.

    When the conversation started again Mishin and his supporters had essentially been blown away, and the debate turned to the space program future. It was Glushko that oriented the meeting in that direction.

    "Shall we keep the N-1 ? I think no, and for a decade I insisted over this program utter failure. We should drop that booster, right now. I have designed a great family of rockets, the RLA - Rocket Launch Aparatus - made of building blocks clustered together for a wide range of payloads..."

    Afanasyev reacted strongly. He was called the Great Hammer for obvious reasons.

    "What do you suggest ? that we start another heavy lifter, from a clean sheet of paper ? And of course, you would design it. I have no doubts it might be a better vehicle than the N-1; but it would taken a decade and billion of rubbles and lot of energia... errh, energy, to make it real. We know what the situation is in our country. We need to restructure ourselves toward assembly in orbit and achieve a very high degree of reliability in docking. This will be a lot less expensive than producing another super-heavy launch vehicle.
    Glushko is assuring us that the N-1 launch facilities can be used for the new series. No one has verified this in detail. Barmin maintains that this is impossible. This needs to be carefully examined. There was no Soviet man on the Moon. This is the fault of OKB-1 and our fault in general. A lunar base—in my opinion this is not a priority mission. It needs to be transferred to research work. I understand Glushko arguments against the N-1, but we can't drop it now, because the Americans have a handful of Saturn V in mothball for their future space station. We should not forgot this."

    Keldysh nodded.

    Glushko tried again.
    "I've tentatively defined a whole family of modular, high performance rockets, the RLAs. There would be very powerful engines with four combustion chambers, that could be downscaled to two or one for smaller launchers; and those modular engines would be be part of boosters that could be clustered. With that method we could cover the whole range of payloads, from 30 tons to 250 tons in earth orbit... standardized rocket blocks, you see."


    Keldysh waved him silent.

    "Afanasyev is right. Listen: it happens that by a bizarre coincidence, in the aftermath of the shuttle debacle NASA focused on a space station which is outrageously similar to comrade Mishin MKBS; a hundred ton module to be launched by a moon rocket, complete with nuclear power and artificial gravity. Eerie similar, isn't it ? Meanwhile, the Air Force is bringing back the Manned Orbital Laboratory, putting hardware leftover after the program cancellation into a modified Big Gemini. This strongly suggest that we keep flying both Almaz and the TKS."

    Ustinov jaw dropped. So did Glushko. By contrast, for the first since the meeting had begun Vasily Mishin looked like a happy man.

    Maybe I've lost my post, but I've lost it with honour. Now let me have some fun.

    "Comrades Keldysh and Afanasyev," he declared, a little smile on his face. "Vladimir Chelomei is not present today, but if he were, he would tell you we that we had in fact an agreement last year, to use the TKS as the MKBS logistic vehicle. It is an idea that makes a lot of sense. I really think we can make the N-1 work; If we drop the N-1 now, all that will remain will be a handful of Salyut or Almaz."

    Mishin was delighted to see how Glushko and Ustinov took his sentence bad.

    It was Keldysh that replied. "So, ok, suppose we keep that N-1 going..."

    "The N-1F will fly next year." Mishin cut him.

    The unflapable Keldysh continued. "we keep the N-1 going, the N-1F flies next year, but what payload for it ? the MKBS won't be ready before the end of the decade."

    Mishin again. "There are plenty of lunar hardware left. I strongly suggest we atempt a fully automated mission."

    To Mishin surprise, Glushko nodded. After all the two men had a common, obssessing goal: a lunar base. Glushko wanted that so much he had even endorsed Mishin L3M plans, even if they included the N-1 he hated so much !

    For a second Vasily Mishin and Valentin Petrovitch Glushko fixed each other with a fragile hope in their eyes. At this very second, Mishin could read Glushko feelings exactly - because he felt the same.

    A successful L3 mission, even fully automated, could turn the tide; the L3M would have an edge over damn earth orbit space stations...

    Their hopes and potential alliance, however, were dashed immediately. By Sergei Afanasyev.

    "The lunar program is over; by the way we military have zero interest in a lunar outpost. We like the MKBS better. What are the Americans doing ? they are planning space stations. They are also planning a couple of Viking Mars landers to seek life there."

    Glushko and Mishin were stunned by the non sequitur.

    Mars ?
    What the hell with that planet ?

    "Yes, Mars.” The Big Hammer continued. “I, Serguey Afanasyev, suggests automated Mars sample return by Lavochkin; drawing from their highly successful lunar scoopers. That would leapfrog Viking."

    Afanasyev could see doubtful glances and ironic smiles all over the room. Every probe send to Mars since 1969 had ended in failure. The first lander ever had worked a mere twenty seconds before dying.
    Don’t worry, comrades, I know how bad the situation has been.
    "Before the sample return mission, there might be a kind of dress rehearsal - a large rover, Lunokhod style."

    Afanasyev first and foremost wanted to keep the N-1 alive and for that it needed payloads, very heavy ones to justify its huge power. Mars sample return was one of these rare missions.

    There was another connection between Mars and the N-1 however. Sergey Kryukov - the man that a decade before had designed the N-1 for Korolev - in 1970 Kryukov couldn't stand Mishin and he had transfered himself to Lavochkin. When Lavochkin very talented boss Babakin died of a heart attack it was Kryukov that replaced him.

    Mishin was far from being convinced, but he also knew politics would rule, as usual. If the Americans were to give up the Moon to build manned space stations and robotic Mars landers, so would the Soviet Union.
    What a waste, with all this hardware build and throughly tested in countless missions in earth and Moon orbit.
    He thought about the circumlunar Zondand the lunar orbit Soyuz, the LK lunar lander, the Block D propulsive stage, the Lunokhod rovers to move the crew from an ailing LK to a backup lander.

    Each of these vehicle had left a trail of cutting-edge hardware that would never be flown - instead gathering dust in a corner of some contractor plant, or collecting snow somewhere in the steppe near Baikonur. Vasily Mishin closed its fists in anger.

    Something has to be saved.

    As the meeting broke, Mishin was already assembling a plan to save and store as much lunar hardware as possible. Barmin - I need him in my conspiracy. Vladimir Pavlovich Barmin had been the master designer of soviet rocket launch pads. Then he had been recruited by Korolev himself to design a lunar base. If someone was to help Mishin hiding moonships in Baikonur with the final objective of bringing a lunar program back someday, it would be Barmin.

    Meanwhile a furious Glushko cornered Ustinov. They climbed into the same car, the driver crossing Moscow suburbs at good pace.

    "Listen. We can make without the N-1. I did some calculations: we can piece together a handful of TKS, Almaz, and Salyut. We can build a modular space station using Proton rockets, or a better medium-lift launcher. But the N-1 can only carry air. Please: let me takeover Mishin bureau, and blend it with my own engine factory. "

    Here we are. Ustinov sighed.

    "I'm sorry, Valentin. I can certainly remove Mishin; I can kill the lunar program; I can certainly help you. But the N-1 is harder to erase since the Americans are mothballing some of their Saturns. If I make you head of TskBEM instead of Mishin, I'm affraid you'll have to keep the N-1 going.”

    He could see Glushko took the last sentence pretty bad. After all he hated the N-1 as much as Ustinov hated Chelomei; he would have had to go against his own ambition. How could Glushko be willing to remain the general designer of a rocket that he had not been involved in developing ?

    “You heard Keldysh arguments; his opinion is shared by Smirnov, and together they have direct access to old Breznhev. Do you remember that American project, the space shuttle ? Do you you know their opinion about it ?"


    "Tell me" Glushko was all rage.

    "Well, they couldn't figure how on Earth NASA economic case for the shuttle made sense. The damn economists planned, can you believe it ? 700 flights over the first twelve years of operations. That mounted to 20 000 tons in Earth orbit ! Then we heard that the shuttle would lift off from a military base in California, fly a single polar orbit and land at the same place. Keldysh slapped his forehead and came to the conclusion the shuttle was to be a nuclear bomber the polar orbit would take above Moscow without a warning, overwhelming our A35 anti-missile system.”

    What ?”

    Keldysh saw the shuttle as a cross between a B-52 and a Minuteman.

    Like the B-52, it is manned and winged so it is flexible.

    Like a Minuteman, it is rocket powered to hypersonic speeds far above the atmosphere.

    Now, we know how to shoot a B-52, with our SA-2 missiles. As for Minutemans, the A35 can do it. But the shuttle ! Imagine it flew a depressed trajectory and sneaked between the two layers of missiles, somewhat too fast for the SAMs and too low for the ABM. So we should need to build a carbon copy of it, for the sake of mutual assured detruction terror."

    Glushko rolled his eyes.

    "The shuttle a nuclear bomber ?" he exclaimed. "Who is Keldysh kidding ?the damn spaceplane was to seat on a fat tank crammed with cryogenic propellants that have to be refill anytime. The way I see it, the shuttle seating on that immense Apollo launch gantry would make a perfect target to any missile. Hell, with a bit of luck even a plain old Tupolev Tu-95 could blew it."
    Glushko laughed at the vision.

    "Oh, the military was no fool either. Grechko certainly dismissed the shuttle nuclear threat as bollocks, just like you did. Their opinion did not mattered, however, because the campaign actually bypassed the military. Whatever you think of the argument, it finally reached Brezhnev."

    "And what was Brezhnev reaction ?"

    "We are not country bumpkins here. Let us make an effort and find the money. That what he said. Can you believe it ?"


    Glushko shook his head in disbelief. "The space shuttle a nuclear bomber. It says a lot about Breznhev shape after his stroke."

    "Well, it is not all Keldysh fault, and in fact it makes for an interesting story.
    Two years ago some young and zealous guys from the Institute of Applied Mathematics (IPM) figured out in advance the possible orbits of the Space Shuttle allowing for possible maneuvers in the atmosphere at 2,000 kilometers clear of ballistic orbit. They scared Keldysh, and he reported to Ustinov, and then to Brezhnev.
    It turned out that the Space Shuttle, flying far from our borders, having lulled the missile defense (PRO) and air defense (PVO) into a false sense of security, could suddenly execute a maneuver—a ‘dash to the north,’ and, flying over Moscow, could drop a 25-ton thermonuclear bomb with an explosive yield of at least 25 megatons there."


    Glushko still couldn't believe what Ustinov had told him. Was Keldysh turning senile like Breznhev ? Was a soviet shuttle on the pipeline ? or MiG Spiral ? He dismissed that hypothesis. For all the high-ranking meetings he had attended, he still had to found a supporter for a soviet space shuttle. And Spiral blue-sky engineering did not helped.

    "Back to our future. I'm furious we can't destroy the N-1; but I still think we can topple it in other ways. If I can't blown the damn white elephant, I have no interest in Mishin design bureau. Give me Chelomei head instead; I know you hate him."

    Ustinov was taken aback by the proposal. Glushko was hammering him with arguments.

    "It would make some sense; we could take Salyut out of Mishin bureau (he doesn't want it in the first place), and join it with Almaz. That way they could concentrate on the MKBS; and I could piece together a modular space station from FGBs, Salyut and Almaz, as a backup to the monolithic orbital complex.

    I could also design a Soyuz successor from the TKS. And I could build a new family of boosters to replace, first the Proton, then the smaller Soyuz, and, at the end of the next decade, the fucking N-1. The Proton propellants are toxic and dangerous; the Soyuz is growing old; while the N-1 was flawed from day one, and still is. If I can't kill the N-1 directly, I'll make it obsolete over time. But I need your help."

    Ustinov did not answered. The car had reached the office where he worked, and he still had a difficult decision to make. Glushko insisted a last time before mercifully leaving him alone. As he went to his office, Ustinov dug a list out of his pocket.

    It was a list of Mishin potential successors. Ustinov had drawn it from two major events: the 1969 Salyut conspiracy, and the anti-Mishin cabal at the beginning of the year.

    Okhapkin ranked number two; he had been a faithfull deputy for years. But the man, like that young, talented Semenov, had supported the alliance with Chelomei. This simple fact evidently discredited them.

    Feoktistov then ? he was certainly talented, and an astronaut with that - he had flown Voskhod 1 a decade earlier. But Feoktistov had a major default. To the amazement of many, he hadnever joined the communist party.


    Bushuyev perhaps ? Bushuyev had refused to bring the Salyut conspiracy to Ustinov in the first place - leaving that task to Feoktistov. In Glushko view he was a bit too loyal to Mishin but, most worryingly, he was deep into Apollo-Soyuz, with his name revealed to the Americans. If they made that man the successor of Mishin, he would inevitably draw attentions of western observers. And that was absolutely undesirable.

    That only left a single candidate.

    Boris Chertok.
     
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    Soviets in space (11)
  • Archibald

    Banned
    In October 1974 Valentin Glushko officially took control of Chelomei TsKBM design bureau. The next year Glushko had two major decisions. First, he stopped the Almaz program. OPS-1 had failed in the weeks before Skylab, but a year later late June 1974 OPS-2 was more successful. Then Glushko took controls, and stroke back.

    OPS-3 that was to launch the next year was grounded. Secondly, Glushko had the Salyut program transferred back from OKB-1 to his shop. Salyut and Almaz being very similar, it was logical to have the two space station programs under the same roof.

    Lastly that same year 1975 the TKS (now part of Glushko empire) was confirmed as the future MKBS crew and cargo vehicle, killing the unmanned Soyuz – Progress – in the process. After cancellation of OPS-3 two Almaz hulls remained at the plant - OPS-4 being under construction at the time.
     
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    Europe in space (10)
  • Archibald

    Banned
    Skylab second life

    August 15, 1973

    ESA is now entirely committed to the space tug program. First flight has to happen in 1976, followed by a second mission the year after. The Agena space tug will be boosted by the lower half of France national launcher Diamant – the L-17 “Amethyste”.

    The space tug however needs a target spacecraft – and NASA and ESA decided that Skylab would fit the bill. So ESA will loft a couple of space tugs to Skylab orbit and practice extensive manoeuvers, notably simulated approaches. Because the Agena isn't piloted, and because Skylab is at the end of its useful life, ESA and NASA decided they would atempt a docking. The Agena space tugs will thus carry Apollo obsolete probe-and-drogue system compatible with the old orbital workshop.

    Consideration is currently given about carrying Canada's robotic arm; the Agena would grapple Skylab and ram itself into Skylab frontal docking ring.

    Grappling may be necessary since Skylab lacks a beacon on which the Agena LIDAR system could home. Such a beacon might be installed by the last Apollo crew to left the orbital workshop, but time is running out pretty fast.
     
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    Soviets in space (12)
  • Archibald

    Banned
    More from the Soviets

    The Poisk commission

    By the beginning of the 1970s the Soviet Ministry of Defence initiated a research programme called Poisk ('Search') to look into future launch needs and vehicles.

    Carried out by TsNII-50, the Ministry.s main space research institute, the study was completed in early 1973 and concluded that it was necessary to build a new family of dedicated space launch vehicles in four payload categories:
    light rockets (payload up to 3 tons)
    medium-lift rockets (10-12 tons)
    heavy-lift rockets (30-35 tons) and
    superheavy rockets (100 tons and more).

    Current vehicles in the class were the Tsyklon, Soyuz, Proton and N-1 - very dissimilar, antiquated, with half of them using the dreaded storable propellants.

    The dream of an universal family of boosters was an old one, never achieved. Korolev, Yangel, Chelomei all had failed to sell the Soviet leadership a complete family of boosters.
    Mishin was ready to try again from the N-1, while Glushko had been given Chelomei empire and designed his own, new family of launch vehicles, the RLAs.

    This new family of launch vehicles was to have two more characteristics.

    First, in order to cut costs to the maximum extent possible, it would use unified rocket stages and engines.

    Second, it would rely on non-toxic, ecologically clean propellants, with preference being given to liquid oxygen and kerosene.

    What played a major role in that second rule were a series of catastrophic low-altitude Proton failures that contaminated wide stretches of land at or near the Baykonur cosmodrome. In one of the major mishap, April 2, 1969 in Baikonur the State Commission had had to run away from a deadly cloud of corrosive propellants.

    The basic conclusions of the study were approved on 3 November 1973 at a meeting of the Chief Directorate of Space Assets (GUKOS), the 'space branch' of the Strategic Rocket Forces.
    Although not stated specifically, the eventual goal of the programme seems to have been to phase out all existing missile-derived launch vehicles - the Tsyklon and Proton.

    At first glance it seemed to Mishin that the N-1 could be cut in shorter and shorter rockets that would ultimately fill the Poisk four categories.
    But, as usual, the devil was in the details. While it worked not too bad for the heavy lifter (and Proton-slayer) the N-11, the smaller two vehicles needed more modifications.

    The N-111 had its share of issues, notably that it fell in payload between Tsyklon and Soyuz. Critically, it was not powerful enough to lift the Soyuz workshorse.
    It essentially lacked a third stage, as suggested by Mishkaelvanski, one of Mishin deputies. With a decent third stage it could certainly loft the Soyuz.

    The last member of the family - the Tsyklon class launcher or N-1111 (!) was even more marginal. A brand new first stage would have to be used, probably build using the Block V tooling with a pair of NK-33, eventually with a Block G second stage and a Block D stage 3.
     
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    Molten Salt Reactors
  • Archibald

    Banned
    October 1973 – February 1974

    ...In response to American aid to Israel, on October 16, 1973, OPEC raised the posted price of oil by 70%, to $5.11 a barrel. The following day, oil ministers agreed to the embargo, a cut in production by five percent from September's output and to continue to cut production in five percent increments until their economic and political objectives were met.

    On October 19, Nixon requested Congress to appropriate $2.2 billion in emergency aid to Israel, including $1.5 billion in outright grants. Libya immediately announced it would embargo oil shipments to the United States. Saudi Arabia and the other Arab oil-producing states joined the embargo on October 20, 1973. At their Kuwait meeting, OPEC proclaimed the embargo that curbed exports to various countries and blocked all oil deliveries to the US as a "principal hostile country".


    -----------

    "...before too many years have passed, corner gasoline stations may be replaced by ammonia or methanol stations

    Notwithstanding the new oil fields in Alaska, some sort of synthetic fuel is inevitable if a synthetic fuel could be manufactured cheaply enough and if it could be stored and transported with safety, the modifications to our transport industry would be rather minor

    Gasoline has always been abundant and cheap in the United States. Despite this fact, the United States Army seriously considered "energy depots" in the 60's. The basic objective was simplification of fuel logistics by switching to fuels that could be synthesized on the spot from air and water. Hydrogen and ammonia were the primary fuels considered. Hydrogen was to be derived from water through electrolysis, using electricity generated in a mobile station built around a small nuclear reactor. Liquid hydrogen would be used built around a small nuclear reactor and used directly as fuel or, more likely, converted into ammonia, which is easier to handle. The fact that the energy depot and the host of vehicles it supported would not pollute the atmosphere was not an important consideration.

    The modern version of the energy depot would be useful in two ways. First, because it would greatly relieve urban pollution and, second, because eventually gasoline will have to be replaced as our primary vehicle fuel regardless of environmental considerations

    When petroleum becomes scarce, perhaps half a century from now, nuclear heat can be employed to gasify coal and further extend the sway of fossil-fueled internal combustion engines and their turbine counterparts. All that is needed is a source of electricity to electrolyze water into hydrogen and oxygen. Nitrogen, if needed, would be taken directly from the atmosphere. If an easily handled fuel, such as ammonia, is synthesized, the fuel plants could be located well away from city centers.

    Most of us think of ammonia as pungent and rather disagreeable, hydrogen has a reputation for being explosive and dangerous. The chemical and space industries, however, have tamed both fuels in recent years. In some ways, anhydrous ammonia is just as safe to handle as gasoline; and liquid hydrogen is becoming common as a high- performance rocket fuel.

    Ammonia is most often encountered (as far as the nose is concerned) in household cleaners. It is less well known that fully 80 percent of the world's fertilizer requirements are met by synthesizing ammonia from natural gas and steam. It is less well known that fully 80 percent of the world's fertilizer requirements are met by synthesizing ammonia from natural gas and steam. Roughly 40 million tons of ammonia are consumed annually in agriculture.Consumption increases almost exponentially. Thus, we can conceive of ammonia production plants that will "fuel" both farms and cities...


    Source: Man and atom: building a new world through nuclear technology, Glenn T. Seaborg - 1971.



    -----------


    Seven U.S. Senators, all members of the Senate Commerce Committee (the delegation included Vance Hartke, Howard Cannon, Frank Moss, James Pearson, Howard Baker, Glenn Beall, and Robert Griffin) meet for more than three hours with Leonid Brezhnev today, April 22, 1973.

    Senator Cannon (D.-Nev.) met with Sergey S. Pavlov, Chief Administrator for Foreign Relations, USSR Ministry of Civil Aviation, as well as various staff personnel.

    Senator Baker (R.-Tenn.) met with Andrey M. Petrosynants (sic), chairman of the State Committee for Utilization of Atomic Energy.

    While the Senators had requested a meeting with Brezhnev, none expected such a lengthy visit. Newsmen present during a session before the talks said Brezhnev was in a jovial mood greeting the seven senators

    Are you going to report back to the President, Brezhnev asked Sen Vance Hartke the leader of the group.

    Not only the President but the Congress Hartke replied.

    Hartke said the group had seen some of Moscow in addition to meeting with Soviet officials since their arrival last Thursday .


    According to Senator Baker, Secretary Brezhnev "talked very frankly and didn't evade any issues, including the Jackson Amendment and the Jewish question."

    The talk covered the development of trade and a number of other facets of Soviet-American relations. General Secretary Brezhnev noted the Soviet Union's readiness to broaden and deepen trade and economic ties with the United States, and put them on a long-term basis. He stressed that such ties, as well as others, must rest on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. The U.S. Senators, in turn, expressed considerable interest in developing trade and other forms of economic relations between the USSR and the USA.

    Among those participating in the discussion were Andrei Gromyko, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR; Nikolai Patolichev, Minister of Foreign Trade of the USSR, and Andrei Brezhnev.


    -----------


    The Molten Salt Reactor Experiment (MSRE) at Oak Ridge nuclear Laboratory, Tennessee operates at around 650 degree Celsius. Future MSR operating temperature will belimited only by material considerations. As materials improve, the temperature can be raised, and the thermal efficiency still further improved. At 850 degree C, we can disassociate hydrogen from water efficiently and produce hydrogen-based fuels.


    Source: Report on the MSRE - letter, Oak Ridge director Alvin Weinberg to Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission Glen Seaborg - 1968


    -----------------


    "One significant military effort of the 1960s was the Army's NuclearPowered Energy Depot - an early experiment in the hydrogen economy, according to a paper international hydrogen conference, dubbed The Hydrogen Economy Miami Energy (THEME) held in Miami, March 1974.

    "Because of increased mechanization, petroleum supply has become one of the major problems of military logistics, especially in Army operations where small, dispersed energy demands often necessitate an extensive, vulnerable fuel supply complex. The nuclear powered energy depot, conceived as a potential solution to the problem, will utilize a nuclear reactor to produce a chemical fuel for vehicle and aircraft engines. The energy depot, logistically independent for a year, would operate with or near the consumer in the field and considerably broaden Army capabilities

    --------

    "In November 1963, an Army study submitted to the Department of Defense (DOD) proposed employing a military compact reactor (MCR) as the power source for a nuclear-powered energy depot, which was being considered as a means of producing synthetic fuels in a combat zone for use in military vehicles. MCR studies, which had begun in 1955, grew out of the Transportation Corps' interest in using nuclear energy to power heavy, overland cargo haulers in remote areas. These studies investigated various reactor and vehicle concepts, including a small liquid-metal-cooled reactor, but ultimately the concept proved impractical.

    The energy depot, however, was an attempt to solve the logistics problem of supplying fuel to military vehicles on the battlefield. While nuclear power could not supply energy directly to individual vehicles, the MCR could provide power to manufacture, under field conditions, a synthetic fuel as a substitute for conventional carbon-based fuels.

    The nuclear power plant would be combined with a fuel production system to turn readily available elements such as hydrogen or nitrogen into fuel, which then could be used as a substitute for gasoline or diesel fuel in cars, trucks, and other vehicles. Of the fuels that could be produced from air and water, hydrogen and ammonia offer the best possibilities as substitutes for petroleum.

    By electrolysis or high- temperature heat, water can be broken down into hydrogen and oxygen and the hydrogen then used in engines or fuel cells. Alternatively, nitrogen can be produced through the liquefaction and fractional distillation of air and then combined with hydrogen to form ammonia as a fuel for internal-combustion engines. Consideration also was given to using nuclear reactors to generate electricity to charge batteries for electric-powered vehicles—a development contingent on the development of suitable battery technology.

    By 1966, the practicality of the energy depot remained in doubt because of questions about the cost-effectiveness of its current and projected technology. The Corps of Engineers concluded that, although feasible, the energy depot would require equipment that probably would not be available during the next decade. As a result, further development of the MCR and the energy depot was suspended until they became economically attractive and technologically possible."

    -----------------


    To: Howard H. Baker, Jr., V.S. Senate, Room 2107, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C.

    Dear Senator Baker,

    Thank you for your letter of February 9, 1973, concerning the planned termination of the Molten Salt Breeder Reactor (MSBR) and the radioisotopes development programs at the Atomic Energy Commission's Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL).

    The decision to terminate the MSBR was taken after careful consideration of the backup efforts to the Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor (LMFBR) program. The LMFBR, as you know, represents the President's top-priority program to meet the growing national needs for clean energy and will require large Government expenditures to accomplish the President's objective of successful demonstration by 1980.

    In light of the current budget stringency, it was decided that of the two backup efforts the MSBR was the less promising and would require very large future expenditures for completion.

    We are not unaware of the difficulties imposed on the affected personnel as a result of terminating these programs at ORNL. However, we think that the impact of these decisions will be minimized by the increased FY 1974 funding for uranium enrichment activities at Oak Ridge and as a result of the decision to build the large LMFBR demonstration plant adjacent to the Oak Ridge reservation. We appreciate the opportunity of being able to provide this information, which we hope will be useful to you.

    Sincerely, Frederic V. Malek, Deputy Director.

    -----------------

    To: Melvin Price, chairman, Joint Committee on Atomic energy

    Washington, DC

    Dear Mel,

    During my visit to the Soviet Union in April 1973, I had an opportunity to discuss nuclear power developments with Professor Andronik M. Petrosyants, Chairman, USSR State Committee on the Utilization of Atomic Energy.

    He specifically asked me about our efforts in molten salt reactor development.

    He indicated his interest in the concept by stating that in his view the molten salt reactor is an excellent area for cooperation between our two countries - much like the Apollo-Soyuz docking.

    He seems to be very open to international cooperation, repeatedly citing excellent relations with past AEC Chairman Glenn Seaborg.

    In view of the potential of the reactor concept and the opportunity to benefit by an exchange of information, should such agreement be reached, I urge that the Committee authorize the necessary funds to continue this effort at a effort at a reasonable pace.

    Sincerely yours,


    Howard H. Baker, Jr - United States Senator from Tennessee – May 1973

    --------------------

    BIOGRAPHICAL DATA
    WILLIAM A. ANDERS
    PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE


    1973-Present.—Commissioner, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. Appointed by the President with Senate confirmation. Responsible along with four other Commissioners for national programs of nuclear energy and weapons R&D and regulation for public health and safety.
    Alternate U.S. Representative to the Seventh General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, Austria, in September 1973.
    Chairman of the U.S. Delegation of the U.S./U.S.S.R. Committee on Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy established under Article 5 of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Atomic Energy Agreement of June 21, 1973.

    1969-1973
    Executive Secretary, National Aeronautics and Space Council. Appointed by the President with Senate confirmation as director of an independent agency within the Executive Office of the President. Participated as a senior member of U.S. negotiating teams developing programs with the U.S.S.R., Japan, and Europe. Acted as a spokesman to Congress and industry on many R&D policy areas. Directed extensive policy studies in such fields as applications satellites, the aerospace and air transport industries, foreign military sales, international cooperation in space^ and launcher licensing. Worked with the Vice President, Cabinet officers, key White House staff members, and agency heads to insure successful implementation of Presidential policy throughout the aeronautics and space fields.


    1964-1969 – NASA. Engineering duties—Gemini and Apollo spaceraft responsibilities for environmental control systems design, test, and procedures.

    Space Operations duties
    Back-up crew for Gemini 11; Lunar Module Pilot for Apollo 8 (1st lunar flight) - spacecraft systems experiments specialist; Back-up Command Module Pilot for Apollo 11 (1st lunar landing).

    1962-1964.—Nuclear Engineer—USAF Officer.

    -----------------

    " In January 1968 Robert Seamans resigned from NASA to become a visiting professor at MIT. During that period at MIT, Seamans also served as a consultant to the administrator of NASA. In 1969 he became Secretary of the United States Air Force, serving until 1973.

    In May 1973, at the time of Seamans's resignation to become president of the National Academy of Engineering, President Richard M. Nixon said that his administration was most fortunate to have had a person of Seamans's leadership and managerial ability directing the development of sophisticated new aircraft and helping to improve U.S. missile systems. Nixon credited Seamans with keeping the Air Force modernization program costs so very close to projected estimates and for creating an environment in which people serving in the Air Force believed they could realize their potential.

    Seamans served as president of the National Academy of Engineering until December 1974, when he became the first administrator of the new Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA), a post he held until 1977 and the creation of the Departement of Energy.

    The ERDA is a byproduct of the Atomic Energy Commission breaking up. It had been decided the monolithic commission could no longer handle both promotion and safety of nuclear power, two goals that had become mutually exclusive.


    -----------------


    Despite emphatic denial by NASA Deputy Administrator George Low, rumors have circulated that the Lewis Research Center would sever what is now a very tenuous connection with NASA and become part of the new Energy Research and Development Administration, where the major part of its research programs were concentrated.

    The ERDA succeeded the controversed Atomic Energy Commission, and coincidently his director Robert Seamans was NASA deputy director until 1969.

    ---------

    "The Senate has confirmed the appointment of Robert Seamans Jr. as chief of the new Energy Research and Development Administration. Seamans, 56, is a former Air Force secretary and deputy administrator of the space agency. The Senate on Thursday also approved by voice vote and without debate the nomination of former astronaut William Anders as a member of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.


    There is a practical logic to the appointment of veteran NASA officials to the energy and nuclear administrations. As Congress put it, "The urgency of the nation's critical energy problems will require a commitment similar to that of the Apollo project. It will require that the Nation undertake, at a minimum, a ten-year $20,000,000,000 research development and demonstration program including a greatly expanded effort in nonnuclear energy technologies."


    ------


    ...William Anders for his part is a team player, accustomed to situations in which a great deal depends on cooperation and obedience. In the formless, directionless Atomic Energy Commission of 1973, he stepped into what should have been the chain of command.

    According to Anders himself

    "On June 21, 1973 I become the Chairman of the newly created U.S. Delegation of the U.S./U.S.S.R. Committee on Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy - established under Article 5 of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Atomic Energy Agreement enacted that day.
    Commissar Andronik Petrosyants and I, David Anders, were the cochairmen.

    The first year the Soviets came in America; during the second we traveled to the Soviet Union. For some unknown reasons, every time that I and Robert Seamans met that Petrosyants, he spoke about a so-called Molten Salt Reactor and insisted heavily we should have a joint program. So did Petrosyants deputy Morozov.

    Their insistance picked my curiosity - what the hell was that molten salt reactor, and why were the Soviets so excited by it ?"

    I come to understood that Soviet interest for molten salt reactor was the result of a visit by Tennessee Senator Howard Baker in April 1973. The Molten Salt reactor in Oak Ridge nuclear laboratory pet project. And Oak Ridge is located in Tennessee... so it is Baker job to defend Oak Ridge bread and butter programs."

    -----------------


    In 1970 with the molten salt reactor starved of funds I had declared that Oak Ridge was sufficiently interested in the concept that if there were anyone anywhere, including the Soviet Union or Red China that was going to build a molten salt reactor, the Oak Ridge National Laboratory would be interested. The next step is more important than who makes it. Indeed the times had changed; in the era of détente, the Soviets were a bit less the ennemy and as concerned as we were about proliferation.

    So I had my friend Howard Baker pitching the molten salt reactor to them during a trip to the Soviet Union in April 1973. In fact I prepared a true sale pitch he was to deliver to the Soviets.

    Not only Baker insisted on the proliferation aspects; by making the MSR a joint project with the Soviets we also made it slightly more visible on the agenda.Of course that was a risky business.
    "We are not developing a thorium cycle in the Soviet Union and for the time being we are not prepared to deal with one," Ivan Morozov, deputy chairman of the State Committee for the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, later said. It explained why his superior, Petrosyants, had been so eager to cooperation on Molten Salt Reactors - much like us, most of Soviet nuclear money was pumped into their breeder program. International cooperation would provide a breath of fresh air to other programs !

    Of course all this didn't went very far, at least at the beginning.

    Then, the next year, in 1974 things started to move in a pretty unexpected direction.
    Baker sale pitch impressed Petrosyants enough he discussed the matter with his American counterparts – William Anders first (before the AEC was disbanded), then Robert Seamans (after the ERDA was created).

    Coincidentally both were former NASA officials; and at the time the space agency was actively cooperating with the Soviets to link their Soyuz to an Apollo.

    It also happened that at the time NASA own nuclear lab, the Lewis Research Center, was being transferred to Seamans energy agency.

    The end result of all this was that Anders, followed by Seamans, decided to ask NASA-Lewis nuclear scientists their opinion over Molten Salt Reactor technology. To mask their intentions they disguised the study under application of the reactor to the space program. With or without the Soviets, in summer 1976 Lewis was given a contract to study potential of the molten salt reactor for space applications.

    Some weeks passed and then Seamans called me. He told me the NASA nuclear scientists were very excited. The molten salt reactor, they told Seamans, was just perfect for space – it had high power densities, high temperature operation without pressurization, high fuel burn up and plenty of other characteristics that were just ideal for a space fission system.

    To make a long story short, fluoride-salt mixtures suitable for use in power reactors have melting points in the temperature range 850 to 900°F and are sufficiently compatible with certain nickel-base alloys to assure long life for reactor components at temperatures up to 1300°F.


    Thus the natural, optimum operating temperature for a molten-salt-fueled reactor is such that the molten salt is a suitable heat source for a modern steam power plant. The principal advantages of the molten-salt system, other than high temperature, in comparison with one or more of the other fluid-fuel systems are (1) low-pressure operation, (2) stability of the liquid under radiation, (3) high solubility of uranium and thorium (as fluorides) in molten-salt mixtures, and (4) resistance to corrosion of the structural materials that does not depend on oxide or other film formation.


    The molten-salt system has the usual benefits attributed to fluid-fuel systems. The principal advantages over solid-fuel-element systems are (1) a high negative temperature coefficient of reactivity, (2) a lack of radiation damage that can limit fuel burnup, (3) the possibility of continuous fission-product removal, (4) the avoidance of the expense of fabricating new fuel elements, and (5) the possibility of adding makeup fuel as needed, which precludes the need for providing excess reactivity.

    The high negative temperature coefficient and the lack of excess reactivity make possible a reactor, without control rods, which automatically adjusts its power in response to changes of the electrical load. The lack of excess reactivity also leads to a reactor that is not endangered by nuclear power excursions.
    That, in a nutshell, is why it made a fantastic space power system.


    ----------------------------

    Udet said, “We tried to shut down. But the moderator was too far out of the core to have any immediate effect. The hydrogen in the core and the jacket boiled quickly and started to expand…”
    And now you’ve got a runaway,” Muldoon continued. “Because the reactor was designed with a positive temperature coefficient.”
    Michaels sighed and locked his hands behind his head. “Just pretend I don’t know what you’re talking about.”
    Muldoon grinned tightly. “I know. It took me a while to figure this stuff out. Look: suppose the temperature of your core rises. And suppose that the core is designed so that when it heats up, the reactivity drops — that is, the reaction rate automatically falls. That’s what’s meant by a ‘negative temperature coefficient.’ In that case you have a negative feedback loop, and your reaction falls off, and the temperature is damped down.”

    Okay. It’s kind of self-correcting.”
    That’s right; the whole thing is stable. That’s how they design civilian reactors. But in the case of NERVA, that coefficient was positive, at least for some of the temperature range. So when the temperature went up, the reactivity went up, too—”
    And the rate of fission increased, leading to a further temperature rise.”
    And so on. Yes.”
    Michaels glared at Udet. “I can see the fucking headlines now, Hans. Why the hell did we fly an unstable reactor?”
    Udet sat forward, his face pale, a muscle in his neck rope-taut with anger. “You must understand that we are not building a reactor to supply domestic electricity, here. We are not heating coffeepots. NERVA 2 is a high-performance booster, a semiexperimental flight model. Stability is not always the condition we require.”
    Michaels frowned. And you just hate having to answer these asshole questions, don’t you, Hans? “Why do we need instability? What do you mean?”
    Seger put in, “It’s like a high-performance aircraft, Fred. A ship that’s too stable will wallow like a sow. So you might design for instability. If a bird’s unstable, it can flip quickly from one mode to another; if you can control that, you’ve gained a lot of maneuverability”

    But that’s a big if, Bert. And evidently, when it got to the wire, we couldn’t control it. Hans, why didn’t you beef up the control system to cover for this?”
    Udet punctuated his words by thumping the edge of his hand on Michaels’s desk. “Because — of — unacceptable — weight — penalties.”

    (Stephen Baxter, Voyage)

    -------------------


    I realized that Bob and I had – involuntarily - made NASA a present they could not refuse. In the wake of the Apollo-Soyuz and Helios-Soyuz flights the space agency made limited studies of space molten salt reactors with the Soviets, and the results further confirmed the sheer goodness of that type of nuclear reactor for space applications.

    I have to confess that I, Alvin Weinberg, had never been a great supporter of the space program; it was not my area of expertise, plus I had voiced concern that Apollo huge expense might drain money away from more pressing priorities.

    With hindsight however Seamans idea was formidable. It gave the molten salt reactor a new life; it placed it out of Clinch River way (and it was as well like that, since even President Carter couldn't cancel the project !).

    My only regret at the time was that the space agency had zero interest in the molten salt breeder - they prefered the non-breeding prototype Molten salt reactor, the MSRE. As Rickover told Howard Baker once - " I was asked the question one time at Oak Ridge, why don't you put breeder reactors in submarines ? Rickover answered that the Navy found it more convenient to breed ashore"

    As time passed however, I come to recognize we didn't needed breeder on Earth, too, since uranium reserves were far from limited. At the end of the day the space program got the molten salt reactors out of the breeder impasse, and that was a good thing.

    In the wake of the Apollo drawdown the space agency desesperately tried to make itself more useful; NASA wanted to prove that the space program could solve the energy crisis or cure pollution,or even cure cancer ! That was they called the space program spinoffs, and they made a big fuss of the thing, grossly inflating and hyping it. What they didn't realized at the time, was that with the molten reactor program they had uncovered the mother of all space program spinoffs...

    I found that one NASA facility stood at the center of the agency sprawling effort to solve the energy crisis; it was the Lewis research center. The space nuclear laboratory found itself at the convergence of varied efforts; they had the molten salt reactor, and they had the Army Energy Depot. Put together the two made a stunning picture of a bright energy future where safe nuclear reactors would dissociate water's hydrogen and air's nitrogen into ammonia fuel for cars. It made for a fascinating vision.

    When Jimmy Carter entered the White House, he was deeply concerned about proliferation, and willing to cooperate with the Soviets; two facts that literally send the space molten salt project into orbit.

    Between 1976 and 1978 NASA and the Soviets ran a joint nuclear space initiative. The program grounded to a stop in 1979, as Cold War temperature dived once again, with each partner going his own separate way.

    On the U.S side David Buden and Robin Zubert made paper studies of space molten salt reactors for the next space station and future Moon / Mars bases.
    The Soviets however went much farther and actually flew a molten salt reactor into orbit as the primary power source for their giant MKBS space station. That grew as a major political and military concern for the Reagan administration.

    It also explains why, in the mid-80's Buden moved from Los Alamos to the brand new SDIO – particularly to a branch called the Office of Survivability, Lethality, and Key Technologies.
    At the SDIO Buden promoted Molten Salt Reactors as a power source for all kind of different applications. It was Buden that redirected the SP-100 program toward molten salt technology.
     
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    Soviets in space (13)
  • Archibald

    Banned
    May 16, 1974

    "It isn’t ours to divine the future."

    Boris Chertok was standing on a platform, facing a sea of inquiring looks from a large part of OKB-1 workforce.

    "But from the future, which becomes the present, we can examine the past. Assessing the behavior of individual people and staffs, one realizes that we really did make history.

    If during the launch of the first Sputnik in 1957 we still did not fully recognize the value of such events, then just five years later—from state leaders and chief designers to thousands of engineers, workers, and soldiers who worked in design bureaus, laboratories, shops, and firing ranges, who to this day remain unknown to his-tory— they understood that they were making history. They understood this just as clearly as a soldier during the Great Patriotic War recognized that he was defending his fatherland and giving up his life, not for foreign, unknown interests, but for his own nation, city, village, and family.

    Today we know the history that we are making. We try to plan the future so as to correct the past. Everything in the plans, schedules, and deadlines is broken down year by year, month by month, and day by day. The workday is planned down to the minute. The preparation, launch, and flight of a rocket is calculated and forecast with an accuracy down to tenths of a second.

    Having been in the recent past, which just yesterday was our future, and once again looking into this future, which has become the past, we, like chess players, feel vexed as a result of our bad decisions and sorted through dozens of options in order to find the one that would bring victory. My own notes, the stories of friends and acquaintances, and rare authoritative memoirs of that time have corroborated individual events and what at that time seemed like everyday life.

    Now, looking at you, my comrades and myself from today’s perspective, I realize that over the last fifteen years we have been involved in tremendous achievements. Episodes that seemed workaday are now great events. However, strict standards forbid the historian describing the past from reflecting on the pages of his work.

    So I begg the question: what would have been, if…. However, the majority of people allow themselves to reflect about what would have been if an hour, a day, a month, or a year ago he or she had acted in one way rather than the other. Before beginning the next game, a chess player who has lost a match must thoroughly analyze the preceding game, find his mistake, and finish playing that match with himself proceeding from the assumption that he has made a stronger move.

    It is more difficult for a field commander, who knows full well how he must act to prevent his troops from taking a drubbing and to save thousands of lives, but despite his predictions he is ordered “from the top” to act otherwise. There are many examples of this in Marshal Zhukov’s Remembrances and Contemplations [Vospominaniya i razmyshleniya].

    Today, we can still turn the tables in the Moon race. Four failed N-1 launches have provided a wealth of experience for the creation of a reliable launch vehicle. Preparation is under way for the launch of N-1 number eight with new reusable engines, which have undergone technological firing tests. Hundreds of modifications have been performed on the launch vehicle based on the results of the previous four launches and also devised “just in case….”

    "With the N-1, we have tremendous opportunities for interplanetary flight and other less fantastic projects. That rocket has to live, and it will live. The future lunar base, the enormous MKBS space station, manned expeditions to Mars, the space radio telescopes with antennas hundreds of meters in diameter, and the communications satellites weighing many tons stationkeeping in geostationary orbit - all of this in thoroughly tangible designs is associated with the N-1.

    I have proposed our leadership that in the future the N-1 project should be implemented in two phases.

    First, on the basis of the second and third stages, produce a separate N-11 rocket with a launch mass of 750 tons, capable of inserting a satellite with a mass up to 25 tons into Earth orbit. Then, and only then, produce the actual super-heavy three-stage N-1 rocket with a launch mass of 2,200 tons.
    "In 1962, and despite its obvious logic, this proposal to begin operations on the N-11 ultimately found no support from expert commissions, from the military, or in subsequent decrees. In history, one should not resort to the “what ifs,” but I am not a historian and I can allow myself to conjecture how everything would have unfolded if our 1962 proposal had been enacted.

    "There is no doubt that we would have produced the N-11 considerably sooner than the first N-1 flight model. We could have conducted developmental testing on the second and third stages of the rocket on the firing rigs near Zagorsk. The launch systems that were constructed for the N-1 would have been simplified to be used for the N-11 during the first phase. We missed a real opportunity to produce an environmentally clean launch vehicle for a 25-metric-ton payload. To this day, world cosmonautics has a very acute need for such a clean launch vehicle.

    In 1962 that idea interfered with Chelomei’s proposals for the UR-500 and Yangel’s proposals for the R-56. Today is different, and we will build that N-11 for a 30-ton payload. The military need this launch vehicle first and foremost for the crucial intelligence-gathering purposes of the Ministry of Defense in Sun-synchronous orbits. As for the N-1, the uprated launch vehicle could fly in a year and apayload needs to be prepared for it. We have received a unique opportunity: to correct - albeit late, but radically—the errors that Korolev, Mishin, and we, their deputies, have committed.

    "With the N-1 we are standing at the treshold of a bold future in space.

    "8 to 10 launches of the upgraded N-1 and we will have a base for six persons on the Moon. Comrades Barmin and Bushuyev are drafting plans for a lunar base known as Zvezda or Barmingrad.

    "The Academy of Sciences is developing the design of a space radio interferometer. The spacecraft, equipped with a uniquely precise parabolic antenna with a diameter of 25 meters, has to be inserted into elliptical orbits with an apogee of up to 150,000 kilometers, and only the N-1 rocket is capable of doing this. Our radio interferometer will make it possible to study the finest structure of the universe right down to the “last boundaries of creation.” The universe is ready to reveal its secrets !

    "The first spacecraft was inserted into geosynchronous orbit (GEO) in the 1960s. Since that time, a total of 300 spacecraft have been inserted there, and each year, on aver-age, 20 to 25 new ones are inserted. Geostationary orbit, as the most advantageous location for placing satellite communications systems, will exhaust its resources in the next 20 years. Strict international competition is unavoidable.

    "One possible solution could be the creation in GEO of a heavy multipurpose platform. With coverage of nearly 1/3 of the surface of the planet, such a multipurpose platform will be able to replace dozens of modern communications satellites. The platform will require a high-capacity solar power plant. To support dozens of modern communica-tions satellites, the platform will require a capacity of 500 to 1,000 kilowatts. Large parabolic antennas or active phased arrays are capable of creating any given value of equivalent isotropically radiated power at Earth’s surface. The capability of placing hundreds of relays for various ranges on a heavy geostationary platform makes it possible for the owners of such platforms to sell all types of communications trunks for any region on Earth. Heavy multipurpose platforms will be commercially advantageous and will facilitate the global information rapprochement of peoples. Humankind needs the development and creation of such geostationary systems not in the distant future, but in the next 25 to 30 years. We developed a real design for the world’s first heavy universal platform for GEO. The mass of the proposed platform, according to the design, will be 20 tons and of course only the N-1 can launch that.

    What will the future be is anyone guess. But whatever happens backed in production by its smaller siblings the N-1 will make that future bold and impressive."

    Chertok concluded his speech under a thunder of applause and cheers from the crowd.
     
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    Soviets in space (14) lunar landing
  • Archibald

    Banned
    The Soviet lunar program
    August 9, 1974

    The Soviet rover had been delivered to the Moon three weeks earlier; it had explored Earth satellite at the pace of 1 miles per hour.Now Lunokhod 2 moved into position.
    The rover cameras tilted upwards. Far above Lunokhod a star was climbing out of the eastern lunar sky, unblinking, hauling its way toward the zenith. It was a Soyuz (LOK) orbiting the Moon. It had delivered the squat LK lunar lander that was now descending toward the lunar surface, in the direction of the waiting Lunokhod.
    The LK was nothing like the American Lunar Module – it fact it was rather pathetic. It was barely able to support a single guy for only six hours, and that was it.
    The landing sequence was entirely different.

    The Lunokhod cameras now tracked a fast descending point of light that grew bigger and bigger; the LK was coming fast. As it closed from the lunar surface the LK jettisoned the block D rocket stage that had assumed most of the descent. The spent stage flew overhead of Lunokhod and went crashing only a mile away. The LK own propulsion system then took over, kicking dust as the Lunokhod cameras filmed the scene. The diminutive lunar lander landed smoothly and the engine thrust died as moon dust fell back to the surface.

    In an alternate reality Alexey Leonov would have stepped out of the LK and planted the USSR flag on the surface. Leonov may have strapped himself to the Lunokhod and driven toward another LK delivered ahead of his landing and to be used as a lifeboat.

    None of this happened, however. The LK now standing on the surface was unmanned, and so was the Soyuz LOK orbiting the Moon. Both had been delivered by the N1-8L, in fact the fifth N-1 and the first to suceed.

    Three hours later the LK fired its block E engine and the upper module climbed into lunar orbit, where it docked with the waiting LOK. The Soyuz jettisoned the spent lander, and then rocketed out of the Moon gravity well, shedding two more modules before the reentry capsule sunk into the Earth atmosphere. The Soyuz landed in Kazakhstan and the ground team recovered some hundreds of photographies of the lunar surface.

    After ten years of harrowing efforts the entire L3 lunar stack was now flight qualified – for nothing, since the system was way too limited and perfectly unseful since Apollo had swept the lunar race in 1969. OKB-1 chief designer Mishin had fought teeth and nail for the automated mission to happen, but there would be no other lunar landing.

    The mission had nonetheless been an unmitigated technical triumph, and for a brief moment the soviet leadership seriously considered reavealing its lunar program to the West.

    The reason was that, the day the Soyuz landed in Kazakhstan a bolt of thunder was heard worldwide – President Nixon resigned from the U.S Presidency because of the Watergate scandal. With America in turmoil, the stunning revelation of a continuing soviet lunar program might be a major propaganda coup.

    The Soviet leadership finally decided that they had nothing to lose, and, as a result, TASS issued a brief news release that stunned the world.

    "Today, August 11, 1974 the Soviet Union tested an advanced manned lunar system with much better performance than Apollo. A modified, deep-space Soyuz delivered a LK lander into lunar orbit; the LK then landed near a Lunokhod rover which filmed the whole landing. The L3 lunar complex is now operational, and will led to a lunar base in 1980."

    The TASS press release was accompanied with the Lunokhod video showing the LK descent, Block D jettison and crash, and the landing, together with the Block E departure three hours later. The movie was made available to Western medias on August 13, 1974. And truth was, the propaganda coup worked beyond the Soviet leadership wildest dreams; the video perfectly, negatively and shockingly echoed another stunning picture – that of Nixon climbing aboard Marine One, the helicopter to carry him away from the White House.

    August 15 1974

    The lunar program was now dead, although it had ended with a huge bang. The decrees were on the way; the Soviet space program was reorganizing, although at bureaucratic pace. Glushko had continued hammering Ustinov, day after day, week after week. Glushko even played Mishin own argument: he had had, too, an alliance with Chelomei in the recent past. Considering the hate Ustinov had for Chelomei, at first it looked like a suicide from Glushko. But, as usual, the machiavellian rocket engine designer had a plan.

    Glushko had designed massive engines for the never-were Chelomei lunar rocket: the huge, brute-looking UR-700, the great sister of the Proton. That the UR-700 was a competitor to the N-1 explained a lot of things. Glushko never had a single hope the UR-700 would be build someday, even with the equally massive N-1s exploding at every launch atempt. What mattered was the engine itself; Glushko hoped that someday, someone would notice his big RD-270 on the bench, and ask him to design an upgraded N-1 around it. The RD-270 had become Glushko vengence against the N-1, Korolev and Mishin. The alliance with Chelomei was a mere detail in that process.

    As of 1974, a handful of RD-270s were running fine on the bench, producing immense amount of thrust; had the N-1F been powered by them, the first stage would have had only five or six engines instead of a staggering thirty, a mind-boggling number that caused so much troubles.

    Obviously launch vehicles assembled of a limited number of serially manufactured stages and boosters were cheaper than missile-derived rockets. Attempts to develop a rocket family from the lightest class to the heaviest according to such a modular principle were repeatedly made in the USSR. This applied to Chelomei UR-100/200/500/700/900 and Korolev N-1/N-11/N-111 programs, the later expanded by Mishin and Chertok.

    Standardization of the rocket fleet: that was the thing. For two decades such a modular family of rockets had been Korolev, Yangel, Chelomei and Glushko holly grail. So far politics had prevented that, together with the hellish, unending fights among soviet rocket designers. The result was a rather disparate fleet of small, medium and heavy civilian boosters. Tsyklon was Yangel, Soyuz, Korolev, and Proton, Chelomei. And of course the N-1 was Mishin's baby, and every rocket had a different diameter and engines and tooling. It cost the Soviet Union an arm and a leg, plus the Tsyklon and Proton propellants were extremely dangerous and dirty.

    Glushko certainly agreed that a modular family of boosters would be a fine thing, but, if it was to derive from the ongoing N-1, to him it would be a lost cause. Now, if he could replace the bloody Kuznestov engines with its cherished RD-270...

    Then Ustinov warned him about a different, although related, program he would have to deal with if he took control of Chelomei empire.

    "The National Reconnaissance Office has no less than four different space reconnaissance systems. The KH-9 scans broad swaths spanning ten thousands of kilometers at medium resolution. The KH-11 will do a mostly similar job with a huge advantage; it will beam the photos electronically and instantly. Even more worrying, however, are their dual use systems - half civilian, half military. Keldysh is pretty much convinced that NASA Agena space tug and Big Gemini are only a cover for military operations. The space tug is nothing more than a civilian KH-8 Gambit 3; as for that Big Gemini, it is nothing less than a return to the KH-10 Manned Orbiting Laboratory.

    Both can take pictures with an extreme resolution of four inches. They can see details of our tanks, aircrafts, ships, ground infrastructures as small as ten centimeters ! Not only their Navy and Air Force is probing our airspace. They are also harassing us in space; there had been case of Agena manoeuvering in the vicinity of our satellites - a reminder of the sixty and their Satellite Interceptor program. They had an Agena outfitted with a camera and a radar to destroy our space assets.

    Someday one of their military Big Gemini missions may have an orbit that flew over Moscow on a regular basis. Wouldn't this be a clear message ? Selective political assassination. Say the Politburo is standing outside on May Day and a single nuclear warhead or laser could take them all out…. These things are overhead, they're invisible, but with zero warning they could zap us."

    Glushko shivered. Ustinov is getting very paranoid these days.

    "Andropov and Keldysh are convinced the Americans are preparing a surprise nuclear attack against us. I personally believe their Agena tug is a cover for a new anti-satellite program. That why I think we should retain the IS system"

    "And how does this concern myself ?" Glushko asked rather naively.

    "Well Chelomei covers our anti-satellite program - Istrebitel Sputnikov, the destroyer of satellites."

    "I thought that program had been killed by the 1972 ABM treaty, or at least put on hold."

    "Nope. Recently Breznhev ordered testing to continue. Do you remember what I told you about the space shuttle ? That the American planned to launch it into polar orbit from an Air Base, and Keldysh was led to believe it was to be a nuclear bomber."

    "Ah yes, I vaguely remember that."

    "Well, had this been the case, the current Istrebitel Sputnikov system could have delt with it, since both only work in low Earth orbit."

    "But the shuttle is dead."

    "Indeed. Yet it has been somewhat replaced by the Agena, with the difference the Agena can fly much higher, up to the Moon if needed."

    "Or into Molnyia orbit" Glushko added.

    "Spot on. Thus the American can blind us by saturating space with space tugs. How could we distinguish civilian and military Agenas ?"

    "So the I.S system has now to match the Agena capabilities..."

    "Up to geostationary orbit and beyond."

    "We will need a new engine capable of multiplefirings in space; a propulsion systems for prolonged operations in space, such as the Mars or Lunar probes." Glushko said.

    "We want more." Ustinov said. "We want an unprecedented capability for such a large engine to make as much as 75 firings in space. Ideally the system could be launched on alert, much like a nuclear missile, and in fact a nuclear missile would be the carrier."

    "A missile like the UR-100, for example."

    "Exactly. Another product from Chelomei, thus your shop. Understood ? You will takeover the Breez upper stage and turn it into a space tug similar, or superior, to the American Agena system."

     
    Last edited:
    Battle for the space shuttle (18): the aftermath
  • Archibald

    Banned
    the space shuttle ghost

    Big Gemini will fly a maximum of four missions a year. There's no way of ramping up flight rates above that level – the bottleneck is the Titan III launcher. At least a space station is being build.

    Reading the leaked Matematica report however one can't help daydreaming about the lost shuttle. The morale might be, NASA gambled a lot and ultimately lost. It should be remembered that, as of 1971 per lack of budget NASA went as far as killing the space station, betting everything on the shuttle itself.

    Per lack of space station, a tin can laboratory would have been flown within the shuttle payload bay. At first glance that looks like a dubious substitute to a space station, but in fact it was a long-thought gamble. With the lab in the payload bay the shuttle tookover a good chunk of space station missions, and that inflated its flight manifest artificially.

    It should be remembered that NASA sought to earn money when flying the shuttle; and to achieve that, the shuttle had to fly a lot, as much as once a week. The more missions the lower the cost - that was the motto. More generally it was hoped that low cost of space transportation to orbit would help creating new missions, closing the shuttle economic case. With perfect hindsight is was a risky, but audacious, bet. We will never for sure whether it would have paid or not – at least not until a successfull atempt at a RLV is made in the future.



    FLIGHT International. 29 August 1974

    By DAVID BAKER

    Recently a disgruntled economist with the name of Klaus Heiss leaked an economic study he had done of the now defunct space shuttle. That study has been the subject of intense controversy. Some see it as a glimpse of a forever lost era – how the shuttle would have flown a lot, turning the usual space launch business upside down. Others said it was just outrageous – the the numbers touted were utterly naive and unrealistic. Taking the Mathematica study as a point of departure, David Baker picks up an interesting angle – that of counterfactual history. He tries to imagine where woud we be had the shuttle not been cancelled three years ago.

    Now that the space shuttle is well under way the technical barriers are coming down and confidence is backed with an enthusiastic optimism for the golden age of cheap commuter travel between Earth and near-space. Just three years ago the much publicised Space Station, a follow-on to Skylab, began to price itself out of future plans and the container method came in.

    By packaging several instruments together and mounting them on a pallet, the Shuttle's own cargo bay will serve as the platform from which scientific tasks may be conducted, so capitalising on the enormous ready-made volume built in to the Orbiter. If men are needed to tend the equipment a cheap, pressurised compartment can be carried alongside. This, in essence, is Spacelab, and flights using this European-built laboratory will be called Sortie Missions.

    But the Shuttle is not an end in itself and even with Spacelab in the cargo bay it will realise only a small part of the ambitious programme now envisaged for it. To effectively plan a space programme for the 1980s Nasa has built up a Mission Model, using proposals for the use of satellites or spacecraft as a yardstick from which the payload priorities over the next decade and beyond can be determined.

    An earlier plan developed in 1971 foresaw 327 possible payloads in a 12-year period and the present model raises this to 507 as a result of cancellation of the Space Station. This is naturally more cost-effective because of the increased launch rate. Non-Nasa Government agencies, private consortia and possible European payloads add a further 173, while the Department of Defence estimates that it will require 304 payloads to be flown into orbit.
    Because the Shuttle will be capable of carrying more than one payload per flight the 986 packages can be condensed into 725 flights in the 12-year period between 1980 and 1991. Of this total Nasa will launch 501, or 69 per cent.

    The Mission Model is best analysed by dividing it into Sortie (Spacelab) flights and direct-launch missions, in which a satellite is put into orbit or "retrieved. About 34 per cent of all Shuttle flights will use Spacelab, and less than half of these are expected to use the unmanned pallet alone (i.e. without the habitable pressure module). Only 12 per cent of Spacelab flights are devoted to non-US payloads, while US commercial users account for 3 per cent and Nasa for 85 per cent. Thus 34 per cent of all Shuttle flights support 69 per cent of the payload envisaged. The remaining 31 per cent of Shuttle payloads will be direct-launch satellites encompassing Earth-orbit, deep-space and planetary objectives.
    But the Shuttle has limitations on performance and not all the anticipated payloads can be launched by the Orbiter alone, although some flexibility exists for tailoring the Shuttle to specific payloads. Normally the Orbiter will carry 23,8801b of propellant, sufficient to provide a l,000ft/sec velocity change for manoeuvring purposes from the two 6,0001b-thrust engines mounted in the rear fuselage.

    These rocket motors will be used to provide the final boost into parking orbit, to circularise the orbit at a desired altitude, to provide the energy needed for all orbital changes, and to de-orbit the craft at the end of the mission. Flights from the Kennedy Space Centre, from due east up to 55° inclination require less than 150ft/sec velocity change to reach a 50 x 100 n.m. orbit, while a launch from Vandenberg AFB, 55° il04° inclination, needs 350ft/sec to reach the same orbit after mainengine cut-off. This allows the big propellant tank to fall back to the atmosphere without the need for a retro-rocket. Polar flights are heavily penalised by the increased velocity demand, and these are reflected in the payload figures.

    In basic form the Shuttle will be capable of placing a 65,0001b payload in a circular 28-5° orbit at 210 n.m. altitude. With the same payload it can attain a 450 n.m. apogee from a 100-mile orbit. For a 90° orbit the payload is reduced to 35,0001b, the altitude falls to 200 n.m. and the maximum apogee available is only 390 n.m. These figures represent the best trade-off between altitude and payload, although weight changes have only a marginal impact on the orbit and the absolute altitude attainable is relatively insensitive to off-loading from the cargo bay. This is reflected in the payload figures for the 28-5° orbit; whereas 65,0001b can be carried to a circular 210 mile path, reducing the payload weight to 1,0001b raises the altitude by only 75 miles.

    To reach higher orbits the Shuttle can be fitted with up to three supplementary fuel tanks fitted in the cargo bay and fed to the two manoeuvring engines by means of additional plumbing. With all three tanks installed the Orbiter gains an, extra l,500ft/sec manoeuvring capability over the l,000ft/sec available by using the integral tanks. This permits the Orbiter to deliver 25,0001b to a circular, 585-mile orbit at 28-5° inclination, or a 1,040-mile apogee from a 100-mile perigee. But even this is too low for many of the payloads proposed in the current Mission Model, in which 43 per cent of all flights require a supplementary method of propulsion. In fact, 17 per cent of all Nasa and DoD missions involve synchronous orbits and this reflects a dilemma of the entire programme.
    For several years the Shuttle was seen as a cheap economic launch vehicle, carrying scientists destined for large orbital laboratories and piloted by a cadre of astronauts, ferrying massive supply containers to the permanent Space Stations. The demise of the Space Station has given predicted launch rates a boost, as noted earlier, by transferring orbital laboratory experiments into the Shuttle itself. However the economics of Shuttle launch operations can no longer be regarded as a challenge to the existing family of expendable rockets. This is due both to relatively high launch costs compared with small rockets such as Scout and Delta, and in the higher percentage of flights needing orbital altitudes in excess of those attainable by the Shuttle. The extra propulsive stages needed for these flights cannot be regarded as payload, but must be chargeable to the Shuttle. To do so would be tantamount to classifying the Saturn V third stage as part of the Saturn's payload. Because of this the launch cost per lb of payload weight increases well beyond the $160 obtained by dividing launch cost by maximum payload. In fact, several flights indicate a financial disadvantage in using the Shuttle.
    An example of this reasoning is illustrated by the proposed 1986 Mariner-Uranus mission. Although the weight in the cargo bay exceeds 46,0001b the actual spacecraft weighs a mere 2,1371b. Two launch cost figures can be deduced from this. If the entire contents of the cargo bay are charged as payload the launch cost per pound of payload weight comes to $218. If, however, the Mariner spacecraft alone is deemed to be the payload then the launch cost is $4,560/lb payload.

    This is an extreme example but it serves to show the influence of an additional propulsive stage in the Shuttle. The Mission Model referred to earlier indicates how effective the Shuttle can be if used for only those missions where a heavy payload is required. For example, Nasa forecasts 14 Shuttle flights into near-Earth orbit in 1980. The average load on each flight will be 25,0721b and since all of this is payload the launch cost comes out at a competitive $36.1/lb payload weight.


    Taking another 12-month period, 1983 for example, Nasa expects to mount 40 flights and the picture here becomes very different. The Mission Model anticipates 27 direct Shuttle flights and 13 missions involving the use of an additional propulsion unit. The average payload weight per flight reduces to 13,9091b and the launch cost increases to $674/lb payload weight. Again, the additional propulsion unit needed reduces the cost advantage over expendable rockets and since a higher fraction of DoD payloads require such a boost the economics become less attractive.
    Because the Shuttle can offer many advantages denied to the conventional launch vehicle, such as re-usability, retrieval of redundant or faulty satellites and the return of a propulsive stage incapable of Earth-entry by itself, any evaluation of economics must take into account the entire programme envisaged for the period 1980-1991. Based on the current Mission Model, accommodating 986 payloads on 725 Nasa /DoD flights, the Shuttle programme would cost $49,370 million at 1972 prices. Included in this estimate is the need for 80 expendable rockets of the Scout, Delta and Titan classes during the 1980-1982 build-up period. Seven Shuttle vehicles are required to support this Mission Model and the three-year build-up envisages maximum acquisition rates of follow-on Orbiters, so keeping production costs down.

    By comparison, the equivalent traffic rate using conventional rockets would cost $63,470 million. The difference between Shuttle and expendable models' shows a gross benefit of $14,100 million during the 12-year period. However, it should be stressed that the expendable rocket model uses criteria developed for the Shuttle, with payloads optimised around the Orbiter. By designing the payload model for expendable rockets in the first place the Shuttle would be hard put to justify its existence. Clearly the new Mission Model is built around the Shuttle itself and this further enhances the argument that not only is Nasa developing a new launch vehicle but also promoting a re-direction of effort in the entire space programme.


    As the annual launch rate is reduced, so the economics become increasingly unfavourable to the Shuttle. It is instructive to compare the projected launch weights in the Mission Model with those of the past 12 years. The highest annual Nasa total was that of 1972 when 33,6451b was launched, but the average over the last 12 years has been only 14,0581b per annum. This excludes manned flights since a true comparison must ignore the abnormally heavy weights associated with these programmes of the past. There is no equivalent in current planning for the Gemini/Apollo/Skylab projects and such figures would serve only to cloud the issue. Seen against this past 12-year record are the predicted launch weights for the future and in three typical years taken from the 1980-1991 Mission Model the comparison sets a different pace. Some 351,0001b is to be launched in 1980, 556,3561b in 1983 and 1,052,5251b in 1990. It is this level of effort which generates the $14,100 million cost benefit mentioned above. (DoD missions are excluded from both sets of figures.)
    It remains to be seen if Nasa, in concert with other users such as the European Space Agency and Intelsat, can really generate such a busy payload traffic from a relatively static budget.
    As we saw earlier Nasa and the DoD will not be able to fulfil all their needs with the present Shuttle performance, even with additional fuel for the two manoeuvring engines. Because of this the USAF is to adapt an existing rocket stage for use with Shuttle payloads from 1980. The Interim Upper Stage, as it is called, will be an expendable booster and will probably take the form of a modified Agena. By 1984 it will be replaced by the Tug (to be developed by Nasa), a more sophisticated propulsion unit capable of dispatching satellites to synchronous or highaltitude orbits, boosting spacecraft to the planets and bringing back payloads to the Shuttle for return to Earth. The interim vehicle arid the Tug will both be made available to customers needing them.


    It is too early yet to discuss the design aspects of either the Interim Upper Stage or the Tug—manufacturers are only just starting to look seriously at the concept—but the performance requirements are already defined and this indicates, in turn, the ultimate potential of the first generation Shuttle.

    The specification for the cryogenic Tug requires transfer of a 7,0001b payload to synchronous orbit and the return of the vehicle to a 160 n.m. parking orbit. It is then retrieved by the Shuttle, placed in the cargo bay and returned to Earth. If the Tug is on a satellite retrieval mission the down-load is limited to 4,2501b, or 2,7501b on a combined deploy/retrieval flight.


    To accommodate these requirements the Tug would be about 35ft long, 15ft in diameter, with a dry weight of 5,2001b and a maximum propellant weight of 55,7001b. The performance calls for a 15,0001b-thrust engine with a specific impulse of 461sec. However, the Tug will not be available before 1984 and the less powerful Interim Upper Stage will not make available anything near this performance during the first five years of Shuttle operations. Even the Tug will not provide the performance needed to meet the requirements for several of the proposed planetary missions. For instance, the velocity increment of 18,000ft/sec needed to reach the outer planets would demand the use of a kick-stage attached to the payload itself. The Tug would propel the spacecraft to a partial escape trajectory, separate and then return to the Shuttle's 160 n.m. orbit. The payload meanwhile would need an additional 6,000ft/sec from the expendable kick-stage to escape from the Earth's gravitational influence. This compromises the economics even more owing to the loss of the supplementary boost stage, which disappears into space along with its payload.

    It- is too early to be dogmatic about projected mission models for the 1980s. The existing model, developed by Nasa and the USAF, assumes a static Nasa budget of $3,300 million at 1972 prices but it is difficult to see how the high launch rate can be sustained. For the Nasa flights alone (501 from 1980 to 1991) the Mission Model calls for an average annual outlay of $390 million in launch costs alone. This assumes each Shuttle flight will cost $9-05 million at 1972 prices, with an extra $1 million for each of the 152 Tug flights.
    Nasa has consistently attempted to justify the economics of a Shuttle-based space programme on the $5,500 million development figure. But this covers only two Orbiters, and the Mission Model now proposed requires procurement of five more Shuttles at an estimated $250 million each. In addition to this the payload prediction includes 12 Interim Upper Stages, seven Tugs and 16 kick-stages. Development of the Tug alone could cost $1,000 million, excluding additional models. Finally, planning for the Spacelab element envisages five support modules (i.e. the pressurised, manned laboratories) eight experiment modules (cylindrical containers attached to the rear of the support modules, carrying experiments) and 45 separate experiment pallets. In short, a lot of equipment will be needed to support the 986 payloads proposed and it is difficult to accurately predict the effects on the economics of even a minor slip in development schedules

    Assuming that the ambitious programme anticipated for the 1980s is a realistic proposition the $14,100 million cost advantage in using the Shuttle for 12 years is going to be offset by the increasing quantity of equipment necessary to support such a venture. Any delay in introducing the full inventory of Shuttles, Tugs, kick-stages and other vehicles now envisaged would keep expendable launch vehicles in business for years. Commercial users such as Intelsat will undoubtedly press vigorously for the retention of conventional rockets, particularly Scout and Delta, unless means can be found to substantially reduce the nearly 2:1 cost penalty of using the Shuttle.

    But if these figures reveal anything at all it is that the Shuttle must be seen as an investment in future space capability, bearing in mind the limitations imposed by the phased introduction of equipment. The Mission Model assumes availability of an interim Tug in 1981, capable of re-rendezvous with the Shuttle but not of retrieving a satellite from high altitude. Now that the USAF has pursued the Interim Upper Stage as an expendable unit Nasa will be unable to retrieve satellites above 350 miles until the Tug appears in 1984. Combined deploy/retrieval flights lower this figure considerably. Also, the 12 Interim Upper Stages demanded by the Mission Model assume them to be recoverable. By throwing each unit away for the first five years of Shuttle operations the economics are further compromised.

    Clearly, the launch of 800,0001b payload per annum relies on too many factors converging at the right time. The ambitious Mission Model has too* many parallels with the programme proposed in 1969 which envisaged longduration stations in space, lunar bases, lunar orbit stations and nuclear shuttles, to be wholly relevant today. Nasa has to develop and effectively use the Shuttle to survive another decade of space operations, but an over-optimistic attitude has, in the past, left the agency with a string of cancelled projects. Only a realistic attitude to future requirements can hope to reverse this trend.

    In conclusion - the Shuttle was hailed as a major technical step forward when it appeared on the scene five years ago, sponsored by a Nasa anxious to keep the huge Apollo industrial machine in being. The Shuttle will undoubtedly have a major part to play in the American and European space programme being schemed for the 1980s, but is not perhaps the total launch vehicle that Nasa appears to consider it. If you have a 65,000lb manned scientific laboratory to place in low Earth orbit, then the Shuttle is just the job. But if you have a 1,0001b communications satellite bound for stationary orbit (and paid for by the shareholders) a good old-fashioned rocket will do the job at half the cost.



    ***



    PRINCETON ECONOMIST KLAUS HEISS ANSWERS DAVID BAKER CRITICISM OF THE PLANNED SHUTTLE FLIGHT RATE.


    - INPUTS TO THE 1972 SPACE SHUTTLE ECONOMIC STUDY

    Contrary to perceptions, the case for the Space Shuttle – and also for the Space Tug, then an integral conceptual part of a reusable Space Transportation System (STS) to service to all Earth orbits – was NOT based on transportation cost savings. Important presentations by the independent assessment team in 1970-71 started with the realization that the Space Shuttle cannot be justified solely with the narrow argument of transportation cost savings.

    Indeed it is this statement – that the Space Shuttle System could NOT be justified on the basis of transportation cost savings – and the logical exposition of the REAL case for the Shuttle that won the author the award to do the independent outside assessment by NASA in 1970 to begin with. Imagine: a $3 million contract, limited explicitly to five pages of substantive exposition AND a full day cross-examination as to the rationale AND to start out the presentation with the statement: “The reusable Space Transportation System (Space Shuttle and Space Tug) can NOT be justified on transportation costs!”

    So what WAS the logic for having a Space Shuttle and Space Tug – other than reducing the cost of Space transportation? The very first Table in our 1971 Executive Summary and our Main Report to NASA clearly and simply stated that the life cycle costs would be less for New Expendable (rocket) systems than for a Space Shuttle and Tug – some $11 billion vs. $12 billion, NOT counting the costs for manned Space flight missions!

    However one “massaged” the NASA and DoD mission models (we reduced the mission numbers given to us by the agencies by up to 67%) there was no way to “justify” the Space Shuttle based on transportation costs over a 10-year, 20-year or even “infinite” time horizon – where “infinity” has a way of shrinking drastically when reasonable discount costs are applied to “future” savings, which we did.

    The various Shuttle configurations considered in the 1971-72 assessment are shown and compared in terms of total non-recurring costs (RDT&E, initial fleet of five orbiters) vs. the cost per flight of the various options. These ranged from a fully reusable version (A “707” sitting atop a “747” taking off vertically with all internal LOX/LH2 tanks), to Thrust Assisted Orbiter Shuttles (TAOS) and a “Reusable Crew Module” launched on expendables.

    Also shown in Figure A-2 is the effect of interest rates on technical system choices: were funding, costs and risks no issue, then a case could have been made for a fully reusable Shuttle. However, given those constraints the TAOS set of configurations emerged as the choice.

    The ‘Orbital Space Plane’ was rejected out of hand, as with the intended uses (with a reusable Space Tug) for carrying all payloads to low, high and geosyncronous orbit and the ensuing ‘payload effects’ the basic rationale for the new Space Transportation System was foregone. Also noteworthy in this context was the fairy tale of the “assumed” $5 million cost for each Shuttle launch. The range of launch costs was clearly identified in ALL reports and testimony to Congress and in three separate GAO ‘in-depth’ reviews in the 1970’s


    For TAOS with Solid Boosters (the configuration ultimately chosen by NASA) these costs ranged anywhere from $15 million to $30 million (in 1970 dollars – or about $60 to $120 millions in today’s dollars) depending on assumed launch rates of up to 24 per year, with a clearly stated launch risk of 2% (98% success rate).

    In contrast, TAOS with Liquid (Pressure Fed) Boosters would reduce these costs and risks by about half – and would permit the possibility of intact abort throughout launch.

    Furthermore, moving toward a fully reusable STS (using modular designs with standardized spacecraft components) would open up totally new ways of operating and assuring space missions – collectively called ‘payload effects’, e.g.,

    · The ability to revisit any and all satellites in Earth orbit would allow for cost effective maintenance, repair and updating of components of these spacecraft. Transportation costs constitute only one third of total STS costs. The rest has to do with spacecraft, instruments, data and their processing – in space and on the ground

    – and a modular design with standardized components offers great benefits in further reducing costs of the other two- thirds of total STS costs.


    · Standardization of Spacecraft and Space systems at the subsystem level was a revolutionary idea in 1970 (still unimplemented, by the way) that promised up to 67% cuts in support costs for spacecraft. Standardization would facilitate repair and updating a satellite subsystem level – permitting relatively untrained personnel to exchange blue, green, pink and whatever other color boxes. As in 1970, only a few Space missions are “outside” the scope of such standardization.

    · Reliable On-orbit service reducing the costs of required high confidence capabilities of key national security satellites, which is very expensive to achieve through redundancy of expensive satellites.

    · In-orbit modernization made feasible by such replacement and repair capability. This prospect of updating expensive satellites in Space at the component level, is much to be desired over replacing whole systems or – worse – letting old technology linger in Space providing obsolete services.

    In this context, our 1971-72 study examined both manned and unmanned missions. We did not want to rationalize the Space Shuttle simply and solely on the basis of man in Space: that would tilt the analysis much too much in favor of the Space Shuttle.

    We observed that Space Tug and Space Shuttle would open up extensive new capabilities, e.g., structures larger than could be carried by any expendable system could be standardized and designed for on-orbit repair, replacements, updates, maintenance, etc8. We identified entirely new classes of Spacecraft for science, commerce or defense – in Low Earth Orbit, intermediate orbits, and up to and beyond Geo-synchronous orbits. Dozens of new Space application missions where designed and outlined for NASA, the DoD and private enterprise – once the Space Shuttle and Tug were fully operational, e.g., for

    Space Science: one of our first visits in Princeton was to the astronomy department, chaired at that time by Prof. Spitzer. The result of these meetings was what today is known as the Hubble Space Telescope. I'm strongly convinced that, had the unique capabilities of the Space Shuttle been available, this magnificent instrument could have been built, launched, repaired, maintained and modernized much more easily – on the ground, not in space !We also defined half a dozen other scientific Spacecraft, some in LEO, some in HEO and some in GEO, ranging from radar to infrared to multi-spectral instruments of a size and capability hitherto unknown and unimaginable.

    · Commercial Applications: particularly for communications and remote sensing. Some applications would develop with or without the Shuttle, e.g., a vast range of communications and navigation satellites, including GPS, a variety of Global resources sensing satellites, low and high Earth orbit communication satellites at a variety of frequency bands. We also foresaw an entirely new class of satellites with vastly expanded capabilities, e.g., a new generation of communication platforms in geo-synchronous orbit with vastly increased power- requirements, on-board switching, data processing and storage; tens of thousands of spot beams, and satellite-to-satellite optical and laser communications allowing point-to-point communications to any place in the world. Direct access to repair, maintain and modernize these platforms was critical to providing 99.999-plus reliability. We envisioned a Global Resources Information System (GRIS) described in detail in the NRC papers of the Snowmass meetings of 1974. The effect on the distribution of world food supplies through the commodities markets alone accounted for billions of dollars in annual benefits. Environmental, energy, geologic and other resource observations benefited as well, including such arcane applications as archeology. Many of these have become reality today, as they can also be achieved with smaller spacecraft, not requiring the capabilities of the Space Shuttle and Tug system.

    · Defense Applications: at least one-third of all applications foreseen for the new STS were defense related. They included some of the applications realized since then in navigation (GPS), in observations, in communications, albeit not to the extent possible if we had truly developed the full Shuttle and Tug capabilities, with vistas for expanded uses of Space very similar to those cited for commercial uses above. Building on the considerations of “Bambi” and a seminal 1968 paper by Max Hunter – a member of our team – showing the technical feasibility (in principle) of a Space based laser defense against ballistic missile attacks, we included BOTH options [kinetic (Killer Bees) and lasers] in our analyses of 1971-1972

    While not necessary for a positive Space Shuttle decision, these possible space missions would have significantly added to the benefits of the STS then proposed.
    Not included in the cost-benefit analysis was a vision of future energy supplies from Space to Earth, e.g., large Solar Power Satellite Platforms of up to 100 square miles in area, first proposed by Peter Glaser of Arthur D. Little. One such platform alone will be able to supply up to 10 GW of electric power to any point on Earth. Also not included were any manned Space flight missions such as a Space Station, or Lunar missions or missions beyond. While these possibilities were recognized, we chose not to comingle them with unmanned Space missions which alone justified the Shuttle-Tug STS on the basis of a cost comparison. Their inclusion would open new horizons, indeed.


    Analyzing literally hundreds of different Space program scenarios, with any and all mixes of foreseeable Space missions and applications, we concluded by the end of 1971 that an STS employing a Space Shuttle and Space Tug was in the interest of the United States, at a substantially reduced cost from the original plans of NASA (a two stage fully reusable design roughly a 707 on top of a 747 taking off vertically with internal hydrogen tanks etc.) saving the country billions of dollars in the development phase (cutting the RDT&E costs by 50% or more) AND allowing a cost effective, new range of Space operations and uses.

    The author presented this result to the NASA Administrator in an October 28, 1971 Memorandum (to assure consideration in the Final Design Selection process set for early November and still limited to two stage designs only). This memorandum was followed in January 1972 by a three volume report and separate Executive Summary, documenting the extensive work done by our group in Princeton with support from Aerospace Corporation (Mission modeling) and Lockheed Missile and Space Corporation (LMSC), the leading contractor for the military uses of Space. Notably, this report explicitly stated that the risk of Shuttle Missions failure was one in fifty.


    ‘break even’ for the TAOS Shuttle configuration was/is around 25 flights (again including all launches out of East and West coast sites) to all orbits. Two broad ‘families’ of Space programs were analyzed: ballistic missile defense and other DoD programs (the upper range of results depicted in Figure 2.3) and scenarios without such advanced uses. Obviously the case for the Space Shuttle system was better with additional uses in low earth orbits.

    Contrary to perceptions held by some, NASA did not ‘assume’ 600 or more space flights to ‘justify’ the Shuttle. This is simply not the case as indicated by all of the testimony throughout the Space Shuttle decision hearings before Congress in the 1970’s. To repeat: however one “massaged” the NASA and DoD mission models (we reduced the mission numbers given to us by the agencies by up to two-thirds) there was no way to “justify” the Space Shuttle based on transportation costs over a 10year, 20 year or even “infinite” time horizon – where “infinity” has a way of shrinking drastically when reasonable discount costs are applied to “future” savings, which was done. Transportation costs were at best a “draw”.

    The real reason for reusable STS capabilities – to LEO, GEO and beyond, ideally including Lunar orbits – is in the profound effect these capabilities would (will) have on the very conduct of Space missions, their reliability and capabilities. They would lead to a fundamental change in how to conduct ‘Near-Earth’ Space missions. Thus, the opening up of the Moon as our ‘natural’ Space Station and Operations Base for Cis- and Trans-Lunar activities will transform and change forever on how we operate and use Earth and Near Earth Space.

    Today, thirty plus years later, the author would not change a single sentence, conclusion or recommendation made in 1971. The concluding observations to NASA deserve highlighting: The economic basis for the Space Shuttle and Tug were sound and solid – AS LONG AS NASA AND THE NATION HAD AN ACTIVE SPACE PROGRAM ALONG THE SCALED BACK SCENARIOS OUTLINED AND USED BY US.

    The initial Space Transportation System Recommendations of 1971 – The 1972 decision to proceed with a new Space Transportation System – including the TAOS Shuttle and the Space Tug – was the last significant, courageous and strategic Space program decision assuring an aggressive U.S. Space strategy for the rest of the century to well into the next millennium: all this at an affordable budget profile substantially less than that expended on the Apollo program of the 1960’s, the vision for which President Kennedy and his generation will be remembered in millennia to come. The salient technical transportation components recommended at that time were :

    · TAOS instead of Two Stage Fully Reusable Shuttle. The TAOS Orbiter Shuttle represented a substantial reduction in development costs, risks and schedules over the desire by NASA to develop a two stage fully reusable Orbiter AND Booster – with the estimated development costs reduced by a factor of three to four (from 50 to $60 billion in 1970 dollars to 15 to $20 billion for TAOS, a savings of at least $40 billion

    · A reusable Space Tug To assure access to all Earth orbit missions to the new STS and its new philosophy of payload standardization for in orbit repairs, refurbishment, updating and rescue for high mission availability;

    · An Ambitious Unmanned Space Missions program, including all “conventional” DoD programs then deployed; two novel DoD missile defense missions, one “kinetic” (then called ‘killer bees’), one laser based (Max Hunter’s concept of 1968); “conventional” science and commercial programs such as communications, observations, navigation and life sciences programs; an entirely new class of science and commercial space capabilities (such as Large Astronomy Observation platforms – e.g. the Hubble Space Telescope and several others which availed themselves uniquely of the new STS capabilities – and large geosyncronous Space communications platforms of entirely new dimensions allowing global point to point communications without ground networks.); and

    · Enabling whatever Manned Space Program the U.S. might wish to pursue as a
    “side benefit” of these capabilities.


    Had NASA and the nation fully pursued these programs in the afterglow of the Apollo program achievements, the dominance of the United States in Space would have been absolute. Some of these programs have immensely contributed to changing the strategic perceptions and relations anyhow, others, indeed most still languish to be implemented. The course charted out then still remains to be taken. Most notably in manned Space flight.

    NEVER, EVER WOULD IT HAVE OCCURRED TO US, THAT NASA AND THE NATION WOULD ABDICATE THE PURSUIT AND CONQUEST, INDEED DOMINATION OF SPACE.

    photostream
    space+shuttle+concept+art+21.jpg


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    Robotic explorers (1)
  • Archibald

    Banned
    JPL, planetary exploration, and the National Academies

    It is interesting to compare JPL "whish-list" to the National Academies impartial list of valuable robotic missions.

    JPL is excited by technology and has no issue with cost.

    The National Academies are precisely tasked with balancing costs against priorities.

    The two mostly agree on a list of missions - missions that might form the nucleus of a tentative planetary exploration program for the 80's.


    On top of the list are the Venus Orbiting Imaging Radar, the Jupiter Orbiter with Probe, and an out-of-the-ecliptic solar mission.

    Ranking fourth is an early cometary flyby (Encke, which short period of 3.3 years provides opportunity in 1976 and 1980). The early cometary flyby is seen as a necessary step before a flight to Halley in 1986.

    Moon and Mars polar orbiters are also desirable but they are hampered by Apollo and Viking respective costs.

    There's also a tentative Mercury orbiter, perhaps as a follow-on to Mariner 10.

    Notably absent from the Academies priorities are Mars landers, rovers, penetrators or sample return crafts, for the simple reason Viking results are not yet known. There JPL disagree, ranking MSR as a top priority mission whatever the Viking results.

    Long term endeavour includes a Saturn orbiter and of course the 1986 Halley opportunity.

    There's also the question of spare spacecrafts. Pioneer, Helios, Viking, Voyager and Mariner 10 left a trail of duplicate, backup spare crafts around which opportunity missions might be designed.


    The backup Mariner 10 craft might be flown as either a lunar orbiter or an Encke flyby craft.

    Pioneer H has been proposed as either the Jupiter orbiter or for the out-of-the-ecliptic mission.


    Voyager 3 might be flown to Uranus, perhaps with an entry probe.

    The third Viking lander might be modified as either a tracked rover.


    Helios C has been proposed – once again – as an Encke flyby ship.

    Truth be told, spare crafts are rarely flown. What seems to be a valuable idea at first glance usually run into obsolescence and cost issues.
     
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    Big Gemini (2)
  • Archibald

    Banned
    astronaut class

    September 21, 1974

    He was to report to Edwards AFB that day - he was among the team the Air Force had sent there to support early atmospheric tests of the Big Gemini capsule. As far as he was concerned there was a NASA astronaut tasked with a similar job. It was really a chore, the kind of mission reserved to the lower ranking wannabee astronauts.

    He felt irritated.

    Albert Crews stronger desire had always been to fly in space. Yet so far he was the most frustrated astronaut in the world.

    He had been on Dynasoar, and DynaSoar had been canned.

    He had moved to the Manned Orbital Laboratory, and the MOL had been canned.

    In frustration he had been to NASA, but had been forbidden to fly in space - too old !

    Dynasoar and MOL had left a trail of fully trained military astronauts with only place to go: NASA. Yet the space agency already had too much old heads and scientists, so they imposed an age limit for the transfer, and of course Crews ended too old and frustrated - for the third time in a decade. Undaunted he still moved to NASA to fill a non-astronaut job at JSC - first on Deke Slayton Flight Mission Directorate, from which he was bumped out by Gordo Cooper - himself bumped out of a lunar landing mission by the grant old Alan Shepard. Damn Mercury astronauts.

    So he had moved to the shuttle program, to an assessment of the Grumman bid. Of course Rockwell was going to get the contract. Everybody knew that; they were pulling strings, just like they did to get Apollo a decade before. Except that the shuttle ended cancelled on behalf of the Bureau of Budget, and Crews sought another position within NASA, or perhaps the Air Force. Every month that passed saw his chances of flying in space someday diminishing.

    So he had given up any hopes when, incredibly, the military called him back.

    To fly in space.

    Soon.

    The program would essentially be a rehash of the old Manned Orbital Laboratory, flying some hardware on the mostly similar Big Gemini spaceship.

    Crews looked at the edge of the runway, eying the massive B-52 with the tail code 008. Balls eight - as wisecracking test pilots nicknamed it - was doing his usual job of carrying wannabee space vehicles high in the atmosphere, releasing them above Roger dry lake in a repetition of future landings. Over the years Balls Eight wing-mounted pylon had seen a whole bunch of different flying machines: missiles falling toward their destruction, unpowered lifting bodies gliding to soft landings, or X-15s rushing to thousands of miles per hour.

    But Balls Eight had never dropped capsules before.

    Today ground teams were bolting a prototype Big Gemini reentry module to the infamous pylon. He smiled, trying to imagine their horrified feelings. Give us lifting body or shuttle or X-15 anyday, but not that horrible thing.

    He walked into the control center. The place was buzzing with NASA and Air Force engineers, with officials and bureaucrats and Edwards test pilots. They could hear Balls Eight crew reporting to the ground. The huge bomber had now reached the drop zone. Crews heard the countdown - three, two one... zero. The plane jolted; the screens showed Big Gemini free falling, as seen from the B-52 itself, the chase planes buzzing around, and ground based cameras. The blunt capsule was falling like a rock, to the evident dismay of the test pilots. Their feelings were evident.

    We want lifting bodies; we want the shuttle. We want to fly down from orbit in huge graceful curves over the high desert; it would be a hell of a difference from falling ass-backwards in an Apollo or that Big Gemini.

    "Stabilization chute" said a voice, as a white mushroom popped out of the space vehicle, slowing the fall a little bit. The capsule was falling ass-backward, and soon cables popped out of the nose and flanks, together with a huge piece of cloth.

    "Parasail deployment nominal" said the off voice. Now the capsule was floating through the air; Crews could see some engineer actually piloting the thing by steering the aerodynamic chute; he was evidently gearing automated controls toward a soft landing on Edwards dry lake bed. It would be half an hour before the thing touch down; Crews was to be present at the landing point, together with his NASA counterpart - where was he ?

    "Mr Crews ?" a young pilot stood before him, evidently tasked with the ferrying. "My name's Richard. We have an helicopter here, for you two." A second later Crews spotted the NASA delegate - and was half surprised. He knew the man, a former military astronaut like him - with a notable distinction.

    That very distinction had made that man happy to bury himself in the mission, to get away from the attention his astronaut assignment had brought him. The first black man in space: the first brother in orbit. That man was learning to deal with it, but it was relentless, distracting. And nothing to do with him. As far as he was concerned he was an American astronaut, complete and entire, and not a symbol of anyone else’s agenda.

    The three men rode to the zone in an helicopter, the first to land there. The Big Gemini reentry module stood immobile, in the middle of nowhere, its landing skids stuck in the dust, the immense parasail spread on the ground.

    biglandg.jpg


    They walked around the capsule, eying eventual cracks or failures. Soon an array of varied vehicles arrived, and the capsule was hauled back in a flatbed truck that carried it to a hangar for a complete dismantling of subsystems. A spaceship on a flatbed truck – Crews sighed. He tried to imagine a massive spaceplane tugged to a hangar, airliner style, to be rapidly readied for another flight...

    The closest thing from that dream was the coming pair of subscale shuttle orbiter models. They would fly at Mach 5 thanks to the old X-15 engine. The program however was pretty stealth; the prototypes had not even been given X-plane numbers, they were to be rolled out discretely, all this because of their shuttle (painful) legacy.
    Three airframes were being built, two were to be powered, a third was a glider, and it was not even sure they would be piloted someday. There were vague plans to haul the things into orbit, probably atop an Atlas Centaur.

    "So, how is the lifting body program running ?" Crews said. "Five years ago we were already here, and at the time were many of them, all with exotic shapes." The NASA delegate nodded. Richard looked as if he was torn.

    "I like flying the X-24B, but I also want to fly in space someday - although not in a damn capsule. Iwant to fly down from orbit in huge graceful curves over the high desert. You know, every time I land the X-24B I can't help thinking the aborted Space Shuttle might have felt something like this.

    We lost a lot of beauty when we killed the Shuttle."

    Then to Crews surprise, it was as if him and Richard had pushed some wrong button with the NASA delegate. It was soon obvious that memories of Edwards, lifting bodies and military astronauts were somewhat painful to that man.

    "Five years ago in this very dry lake, I was training on a F-104D with another pilot. We were simulating spaceplanes high drag, fast landings - a very risky exercise. And things went for the worse: we landed too fast and too early, and broke our undercarriage. Our Starfighter skidded on the runway, destroying itself in the process; fortunately it did not cartwheeled nor bounced back. After long seconds we finally stopped; the fellow in the forward seat was badly hurt, and by a goddam miracle I escaped unhurt. Just to say that unpowered landings have their share of issues, too."

    Albert Crews remembered the freaking accident quite well. That Robert Lawrence had survived was indeed some miracle...

    "Richard, you should ask yourself what matters much for you - flying in space or piloting. It is an old dilemma reaching back as far as the X-15 and Mercury antagonism." He understood Richard hesitations and doubts quite well.

    Richard Scobee, Robert Lawrence and Albert Crews spent the evening chatting near the sleek lifting body. Later in the night Lawrence and Crews took a ride around Edwards, talking quietly. "It finally looks as if we, poor military astronauts, are going to fly in space. " Crews smiled. "Do you remember that colleague, how was he called ? Abrahamson ?"

    "James Abrahamson ?"

    "Himself."

    "What did happened to him ?" Lawrence inquired.

    "Oh,he moved, first to the space council, then when Nixon killed the group, he geared himself to a promising career in Washington military circles. We remained in contact, you see. And he told me lot of interesting things.

    "After the space shuttle cancellation NASA officials entered into discussions with the Air Force’s Ballistic Missiles Division over utilizing Big Gemini - perdon, Helios. It happened that Big G, hum, Helios, is morphologically similar to the Manned Orbital Laboratory. And that resulted in the Blue Helios program. The Air Force first proposed a number of possible experiments such as flying stellar sensors, testing astronaut mobility unit, or flying some powerful ground mapping radar."

    "and then ?"

    "Recently Blue Helios changed dramatically. The reason is that the National Reconnaissance Office now sponsors the program. The NRO is a secret agency tasked with building automated spy satellites - the Key Holes. Early Key Holes were short lived and build around an Agena.

    "Agena ? well, now I understand why Lockheed was so confident they would win the space tug contract." Lawrence noted.

    "Bingo. The last three Key Holes in the series are rather interesting. The KH-9 Hexagon is a new, massive satellite; KH-10 was the Manned Orbital Laboratory itself, also known as Dorian; and now the NRO plots another massive bird to replace the Hexagon. The KH-11 Kennan features a major improvement: it can electronically beam the photos real time to the ground, instead of dropping film into earth return capsules a cargo aircraft snap in midair and carries to Washington... That evidently speed intelligence gathering a lot. So you see the issue: NRO is battling with four different systems, since the old Agena-based birds are still there, too."

    "How about that."

    "Yeah, Abrahamson told me that, in the MOL days, at least two highly classified studies of that equipment indicated that it was unlikely to work. The studies simply concluded that putting humans alongside a powerful optical instrument dramatically undercut its capabilities. Humans bumps and pee and breath, and all this cause vibrations that would ruin any high-precision camera."

    "So, did they gave up ?"

    "Nope. They recognized these problems were not tolerable for a clean-sheet design costing billions; but flying a mothballed Dorian camera aboard an off-the-shelf NASA spacecraft is much less expensive. By the way, the solution they found is to let the cargo section with the camera fly alone in space for months after the astronauts departed. Another crew would come back to pickup the photos... Collaboration between NASA and the military is kind of a win-win."

    "How that ?"

    "Blue Helios missions are to last a month or more, which meant special modifications to the spacecraft, modifications that also applies to civilian Big Gemini flown by NASA in the pre-space station days. You have to understand the Manned Orbital Laboratory lived long enough that some hardware was build. There was the launch pad in Vandenberg, of course, and they plan to finish it for Blue Helios. Also build were a set of mirrors, a complete camera system, and - believe it or not – six Gemini B. That fact somewhat helped McDonnell Douglas when they pitched Big Gemini to NASA against Rockwell uprated Apollo. Understand ?" Crews smirked.

    "So that's the reason why they tried to call us back from NASA." Lawrence was surprised.

    "You got it. A bitter irony, isn't it ? Two years and a half after the MOL cancellation most of us military astronauts have been lost to the Air Force. You and others are currently doing a fine job at NASA. And you don't want to come back, do you ?"

    "No." Lawrence smiled.

    "So that left the Air Force with the older ones; those NASA rejected out of hand, you know. Unfortunately most of us have already moved to other jobs, some in Vietnam, others in flight testing. Other died in accidents - Michael Adams was killed in the mach 5 spin that broke X-15 number two, and James Taylor lost his life in a T-38 crash." Lawrence nodded.

    "Thus in the end only Lawyer and Neubeck remained; and myself, Albert Crews, in my non-astronaut NASA job. Our three will now form the nucleus of a new group of space soldiers, in the fourth atempt by the Air Force to fly aviators in space. So perhaps I will fly into in space after all these years. Of course they will have to recruit a whole bunch of new guys, and I'm quite sure test pilots across the country are bracing themselves for the job."

    "If you ever fly in space then I'll happy for you, Albert. Godspeed to you." Robert Lawrence was sincere.

    Robertlawrence.jpg

    Robert Lawrence

    Col._Albert_H._Crews_Jr.jpg

    Al Crews

    ECN-4968a.jpg

    Dick Scobee with the X-24B
     
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    Lockheed's Agena: it' ugly, but it gets you there (1)
  • Archibald

    Banned
    The Agena was nothing like the lost space shuttle. It was unmanned, it was ugly, it was unglamorous, it was not even reusable nor it could return to Earth. Yet it was unavoidable comparisons were drawn between the two, if only because the Agena assumed space station assembly and logistics, once the role planned for the shuttle.

    Lockheed officials were soon angried with the comparison, and they tried to defuse it. To achieve that, and with Volkswagen consent, they subverted the famous Beetle advert involving the Lunar Module.


    Lockheed spoof advert featured a photo of the Agena as seen from a Gemini capsule in 1965, together with the iconic catchphrase - "It's ugly, but it gets you there". Volkswagen logo was obviously gone, replaced by Lockheed's.

    VW_zpsmpqwbtu2.png

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    Lifting body (2)
  • Archibald

    Banned
    Apollo and lifting bodies

    July 13, 1975

    Music: Ozzy Osborne, Crazy train.

    That night in Mojave, Story England was sleeping at the wheel of his Corvette, under the Milky Way scarred sky. He usually dreamed of naked women, but that night was different. He had a vivid dream of a handful of different spaceships flying in formation.

    He was looking through the porthole of what was apparently an Apollo floating in orbit.

    He was looking at Skylab, the space station growing bigger and bigger. And suddenly he found himself aboard the station docking assembly, and he found he was wearing a pressure suit.

    He floated through the tunnel, in the direction of a docking hatch. He vaguely remembered the orbital workshop had two ports, one for Apollo, the other only to be used in an emergency. Suddenly he was frightened; he didn't knew where Apollo was, how he had ended there, and whether he was in danger or not. The tunnel was dark and cold, and the docking hatch was gaping, wide open on the empty space – another anomaly.

    He really had to look through that damn hole, and so he did, and now he found an old friend hanging there – a X-24 lifting body. Every detail was neatly drew, the flat underside, the pointed nose, the small ailerons that stuck out of the fat-assed body. On top of that was a small, translucent bubble: the canopy was wide open, as if the little machine waited for a pilot.

    The next sequence in his dream had him sat in the cockpit with the canopy closed and the X-24 flying away from the workshop. And suddenly the Apollo was there again, flying in formation with him.

    Story England was living a dream, a dream that, to date had only been embodied in theatre or in literature. That dream – or was it a nightmare ? - was called Marooned. Apollo closed from the X-24; the diminutive, unwinged aircraft gleamed silver against the blue of Earth. Story waved at the pilot, who raised a gloved thumb in answer - everything's A-OK.

    The big, silvered Apollo backed-down in slow motion, flying around the lifting body in close formation, checking it out a last time. Now a pilot rather than an astronaut, Story felt a pinch to his heart as he watched his mothership move to a safe distance. When he glanced upwards thirty seconds later, Apollo was already much higher.
    Now he had to bring the thing down to the Cape – or to Edwards if weather decided otherwise.

    In his dream, Story England could see how air started to bite at its ablative heatshield. He had to perform a series of banks to carry some of this heat way - four of them, carefully spaced. As he enjoyed the fiery inferno outside its fragile cockpit, he thought about the defunct shuttle.

    It should have been like this, he thought, except that I wouldn't be alone; we would be six or eight, and behind my back I would have had a big payload bay crammed with satellites brought back to Earth for refurbishment.


    He was smiling under his helmet – or perhaps at the wheel of his car. The ride was exhilarating. After perhaps ten minutes the lifting body gently touched down on Edwards runway.
     
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    Soviets in space (15)
  • Archibald

    Banned
    The NRO is watching you !

    September 21, 1975
    Washington DC

    For the CIA the massive Soviet lunar booster was the J-vehicle. And the CIA knew of its existence for a very long time, with NASA administrator James Webb regularly briefed about it during the Apollo days.
    Although the CIA had missed the first launch (and failure) of the J vehicle in February 1969, it did not miss the second launch and its spectacular failure. The first American to see signs of the damage it caused was a former Navy Chief Petty Officer named Jack Rooney.

    Six years later Rooney was still holding his fascinating job. Day after day he peered through Corona, Gambit and Hexagon imagery of the Soviet Union and particularly of the Baikonur launch complex.
    That day of 1975 Rooney was at work one day in the massive windowless building known as the National Photographic Interpretation Center. The seven-story building, was originally used for manufacturing battleship guns during World War I. It was located in the Washington Navy Yard, near the Potomac River, in a run-down area of Washington, DC.

    Rooney had left the Navy after a long career and was now working as a photo-interpreter, or PI, in NPIC’s Missiles and Space Division. NPIC was administered by the Central Intelligence Agency, but included photo-interpreters from the military services as well. There were all kinds of different analysts at the CIA, and a lot of them tended to look down their noses at the photo-interpreters at NPIC, who they thought were largely intelligence grunts: mere bean-counters and not true “analysts.” But often the photo-interpreters produced the first definitive reports of major events behind the iron curtain.

    Rooney had just been given a roll of duplicate positive film from the latest KH-9 HEXAGON satellite reconnaissance mission to fly over the Soviet Union.

    Unlike a negative, a positive looks like the object that is photographed, and when light is shown through it the film reveals a high-quality image, much better than a paper print. HEXAGON had overflown the vast Soviet rocket test facility at Tyura-Tam located in Kazakhstan. It had taken some time for the satellite to return its film back to Earth, and more time for Eastman Kodak in Rochester, New York, to process the film and make duplicate negatives and positives.

    Now Rooney’s job was to conduct the “first phase” review of the Tyura-Tam facility, looking for any changes at the launch complex since the last mission had flown over it more than a month earlier at over two hundred kilometers altitude. Other members of the branch also received their film and were looking at other facilities, like the Plesetsk and Kapustin Yar launch ranges. The highest priority images, however, were not the launch ranges, but the operational ICBM sites, and several of Rooney’s co-workers were also looking at those. They looked at the film as soon as it came in, no matter what time of the day it came in. Often they worked through the night, writing up quick summaries of what they saw which they cabled to the White House and the Pentagon.

    Rooney took the film roll back to his light table and removed it from its small film can, which was roughly the diameter of a compact disc and about eight centimeters tall. The film was on a spool, and he clamped the spool on one side of his light table, ran the 70 millimeter film over the frosted glass surface of the table, and then taped the end to the take-up reel on the other side of his table. He turned on the lights underneath the table glass and then began winding the take-up reel, pulling the long, thin black-and-white film strip across the lighted table. Each frame was only 70 millimeters wide, and about a meter long, and depicted a huge amount of Soviet territory covering hundreds of square kilometers on the ground. Printed on one side of the film were the words “TOP SECRET RUFF” and the mission number, the date, the orbit (divided into ascending and descending passes), and the frame number.

    Rooney reached the by now very familiar image of the Tyura-Tam launch range, which he had seen hundreds of times before. Thin roadways spread out from larger roadways to reach to the various buildings and apartment complexes and missile silos and large launch pads of Tyura-Tam in the Kazakh desert. From high above, the complex roughly had the shape of a letter “Y”, with the base of the Y connecting to a dock facility on the Syr Darya River.
    His dual-eyepiece microscope was mounted on runners above the light table so that he could slide it over the film and look down at the images at very high magnification. He slid it into place.

    Rooney looked at Launch Complex A first. That was the first launch pad built at Tyura-Tam and the most heavily used. It was where Sputnik first shot into space in 1957, and where Yuri Gagarin followed in 1961. It was essentially the center of the complex that American PI’s called “TT”. It was near the juncture of the Y-shaped road complex, with other launch complexes stretching out to the northwest and the northeast and the base of the Y running almost due south. Launch Complex A was very distinct, with a massive pear-shaped flame trench for venting the exhaust from the rocket that the CIA had designated the SS-6, and the Russians called the R-7.

    Rooney then slid his microscope only a few centimeters over to the northwest, an amount of film equivalent to several kilometers on the ground, and looked at the massive Launch Complex J, the site of the Soviet equivalent to the Saturn V Launch Complex 39 at Cape Canaveral. It was surrounded by several perimeter fences, what the PI’s somewhat comically called “horizontal security,” intended to keep intruders out on the ground, but which stood out like a sore thumb from above, providing no security from that direction. He adjusted the focus.

    Rooney light table also had a Polaroid attachment that allowed him to take instant photos of the image. He pressed the button and made Polaroid shots, which the men passed around the room. His division head, David Doyle, came by and also took a look through the microscope.

    Rooney called for his colleagues. "Look at that. It seems that our Soviet friends rolled out another J vehicle." As usual the Hexagon pictures were extremely sharp.

    In August 1974 as America struggled with the Watergate scandal revelation of the Soviet manned lunar program had been a major shock. There had been no J-vehicle launch in 1975, but now another monster rocket was standing over the Baikonur launch complex. "It seems that they have repaired the massive damage caused by the July 1969 explosion." Rooney remembered all too well the pictures taken by a Corona at the time. Although Corona lacked the sharpness of Gambit or Hexagon, even at lower resolution large scale destruction was shockingly apparent.

    The grillwork covering the trifoil flame trenches had been blown away. One of the two adjacent lightning towers was also knocked down. The scorch marks spread all around the hole in the center of the launch pad. One of the pad’s two large lightning towers had been knocked down. The grillwork covering the three flame trenches was also collapsed. There was considerable scorching around the pad. In 1970 Rooney noted the construction of a rail line to the pad to enable removal of the debris. Of course the Soviets had a second launch pad for the J-vehicle, and two of them launched in 1971 and 1972, without success.

    Now the second pad was back in operation, and probably the J-vehicle would launch on a regular basis. What worried Rooney hierarchy was the payloads – was that J-vehicle carrying a manned lunar landing complex or something else ?

    The CIA analysts didn't had to wait for long.

    Some times later the TASS Soviet press agency relayed a message from the Soviet science academy.
    "Today the Soviet Union launched a large rover to Mars surface. In the continuity of the highly successfull Lunokhods, the nuclear-powered, (5kW) Marsokhod will perform a 100 km long geological traverse across the Martian landscape."
    Rooney and his hierarchy were baffled. "They take a goddam enormous lunar rocket to lift a rover to Mars. The TASS press release says the large spacecraft weights 45 000 pounds during the transmars cruise. The rover by itself weights nearly 6000 pounds !"

    "That's remind me of the first Voyager, the one that was to go to Mars. It was to use a Saturn V, but fucking Congress cut in in summer 1967 as they saw it as a foot-in-the-door for manned Mars missions. Do you remember it ? They were to launch on Saturn V in 1973, 1975 and 1977. Not that Viking did a bad job, but, frankly, the Titan IIIE pale in comparison with the goddam J-vehicle. At least it works superbly; it doesn't ravage its launch pad." Rooney laughed.

    Over the next months the Gambit and Hexagon spy satellites unmasked more changes from Baikonur. Early in the year 1977 a new rocket the size of a Proton was rolled out of the MIK-112 building. On the Gambit sharp pictures it looked somewhat similar to a N-1 albeit much smaller and with a thinner base. The West did not immediately realized that the N-11 (code-named SL-16) was a N-1 cut of its troublesome block A stage 1; it was to replace the Proton.

    Through the sharp eyes of the Gambit and Hexagon spysats Rooney and his colleague soon discovered important changes to Baikonur. From 1973 onwards Area 250 in Baikonur was created near Area 110, the massive dual launch complex of the N-1.

    Area 250 had a dual role.

    First, the new N-11 would lift-off there, from a couple of medium-size launch pads build for it. N-11 assembly was done in the MIK-112 enormous building, next to the stored N-1s. Although much lighter, in order to save money the N-11 used the N-1 enormous rail-tracked erector system. The new pads were rail-linked to Area 110.
    Secondly, an enormous test stand was build there for pre-launch firings of the N-1 block A. In the mid-80's Glushko's Polyblock was ground-fired on the same test stand that had to be modified to run on storable propellants.The Soviet plan was to ensure reliability of the N-1 upper stages through many N-11 flights in replacement of the Proton. With the upper stages made reliable, a new superheavy launcher would be re-created by mating the N-11 with an extremely powerful first stage.The now ground-tested Block A would be flown on N-1 boosters 10L, 11L, 12L, 13L and 14L, most of these flights dedicated to MKBS-1 and eventually, MKBS-2 enormous space stations.
    N1 8L and 9L still didn't tested their first stage on the ground since the stand was not completed as of 1974-75. But the two missions were mostly filler – the first with a completely automated lunar landing complex, the second with the big 4NM Marsokhod. Payloads were still secondary to N-1 reliable flights, but against all odds the N-1s survived beyond stage 1 separation, although the improved KORD system shut some engines during early ascent.

    These incidents convinced Mishin and his successor Chertok that the Block A should be ground tested from booster 10L. As such, the N-1 10L payload – the enormous 5NM Mars sample Return probe – was pushed back to 1979 so that its N-1 block A could be ground-tested on the new bench in Area 250. By a curious irony however Marsokhod failed just after a succesful landing and in 1978 spacecraft 5NM was send to development hell with its N-1 launcher. At least N-1 10L paved the way to ground-testing of the first stage.

    Once the supply of Block A exhausted, a new N-1 - the N-1M - would be created with Glushko Polyblock as stage 1. With six RD-270s it would be (hopefully) more reliable than Kuznetsov Block A and its thirty engines... At a later date the toxic storable propellants in the RD-270 were to be replaced by LOX/kerosene, creating the RD-116 - and engine very much a Soviet F-1.

    After a seven years hiatus ground-testing of the RD-270 started again in 1977, with various problems plaguing test firings. Torturous development of that engine continued from 1977 to 1987, presenting some of the most serious challenges before engineers at Moscow-based NPO Energomash led at the time by Valentin Glushko. Instability of combustion was extremely troublesome, so much that in 1984 Glushko had to postpone development of the RD-116 and focuse all energy on the troubled RD-270.

    In 1982 one RD-270 botched tests at NPO Energomash test facility on the outskirts of Moscow reportedly ended with a massive explosion that sent a heavy metal cover of the troubled engine's turbopump several miles away concluding with an impact on the runway of Moscow's main international airport in Sheremetievo! After that fiasco it was decided to move testing to Baikonur Area 250, with the ultimate goal of firing a phase 2 polyblock with RD-116s instead of RD-270s, but the Soviet Union collapsed as the first RD-116 was run on Glushko test bench near Moscow.

    Glushko Polyblock program never had high priority since there were just enough N-1s stored in MIK-112 to launch a couple of MKBS large space station trios of core modules. The Polyblock-upgraded N-1 had no clear mission nor payload– although Glushko considered a lunar base as the next logical step beyond the MKBS, the Soviet leadership was hardly interested.
    (note: this entry is partially adapted from this by space historian Dwayne A. Day)

     
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    Soviets in space (16)
  • Archibald

    Banned
    “...intelligence analyst Peter N. James’s none-too-subtly titled book Soviet Conquest From Space offers a sweeping portrait of a “total” Soviet space effort centered on the construction of a space shuttle fleet; second fleet of orbit-to-orbit spacecraft for servicing them, or space tugs; and not one, but a network of orbiting space stations, some capable of hosting twenty crewmembers at a time.

    "The Soviets believe that the creation of a network of space stations is their highway into outer space" James says. "This massive, robust infrastructure would enable the Soviet Union to conduct space operations on a routine basis, just as military aircraft are currently used in surveillance, reconnaissance, tactical or strategic missions.”

    James predicts that by the early 1980s "orbital space will be saturated by practically every conceivable Soviet satellite, from passive to aggressive space systems, from maneuverable spaceships which can seek and destroy orbiting U.S. satellites, to orbital weapons systems which can destroy terrestrial targets as well"


    51qm3gj%2B04L._SX342_BO1,204,203,200_.jpg


    ...


    Only much later was it understood that during his private discussions with Soviets officials, Peter James clearly picked up some shreds of information on MiG's Spiral. One of the specialists James talkeld to at the 1969 IAF congress in Argentina was Gennadiy Dementyev. That person was interesting in many ways.
    First, he was the son of the Minister of the Aviation Industry, Peter V. Dementyev. Born in 1907, from March 1946 he was Deputy Minister of Aviation Industry of the USSR. In March 1953 the Ministry became the Ministry of Defense Industry and Dementyev has lost his post. After the arrest of Beria Peter Dementiyev became Minister of Aviation Industry of the USSR. He led the industry until his death in May 1977 - almost 34 years. As for his son, he had first worked at the Moscow aviation institute but in 1967 he was named Lozino Lozinskiy deputy for the Spiral Program at Mikoyan's space branch in Dubna.
    So Peter Dementiyev son Gennadiy found himself in touch with Peter N. James and through him, James speculated on the misterious Soviet space plane.
    What James couldn't guess was that the Spiral project had never been the Soviet answer to the cancelled American shuttle. Spiral had started long before, in 1965, and ten years later was stalled because of his dual nature half-rocket and half-aircraft. The two branches – led by Peter Dementiyev and Serguey Afanasyev - hated each other since 1960, when Khrushchev had sacrificed long range bombers to ICBMs, redirecting five aviation shops to the missile industry.


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    Europe in space (11)
  • Archibald

    Banned
    this one is for E of Pi (and his new TL)

    On 23rd and 24th October, 1975 the launcher division of the CNES hold a meeting in Beaugency. There was studied the feasibility of using Ariane for manned flight.
    It was found feasible to orbit a capsule with a mass of 8000 to 12000 pounds and a diameter of 3 m – a craft somewhere between the American Gemini and the Soviet Soyuz.

    It appears that the CNES engineers were more or less split into two opposite camps; one supported a Dyna-Soar type hypersonic glider, the other a Gemini- or Apollo- shaped capsule.
    Some bitterly noted it was a little annoying to repeat Gemini missions twenty years late; as for the hypersonic glider, his fate was sealed by the death of of the space shuttle, which weighed heavily in the decision. The capsule supporters used the same argument - wasn't the Dyna-Soar design as "antiquated" as a capsule ? they said ironically.

    A real breakthrough would have been a reusable launcher, some said.
     
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    Big Gemini 1975: Transition to a new manned space program
  • Archibald

    Banned
    ISS: the interim space station

    Salyut rapid progresses have forced NASA to try and bridge the gap between Skylab and the coming space station which will be launched in 1979 at best. That leave a five year gap between the two space stations. NASA explored three possible options.

    Option A was docking a Big Gemini to Skylab A; but that option was rejected since Skylab A is too battered, his internal systems a generation backward when compared to Big Gemini. The atmospheres are not even the same; somewhat ironically Big Gemini will use a mixture similar to Soyuz, that is, air instead of pure oxygen. Hence docking a Big G to Skylab would have issues similar to Apollo-Soyuz. A docking module would be necessary – in fact such module already exists since a backup system was build for ASTP. The backup Apollo-Soyuz docking module would be added to Big Gemini cargo section permitting a docking to Skylab.

    Option B consisted of an upgrade of Skylab B, launching it as an intermediate space station in the 1976 – 78 era. Once again that option was discarded per lack of funds. Skylab B is instead being turned into a ground-based mockup of the future modules. Its Apollo Telescope Mount has been detached and mothballed; it will probably be integrated to either a Big Gemini mission or even to the future space station.

    Instead Option C was imagined. It happens that the space station modules are being build faster than the more complex core. So it was proposed to fly one module ahead of the core as a semi-autonomous space station. Once the core in orbit the module would be docked to it. That solution is called the ISS – Interim Space Station.
    1975 will be a busy year for NASA. The last Saturn IB and the last Apollo are being readied on the VAB and LC-39B; in July they will fly the joint mission with the soviets. Another Saturn IB stands in alert with CSM-119; it is the rescue vehicle. On the other side of Cape Canaveral a pair of Titan III is prepared for flight. Those are Big Gemini EFT-1 and EFT-2 unmanned test flights.
    Back in 1973 a Titan II has lofted a MOL Gemini-B capsule into a suborbital trajectory for the first test of the hatch-through-the-heatshield, a critical aspect of Big Gemini. EFT-1 and EFT-2 will test the definitive variant of NASA new manned spacecraft.

    Spring 1976 will see the first manned test, followed by the so-called bicentennial mission in July. The next year will start with the Skylab revisit flight.
    Big Gemini will fly around the old workshop without any docking.
    Later in the year 1977 the second joint flight with the Soviets will happen. It will be a little less difficult than Apollo-Soyuz since both ships will feature similar atmospheres. The crews will no longer prebreath pure oxygen or atmospheric air when going from one ship to another. Big Gemini cargo hold, which is nearly as big as a Salyut, will be turned into an international space laboratory crammed with experiments borrowed from both Skylab and the future space station. It is planned the two ship will remain linked for a whole week.

    1978 will see the autonomous module fly in orbit. It will be outfitted during a 28 day mission. Later in the year Skylab B Apollo Telescope Mount might be added to the Interim Space Station. From this moment one-month missions will be performed three times a year until, hopefully in late 1979 the new space station core become available.

     
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    Owen Gordon (2)
  • Archibald

    Banned
    March 21, 1976

    Owen Gordon aerospace career was progressing nicely, still he was plagued with contradiction and misunderstandings. There was some entrenched hate directed against the Big Gemini program he was managing, if only because of the lost space shuttle it replaced. He somewhat felt that resent, and suffered from it. He masked that working as hard as he could; next month would mark a milestone, the rollout of the first manned Big Gemini. He actually enjoyed his work; he had learned a lot of things, and there had even been some big surprises on the way.

    For example, that day at a remote military area in the desert.

    There, the Air Force had a vault were they stored a variety of things they didn’t wanted leaking to the outside world.
    To Gordon frustration there had been no alien bodies nor Ark of he Covenant nor fake Apollo film stage; and, unfortunately, no Arrow that got away. Instead were three little spaceships the shape he immediately recognized. Three Geminis ! The ships had been build for the military, for the Manned Orbiting Laboratory that had been canned in ’69. For Douglas they were precious assets; launched by Titan II the refurbished capsules would become testbeds for the incoming Big Gemini. It had been a very strange day spent in the desert, far away from the outside world, at the mercy of nervous soldiers and men dressed in black. At some point Gordon even figured himself running across the desert, chased by a black helicopter with snipers firing at him... just because he had discovered the truth was out there... he laughed uncomfortably at the vision.

    Owen Gordon had been tasked to take a pair of Gemini B out of mothball and prepare it for a suborbital flight. In 1973 a Titan II had lofted the capsule into a ballistic hope to test the hatch through the heatshield.

    What Gordon had discovered was rather amazing. The MOL had started as early as 1963 but the real start had been 1965. Six missions were planned, so six more Gemini capsules would be build in the shape of the somewhat upgraded Gemini-B. NASA for its part had flown its last Gemini in November 1966. The military wanted a smooth transition from Gemini to Gemini B; McDonnell Douglas production line wouldn't be interrupted. That meant that production of the six Gemini B had started as early as 1966 while the MOL program had been canned only in June 1969, three years later.
    Within the span of three years McDonnell Douglas had had well enough time to build all six capsules; but the rest of the MOL being delayed, the six Gemini B had been stored. The storage that should have been temporary had become permanent post June 1969 after the MOL was canned. Gordon had seen all six capsules carefully stored at a secret military facility in the desert. Only two of them had been taken out of storage for the Big Gemini flight test program. Four more flight-ready capsules stood in the hangar, unused.


    Gemini-B_1.jpg

    Perhaps someday they will be some space cadet crazy enough to fly those capsules for space tourism. Gemini only weights 3.5 metric ton yet it can remain in orbit for 14 days. One day, perhaps... time will tell.


    So he loved his job, but the nightmares remained; he was still haunted by his WWII fighting experiences.



    March 21, 1945.

    Music: Twisted sisters, Like a knife in the back

    Seen from 20 000ft, the plant was a blurry square, with little details visible in his gunsight. Details didn't mattered, however; he just had to plant his pair of 1000 pound bombs right in the middle of that square. He first throttled the big Sabre engine back, and the Typhoon was shaken by vibrations. Then he lowered his flaps, turning them into dive brakes. He armed the massive bombs strapped under his wings, pushed his stick forward, and entered a 80 degree dive. Noise and speed reached alarming levels, with the altimeter veering crazily. "If the altimeter is right, we are aboard a fucking submarine" he reminded that joke about a bomber crew lost in the fog. The acceleration just boggled his mind - 300, 400, 500, 600 miles per hour, on the way to supersonic speeds his machine couldn't endure. For a fraction of second the blurred square become a plant, complete with rows of Junker bombers, hangars, smoking chemneys, and fuel tanks. A neat little German plant, only seconds away from hell. He dropped his bombs and pulled the stick like hell - the effort was horrible, as if the damn column was solidly planted in concrete. G-forces literally crushed him, he weighed tons, but he never stopped pulling his column with all the strength he was left. The Typhoon was now in a ten degree dive, a gentle dive. He throttled his engine back to full power, and with the dive, he was still flying at a good 450 miles per hour. He pressed on to its next target, the air base. He briefly glanced over his shoulder and saw an huge cloud of smoke, with orange flames at the base. Gotcha. He pushed his column, and the Typhoon accelerated again, diving at tree tops level - no less, the pine trees clearly visible. Sweat cascaded in his back. He eyed a small tower over the top of a hill; the air base was behind the hill, he would have to literally jump above that bump that, he hoped, would mask him to the flak until it was too late for them. And so he did, and he took the Krauts per suprise. There was row of tent or hangars or whatever that was, and he took the thing into his gunsight, and pressed the trigger. Four Hispano guns and four small machine guns exploded in a hail of deadly bullets. Hell spread below his wings as he pressed over the airfield at an alarming low level. Now the Krauts were jumping to their guns, trying to blast him from the sky. Good luck to them. The last thing he saw of the damn base was a huge hangar, huge like a cathedral, and he had to pull his stick not to smash into the big thing. He pressed the trigger again, and bullets cascaded out of the Hispanos, crippling the huge structure, with secondary explosions everywhere. Not time to admire what he had done; he was already out of the perimeter, cutting the top of pine trees with its thick wings, with the flak exploding above his cockpit. He did not dared to climb until a complete minute had passed, and he returned to his base in France.


    After losing so much friends along the years, Gordon had conceived a maddening hate for the flak. Against 109s or 190s you could defend yourself; but the anti-aircraft weapons were for cowards, he had decided. He had so much hate tucked inside him he had asked to be detached to a ground attack unit. For some weeks now he had flown a Typhoon, a massively ugly, brute-looking fighter, with a huge air intake gapping like the mouth of a dinosaur. It was the exact opposite of the sleek Spitfires he had flown for years; and a perfect match to Gordon enraged, hateful mind. With his Typhoon he had blasted dozens of ground targets, notably steam locomotives vital to whacko Adolf war effort. Only a couple of hispano bullets into the boiler would blast not only the locomotive, but also much of the wagons and part of the rail track. Most of the time the trains were crammed with ammunitions and gazoline, with obvious results. He took some ignominous pleasure aiming, pulling the trigger, and making his target explode. Kabooom: he was just insane. The war had turned him into an enraged beast; he was living only to the day, never hoping to return alive from a mission. Typhoons piloted by his squadron mates felt like flies, and died pilots were replaced by young recruits lacking experience that suffered horrible losses.Still, somewhere the fucking fate had decided he would not die, and he did not died, and from May 1945, like millions of survivors across the planet he had to find a new sense to his shattered life.

    March 21, 1976 - McDonnell Douglas plant - Long Beach, California

    There was the public and press and NASA officials and lot of people, all gathered at the McDonnell plant for the presentation of a Big Gemini full size mockup. NASA was taking no risk with the hatch through the heatshield, another controversial aspect of the new manned ship.

    Design of Big Gemini had long been frozen, since 1973. There has been some interesting debates about how would Helios appproach and dock from the space station.

    The Agena was to use a LIDAR, an automated docking system, and initially Helios was to use it, too. But the astronaut corps had protested, and they had obtained manual docking. An astronaut would stand up, strapped to a work station similar to a phone booth and located at the rear of Helios cargo module. The astronaut would take manual control of Helios reaction and control system and ram the spaceship backward, into the space station docking assembly. The docking rings by themselves had been the subject of heated debates. Should NASA use the plain old Apollo probe and drogue system, or the brand new APAS-75 androgynous system invented for Apollo-Soyuz ? In theend the APAS-75 was chosen. Not only the Agena and Helios would use it. All the space station modules would feature strengthened APAS-75 docking rings.

    The Big Geminis neighbored with Skylab B, and Owen Gordon felt the move had been delibarate. It was a demonstration of force, a message send to both NASA and Rockwell.

    We are the winner of the shuttle debacle.

    Legendary designer Raymond Loewy was also there - many years before NASA had hired him for a major redesign of Skylab interior. Loewy and a promising, 30-years old recruit named John Frassanito had done a fantastic job, so good that NASA asked Loewy to renew his work for the next space station. Loewy agreed, but warned that Frassanito was no longer with the company, and that himself was on the brink of retirement. Still he would work on the space station with great pleasure.

    When in 1972 NASA emphasis switched from shuttle to station, McDonnell Douglas felt their experience with Skylab promised more modules of that kind, notably the core of the space station.

    Instead, the space agency decided MDD had enough work on his plate with Big Gemini, and turned the core contract to Rockwell and their S-II stage. In the process they also contracted with Loewy for the design interior.
    The reasonning was the McDonnell Douglas didn't needed Loewy again, since their own modules would be close derivatives of Skylab he had already worked on. Gordon company completely disagree, and wanted his own talented designer for the Skylab design modules and even Big Gemini.

    That's how Gordon was tasked to track back that Frassanito and hire him at any cost.
    He ultimately found him working in Houston but not on the space program. Frassanito had been hired by Datapoint, a growing computing company. To Gordon surprise, he learned that the co-founders Austin Roche and Phil Ray were former NASA employees from the Apollo days. The company itself was exploiting a spinoff from the Apollo program, some revolutionnary technology invented for the Lunar Module landing computer.

    It was called the microchip.

    Gordon had no idea what a microchip was, thus Frassanito asked Roche to show him one. It was rather unempressive, an aparently unsignificant little bit of metal that looked like a centipede. Yet watching Ray and Roche and Frassanito excitation, for unknown reasons Gordon felt that microchip thing alone might be worth the $20 billion the space agency had spent on Apollo. The very irony was that NASA had so far completely missed one of the potentially best space program spinoff that ever existed. Or did it ?


    datapoint%2B2200.jpg
    Frassanito sketch of the Datapoint 2200 computer, the great grandfather of today's PC.


    Gordon did not managed to hire Frassanito, which instead went on to fund his own design company. Still, Gordon could see that work done by Frassanito on Skylab had sparked some deep-rooted interest for the space program.

    Back at McDonnell Douglas, Gordon remained in touch with Frassanito and the guys at Datapoint. He felt something huge was coming from there, which may be useful for the space program.

    The shuttle controls may need some hefty computing power someday.

    The shuttle, by the way, was far from dead. It was more like in life support or coma, with the hope of a resurrection, perhaps after 1980. Low-level contract studies had in fact never stopped, refining the future shuttle again and again. With Marshall on the brink of closure and Houston busy with Big Gemini and the space station, Langley had taken a lead role in shuttle studies.

    Gordon had made a brief stint at Langley before - like so many Canadian engineers orphans from the Arrow, he had been send there in 1959, together with Chamberlin, Lindley, Hodge and others.

    A decade later a small group under the direction of Gene Love fought for the shuttle against all odds. They had obtained funds not only to refine the shuttle, but also for industry study of more advanced concepts such as single-stage-to-orbit. Martin Marietta and Boeing had received contracts but Martin was busy with the Titan, so they withdrawn, and Gordon's company replaced them.

    His leader counterpart for Boeing was Andrew Hepler, and because there would be nothing to build at the end of the contracts, they were not true rivals. Hepler had impressive credentials in both aircraft and missile worlds. He had worked on Boeing famous B-29 and B-52 bombers, the tankers to refuel them, the BOMARC huge anti-aircraft missile (a program where he had worked along future writter Thomas Pynchon !), Dynasoar, the MOL, and the 2707 supersonic airliner.

    After the latter cancellation in April 1971 he had briefly worked on Boeing bid for the aborted shuttle, and on Langley post-shuttle studies. He had recruited from Rockwell a very talented engineer with a promising concept - Len Cormier and his Windjammer.

    Gordon and Hepler went along quite well.

    Because of his Boeing background, Hepler strongly embraced George Mueller original vision of the space shuttle, exposed at that JBIS meeting in London, August 10, 1968. He was obsessed with giving the future shuttle aircraft-like operations.

    All this, however, was very preliminary work, and the lost shuttle remained in everyone mind.

    The year 1973 had brought two massive changes.


    On one hand, NASA had secured a space station; on the other hand, the Air Force had affirmed the Titan III would handle the heaviest satellites for the predictable future. Accordingly, the space shuttle had been reduced in size and weight and crew. Now four astronauts would ferry 20 000 pounds of payload to Liberty, or perhaps to its twin and eventual successor everybody already called Destiny. The reduced crew would sat on ejector seats similar to those of the SR-71, assuring survival up to Mach 3.

    With a decade to spent, NASA had plenty of time to refine the shuttle, giving contractors lots of contracts to study some aspects more pointedly. For example Owen team at Douglas had recently been tasked with assessing the issue of ferrying orbiters from their landing fields back to their home base of Cape Canaveral. The lighter shuttle could have easily been hauled on the back of an airliner. But that solution was anything but practical: not all airports featured giant cranes strong enough to loft an orbiter.

    No, the best scenario would have the shuttle flying alone; a couple of F-101 turbofans, together with a kerosene tank in the payload bay, would do the trick. The orbiter blunt ass would be covered with an aerodynamic fairing. Gordon five-volumes report to NASA featured a picture of the whole thing on the cover, a superb artwork done by legendary Robert McCall.

    The orbiter had the turbofans hanging from a couple of underwing pylons very reminiscent of the Boeing 707 or Convair Hustler from the 50's. Together with the rear aerodynamic fairing, it made for an awesome-looking flying machine - if not very efficient. The low atmosphere being evidently not the orbiter home place, it would stuck to subsonic speeds and short hops, a mere 500 miles at best. Ferry flights across the United States promised to be a shore, although they might be familiarize astronauts with the beast cockpit.

    index.php


    If I were to sat at the controls, I would go full throttle and try a barrel roll. Open day at Edwards AFB, in the 80's: god, the look in the eyes of childs watching an acrobatic shuttle orbiter barreling over Roger Dry Lake !

    As for the lower half of the shuttle, the flyback S-IC booster, the latest news were pretty encouraging. NASA was throwing a lot of contract money at Boeing so that they refined the concept.
     
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    Beyond Apollo (1970)
  • Archibald

    Banned
    HOW TO REPLACE THE APOLLO LUNAR LANDING SYSTEM (1976)

    Between 1960 and 1970 there were countless studies exploring what NASA was supposed to do after Apollo 11 and the nine landings planned, up to Apollo 20. Nothing was carved in stone, and truth be told, future was pretty murky. There were studies of steps backwards – into low Earth orbit – or studies of step forward, onward to Mars. Also was statu quo – with Apollo exploring the Moon, why go elsewhere at all ?

    One can ask whether or not Apollo was an efficient manned lunar landing system. Surprise: it was not, and that's the reason why it was brutally cancelled post Apollo 17, in 1972. Apollo largest sins were two-fold: nothing in the 5000 tons Apollo-Saturn lunar stack was reusable, and thus nothing was cheap. Every Apollo shot to the lunar surface cost a billion of dollar or so.

    Now let's consider three monuments of sci-fi: Hergé Explorers of the Moon; Clarke and Kubrick 2001; and the mostly forgotten Continent in the Sky by Paul Berna, a French writer and a friend of Clarke. All three novels features lunar transportation systems very unlike Apollo. Tintin nuclear V2, Berna Astrospheres, and Kubrick Aries 1B doesn't stage nor expend bits and bits of spacecraft to reach the lunar surface. They are more akin to lunar airliners. The fact that – admittedly – they are not technically realistic doesn't change the bottom line, which is: in order to support a lunar base, you need an airliner to the Moon. The absence of such system explains why the only atempt at funding Apollo through private money (project Harvest Moon) imediately fell by the wayside. The whole Saturn - Apollo system just can't be handled to any private entity, it is just too cumbersome and expensive.

    Thus one can ask whether, at some point after 1969 and Apollo 11 - did NASA considered a more efficient, cheaper to operate, manned lunar landing system ? Fasten your seat belts and forget Mars; forget the aborted space shuttle and forget the Liberty space station. Also, forget the 1966 AAP: Apollo Application Systems, which was a mere extension of the Apollo hardware, hence had the same sins.
    NASA vision of Apollo replacement system featured two major aspects: a) reusable spacecrafts flying a large number of missions to save money and b) outposts everywhere to sustain the reusable systems who, unlike Apollo, needed refueling and refurbishment to keep flying.
    By outposts we mean space stations and propellant depots – in Earth orbit, then in cislunar space. Here we are going to detail the reusable components in the shape of a short alternate history – how things might have happened after in the summer of 1975 the Apollo 20 mission concluded the first phase of lunar exploration – Apollo.

    The year is 1976 – of the United States of America bicentennial, obviously.

    Launch Complex 39A – Cape Canaveral, Florida

    Even the mighty thrust of five F-1As is not enough – the Saturn INT-21 can't haul a fully-fueled Nuclear Shuttle into Earth orbit, so some tanking will be needed once in Earth orbit to perform a roundtrip to lunar orbit. Unlike the old S-IVB translunar stage the nuclear shuttle is reusable; after delivering a payload to lunar orbit it will brake itself back into low Earth orbit, ready for another mission.

    Launch Complex 39B – Cape Canaveral, Florida

    The 747-sized spaceplane lights its five huge F-1A engines and rapidly climbs into the Florida sky. Somewhat an aircraft – delta wing, vertical tail, cockpit, undercarriage and a handful of jet engines - has been wrapped around the mighty S-IC to make it reusable and save a large amount of cash. Forget a 140 ton empty can splashing and crashing in the Atlantic ocean thousands of kilometers away from The Cape. Albeit reusable the so-called flyback S-IC never reach orbit – it is way too heavy for that. It instead rocket into a suborbital flight and release the large payload stuck to its back.
    Usually it is another winged, piloted space plane: the shuttle orbiter would haul itself into Earth orbit thanks to voluminous internal tankage and a trio of LH2/LOX rocket engines.

    But today the payload stuck to the flyback S-IC is an enormous, non-reusable fuel pod; a fat tanker crammed with liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen propellants. The winged S-IC reaches the apex of its suborbital parabola and release the fuel pod. After release the manned booster re-enter Earth atmosphere, gliding back to 30 000 ft. There it lights four big turbofans than pump kerosene from the rocket fuel tank. The two-man crew fly the S-IC back to The Cape, where it lands like an ordinary airliner.

    Meanwhile the tanker fires its own shuttle-orbiter rocket engines and hauls itself into Earth orbit. There, a Reusable Nuclear Shuttle (RNS, powered by the infamous NERVA nuclear thermal rocket engine) awaits the tanker. It needs the propellant for a roundtrip to the Moon orbit and backwith a crew of four.


    Launch Complex 39C – Cape Canaveral, Florida

    The Saturn INT-21 is a two stage booster, essentially a cut Saturn V of Apollo fame. That peculiar Saturn INT-21 carries a payload of five LM-B, also known as space tugs - the RNS little brother. Two of the five space tugs features a cylindrical crew cabin; they are aimed to the lunar surface, replacing the expensive and cumbersome Apollo CSM-LM stack. The other three space tugs won't go to the Moon: they will be stored into orbit and later used for different missions, such as satellite repair or boosting a robotic probe into the solar system.


    Up in Earth orbit the RNS is refueling from the fuel pod, topping its large hydrogen tank. The RNS is to carry the two LM-B tugs into lunar orbit so that one piloted tug can land on the lunar surface. The other tug awaits in lunar orbit for an eventual rescue flight. Unlike the LM-B the RNS doesn't burn its hydrogen fuel with liquid oxygen. Instead the hydrogen is heated by the nuclear core and then expelled through an exhaust. That was supposed to get twice the performance of the classic rocket engine – on paper at least.

    So there is the reusable, cheap system that links Earth surface to Moon surface, replacing old Apollo. The flyback S-IC hauls a reusable orbiter that flies out to Earth orbit and meet a reusable nuclear ship there. The nuclear shuttle rockets to lunar orbit and delivers a piloted chemical space tug to the lunar surface. End result: four reusable vehicles – flyback S-IC, shuttle orbiter, lunar nuclear shuttle and chemical space tug / LM-B. Just compare that with Apollo seven expendable stages – S-IC, S-II, S-IVB, Apollo's Command Module and Service Module, the Lunar Module's descent stage and ascent stages.

     
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