A Glorious Union or America: the New Sparta

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter One Hundred and Seven​

Marching Through The Carolinas ​

Part IV​

From “The North Carolina Campaign” by Thomas R. Yetters
Buffalo 2006

“Jackson initiated the battle at Statesville with the intent of repulsing Reynolds’ foray south of the Yadkin River. As Jackson’s vanguard, under Dick Ewell, came within sight of the town Stuart’s cavalry had formed west of the town on two hillocks, each with its own farmhouse: Watts and Edwards. Bartlett’s II Division of Lew Wallace’s Corps was pushing through the town in pursuit. Wallace spotted Ewell’s column and sought to form Duryee’s Division at the crossroads between the Mocksville Road (on which Reynolds’ advanced) and the Salisbury Road (Jackson). Duryee however was faced with by a problem, an inconvenience, that would plague many of Reynolds’ troops on the Mocksville Road – not only was it quite sunken (3ft or so) but large sections of it had been fenced by a local estate owner, Ezekiel Bell. Although the fencing would be broken up during the day it was a severe obstacle in the prompt deployment on Union troops from column, left facing, into line. The rebels faced no such problem on the more southern road as they advanced directly towards the Union column. Wallace had already directed Newton’s division to Bartlett’s right with the intention of securing the town and flanking Stuart…

Fighting along the road is fierce​

Noticing the buildup of IV Corps (Wallace's) troops along the Mocksville Road, Jackson ordered Ewell's brigades into line for a swift assault on the tightly packed Union column. Aware that the ground was largely open between the two roads except for the slight eminence known as Signal Hill and a shallow creek, Jackson believed a swift attacked on the unwieldy Union column before it could deploy would undo any superiority in numbers they might have….

With Ewell’s four brigades advancing in line athwart the Salisbury Road, Jackson road back to direct A.P. Hill’s division to Ewell’s right to assault the next Union formation in column. Jackson was to repeat this with Winder. The three divisions, 12 brigades in all, would advance echelon against the main body of Reynolds’ column: Duryee’s Division of Wallace’s Corps, the three divisions Williams’ XII Corps and the leading divisions of Hancock’s I Corps (Stannard’s and Gibbon’s) – 16 tightly packed brigades…

Williams’ 3 divisions had particular difficulties getting from column into line. In the end both Geary and Greene would only deploy 2 brigades in front and 1 behind to cope with the narrow, obstructed frontage. Ruger’s division, which had but two brigades, deployed in line but with some regiments from each brigade in the second line…

The fourth division in Jackson’s line was that of Jubal Early. Having deployed his leading divisions in an attack echelon Jackson sought to strike the Union “flank” or rather what had been the head of the Union column. Jackson directed Early’s four brigades to Ewell’s left to join with Stuart’s dismounted troopers and redouble the assault on the town, now held by Generals Bartlett and Newton. With the body of the Union column engaged the only potential Union reserves near the head of the column were Custer’s tired horsemen…

Fighting on the southern edge of the town was intense. John B. Gordon’s brigade of Ewell’s division in particular would repeatedly penetrate Duryee’s line…

Jackson was quick to realize the importance of Signal Hill and directed his chief of artillery, such as it was, to deploy his batteries on the reverse slope which allowed the Confederate artillery to dominate much of the Union position…

A.P. Hill’s division with the support of the artillery would wreak havoc upon the divisions of George S. Greene and John White Geary. Further along the line Winder’s division has facing a more difficult proposition. He overlapped part of Thomas Ruger's Division, but more importantly General Hancock, with more time and more room, had maneuvered his two leading divisions out of the sunken road and into line of battle in the open field. General Stannard has also rushed out skirmishers who had occupied elements of the Bell family farm complex which would act as a strong point in the centre of Hancock’s line, albeit an isolated one…

Furthermore his divisions stood at an angle to Winder’s advance, and soon William E. Starke’s brigade came under a terrible flanking fire and Winder’s advance began to falter…

General Jackson had seen Hancock’s preparations from Signal Hill and had anticipated that Winder’s advance would come under sustained flanking fire. The fifth division in Jackson’s column was from Anderson’s I Corps. It was George Pickett’s 3 brigade Virginia Division. Pickett was ordered to march to Winder’s flank and support his attack. Pickett’s troops would have to march eastwards, passing behind Hill’s and Winder’s divisions, before angling northwards to support the attack…

General Winfield Hancock would earn great praise for the manner of his response to Pickett’s advance. Taking command of Doubleday’s I Corps he directed well beyond Gibbon’s left flank, into the fields, to meet Pickett’s advance before it would turn northwards. It was the smallest division in the Union army that day: the Black Hats brigade under Lysander Cutler and another brigade under Solomon Meredith. When Cutler remonstrated with General Hancock about his exposed position, Hancock replied “sometimes, general, the life of a corps commander simply does not count”…

Hancock reacts to Pickett's advance with one of his own​

Despite a valiant attack by the brigades of Kemper, Garnett and Pegram, which overlapped Doubleday’s line and forced Meredith to refuse part of his line at right angles to prevent the line being flanked, Pickett’s advance was stopped and ultimately repulsed…

With the fighting on both flanks deadlocked, Jackson had one final division to deploy in what he hoped would be the decisive attack of the battle. Union reserves were at the rear of their column and distracted by the conflict between Pickett and Hancock. Jackson would direct his final division to the left – to join Ewell, Early and Stuart in an assault on Wallace’s IV Corps. If it was successful it could role up the Union line from the west back upon itself. The final division was commanded by John Bell Hood…”

From "Always The General - The Life of John Fulton Reynolds" by Jed Bradshaw
Penn State 1999

“Reynolds had quickly realized his mistake in allowing his force to become concentrated on the Mocksville Road, thus reducing its maneuverability. However Lew Wallace has formed a solid defensive line, in an L shape, well anchored at the corner in Statesville. Williams’ Corps was performing adequately in the centre, holding the line against a determined rebel attack. Reynolds also saw that Hancock was provided with sufficient artillery support when he countered Pickett. Although the rebels had the perfect position for artillery, on Signal Hill, and deployed it well, Reynolds had vastly more artillery which he deployed (in the absence of General Henry Hunt who remained with Kearny) effectively to counter both the rebel artillery with counter battery fire and in support of both flanks…

The attack by Hood’s Division threatened to unhinge Reynolds’ whole line. Wallace's forces, with Custer’s dismounted troopers on its right flank, had been finely balanced against the forces of Ewell and Early with Stuart’s troopers in support. Hood’s brigades, Wofford’s, Law’s, Kershaw’s and Barksdale’s burst through the hinge of Wallace’s line, splitting Newton’s division from that of Bartlett’s. Bartlett now had Ewell’s men to his front and Hood’s on his flank. His regiments were quickly being outflanked…

Hood personally leads the attack​

Alpheus Williams would respond to Wallace’s plea for help by spending one of his brigades which, because of the narrow frontage, he had held in reserve. Zealous B. Tower would lead his brigade from the front on a beautiful white horse into a hail of metal. Tower’s brigade would slow Hood’s division but it could not stop it. Hood’s division would advance over a dreadfully wounded General Tower into the rear of Williams’ position…

General Reynolds had left General Humphreys’ V Corps (two divisions as the third had been assigned to hold Salem and Greensboro) behind at the crossing point over the Yadkin to ensure the rebels did not cut him off from Kearny. Reynolds therefore only had one corps in reserve – Sickles’ III Corps. Reynolds’ had moved Sickles from the rear of the column, east of Hancock, to a position north of the road in the rear of Hancock’s and Williams’ position. From this position Reynolds could use Sickles’ force to reinforce either flank or the centre. As the crisis emerged on the Union right at Statesville, Reynolds reluctantly turned to Dan Sickles to stem the rebel tide…

Dan Sickles would become one of the heroes of the battle​

Gersham Mott led off with the brigades, of what Sickles laughingly called “Jesus, Mary and the two Josephs” Joseph Carr and Joseph Revere. Charles T. Campbell’s brigade was in reserve. Further north and east Amiel Whipples shook out his division in a similar formation, two brigades in front – Gilman Marston’s and Stephen G. Champlin’s, with one in reserve – Abram S. Piatt. In the rear came Dan Sickles with his third division in line of battle, with an ill David Birney barely able to keep his seat. The brigades of Charles K. Graham (under Colonel Henry J. Madill as Graham had been injured at Thomasville), John H.H. Ward and the bloodied force of Thomas Egan (under Colonel Byron R. Pierce leading those elements not captured at Thomasville. The brigade was barely 600 men at Statesville)…

The nine brigades of Sickles’ III Corps, though well under strength and recently bloodied at Thomasville, smashed into Hood’s advance and sent the rebels reeling back to the town. Rallying his own division, as well as elements of Early’s and Ewell’s commands Hood made a defiant stand at the crossroads in Statesville. He meant to stop and throw back Sickles’ troops. But Hood was not the only general rallying his troops. General Reynolds ensured General Wallace reformed his formations in Sickles rear and that General Greene’s division of Williams' corps was reformed as well…

General Reynolds kept a close watch on Sickles’ advance but he need not have feared. This was the kind of engagement where Sickles’ aggressiveness could do nothing advance the course of the battle in the Union’s favor…

With Whipples’ division overlapping the rebel line and swinging south it was the rebel line that became unhinged. Reynolds ordered his entire line to advance and attack. Union numbers and Reynolds’ leadership had finally begun to tell…”

From “The Blue Eyed Prophet of War” by Robert Lee Thomas
Carlotta Press 1906

“Did General Jackson know that the moment had passed? That the last great attack by the Army of Northern Virginia had been made? Perhaps he did as he ordered his troops to fall back. He was disgusted. General Pickett had failed to press the Union left. General Winder had not shown the alacrity needed. The men had fought. How the men had fought but Jackson felt that too many of the army’s generals simply could not follow orders…”

From “The North Carolina Campaign” by Thomas R. Yetters
Buffalo 2006

“Reynolds did not initially allow General Jackson to break contact. Generals Hancock and Sickles were quick to ensure their troops pressed the retreating rebels. Even the cavalry, under Custer, exhausted and light on ammunition pursued the rebel troops. In a dramatic action that would keep the arm blanche alive in the US Army for another 50 years element’s of Custer’s division charged a rebel regiment. A North Carolina regiment of Branch’s brigade (Early’s division) formed square in the presence of cavalry. An archaic manouver but often an effective one in the absence of enemy artillery. It was standard military doctrine that cavalry could not break infantry in square. No one it seems had managed to teach George Armstrong Custer that. With Russell A. Alger and the Michigan Brigade at his rear they charged the North Carolinians with sword, with pistol, and with carbine. Against doctrine but perhaps not the odds (the North Carolinians were likely out of ammunition, tired and unfed) the square broke and a legend was cemented…”

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter One Hundred and Eight​

Bureaucracy – War By Other Means​

From “Manpower Miracle – Gideon Pillow’s Bureau of Conscription” from an article by Dr David Shale
North & South Magazine 2011

“A question often asked is how did the Confederates continue to field effective armies after the defeats of the fall of 1863. Confederate losses in Bragg’s Central Campaign and Lee’s Invasion of the North were huge, somewhere between 75,000 and 100,000 killed, wounded and captured. Morale in several elements of the C.S Army collapsed with desertion rising throughout the winter, becoming a torrent in the East after the defeat at Statesville. So how did the Confederate Army go on? One man has long been denied the credit but in the words of General Hardee he “bears the greatest credit for keeping this Army [of Tennessee] in its most needed article – men. His service has been worth a division to me…”. The man in question was Brigadier General Gideon J. Pillow…

Major General Gideon J. Pillow​

General Pillow was an aggressive and courageous officer but there his talents in the field ended. Ambitious, disputatious, disingenuous, insubordinate – General Pillow was an extremely inconvenient subordinate for his commanders in the west. A power in the Democratic party before the war and alleged architect of the nomination of James Polk to the presidency, his political feuds were legendary. They were so ambitious that Pillow’s most fervent feud during the period 1862-1864 was with President Davis himself…

Relieved of a field command by a combination of tactical incompetence and political miscalculation, Pillow beset his one senior ally in the West, newly elevated Braxton Bragg, with demands for a command. Bragg would place Pillow in command of the Department of the West’s Office of Conscription. As Chief of Conscription Pillow would prove a revelation. A whirlwind of activity he let nothing stand in the way of his office or his agents in putting every man in uniform that they practically could. Pillow sought and obtained cavalry regiments which he used to swept the areas still under rebel control (and several that technically weren’t!), county by county, for deserters, draft dodgers, unionists and bearers of invalid or fraudulent exemptions. Between the fall of Vicksburg and the Battle of Four Armies, it was estimated by Bragg, that Pillow’s office was responsible for the supply of 11,000 troops to the armies of the Department from the state of Alabama alone…

One of the first actions of the new Secretary of War, John C. Breckinridge, was to accept the endorsements of Generals Bragg, Johnson and Hardee and appoint General Pillow to head the Bureau of Conscription in place of Gabriel Rains. President Davis’ influence was at a low ebb and he could do nothing to block the appointment. Pillow was appointed to the office with, what he certainly believed was, a much belated promotion to Major-General. He translated his energy and methods from the West into his new national office…

Pillow’s actions as head of the Bureau would increase the flow of manpower back to the Confederate armies. One of James Longstreet’s staff officers, Colonel G. Moxley Sorrell, estimated that the Bureau sent 4,000 men to the Army of Northern Virginia in January 1864…

Many questioned Pillow’s methods and effectiveness at the time – what use were deserters and ardent Unionists to the army? Was there any greater breach of the principle of states-rights that the Army’s forcible conscription of citizens? In many cases Pillow’s agents ignored valid exemptions, state and national but particularly state exemptions, in order to fill their quotas. This riding roughshod over state legislation would further heighten the tension between the Army and central government on one hand and state governments on the other. In the post-war environment, following his escape to Mexico, Pillow would become a polarizing figure for Confederate community there - between the Army-based integrationalist faction and the “exilado gris” faction led by former states-rights politicians…”

From “A History of the United States Office of Military Intelligence” by General (Rt) Roger McKee
MacArthur University 2001

“The Office of Military Intelligence had initially been the brainchild of General Joseph Hooker while still serving in the Army of the Potomac. He had originally envisaged a professionally organized bureau attached to the Army of the Potomac. General Kearny had adopted the idea and infused it with his own sense of scope and grandeur, which was endorsed by Secretary Stanton. The Office of Military Intelligence was born with OMI officers attached to all the major Union formations…

General Kearny resisted attempts to saddle the office with “a political general who would leak like a grape-shot pail”, and who would “serve up any intelligence, and no doubt a good leavening of foolishness, to the papers” . He instead sought an officer of sufficient professionalism and experience to serve in what Kearny had begun to consider was a vital staff role. His choice would outrage the radicals in Congress, but they dared not challenge Kearny for within a few days he became the “liberator” of Richmond. The officer was the recently released Brigadier General Charles Pomeroy Stone…

Brigadier General Charles Pomeroy Stone​

However the OMI’s greatest exercise in 1863 was reviewing the treasure trove of papers seized upon the capture of Richmond. Although many of the naval papers had been transferred by Confederate Secretary of the Navy, Stephen Mallory, to Atlanta substantial records for the Confederate army and other departments had been taken. This was supplemented by considerable piles of congressional documentation and personal correspondence obtained from the Confederate Congress and abandoned personal residents around the city. General Stone was unflinching in his pursuit of valuable intelligence. With the fall of the rebel capitol he quickly transferred his personal office from Washington to Richmond or “from one nest of vipers to another” as he confided to a friend later. In his desire to prove himself and his loyalty beyond doubt, and indeed to repay General Kearny’s faith, he pushed the boundaries of common military practice and the manners of the age… Several senior Confederate figures sought to complain to Union officers about Stone’s failure to return personal correspondence…

One of Stone’s subordinates, an injured officer from the 20th Maine, Major Ellis Spear, had been given the task of overseeing the review of correspondence held in the records of the Confederate Regular Army which had largely been captured intact. It was he who realized the importance of the letter from Governor Thomas O. Moore to Secretary of War LeRoy Walker from 2nd April 1861. It confirmed that P.G.T. Beauregard, then an officer in the US Army and recent appointee to the command of West Point Military Academy, had written to the Governor confirming a willingness to serve in any Louisiana State military force or as an appointee from Louisiana to the nascent Confederate Regular Army. The issue was that Beauregard had not resigned for another two weeks after the date of that correspondence…

To Major Spear and later General Stone this was clear evidence that an United States commissioned officer had entered into traitorous correspondence with a “domestic” enemy. It was to prove the first of many letters which would implicate at least two score former regular army officers in similar forms of traitorous correspondence…The review of private correspondence led by Major John McEntee would similarly implicate several former Senators and Representatives in similar communications with “rebellious elements” while still holding elected office under the auspices of the United States Congress…

The disclosure of his initial reports would redeem General Stone in the eyes of many radicals. Senator Ben Wade would later say of General Stone “he is to be lauded for he has given us the means to punish the most despicable class of traitor; men who have betrayed, not only their country, not only their family and neighbors but men who have broken the most sacred of oaths…”

From “Kearny and the Radicals” by Hugh W. McGrath
New England Press 1992

“Spring saw the eruption of the debate on Reconstruction with a vigor. Many saw the question of victory as one of when rather than if. The various factions in Congress were maneuvering in earnest to ensure their vision was the one imposed upon a defeated south…

Although increasingly muted over the last year many conservative Republicans, particularly westerners, supported a light handed approach to the South. States would quickly be reincorporated into the normal political framework, and would retain the right to govern themselves. They discussed general amnesties and how the economic life of the south could be revived at the close of hostilities. The primary goal for this faction was reconciliation. The war for them had been fought to preserve the Union, and while emancipation was an agreeable achievement, the Union restored in practice and in sentiment was their objective….they took their lead from the President himself. When asked by Secretary Chase what instructions the President had given Kearny on the subject of terms should the southern armies seek to surrender, the President replied he had as yet given none but expressed the desire that they should “let them up easy”…

The Radical Republicans opposed Lincoln's terms for reuniting the United States which they viewed as far too lenient. As a minimum they proposed an "ironclad oath" that would prevent anyone who supported the Confederacy from voting in Southern elections. The majority of the Radicals sought the trial and execution of Confederate leaders on charges of treason. All sought that the killers of General Hunter and the perpetrators of other “crimes against the rules of war” be brought to trial. In order to control the terms of Reconstruction Radicals pushed for the formation of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction which seated a Radical majority…

Within the Radicals there were more eccentric philosophies: known as the "conquered provinces" idea, Thaddeus Stevens asserted that the Confederacy had in practical fact created a separate nation, however illegal doing so under the Constitution might be. They could therefore be treated as if they were a foreign nation that had been conquered, permitting the United States full power to remake southern society as it saw fit. (At the same time, Stevens' theory meant that Confederate leaders could not be tried for treason, because they had not made war on their own country, and Stevens himself was prepared to act as defence counsel for Jefferson Davis, if the occasion arose.). Furthermore Stevens proposed large scale permanent property confiscations. Initially rejected by his colleagues this idea would gain growing favour in Congress as a means of punishing rebels, rewarding Southern Unionists, assisting freed slaves and perhaps paying down the debt incurred by the Government during the war. The idea of land confiscations became a cure-all for the Radicals…

General Kearny was not an apolitical general in the mold of U.S. Grant. Nor though did he seek to become a competing locus of power to the President as McClellan had. However he had always ploughed his own furrow, and he did not agree with the President’s view of reconstruction. As a result he had subtly percolated his views among his more trusted and politically influential generals (Daniel Sickles, Joseph Hooker, Isaac Stevens, Jacob D. Cox etc) as well as a number of influential northern governors. Kearny had no difficultly with Lincoln’s “up-easy” policy for the “common citizenry of the rebellious south; the rank and file” but he was fiercely opposed to the idea that the southern leadership should be let off lightly. Initial reports from General Stone’s OMI suggested a number of former US regular officers, now in Confederate uniform, had committed their acts of treachery to paper. Some indeed appeared to have accepted commissions in rebel state and Confederate forces before resigning their US commissions. It was clear that many elected and appointed officials were likewise guilty… Furthermore Union prisoners of war had been executed… Kearny’s rage would only increase when Custer returned from his raid on the Salisbury prison camp with wagons filled with emaciated veterans…

General Wadsworth supported and promoted Kearny's views through his own connections in New York​

Kearny meant for the Confederate leadership to be punished harshly and publicly. Kearny clarified his thinking during a dinner with former Democrat and friend to the President, General Isaac Stevens, in the midst of the North Carolina campaign. In what became known as the Potomac Memorandum Kearny set out roughly in his own hand his thoughts on some of the key elements of Reconstruction settlement:

1. Necessary amnesty for enlisted men and commissioned officers of the rank of captain and below;
2. Internment of field grade officers and of C.S. national and state government officials pending preferment of appropriate charges;
3. Charges to be heard by military tribunal;
4. Lifetime disenfranchisement of all field grade and general officers, also C.S. elected officials and general office holders – neither a right to vote nor the ability to hold public office;
5. Confiscation of all real property of convicted traitors - and other convicted rebels and criminals;
6. Limits to future property holding rights for convicted traitors [This item is struck through in a different color in the original document]
7. Guarantees of the rights of southern veterans of the Union army – southerners and negros;
8. A regular army of a minimum of 25 infantry regiments and 15 cavalry regiments to sufficiently occupy the south during any period of Reconstruction.

The contents of the Potomac Memorandum and variations on it would almost immediately begin to appear in the correspondence of Union generals and several northern governors, and as such began to inform the debate on Reconstruction from the Army’s perspective…

It would be inaccurate to suggest that General Kearny disagreed with the President in all matters pertaining to Reconstruction. Kearny was firmly in the President’s camp when it came to his belief that the southern states, though in rebellion, remained constituted as states and were, as they had always been, part of the Union. Kearny was also enthusiastic about the idea of returning the “liberated” states to an atmosphere of normality as quickly as possible. General Sedgwick’s reports from Virginia suggested that a firm but fair hand in the governance of the southern states would see them quickly pacified and would nurture a rapid upswing in Unionist sentiment among the common classes…”

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter One Hundred and Nine

Don't Spare The Rodman​

From “Isaac Peace Rodman - Soldier, Statesman, Quaker” by Leonard H.K. Wool
Empire 1918

"It was perhaps surprising that General Rodman did not consider the taking of Charleston to be his most difficult task. It was instead the prospect of having to command the X Corps (as well as his own VI Corps) that concerned him most. X Corps was a corps in name only. It had been cobbled together from the two northern brigades, formerly under Robert Milroy, which had in concert with the navy, harassed the Carolina coast, and two newly formed negro brigades made up of Sea Island Gullahs and runaway slaves. Milroy had resigned in protest at his supersession and in frustration with the command generally...

Brigadier General John P. Hatch commanded the white brigades in what would become I Division of X Corps. The staff officer assigned to keep Milroy "in army order" (Halleck), Brigadier-General William Scott Ketchum, had remained to command a brigade at Rodman's personal request. The second brigade was commanded by Colonel George D. Chapman of Connecticut. Brigadier General Julius White had been placed, despite his own misgivings, in command of the all negro II Division. Its brigades were commanded by two colonels, Thomas W. Higginson and William True Bennett...

Union troops land on James Island​

As General Rodman would have command of this little army he would need commanders for both VI and X Corps. Having heard little good of General Hatch from the Army of the Potomac, Rodman sagely decided to promote one of his veteran commanders to command of the X Corps. William T.H. Brooks had been an exceptional divisional commander, and like General Rodman, he was known for his ability to manage well officers of all temperaments and abilities. The only mark against Major General Brooks was his poor health. The war had taken its toll on Brooks and Rodman was concerned about the effect the climate and the pressure of corps command might have on his friend.

However the alternative, Major General Albion P. Howe, who would be placed in command of VI Corps, though also a veteran fighting divisional commander, was also sometimes an abrasive officer himself and Rodman wished to keep him within the corps that knew and trusted him...

Brigadier Generals Alfred Torbert and Henry Terry​

Alfred T.A. Torbert would ascend to command I Division VI Corps in Howe's place, and Henry D. Terry would likewise replace Brooks in command of the III Division VI Corps..."

From "Rodman's Secret Plan - the Plan for a Naval Assault on Charleston" by Rear Adm (Ret) John Higgs-Tarleton
North & South Magazine

"It is only in the last 30 years, since the discovery of the detailed plans for the naval invasion of Charleston, that we have been able to put meat on the bones of the rumors that heretofore existed. General Isaac P. Rodman really did have a plan for a combined arms assault on Charleston Harbor itself. The ultimate coup de main...

With limited input from Admiral Du Pont, Rodman conceived of a plan whereby (i) the "wooden" fleet would bombard Charleston's inner forts from a distance; (ii) the navy's monitors would enter the harbor and bombard rebel emplacements at close quarters and (iii) under cover of the bombardment and with the close support of the monitors, specially drilled elements of the army and marines would land in the harbor and storm the fortifications...

A contested landing from the sea into the mouth of a heavily fortified port had previously been unheard of. Indeed of the subordinates with whom Rodman discussed the plan (Albion Howe, David Russell and William Brooks) Howe and Russell expressed strong reservations. Admiral Du Pont also thought the undertaking "hazardous to an extreme, such as to guarantee tragedy"...

Is this what General Rodman had in mind?​

When Rodman saw the condition of X Corps he quickly shelved his plan. It would remain on that shelf for another 7 years before Rodman would again conceive of a need for contested seabourn assault..."

From “Isaac Peace Rodman - Soldier, Statesman, Quaker” by Leonard H.K. Wool
Empire 1918

"Rodman began his offensive campaign against the defenses of Charleston Harbor on 25th March, with a naval bombardment. The bombard accomplished little in terms of damage to Charleston's defences. However it did serve to distract an already tired and harassed Beauregard [the Charleston Massacre had occurred only days earlier] from the landing of the main body of troops on James Island...

Rodman had no intention of besieging Charleston through a sickening summer that would sap his army's strength. While appearing to turn his attention to Battery Wagner on Morris Island, which guarded the harbor entrance from the southwest, Rodman sought to quickly prepare the poorly trained X Corps for the struggle ahead. Brooks had described the II Division as "all green and black". The assessment became widely known, and the troops adopted a green and black divisional flag so as not to let Brooks forget his initial verdict...

The flag of the II Division, X Corps. The symbol of X Corps was South Carolina's Palmetto tree​

In the Battle of Fort Wagner, Union forces suffered minor losses, in what Beauregard perceived as a failed attempt to capture the fort. Instead General Rodman had taken the strength and of the fortifications and it had further convinced him to attack Charleston from the landward side...

Beauregard was suffering an extreme manpower shortage. In order to properly garrison the city against another "uprising" he had withdrawn troops from all fortifications and batteries on James Island but Forts Johnson, Pemberton and Barnes. He had further reinforced Fort Wagner against another attempt at storm. Furthermore Beauregard was attempting to hide the fact that large portions of his artillery had been stripped of supplies (for the powder and the shot itself) to supply the rebel armies in the field. It had been a short sighted decision on the part of the rebel government made in January before a single ship had appeared before the Charleston harbor mouth...

On 25th April Rodman struck out across James Island with all of X Corps and two divisions of VI Corps, leaving David Russell's II Division behind to screen Wagner and appear "threatening"...

To face Rodman's army Beauregard could only deploy a small division under Brigadier General Wilmot G. De Saussure. Colonel Keitt's and Colonel Shaw's brigades were deployed between the railroad and the branch of the Stono River that emptied into the Ashley River...

Tobert's Division attacks​

The battle was short and bloody. Initially under flanking fire from Forts Johnson and Pemberton (Pemberton quickly came under attack from US marines) the Union troop surged forward. From intelligence gained from runaways and hazardous reconnaissance Rodman and his commanders knew where and how to cross the river. Elements of Brook's negro troops quickly flanked the rebel right, quickly followed by Emory Upton's brigade of Torbert's division on the left. The rebel defence turned into a rout...

With James Island and everything south of the Ashley, but for Fort Johnson in Union hands, Rodman set about bringing the city under fire from his own heavy guns on James Island. With the railroad cut and under prospect of a siege Beauregard requested instructions...

By mid May Charleston harbor was the subject of a constant artillery battle. The accumulated effects of this bombardment would destroy a good portion of Charleston. The inability to keep Fort Johnson's guns supplied required its abandonment. In desperation Beauregard authorized an attack on the Union blockading fleet by the CSS. H.L.Hunley, a submarine. The attack failed and she foundered and sank with the loss of all hands, thus ending the threat to the Union blockade...

On May 18th there would be another food riot among the negros in the city. Beauregard was barely able to put it down and maintain the defences. It was the final straw for him. He had no wish to hang on a northern rope or worse yet at the hands of a black lynch mob. He ordered the evacuation of the city by the bulk of his troops on May 20th, leaving the mayor to surrender the city to General Rodman...

"God be praised. Let all men know that Charleston is ours" was Rodman's first message to Washington..."

General William Brooks leads the II Division X Corps into Charleston​

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter One Hundred and Ten​

To Atlanta or Hell​

Part I​

From “The Life of General William J. Hardee - Teach Them How To War” by Christopher L. Pike
Bison 1965

“As a the Army of Mississippi was no more and Hardee was given responsibility for all troops in the state of Georgia, the now misnamed Army of Tennessee, was radically altered. With General Hardee at Resaca were the I Corps and II Corps still under Lieutenant General Patrick Cleburne and Major General Thomas Churchill respectively. A III Corps was now formed from the troops with Lieutenant General John Bankhead Magruder now spread between Columbus and Albany in the south west of the state…

Both the I and II Corps were expanded to 4 divisions to accept remnants of the Army of Mississippi. Joining Cleburne’s three divisions (A.P.Stewart’s, Jones M. Withers’ and Preston Smith’s) was a small two brigade division under Major General Camile Polignac made up exclusively of Texans. Joining Churchill’s divisions (William Preston’s who replaced the deceased McCown, Bushrod R. Johnson’s and St.John R. Liddell’s) was a three brigade division formed under Major General Benjamin Hardin Helm. Helm inherited the brigades of Brigadier Colton Greene and Colonel John Q. Burbridge formerly of Marmaduke’s old, now shattered, division. Helm also was given a new, scratch brigade of Alabamians swept up by the Bureau of Conscription under Brigadier Edmund Pettus…

Hardee’s goal was to act on the defensive against Grant and Hooker, while seeking an opportunity for a decisive counterstroke in the difficult terrain north of Atlanta…”

From “The Road to Hell and Atlanta” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 2004

“Grant’s reform of the Army of the Mississippi was not as extensive as Hooker’s. Eugene Carr’s XIII Corps had suffered massive casualties in the Battle of the Four Armies. While some of these losses were recouped during the winter, Grant still deemed it wise to consolidate the corps. Its four divisions were reduced to three. The fourth division was broken up between the remaining three, its commander Michael K. Lawler replacing the deceased Andrew J. Smith in command of the second division…

Francis Blair’s accession to command of XV Corps allowed Hugh Ewing to rise to command its second division. Ewing had performed well at Gadsden, despite spending the latter parts of the battle as a rebel prisoner. E.O.C Ord’s XVI Corps remained largely unchanged save for the loss of Colonel William W. Sandford’s brigade which was transferred to reinforce XIII Corps…

After the shambles at Gilbert’s Ferry Black Jack Logan was not enamoured of two of his divisional commanders – Isaac Quinby and Francis J. Herron. Notwithstanding his efforts they remained, for the moment, in their commands. The only major change wrought in the corps was the elevation of John E. Smith to command Logan’s old first division…

Hooker found elements of his Army of the Cumberland required substantial rebuilding over the winter. Two of his four corps were badly knocked about. Hooker poured his reinforcements into XIV Corps now placed under Lovell Rousseau, the capturer of Braxton Bragg. All three divisions had new commanders. One of the fighting family of the McCooks of Ohio replaced Rousseau at the head of the first division, Anson George McCook. J.S. Jackson and J.J. Reynolds were dismissed and replaced with John T. Wilder and the wild Russian John Turchin in command of the second and third divisions respectively. Rousseau now had three “fighting generals” (the view of a begrudingly admiring Israel Richardson) under him…

XX Corps was a shell. Hooker could not build it back up to anything like full strength before the commencement of the campaign. Instead he reduced it from three to two under strength divisions. The very controversial Jeff C. Davis remained in command despite demands from the Governor of Ohio that he be arrested for his actions at Chickamauga. Hooker, ever the politician kept Kearny’s favourites, Hiram Berry and Regis de Trobriand in divisional commands. Davis’ enemy, the quarrelsome William P. Carlin, was shuffled off to Richardson’s XXI Corps.

XXI Corps saw only one significant change with Carlin replacing the “worn out” (according to Dan Butterfield) John M. Palmer. Granger’s XXIII Corps command remained unchanged…”

From “Fighting Joe Hooker” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 1999​

"The ever quotable Hooker had delighted the assembled press, who's attention he assiduously courted, with his declaration that come July 4th he intended to be in "Atlanta or in Hell!"..."

From “The Life of General William J. Hardee - Teach Them How To War” by Christopher L. Pike
Bison 1965

"The nature of the coming struggle and the sacrifices needed for victory were not lost on Hardee. "You might as well appeal against the hurricane as to this terrible foe that has come amongst us. The hardships of war... they are inevitable. The only way the people of Georgia and indeed the whole south can hope once more to live in peace and quiet, is to give everything unto the war - tears, sweat, toil, industry and above all men"(Hardee in a letter to the Mayor of Atlanta)..."

Resaca (April 4–10, 1864)​

The Battle of Resaca​

From “The Life of General William J. Hardee - Teach Them How To War” by Christopher L. Pike
Bison 1965

“Hardee had entrenched his army on the long, high mountain of Rocky Face Ridge and eastward across Crow Valley. As Grant approached, he decided to demonstrate against the position with two columns while he sent a third one through Snake Creek Gap on the Confederate left. Grant’s objective was to hit the Western & Atlantic Railroad at Resaca [Georgia]. The two columns engaged the enemy at Mill Creek Gap and at Dug Gap. In the meantime, the third column, under E.O.C. Ord, passed through Snake Creek Gap and on April 5 advanced to the outskirts of Resaca, where it found Confederates under Cleburne entrenched. Fearing defeat, Ord pulled his column back to Snake Creek Gap. On April 6, Grant decided to “shift his weight” (Butterfield) and join Ord to take Resaca. The next morning, as he discovered Grant's army withdrawing from their positions in front of Rocky Face Ridge, Hardee retired south towards Resaca…”

From “Voices in the Distance: The Rebels in their own Words”
University of Louisiana 2004

"General Felix Houston Robertson, commander of Hardee's artillery, was heavily involved in the fighting on the Confederate left. "During the course of the morning I received orders to place the bulk of my artillery in such a position as would enable it to drive off a battery that was annoying General Stewart's line. Before the necessary measures for the protection of the artillery could be taken, I received urgent orders to open it upon the battery before alluded to. Corput's battery was accordingly placed in position at the only available point, about eighty yards in front of General Maney's line. It had hardly gotten into position when the enemy hotly engaged our skirmishers, driving them in and pushing on to the assault with great impetuosity. So quickly was all this done that it only with great daring that we removed the artillery before the enemy had effected a lodgment in the ravine in front of it. The whole episode was attended with great loss of life. It was our good fortune that the Federal commander seemed to reconsider his attack..."

From “Fighting Joe Hooker” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 1999

“Grant had troops from the Army of the Mississippi test the rebel lines around Resaca to pinpoint their whereabouts. Full scale fighting occurred on April 9, and the Union troops were generally repulsed except on Hardee's right flank. Here Hooker, leading Rousseau’s XIV Corps, fully exploited this advantage. On May 10, the battle continued as Hooker’s troops forced Churchill’s troops back along the axis of the Dalton Road/Railroad. Combined with Grant’s dispatch of John Logan with a force across the Oostanula River at Lay's Ferry, towards Hardee's railroad supply line, Hardee, badly outnumbered as Grant and Hooker sought to bring all their troops into play, was forced to retire.”

Adairsville (April 14, 1864)​

Hooker prepares for a massed assault on the rebel lines at Adairsville​

From “The Road to Hell and Atlanta” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 2004

“Hardee's army retreated southward while Grant and Hooker pursued. Failing to find a good defensive position south of Calhoun, Hardee was forced to continue on to Adairsville while the reorganised Confederate cavalry, still under Abraham Buford, fought a skillful rearguard action. On April 14, Granger's XXIII Corps ran into entrenched infantry of Churchill's corps, while advancing about two miles north of Adairsville. Granger’s three divisions prepared for battle, but Hooker halted them because of the approach of darkness. The experience of Chickamauga had caused Hooker to become more circumspect in his tactics. Hooker had the ground reconoitered overnight and concentrated his men in the Adairsville area to attack Hardee the next day with Grant’s blessing. Hardee had originally expected to find a valley at Adairsville of suitable width to deploy his men and anchor his line with the flanks on hills, but the valley was too wide, and despite the entreaties of Churchill, who was keen to stand and fight, Hardee ordered the army to disengage and withdraw…”

Cassville (April 17-19, 1864)​

Cleburne's troops prepare to attack​

From “The Life of General William J. Hardee - Teach Them How To War” by Christopher L. Pike
Bison 1965

“Hardee's instinct was to withdraw south of the Etowah River. However both Cleburne and Churchill were in favor of fighting again north of the river. As the three generals poured over the maps in Hardee's tent, Cleburne outlined a plan...”

From “The Road to Hell and Atlanta” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 2004

“The Confederate rearguard, consisting of Bushrod Johnson’s division of Churchill's Corps marched south along the straight flat road paralleling the railroad to Kingston. The wagons had already passed that way. Hooker, naturally assumed that Hardee's whole army had passed that way and pursued. At Kingston, both Johnson’s and Helm’s divisions turned east, facing about, and blocked the road between Kingston and Cassville. Meanwhile Cleburne with the remaining divisions of Churchill's corps (Preston’s and Liddell’s) had marched over the windy road directly to Cassville. Grant was no fool and spotting the split of Hardee’s army, he divided his forces in pursuit. With Hooker in pursuit of the rearguard, Francis Blair’s corps led the way down the other road, the winding road to Cassville…

The inhospitable terrain between the two Federal wings made them effectively isolated from one another. Hardee’s plan was to unite the army at Cassville. They would then ambush whatever elements of Grant's force that were unlucky enough to be assigned to the Cassville Road. It was a well conceived plan and again the Federals were unaware of the waiting trap...”

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter One Hundred and Ten​

To Atlanta or Hell​

Part II​

Cassville (April 17-19, 1864)​

From “The Road to Hell and Atlanta” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 2004

"The Battle of Cassville came as complete surprise for the Union Army group where Grant had taken the somewhat risky option of placing Blair’s corps on his left. His decision for doing so was to use this smaller force to feel out the Confederate positions, then pin them in place, until Hooker's Army of the Cumberland could come along and heavily attack them at Kingston. Perhaps Blair would then be given the opportunity to get around behind the Confederates in an effort to envelop them.

So far the tactic had worked reasonably well and success had been achieved at Resaca. This had, though, all been based on the assumption that Hardee would fight a defensive campaign and not go on the attack himself. Still, Grant believed, even if Blair’s smaller command had to fight off such an attack, Hooker would be nearby to ensure no disaster would take place through offering massive support, and Ord was in reserve at Adairsville..."


From “Fighting Joe Hooker” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 1999

"Grant had begun with the Army of the Cumberland and the Army of the Mississippi with him at Adairsville. Strangely enough however, Grant had no idea where the Hardee's army was at the time. He had allowed the Confederates to retreat out of his reach. Furthermore Grant was not aware of the restrictive terrain, in the surrounding region of Cassville. An air of overconfidence hung over Grant’s Armies...

Grant assumed that since Hooker's vanguard were in Kingston, that Hardee's army had retreated to Kingston as well. However, Hardee was in Cassville busy digging in for a defensive stand. Grant, still in Adairsville, authorised Hooker's plans to attack Kingston. He had no idea of the peril to the isolated Blair..."

From “The Life of General William J. Hardee - Teach Them How To War” by Christopher L. Pike
Bison 1965

"On the 17th, General Hardee issued orders that he would no longer retreat in front of the enemy but would turn and attack the invaders. It was at Cassville that he meant to turn his troops to fight. It was early in the day when Hardee called a conference at the McKelvey home near Cass Station. At this conference Hardee met with Cleburne and Churchill, as well as the divisional commanders who would lead the attack. They decided to attack as planned. The Confederates were anxious for a fight, and they were confident of turning back the Yankees..."

Left to Right: General William Hardee, Major General Camile Polignac, Lieutenant General Patrick Cleburne, Major General Jones M. Withers, Major General A.P. Stewart, and Major General Thomas James Churchill​

From “The Road to Hell and Atlanta” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 2004

“Elements of the Union army broke camp and marched off south in their columns. As Blair’s Corps passed through Adairsville, nothing was seen of any Confederates. Slightly to the west, in the centre of the overall Union line, divided by a ridge, Hooker’s army marched in parallel to Blair, whilst further west again, as previously, marched Logan’s and Carr’s Corps. Grant began the day with Ord in Adairsville as they discussed plans for the day ahead. By 10am, however, all those plans had rapidly changed…

Out of nowhere, or so it seemed to Blair and his soldiers, thousands of Rebels came charging out of hiding as they passed a large hill to their east. This happened at the worst of times, for the Union, as Hooker’s Army of the Cumberland was out of visual contact with a large ridge line separating the two commands. Still, dispatch riders were immediately sent to get help, as Blair formed his corps into line of battle, but conducting a successful defence would prove easier said than done…

The first stage of the Hardee/Cleburne plan had thus begun, although it was nearly called off at the last moment due to reports of a Union cavalry division somewhere to the east of Cleburne’s Corps. But the Confederate commanders were resolved to assume the offensive regardless, though Hardee did order Buford to dispatch a cavalry division, under the command of Joseph Wheeler, in order to keep their Union counterparts away from Cleburne’s right flank. This having been done, Cleburne unleashed his expanded corps onto the ill-prepared Blair…

It was not as if Grant and Hooker had not heard the opening shots of the Battle of Cassville. On the contrary they both did, as did many in Hooker’s army. Thus Hooker’s soldiers changed their heading, from their southward journey, and marched east to the sound of the guns, to assist Blair just as dispatch riders arrived to inform Grant and Hooker of the situation. Both were surprised, as to the sudden surprise attack, yet responded with all haste. Not only was the double quick ordered, to rush along Hooker’s troops, but riders were sent to Ord at Adairsville to press on with all possible haste…

Being the veterans that they were, the Army of the Cumberland was quick to respond and Hooker’s vanguard, Granger’s Corps, led the way as they rushed east towards their comrades in trouble. At the same time, however, the rump of Churchill’s Corps was moving orderly into line, athwart the road from Kingston to Cassville and its narrow confines. Granger ran head long into Churchill’s well prepared lines. Thus Hooker’s troops would never get to assist Blair’s Corps, which was soon on its own, as a second full-on battle now raged around the road from Kingston…

Blair’s Corps was soon forced, by sheer weight of numbers and firepower, into head long retreat. With the aggressive Cleburne at their heels, Blair’s troops dropped like flies and, given a high casualty rate among the officers (Cleburne’s sharpshooter battalion was hard at work), order broke down. Blair himself was badly injured by shell fragments which gashed his chest and left thigh. As the shattered fragments of his column reached Ord, Ord realised a major setback had occurred and dug in where in stood, just south of Adairsville. He would eventually manage to organise a defensive line around Adairsville, where the survivors of Blair’s Corps began to rally. This was effective, insofar as a potential rout was thus stopped, and Ord considered his next move…

Hearing the sound of battle Eugene Carr and John Logan discussed the situation. They agreed that Carr would press on but that Logan would march east with all dispatch with his corps as it may be needed. Grant would later be very glad of their initiative.

Having taken the difficult decision to tear up his orders for the day’s march, Logan wasted little time in heading east back towards Adairsville…

Hooker’s command was stalemated around Kingston, against the effective defence led by Churchill. The narrow front meant that Hooker was having difficulty bringing his numerical superiority to bear. Had he but known it, he would have been surprised at how effective his artillery under General William F. Barry was actually proving. Nonetheless Granger’s attacks had incurred a large number of casualties without visible benefit. Hardee, though, upon seeing Logan’s columns marching towards Hooker’s rear, now feared that he could be outflanked, in his current position. He knew that at least one Union corps was still out west somewhere unaccounted for and began to have doubts about his position. He sought out Cleburne to discuss a withdrawal. Cleburne can only be described as extremely unenthusiastic about the proposal, having achieved so much in a few short hours, but he clearly comprehended the danger involved. With Wheeler’s cavalry screening the Confederate right and Wharton’s on a raid, the strategic picture beyond the Confederate left was unclear. Where was the remainder of Grant’s force? Cleburne reluctantly agreed to withdraw…

Thus Blair’s command, smashed almost beyond recognition, would survive the battle although some 5,500 of his soldiers either did not or became Confederate prisoners. It is hard to decide who was luckier as the prisoners began their march towards Andersonville…

Cleburne’s tasks, though, were not at an end, for Hardee had continued to plan for a defensive move. As Cleburne’s Corps withdrew, it immediately took up new positions at Allatoona Pass, just to the south of the Etowah River. Then, once in position, Churchill’s Corps disengaged from Hooker’s battle line, with Helm’s division pulling away last and acting as a rearguard. Granger’s Corps had been badly mauled, having lost close to 3,000 troops itself. Frustratingly Rousseau’s Corps had to pass through Granger’s lines which partially blocked his path, to led the march on the Etowah River. Delays as Grant and Hooker sorted out the mess ensured it would take some time before any outflanking manoeuvre could be attempted…

Although Wheeler’s Cavalry Division would be involved in combat, with its Union counterpart, for the rest of the day and part of the following morning, little other fighting took place. In truth the bulk of the fighting was over by 2pm. All the exhausted Union troops could do was simply watch as their Confederate counterparts, from both Cleburne’s and Churchill’s battle hardened corps, deployed along the ridges around Allatoona Pass, fearing what tomorrow may bring…

Grant, though, knew he had the fresh corps of Ord, Carr and Logan to use and saw no reason why he could not cross the Etowah River, somewhere up stream, whilst Hooker’s army fixed the Confederates in place. He was, however, annoyed at himself in having left Blair’s command to smashed, not to mention Hooker’s casualties. Had he known Hardee’s casualties were but a tenth of his own, and largely in Churchill’s corps, no doubt his annoyance would have increased…”

Israel Richardson's action almost won a great victory at Allatoona. Instead he would be blamed by Hooker for an "over aggressive ignorance of orders".​

Allatoona Pass - 20 April​

From “The Road to Hell and Atlanta” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 2004

“Ord’s Corps moved out at first light. Its initial objective was to take the bridge, still standing, south of Kingston spanning the Etowah River. This was achieved relatively quickly, with little resistance offered except for a Confederate cavalry company which had no chance of stopping the 15,000 or so Union troops heading their way. It seemed to Grant that Hardee had, in the hustle and bustle of the previous day’s fighting, forgotten about the bridge and the potential for another outflanking manoeuvre…

Soon, one division, then a second, had crossed the river and were lining up to defend a bridgehead, so that the rest of Ord’s Corps could follow. Hardee, however, had planned a response, but in an error of judgement, decided to only defend the bridge with Bushrod Johnson’s Division. He could have moved overnight to reinforce Johnson, yet was hoping that Hooker would attack Allatoona Pass instead. Still that mattered little to Johnson who relished the opportunity given to his small command of roughly 6,500 troops. Although outnumbered, Johnson would fight…

Thus, not long after dawn, just as the Union was establishing its bridgehead, the artillery attached to Johnson’s command opened fire on the Union troops who had crossed the river. This caused some concern, for these troops, but Grant had half expected some resistance considering he knew that Hardee still occupied Allatoona Pass and had showed that the rebel army still had teeth. But if Hardee thought that Grant was going to attack the pass en masse he was wrong. Grant saw the pass for the trap it was. Grant was no butcher to send his men forward into the pass…

Hooker was given the task of demonstrating, in front of the pass, in an effort to convince Hardee that an attack may indeed take place. Elements of Richardson’s (Hazen's and Carlin's) and Rousseau’s (McCook's) commands were given the task. The illusion fooled Hardee for a couple of hours…

Ord was grateful for the distraction, otherwise his solders could have been extremely vulnerable to a counterattack with the backs to the river. Union guns were soon rushed up to the northern river banks and started to engage with their Southern counterparts attacking Ord’s lodgement. Needless to say, this caused Johnson’s supporting guns to commence a duel, with their Northern counterparts, and, due to weight of numbers and a disparity in calibre, the Confederate guns quickly began to lose the contest. Ord believed the time to press Johnson had arrived, and in an effort to relieve the pressure on his command and to broaden his lodgement, he ordered two of his divisions to attack (Nathan Kimball's and Jacob Lauman's).

When the Union front ranks got within range of Confederate musketry, some 3,000 Rebels arose and let loose a most dreadful salvo right into a similar number of Union troops. The Union line staggered, took a breath, and tried to advanced again. Yet, once again, the Confederates let lose another salvo, which did much damage to the Union line. These Union troops, by now, had also begun to return musket fire, but the Confederates, behind prepared positions, suffered minimal casualties in comparison. Soon the initial Union advance turned stalled and Ord was forced to commit his other two divisions (William Sooy Smith's and Greville Dodge's). Here the Union artillery gave much support under the ever efficient General Barry…

This situation so concerned Grant, that he ordered Gouvenor Warren (who had been reassigned from the Army of the Cumberland to replace Francis Blair) to gather his very weak command, still at Adairsville, and lead them south to lend their fire support to Ord’s efforts. Thus by 9 AM, some four divisions of Union troops, including the two badly mauled ones, once more tried to advance forward and break Johnson’s position. Combined with support, coming from Warren’s artillery and troops, Johnson was massively outnumbered and it soon began to tell and Ord’s troops lapped around the flanks of his position…

Hardee, at this point, accepted Johnson’s assessment that he could not hold his line for much longer. Hardee first contemplated moving the remainder of Churchill’s Corps down from Allatoona Pass, to reinforce Johnson, but thought time was against him. Consequentially orders were issued to commence a full withdrawal. Churchill’s Corps would leave first, followed by Cleburne’s Corps…

Yet before Cleburne’s Corps could leave, Israel Richardson noticed that the Rebels were deserting Allatoona Pass. In a rushed effort to get into the fight, before the Confederates could get away once more, Richardson ignored his original orders of conducting a mere demonstration and, instead, rushed two divisions straight at the Pass itself…

Even though the defenders had been weakened by half, Richardson’s troops suffered horrendous casualties in an attack that lasted no more than 30 minutes. An angry Joe Hooker could do nothing else but simply watch on as the futile attack was repulsed…

Unknown to both Hooker and Richardson, this impromptu attack almost succeeded in pinning both Cleburne’s and Churchill’s Corps in place as Ord slowly pushed ahead against Johnson’s stubborn defence. And just as Johnson was preparing to withdraw his troops out of the battle, first Churchill, and then Cleburne, were able to rush south of Allatoona Pass just in the nick of time, as Logan’s troops which had waited impatiently behind Ord, were now unleashed in light marching order in an attempt to get behind the Confederates defending the Pass. Instead, as Johnson successfully broke contact, they lashed out at open air. The Army of Tennessee had escaped Grant's grasp once again…”

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter One Hundred and Ten​

To Atlanta or Hell​

Part III​

Cold Spring Church (April 26-28, 1864)​

From “The Road to Hell and Atlanta” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 2004​

“After Hardee retreated from Allatoona Pass, Grant determined to move around Hardee's left flank and steal a march toward Dallas. Hardee anticipated Grant's move and sought to ambush the Union forces at Cold Spring Church. Grant mistakenly concluded that Hardee had a token force, as he expected Hardee to hold the line of the Pumpkin Vine Creek is his advance was to be contested at all. As a result Grant ordered Eugene Carr’s XIII Corps to attack. This corps was severely mauled. On April 27 both sides entrenched…​

On the morning of April 28th Grant's army tested the Confederate line. Later that same day Churchill had elements of his corps probe part of the Union defensive line held by Logan's XVII Corps, to exploit any weakness or identify any possible withdrawal. Fighting ensued at three different points, including an extremely sharp if small scale engagement between the brigades of Brigadier General Manning Force and Brigadier General Colton Greene. Churchill called halt to the probes before serious casualties were incurred. Hooker’s force was tasked with looking for a way around Hardee's line, and on May 1 doubling back on itself, the leading element of Hooker’s army, Robert Minty’s cavalry brigade, occupied Allatoona Pass, which had a railroad and would allow his men and supplies to reach him by train. Upon receiving the news that Hooker has secured the Pass, Grant abandoned his lines along the Racoon Creek on May 4 and moved toward the railhead at Allatoona Pass, forcing Hardee to follow…​

The ground favoured the Confederates at Cold Spring Church​

Burnt Hickory (May 5, 1864)​

From “The Road to Hell and Atlanta” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 2004​

“After what was effectively a Union defeat at Cold Spring Church, Grant ordered Logan to attack Hardee's seemingly exposed right flank with the potential threat to any march on Allatoona that Hardee might be considering. The Confederates, primarily of William Preston’s and St John R. Liddell’s divisions were ready for the attack, but Logan’s XVII Corps attack was powerful and concentrated. Troops under John McArthur threatened a break in Churchill’s lines but this was ultimately plugged by the timely redeployment of States Right Gist’s brigade with further support from Ben Helm’s division. Eventually the Confederates repulsed the attack, but with high casualties on both sides…”​

When Hooker found Hardee entrenched in the Marietta area on May 20, he drew up his own lines to match the Confederate lines. On Grant’s arrival he began extending his lines beyond Hardee’s lines, forcing Hardee to redeploy some elements and seek to refuse others. On May 18–19, Hardee, seeing envelopment in his current position was inevitable, moved his army to a new position, previously selected by Thomas Churchill, astride Kennesaw Mountain. The Confederates entrenched in an arc-shaped line to the west of Marietta. This would protect Hardee’s supply line, the Western & Atlantic Railroad. Grant, in spite of Hooker’s misgivings, prepared to attack this position…”​

Kennesaw Mountain (May 22, 1864)​

From “The Road to Hell and Atlanta” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 2004​

“Grant's plan was first to induce Hardee to thin out and weaken his line by ordering Warren and Ord to extend his army to the right. Then Hooker was to make a feint on his extreme left —the northern outskirts of Marietta and the northeastern end of Kennesaw Mountain — with his cavalry under George Crook and a division of infantry (Anson G. McCook’s), and to make a major assault on the southwestern end of Little Kennesaw Mountain. Meanwhile, Carr and Logan were to conduct the principal attack against the Confederate fortifications in the center of their line, and Ord was to demonstrate on the Confederate left flank and attack somewhere near the Powder Springs Road "as he can with the prospect of success” (Grant).​

At 8 a.m. on May 22, Union artillery opened a furious bombardment with over 200 guns on the Confederate works and the Rebel artillery responded in kind. General William F. Barry wrote, "Kennesaw smoked and blazed with fire, a volcano as grand as Etna." As the Federal infantry began moving soon afterward, the Confederates quickly determined that much of the 8 miles wide advance consisted of demonstrations rather than concerted assaults. The first of those assaults began at around 8:30am, with three brigades of Brigadier General Albert L. Lee's division (Major General Eugene Carr's XIII Corps, Army of the Mississippi) moving against Cleburne's corps on the southern end of Little Kennesaw Mountain and the spur known as Pigeon Hill near the Burnt Hickory Road. If the attack were successful, capturing Pigeon Hill would isolate most of Cleburne's corps on Kennesaw Mountain. All three brigades were disadvantaged by the approach through dense thickets, steep and rocky slopes, and a lack of knowledge of the terrain. About 5,500 Union troops in two columns of regiments moved against about 5,000 Confederate soldiers (under Preston Smith), well entrenched…​

On the right of Lee's attack, the brigade of Brigadier General William P. Benton was forced to advance through a knee-deep swamp, stopped short of the Confederate breastworks on the southern end of Pigeon Hill by enfilading fire. They were able to overrun the rifle pits in front of the works, but could not pierce the main Confederate line. To their left, the brigades of Colonels James Keigwin and Daniel W. Lindsey crossed difficult terrain interrupted by steep cliffs and scattered with huge rocks to approach the brigade of Brigadier General William B. Bate. Some of the troops were able to reach as far as the abatis, but most were not and they were forced to remain stationary, firing behind trees and rocks. When General Carr rode forward, under fire, to judge their progress, he determined that many of his men were being "uselessly slain" and ordered Keigwin and Lindsey to withdraw and entrench behind the gorge that separated the lines…​

About 2 miles to the south, Logan's troops were behind schedule, but began their main attack against William Preston's division at 9 a.m. Two divisions totaling about 9,000 men under Brigadier Generals John E. Smith and John McArthur, advanced in column formation rather than the typical broad line of battle against the Confederate division of Brigadier General William Preston, entrenched on what is now known as "Preston’s Hill." On Smith’s left, his brigade under Brigadier General Manning Force attacked through dense undergrowth, but was unable to break through the abatis and fierce rifle fire. On his right, the brigade of Brigadier General Mortimer D. Leggett charged the brigade of Brigadier General John C. Brown and was repulsed. During a second charge, Leggett was seriously wounded…​

McArthur's division, to the right of Smith's, also advanced in column formation. While such a movement offered the opportunity for a quick breakthrough by massing power against a narrow point, it also had the disadvantage of offering a large concentrated target to enemy guns. Their orders were to advance silently, capture the works, and then cheer to give a signal to the reserve divisions to move forward to secure the railroad and cut the Confederate army in two. Brigadier General Hugh T. Reid's brigade advanced down a slope to a creek and then crossed a wheat field to ascend the slope of Preston Hill. When they reached within a few yards of the Confederate works, the line halted, crouched, and began firing. But the Confederate counter fire was too strong and Reid's brigade lost two commanders (Reid wounded and his replacement, Colonel Adam G. Malloy, killed), nearly all of its field officers, and a third of its men. Malloy was killed on the Confederate parapet as he slashed with his sword and shouted "Surrender, you rebels and traitors!" Colonel William Hall's brigade on Reid's right suffered similar losses. Brigadier Thomas E.G. Ransom’s brigade never made it beyond the abatis. After ferocious hand-to-hand fighting, the Union troops dug in across from the Confederates, ending the fighting around 10:45 a.m. Both sides nicknamed this place "Bloody Angle"…​

To the right of McArthur's division, Major General Francis J. Herron's division advanced, but did not join in the attack for reasons that he was never able to fully justify. Logan’s distaste for Herron was only increased by this failure. Considerably farther to the right, however, was the site of the only success of the day. Ord's XVI Corps had been assigned to demonstrate against the Confederate left and he was able to put two brigades across Olley's Creek without resistance. That movement, along with an advance by Major General John Wynn Davidson's [the former commander of the Army of the Potomac’s cavalry returned from injury] cavalry division on Ord's right, put Union troops within 5 miles of the Chattahoochee River, closer to the last river protecting Atlanta than any unit in Hardee's army…​

Grant's armies suffered about 4,500 casualties in comparison to Hardee's 1,000. The Union general was not initially deterred by these losses and he twice asked Carr and Logan to renew the assault. "Our loss is small, compared to some of those [battles in the] East" Grant felt. Black Jack Logan was willing as he still had Brigadier General Isaac Quinby’s division in reserve, but Eugene Carr’s response, however, "Another such assaults if what Hardee wishes for most and, if out of hand, would use up this army." Grant weighed the professional Carr’s opinion and demurred from further attacks. A few days later Hooker wrote to a friend, "We are all becoming more like Grant with each passing day, regarding the death and mangling of couple thousand men as a small affair, a scuffle"…”​

It was a bloody business before the Confederate works​

From "U.S. Grant - Hero of Three Wars" by John W. Eisenhower
Edison 1953​

“Grant was not fixated on large-scale frontal assaults as some of his critics have asserted, some like Richardson’s attack at Allatoona were not on his orders. However he felt constrained to try at Kennesaw for logistical reasons, but also so that he could keep Hardee guessing about the tactics he would employ in the future. In his report of the battle, Grant wrote, "I perceived that the enemy and our officers were in some doubt as to whether I would assault fortified lines or look to outflank. An army to be efficient - it must not settle down to a single mode of offence, but must be prepared to execute any plan which promises success. I mean therefore to promote that doubt for its moral effect on the enemy, thus resolved to attempt it at that point where success would give the largest fruits of victory"…​

From “Fighting Joe Hooker” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 1999​

“Hooker considered Grant’s attack at Kennesaw Mountain a significant tactical defeat. "Hardee has won a minor defensive triumph. Grant did not press the attack as he should once started”. It seemed to reignite Hooker’s ambition to replace Grant in united command of the armies…”​

From “The Road to Hell and Atlanta” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 2004​

"It must be admitted that Ord's success on the right gave Grant a great advantage, and the federal commander quickly decided to exploit it. The opposing forces spent seven days facing each other at close range, but on May 29, with good summer weather near at hand, Grant sent the Army of the Cumberland and Crook's cavalry around the Confederate left flank and Hardee was forced to withdraw from Kennesaw Mountain to prepared positions at Smyrna…”​

Smyrna and Chattahoochee (June 5, 1864)​

From “The Road to Hell and Atlanta” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 2004​

“On June 5, Grant had Warren and Ord demonstrated against Hardee’s positions at Smyrna, while directing Hooker to outflank Hardee again by sending Granger and Davis to cross the Chattahoochee near the mouth of Soap Creek, the last major geographic barrier to entering Atlanta…”​

From “The Irish Corporal – The Life and Battles of Patrick Ronayne Cleburne” by James Fitzgerald Maguire
Trinity Press​

“Cleburne withdrew from the positions at Smyrna in the face of Ord and Warren. Grant was focused on Hooker’s flanking movement and therefore the decision to press their advantage fell on the more senior Ord who pressed on…​

Cleburne had a second line of defensive works at MacRae’s Hill. Having lured Ord and Warren forward, some distance from their support in the form of Carr’s Corps, Cleburne paused to watch the Federals halt to assess these new works…​

The last thing Ord was expecting was that Cleburne would abandon his works and attack, yet that is what Cleburne did that afternoon. Ord’s troops had not yet commenced serious preparation of their own positions; his artillery support was still coming up; and Ord was unsure of his authority to press matters against a second line. Cleburne, realizing that he had at least comparative numbers resolved to attack the unsuspecting Federals… ​

The attack of Polignac’s small but angry brigade of Texans on the federal right flank rolled up Dodge’s division of Ord’s Corps and drove them from the field. Matters quickly deteriorated for the Federal force from there. Ord was quick to respond. He ordered Warren’s XV Corps back to the first line of abandoned rebel works, while Ord’s own XVI Corps acted as a rearguard. When Ord came to fall back, Warren would be in position to do the same for him, as Ord's troops streamed past…​

A fighting retreat is a messy business and to the Federals credit they managed it well. Ord’s stand as rearguard was brief but bloody and he promptly ordered his divisions to the rear. Warren’s stand at the Smyrna line lasted longer and many commanders distinguished themselves. Hugh Ewing, Joseph Lightburn and Joseph Mower would be commended by Warren, as was Warren himself by Ord…​

As night fell Cleburne was back in his Smyrna lines having inflicted three times as many casualties against Ord and Warren as he had himself received. His position was tenuous now as Carr had joined Ord and Warren. Logan’s location was still unknown as the Federals appeared to be preparing for a more organized attack…”​

The aggressiveness of Cleburne's Corps surprised E.O.C. Ord​

From “The Road to Hell and Atlanta” by Herbert Walter

Buffalo 2004​

“Hardee knew that Grant would try to flank him and cross the Chattahoochee River. As General Granger's XXIII corps advanced on the river, his scouts identified a Confederate pontoon bridge there which appeared to be defended by dismounted cavalry. They were driven away by Major General Jacob D. Cox’s division of XXIII Corps. The bridge, although damaged, was captured. Granger’s orders were to force a crossing, which he sought to do in the face of increased Confederate opposition. Hardee had ordered William W. Loring, commander of the Atlanta garrison, to bring up his forces to the river. With a motley division of troops Loring held until Hardee could rush troops from Churchill’s corps across the river to his support…​

After five separate attempts by both Cox’s and then Steedman’s divisions the crossing was still in Confederate hands and Granger called off the attack…​

Hardee withdrew Cleburne from his exposed position at Smyrna overnight and withdrew his whole army across the Chattahoochee River. Grant was not pleased. His commanders had been tricked again by Cleburne and Hardee still held the river – the last major geographical obstacle before Atlanta…​

One element of good news reached Grant on June 6 – George Thomas had defeated Buckner and Cheatham and taken Knoxville. East Tennessee was liberated and Thomas had been order to take his small, corps sized, Army of the Ohio to join Grant. Grant decided to wait for Thomas before making his final move against Atlanta…”​

From “The Life of General William J. Hardee - Teach Them How To War” by Christopher L. Pike
Bison 1965​

“Hardee, now free of the continuous pressure coming from Grant, had a brief window to plan accordingly. Although Atlanta was only 30 miles away, the Confederate Army of the Tennessee had done well. What it needed to do, though, was ensure that their Union counterparts suffered another large defeat somewhere before Atlanta. Jeff Davis, the Confederate President, more or less demanded it though Secretary Breckinridge and Chief of Staff Johnson did their best to shield Hardee from direct interference…”​

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter One Hundred and Eleven​

The Players Are Cast​

From the article “The Conventions of 1864 – The Transition from the Second to the Third Party System” by Otis R. Mayhew
North & South Magazine 1999

The Radical Party – Forerunners of the Radical Liberal Party​

“As the Civil War progressed, political opinions within the Republican Party began to diverge. Senators Charles Sumner and Henry Wilson of Massachusetts wanted the Republican Party to advocate constitutional amendments to prohibit slavery and to guarantee racial equality before the law. These bills were not yet supported by all Republicans. A number of “conservatives” particularly from Western states opposed this…

Democratic leaders hoped that the radical Republicans would put forth a ticket in the election because of President Lincoln’s perceived intransigence on the nature of Reconstruction. The New York World was particularly interested in undermining the National Union Party and ran a series of articles setting forth that the National Union Convention would be delayed until late in 1864 to allow a Radical time to collect delegates to win the nomination. Some of the extreme radicals looked to General John C. Frémont initially. Supporters in New York City established a newspaper called the New Nation, which declared in one of its initial issues that the National Union Convention would be a "nonentity"…

The Radical Democracy & Freedom Convention assembled in Massachusetts with delegates arriving on May 22, 1864. By now the delegations had fractured in their support. Lincoln’s hints throughout April and May that he might compromise with the Radicals on some elements of Reconstruction had muddied the waters. Lincoln’s reaffirmation that firm steps would be taken to protect the rights of freedmen after the war to prevent them becoming “America’s serf class” had secured the support of many waiving Republicans. Various names were nonetheless proposed: John C. Fremont, Benjamin Butler, even John Peck’s name was mentioned. The major exceptions were the New York and New Jersey delegations. They remained united, composed mainly of War Democrats, in supporting Philip Kearny. 375 delegates came from 17 states and the District of Columbia. They adopted the name the "Radical Party"…

A supporter of Butler was appointed chairman. The platform was vigorously discussed with much argument as to the severity of Reconstruction and a series of resolutions bogged down the convention proceedings for several days. The convention broke down without a nomination for president. Ben Butler had confirmed in a letter to the Convention that he would not accept the nomination of the Radical Party. Phil Kearny ignored the Convention’s declarations altogether, publicly calling it “a farce” and a “circus of disappointed office-seekers”. Fremont’s supporters could not gain any momentum, and thus could not get him nominated. The convention broke down but the organizers resolved to meet again after the National Union Convention scheduled for June 7-8, 1864. They never did…

The National Union Party – Lincoln’s Bastard​

Before the election, Lincoln had overseen the joining of the War Democrats to the Republicans under the umbrella of the new National Union Party. At the commencement of 1864 some political leaders, including Salmon P. Chase, Benjamin Wade, and Horace Greeley, intended to oppose Lincoln's re-nomination on the grounds that he could not win re-election with his soft approach to Reconstruction and the outcome of the war still in doubt. However following the fall of Charleston to Isaac Rodman in May, as well as Kearny’s conquests in North Carolina, and Grant’s seemingly inexorable advance on Atlanta, not even the self-deluded Chase would actively contest Lincoln' re-nomination…

The nominating convention of the National Union Party, dominated by Republicans with a scattering of War Democrats, met in Baltimore on June 7-8, 1864. By that time, Lincoln’s supporters, uplifted by victories on a dozen battlefields, had thwarted various insurgencies and partially secured control of the proceedings. The platform called for pursuit of the war until the Confederacy surrendered unconditionally; a constitutional amendment for the abolition of slavery; aid to disabled Union veterans; continued European neutrality; encouragement of immigration; and construction of a transcontinental railroad. It also praised the use of black troops and Lincoln’s management of the war. On the first presidential ballot, Lincoln got all of the votes, and the National Union Party nominated him for a second term as president…

The difficulty for Lincoln was the planks for Reconstruction that the Convention adopted. Although personally popular with the membership of the party, Lincoln was still at odds with much of the leadership of the party – the Radical Republicans. Despite some inspiring, but vague speeches given by Lincoln during the spring, including the Union Mills Address, which hinted at a hardening of his attitude to Reconstruction, many radicals remained suspicious of Lincoln and his desire and ability to “subjugate the South”(Greeley). They therefore sought the adoption of a radical series of “planks” in the platform of the National Union party to spell out their policy on Reconstruction. That platform would look suspiciously like Kearny’s “Potomac Memorandum”. Lincoln sincerely believed that the formal expression of such a platform for a hard peace would extend the war by making the Confederates fight on out of desperation. The Radicals considered it the bare minimum they would be prepared to accept and would to build on it with more severe measures if they won sufficient seats in Congress…

The tactics of Lincoln’s opposition to such a rigid platform were not as well managed as his 1860 nomination campaign. His close friend and former campaign manager, David Davis, did not agree with Lincoln’s position on Reconstruction and this was symptomatic of many of Lincoln’s formerly close allies. Furthermore Lincoln had clearly indicated his desire to replace Vice President Hannibal Hamlin on the ticket. Hamlin was a fellow traveler of the Radicals and they demanded the support of Lincoln’s “pocket conservatives” (as they were described by Benjamin Wade) in return for a new vice presidential candidate. The decision by Lincoln’s supporters to give way on the platform in return for the dropping of Hamlin has been described as both foolish and realistic in equal measure by historians since…

In his dissatisfaction with Republican Vice-President Hannibal Hamlin, Lincoln has explored a number of alternative candidates. He had even asked General Benjamin Butler. Butler, still darling of the Radicals and some War Democrats, had refused on the grounds that the office of Vice President was “in political circles like dying without realizing it for 4 years”. The controversial Military-Governor of Tennessee, Andrew Johnson, a War Democrat, was also considered. Johnson was ideally suited to run as a vice-presidential candidate with Lincoln in 1864. He strongly supported the Union, he was a Southerner, and he was a leader of the War Democrats. However Andrew Johnson had got into disputes with two powerful figures – the politically powerful General William “Bull” Nelson, commanding in Kentucky (described as more of a “blood feud” than a disagreement by Ben Butler) and equally importantly, the General in Chief, Phil Kearny. On Kearny’s tour of the west he had dined twice with Johnson and meet with him several times. Kearny quickly let it be known that he thought that Johnson was an “incoherent, quarrelsome drunk who is a War Democrat today for no better reason than it has made him governor and hasn’t learned a damn thing these last 3 years” (at least according to Dan Butterfield). Kearny’s view was widely known in military and public circles. Nelson’s vendetta was politically more significant as Kentucky’s delegation worked before and during the convention to suppress any move to Johnson. They had their own compromise candidate in mind…

On that basis Lincoln passed over Johnson. He also passed over former New York Senator Daniel S. Dickinson. Dickinson was eminently qualified for the position but Lincoln was keen to maintain the regional balance in the Executive. Accepting Dickinson would mean replacing William Seward also of New York and Lincoln was not prepared to do without his counsel. In the end both Lincoln’s and the Convention’s approbation fell upon Joseph Holt of Kentucky. His credentials were as good as Johnson’s - he was a Southerner born in Kentucky and long resident in Mississippi; he was a leading War Democrat and former member of James Buchanan’s cabinet; and as Judge Advocate General of the Union Army he had first class military credentials as well (including Philip Kearny’s seal of approval)…

Abraham Lincoln of Illinois and Joseph Holt of Kentucky​

The Democratic Party – Beginning of the Long Decline​

The Democratic Party was bitterly split between War Democrats, Moderates and Peace Democrats, who further divided among their own competing factions. However since the murder of David Hunter the power and influence of the Peace Democrats was on the wane. Those who would unconditionally compromise with the Confederacy were considered outcasts by the majority of the party…

Leading Peace Democrat Fernando Wood first campaigned for Thomas H. Seymour and then for George Pendleton​

Moderate Peace Democrats who supported the war against the Confederacy, such as Horatio Seymour, were preaching the wisdom of a negotiated peace. After the Battles of Union Mills and the Four Armies, when it was clear the South could no longer win the war, moderate Peace Democrats proposed a negotiated peace that would secure Union victory. They believed this was the best course of action, because an armistice could finish the war without devastating the South. The handful of remaining Radical Peace Democrats, known as Copperheads, such as Clement Vallandigham, were either in prison, in exile or were cast out of their own convention. The majority of the Democratic Party would not accept a candidate or a platform that would declare the war a failure or favored an immediate end to hostilities without securing Union victory…

There were few obvious candidates for the nomination. Horatio Seymour, Governor of New York was favored but had declared he would not accept the nomination. Former Connecticut Governor and former radical Peace Democrat Thomas H. Seymour actively vied for the presidential nomination but his history as a total opponent of the war stood against him. Some even suggested Andrew Johnson could be brought back into the Democratic fold to lead his party. As Harpers Weekly observed “those fit for the nomination will not accept it, and those seeking it are not fit for the nomination”…

The most startling name to appear on the ballot was that of General Ambrose Burnside. Formerly a Democrat before the war his current political allegiance was not known meaning that a, not particularly inspiring, Union General received both Republican votes for the vice presidential nomination and Democratic votes for the presidential nomination. However the War Democrats within the party, who utterly repudiated the Thomas Seymour candidacy (and the dead hand of Clement Vallandigham behind the Peace Democrats), wanted to lay down a marker that would alarm the Moderates and Peace Democrats into an acceptable compromise. They also wanted to establish their credentials a loyal Unionist Democrats. They choose to elevate Burnside as he was the widely publicized persecutor of Clement Vallandigham, and a man not afraid to arrest Copperheads who had once been his political fellow travelers before the war…

The convention was held in Columbus, Ohio on August 22–24, 1864. A pro-war pro-negotiated settlement platform was adopted over the Peace Democrats opposition. The South in the Union but on the basis of a negotiated settlement of the war’s issues would be their nuanced election stance. The nomination of a candidate was less straight forward particularly given the recent dramatic news from North Carolina…

After Horatio Seymour and Lazarus Powell let it be known they would not accept the nomination (Powell believed the nominee should be from a ‘free’ state). It seemed that the moderates would rally around former President, Franklin Pierce, while the radical Peace Democrats continued to support Thomas H. Seymour. However many other ‘favorite sons’ and compromise candidates remained in the picture. The announcement that Franklin Pierce would also not accept the nomination occurred after the third ballot. The moderates split, the more ardent for a “hard war but a just peace” went to Burnside, who had not even declared himself a Democrat still. The bulk however broke for Indiana’s favorite son Senator Thomas A. Hendricks. There was an expectation that the Peace Democrats might surprise everyone and win through if they could get momentum behind Thomas Seymour. However on the fourth and fifth ballots, the surge to Thomas Seymour did not occur. He was considered by the majority of the party to be a toxic candidate and even a handful of ardent Peace Democrats could not be reconciled with his candidacy, which kept the names of George Pendleton and James Bayard jr names in the contest…

By the seventh ballot the Peace Democrats bolted from Thomas Seymour to Pendleton in the hope a less polarizing figure could unite the party. Again the voting remained deadlocked throughout the seventh and eight ballots. The Moderates, Peace Democrats and remaining War Democrats all remained split. On the ninth ballot the New York delegation reintroduced Horatio Seymour’s name to the maelstrom. It was suggested to the convention that if it could agree unanimously to his candidacy he would be forced to relent and accept the will of the party. By the tenth ballot the weary party, desperate to avoid the factionalism of 1860, were drawn to Horatio Seymour. The delegates rushed to him with only 24 Peace Democrats voting otherwise. Although Horatio Seymour had ‘won’ the nomination, after some strong arming, there was an eleventh ballot which unanimously voted for Horatio Seymour...​

When Horatio Seymour received word that “Seymour has been nominated” he assumed it was Thomas H. Seymour. “We are defeated now for we have nominated a defeatist” was his pessimistic response upon hearing the news. His surprise at realizing the nominee was in fact himself can only be imagined. Whether it was relief that the candidate was not his namesake, or his understanding that there was no other viable candidate, he relented and accepted the nomination…

The party opted for regional balance and, in a direct challenge to the National Unionists who had nominated Joseph Holt of Kentucky for Vice President, they voted to nominate their own Kentuckian, Lazarus Powell to the post. Powell, though reluctant to accept the presidential nomination as a southerner, had no qualms about running for the Vice Presidency…”

Horatio Seymour of New York and Lazarus W. Powell of Kentucky​

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter One Hundred and Twelve

From Lambs to Lions​

From “The Fighting Lambs – The Army of the James” by Geoffrey T. W. Werner
Radical Press 1928

“While the Army of the Potomac was winning further laurels in its near constant battles with Longstreet’s army, The Army of the James had been ordered to adopt n almost leisurely pace. There seemed no clear reason for General Kearny’s strictures. There was little opposition in the east half of the state: mostly militia, some cavalry and a few scratch brigades of infantry. Foster’s “Liberty” Corps had taken Raleigh with ease. Wright’s VII Corps had smashed a small rebel force before taking Goldsboro. General Kearny had ordered Peck to secure his prizes, concentrate at Goldsboro and await further orders. That did not stop Peck leading Birney’s Division to secure New Berne. The ports and towns of the Pamlico and Abermarle Sounds were now in Union hands…

Speculation swirled around the delay at Goldsboro. Were the largely (though not exclusively) negro corps to be denied glory in the defeat of the rebel forces? Was Wilmington, the likely target of any advance, too well defended? Did they await a siege train? The speculation was reflected in the Northern Press. Some radical publications began, some for the first time, to seriously question General Kearny’s commitment to the colored troops. Did he simply not want them racing ahead of his beloved Army of the Potomac…”

From “The North Carolina Campaign” by Thomas R. Yetters
Buffalo 2006

“The defeat at Statesville was a grievous one for Longstreet’s army, but he had never been as sanguine as General Jackson about the prospects of success. Indeed General Longstreet had thoroughly prepared for the failure of the flanking march. While the army fought, another army, one made up of impressed slave labor toiled around the city of Charlotte to prepare it for defense, though it had cost him a dearly need brigade of troops to watch over the slaves…

General Longstreet had no intention of being besieged in Charlotte, and quickly ordered the commencement of his supply base further south. However his hope was that he could once again tempt General Reynolds into a costly assault on his works there…”

Head-Quarters, Army of the James, Goldsboro​

From “Kearny the Magnificent” by Roger Galton
NorthWestern

“When Reynolds set off on his flanking march that would lead to the farmland east of Statesville General Kearny had indicated he would remain at the river crossing least Longstreet move. That was a lie least any element of Reynolds force fall into rebel hands. As soon as the last element of Reynolds force was out of sight Reynolds placed Baldy Smith in command of the crossing. Kearny was going to Goldsboro to see Peck. It would mean riding across 50 miles of hostile country. General Buford was not about to let General Kearny set off without a guard. Brigadier Wesley Merritt and his cavalry brigade were given the dubious honor of escorting the commanding general. “Don’t let him get you into any scrapes” was the rather difficult instruction General Buford gave to Merritt before their departure. It was a very relieved Merritt who delivered General Kearny to General Peck’s headquarters in two days of hard riding. Merritt later wrote “Nobody could figure out how the General kept going…one armed as he was, he stayed in the saddle for hours without trouble…and rode easily on paths that were difficult for a sure footed mountain mule”...

Kearny would first ride with the surprised Peck to inspect the army. The troops, black and white, went wild at the sight of General Kearny. “I’ll never forget the General, so straight and fine looking, with his French cap raised. It gave me a shiver of pride just to see him” (Sergeant Nimrod Burke: Freeman and a Virginian in Blue). The incident caused General Kearny to circulate a note to the armies that showed some measure of his confidence: “The General commanding takes great pleasure in the kind reception given him when he passes among the men – but prefers – to be allowed to pass quietly and unobserved – Immediately after a victorious battle he has no obligation to a few hearty cheers”. Taken as a challenge to their rights the men cheered all the more loudly…”

From “The Fighting Lambs – The Army of the James” by Geoffrey T. W. Werner
Radical Press 1928

“General Kearny observed the men seemed well rested by their leisurely march. General Peck responded that they were lean and hungry for the fight and would rise to any challenge General Kearny cared to name. General Kearny had come to give orders for just such a challenge. General Peck was to strip down his troops quickly to a light marching order, as he had done in his march in Virginia, and prepare to move as directed. Any slower troops, his wagons and his heavy artillery were to follow as best it could. He was to use his cavalry under Elliott, which would be augmented by Buford to screen his movement from the rebels. Given Peck’s slow pace in North Carolina the rebels would not expect a swift march and a lightening blow from Peck’s troops…

The only remaining question was in which direction should Peck march? He naturally assumed it would be on Wilmington. It was not and General Kearny outlined an ambitious plan…”

General John J. Peck would be surprised by Kearny's Plan​

From “The Life and Letters of John J. Peck” by John Watts de Peyster Jr.
Buffalo 1892

“One might have thought Phil was anticipating a party rather than a deadly struggle…”

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter One Hundred and Thirteen

Last Hurrah of the Black Horse Cavalry​

From “The North Carolina Campaign” by Thomas R. Yetters
Buffalo 2006

“From outposts at Kings Mountain and Cramer Mountain in the west, over the Catawba River to the main fortifications of Fort Latta, The Hornest’s Nest, Fort Wedgewood, Fort Lee, Cox’s Mill, Pharr’s Mill, Mint Hill and Midland, the city of Charlotte was ringed with defensive works. What artillery remained available to the Army of Northern Virginia had been expertly placed by its chief of artillery, E. Porter Alexander. General Longstreet had followed General Hardee’s (and indeed General Kearny’s example) by concentrating all his artillery under one officer…

As the last of his troops passed Fort Wedgewood on the Statesville Road, Longstreet was already planning how he would draw Kearny and Reynolds into an attack on his works. However his first priority was to send out General Stuart’s cavalry to precisely locate all Reynolds’ corps. General Longstreet had had enough Union surprises…”

From "Always The General - The Life of John Fulton Reynolds" by Jed Bradshaw
Penn State 1999

“When General Reynolds met General Smith in Carrabus County he was surprised to learn that General Kearny had ridden off to meet with Peck. However General Smith did have orders from Kearny to Reynolds. General Reynolds was to concentrate his forces to the north and west of the city, and maintain pressure without assaulting the city or otherwise driving the rebels out – “I want those people there when I return” was Kearny’s demand…

It made little sense to Reynolds. The city was best protected to the west by the Catawba River. The best Reynolds’ could cheaply win would be to overwhelm the rebel outposts at Kings and Cramer Mountains…

Kearny had a further order: Reynolds was to concentrate Buford’s full cavalry corps to the east of Charlotte. “Not a rebel, not a fox, not a bird must penetrate your screen…The rebels must be blind to all east of the Pee Dee River…If he must fight and whip Stuart to maintain the veil then by all means do so. So much the better…”

After the initial mounted clash between Stuart and Gregg's Division, the Union cavalry would fight largely on foot from behind cover​

From "A History of Cavalry in the 19th Century" by Pierre J. Hollande
Nouveau Monde Editions 1952 Translated by Jack M. Webber

“The great Southern cavalry commander Stuart would finally be humbled at the eccentrically named Battle of Coffee Pot Hill. The gallant Stuart had located and reported the location of the 8 Union corps which stretched in a crecent formation from the west to the north east of the city. In doing so his subordinate, the amateur gentleman dragoon, Wade Hampton III had reported a heavy screen of Federal cavalry to the east. General Stuart was ordered to push the Federal cavalry, which could not be supported by Federal infantry (all corps being accounted for), into the Peedee [sic] River. The resulting battle, though not the largest cavalry engagement of the war, would be one of the most decisive…

Stuart planned to strike at the heart of the Federal cavalry screen – its midpoint near Haileys Ford. General Stuart would deploy his whole force, though much reduced in numbers from its former glories; it was still a formidable fighting formation. However it would be outmanned and outgunned by the Federal cavalry that day. Coffee Pot Hill was a battle of panache versus professionalism, courage versus firepower. If further evidence was needed that the age of mathematical warfare had commenced one need have looked no further that the victory of the calculating professional dragoon Buford over the dashing cavalier that was Stuart…”

From “The North Carolina Campaign” by Thomas R. Yetters
Buffalo 2006

“The defeat of Stuart’s cavalry by a mere 3/5ths of Buford’s cavalry (Gregg’s, Custer’s and B.F. Davis’ divisions) had catastrophic implications for the Confederates had they but known it. Overzealous charges into the face of Buford’s repeaters had crippled the Confederate mounted arm. However Longstreet was not initially overly concerned. Stuart had reported the location of all the Union corps, and Longstreet would ensure the remaining cavalry maintained a close watch. He had not concerned himself with the events in tidewater North Carolina – he had neither the troops nor the inclination to do so. If Wilmington were besieged there was nothing he could do about it in any event. His foe, the Army of the Potomac, was before him…”

Chief of Staff Joseph E. Johnson​

From “The War Between the States” by Otis R. Mayhew
Sword & Musket 1992

“Joseph Johnson had approved Longstreet’s plan to fight defensively if practicable or to retreat if a siege was threatened. Johnson began to see possibilities: with interior lines in Georgia and South Carolina, there would be four rebel “armies” in close proximity – Longstreet, Hardee, Magruder [technically part of Hardee’s force] and Beauregard. Any three combined could smash McClernand’s Army of Alabama or Rodman’s Army of the Stono. All four together could well be a match for Reynolds or Grant…

Johnson’s endorsement of Longstreet’s plan emphasized the need not to be trapped or have his mobility limited unnecessarily. The Confederacy’s last hope lay in keeping its remaining armies mobile and capable of mutual support. Unfortunately for the rebels, what had occurred to Joseph Johnson had already occurred to Phil Kearny…”

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter One Hundred and Fourteen

I Can Make Men Follow Me To Hell​

From “A Thunderbolt on the Battlefield – the Battles of Philip Kearny: Volume III” by Professor Kearny Bowes
MacArthur University Press 1962

“General Kearny arrived back to General Reynolds’ Headquarters at Davidson’s Farm on the Catawba with a plan of action. If General Longstreet stayed true to form he would only remain in the works at Charlotte if the Army of the Potomac threatened a direct assault. Once the risk of encirclement presented itself, Longstreet would withdraw. General Kearny intended to offer General Longstreet the head on assault that he sought…

General Andrew Humphreys’ V Corps would have the honor of assaulting the isolated posts of Kings Mountain and Crowder’s Mountain, west of the Catawba River. In addition to his own three divisions (Barnes, Ayres and Crawford) he would be supported by Major General Orlando Willcox’s III Division of IX Corps. Kearny expected Humphreys to seize these objectives…

General Reynolds’ would orchestrate a second attack on the main works on a front covering Fort Latta, The Hornet’s Nest Works and Fort Wedgewood. This would involve General Hancock’s I Corps and Baldy Smith’s II Corps with Stevens’ remaining two divisions from IX Corps in reserve. Kearny expected this second attack, on the main works, would fail…

For the perhaps the first time General Kearny’s ruthlessness was apparent. He wished to “encourage” the Rebels to remain at Charlotte for his own strategic reasons. In order to do so he would offer them the battle the so desperately sought on the terms they desired…”

From “Kearny the Magnificent” by Roger Galton
NorthWestern

“General Kearny loved war, but he loved his armies too. He had avoided the worst excesses of frontal daylight assaults seen elsewhere in the war. Now, in order to achieve his war-winning objective, he felt he no longer had an option…

It was the argumentative William F. Smith, old Baldy, that raised an issue that was on many minds - with the war clearing coming to a conclusion there was a certain growing reluctance among the men to take risks; to press home attacks. Before the assembled commanders Kearny harked back to a comment he had made as the army had entered North Carolina. “I shall continue to the press the enemy…keeping him on the run until he must turn, stand and do battle…when that time comes I shall destroy him…to accomplish this I shall do all I deem necessary” and then he would go on to add “Shirkers and malingers in any command will be regarded as deserters…and dealt with accordingly”. General Smith must not have looked satisfied for General Kearny’s next remark was aimed at him “General if you cannot get your men to fight I shall lead your corps into the fight. I can make men follow me to Hell”…

From “The North Carolina Campaign” by Thomas R. Yetters
Buffalo 2006

“The preparations for the attacks were not missed by General Longstreet whose troops had a view over much of the battlefield. Furthermore Stuart’s cavalry, though much reduced in number, had reverted to small unit patrols to watch the Union Corps and so Longstreet remained well informed about the location of the Union troops. Any further questions which Longstreet had were usually answered by the Northern papers (and a few Virginia Unionist publications) which still flowed into Charlotte…

General Longstreet reached the same conclusions as General Kearny. He could not hold his outposts west of the Catawba, but any assault on his northern works must fail…”

From "Always The General - The Life of John Fulton Reynolds" by Jed Bradshaw
Penn State 1999

“As dawn broke on the morning of 12th July General Reynolds gave General Humphreys his final orders at Humphreys’ Headquarters at Tryon House. Within minutes the V Corps was advancing on the fortifications at Kings Mountain - the divisions of James Barnes and Romeyn B. Ayres from the north, and the division of Samuel Crawford from the west. Their opposition did not at first sight appear significant - brigades from the Army of Northern Virginia under Brigadier General and Colonel James K. Marshall with a brigade of militia under Colonel John H. Nethercutt, and some artillery under Lieutenant Colonel John J. Garnett. The whole was under the command of Major General Henry “Harry” Heth. However the strength of the works cannot be overstated. General Reynolds expected bloody work that morning…”

From “The North Carolina Campaign” by Thomas R. Yetters
Buffalo 2006

“General Jackson’s instructions to General Heth were not as inspiring as General Kearny’s exhortations to the Union troops. The rather jovial Heth recounted General Jackson’s grim sentiments to his Union gaolers “General Heth - you must kill five of those people, those invaders, for everyone of ours lost. Do that and though every one of you falls we will still have a victory”…

General Hunt had placed Colonel Charles S. Wainwright in command of the Union artillery west of the Catawba and it now opened up a fearful bombardment of the Confederate works as the V Corps advanced…

Crawford’s advance from the west was slowed by flanking artillery fire from Crowder’s Mountain. Barnes’ advance was slowed by an unexpected obstacle, Potts Creek. The first attack was carried out by the men of Ayres’ II Division largely unsupported. They were repulsed. Brigadier Stephen H. Weed was injured and Brigadier Hannibal Day was killed. General Day was the oldest man in the Army of the Potomac after General Greene. His body was found with one hand on the Rebel works. No one from Ayres’ command had advanced further in that attack…

Recently promoted Brigadier Hannibal Day​

As Ayres’ troops fell back, Barnes launched his assault. The brigades of Jacob B. Sweitzer, Joshua Chamberlain, and Patrick Guiney pressed forward. The two lawyers and the professor lead their attack courageously and decisively. Stalled briefly at the foot of the main works, it would be Colonel Adolph von Hartung of the 74th Pennsylvania who would break the deadlock. The former Prussian officer took the regimental flag, planted it half way up the earthworks in a broken section of chevaux de frise, and with a cry of “Gott Mit Uns” led the renewed attack forward. For his courage he would obtain a Kearny Cross. The 74th Pennsylvania of Sweitzer’s Brigade would have the honor of being the first into the rebel works at Kings Mountain, followed by the 20th Maine and 44th New York of Chamberlain’s Brigade. Such of Marshall’s troops as could escape fell back on Crowder’s Mountain. More than a few would fall with a bullet in the back…

With Kings Mountain in his hands, General Humphreys pushed Crawford’s and Barnes’ divisions forward against the field works at Crowder’s Mountain. As a precaution he ordered up Willcox’s Division as far as Kings Mountain…

"Gott Mit Uns!"

Some of the works at Crowder's Mountain​

The position at Crowder’s Mountain, which was more of a long ridge running south west to north east, was actually too long to be defended effectively by the limited number of troops at Heth’s disposal. With only a handful of militia occupying the extreme left wing of his works, it should have been a simple matter for Crawford to break through where the Bethlehem Road, cut the ridge, but the for the second time that day Crawford bungled his attack. The artillery fire that morning seemed to have sapped the will of Crawford and his brigade commanders, William McCandless and Francis B. Spinola to press home. It was Barnes’ division that again bore the brunt of the fighting…

Patrick Guiney, one the many Irish born soldiers in the Army of the Potomac, thought he had identified a weak spot on the left near Freedom Mill, but with all three brigades engaged, Barnes’ had no one to exploit it. Humphreys responded to Guiney’s observation by releasing the brigades of John F. Hartranft and Thomas Welch, from Willcox’s Division, to attack the Rebel right. Guiney was right. The IX Corps troops burst through the militia battalion holding the works near Freedom Mill. The position at Crowder’s Mountain was lost and Heth quickly lost control as first the militia and then the regulars broke and ran for the river. Few would make it back to the Catawba defenses and Heth would become a guest of his former West Point classmates, Willcox and Ayres…

Humphreys had seized his objectives, albeit with heavy losses in Ayres division. In doing so had smashed three rebel brigades (though one was militia) which would never effectively reorganize. The course of events on the eastern bank of the Catawba was going rather differently…”

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter One Hundred and Fifteen

Faugh a Ballagh​

Flag of the 28th Massachusetts​

From “The North Carolina Campaign” by Thomas R. Yetters
Buffalo 2006

“From the eastern bank of the Catawba, the three main works ran in a line: Fort Latta, Fort Wedgewood and Fort Lee. The North Road ran between Forts Latta and Wedgewood and in order to protect it another major work was raised athwart it about 700 yards behind and between Forts Latta and Wedgewood, called Fort Pickett but known by the men as the Hornet’s Nest. The forts of wood and earth were not the only defenses raised by the Confederates. Between each of the works further field works had been raised and manned albeit with no artillery in these lines. No works were raised between Forts Latta and Wedgewood but anyone pressing down the road between them would be in a deadly crossfire from the three forts and the field works between Forts Latta and Pickett, and between Forts Pickett and Wedgewood. The deadly crossfire that would ensue from any attack meant the position, a well fortified “V”, well earned its nickname of the Hornet’s Nest…

Pickett’s Division occupied the left of the line: Kemper’s Brigade in Fort Latta, Pegram’s in the intervening works, and Garnett’s in Fort Pickett. Mahone’s Division came next: G.B. Anderson’s brigade in the works between Forts Pickett and Wedgewood, Wright’s in Fort Wedgewood and Benning’s between Forts Wedgewood and Lee. Barksdale’s Mississippi brigade of Hood’s Division occupied Fort Lee on the extreme right of the portion of the line that would be subjected to the Union attack. General Richard H. Anderson would oversee the defense that day…”

From "Always The General - The Life of John Fulton Reynolds" by Jed Bradshaw
Penn State 1999

“The ever professional General Reynolds seemed particularly serious that morning. He had met with Generals Hancock and Smith before dawn before passing over the Catawba to General Humphreys. General Hunt had prepared four “grand” batteries to support the attack. The fire of two of those batteries would converge on Fort Latta making it the focus of Smith’s attack. Smith would attack Fort Latta with Caldwell’s divisions, Gorman’s would advance down the North Road, and William Hays’ would attack Fort Wedgewood from the north west. Of Hancock’s Corps, Stannard’s division was ordered to the assault of Fort Wedgewood from the north east, while the smaller divisions of Gibbon and Doubleday would attack Fort Lee. General Stevens and his two remaining divisions (Orlando Poe’s and Edward Harland’s) would be held in reserve astride the road…

It was suggested that, because General Reynolds had serious misgivings about the attack and as General Kearny had not shared his purpose in making it, General Reynolds left the direction of this attack to Kearny, while positioning himself on the west bank with Humphreys. Whatever the truth of it, General Reynolds would spend most the morning away from the main assault…”

From “A Thunderbolt on the Battlefield – the Battles of Philip Kearny: Volume III” by Professor Kearny Bowes
MacArthur University Press 1962

“General Kearny had placed his headquarters behind Caldwell’s division, just to the east of Battery No.1. He was at the edge of the range of the best Confederate artillery in this position. As a result his staff, at the orchestration of Colonel McKeever, tended to gather around him to try to shield him from harm. General Stevens suggested Kearny’s staff appeared as “a host unto themselves”. General Kearny’s staff had attracted the brave and the talented. Not only had the staff gathered around. General Kearny was the “lightening rod” (Wolseley) as far as the European observers were concerned. With little sensibility for what was proper or diplomatic, General Kearny encouraged the observers to ride with him (in their own uniforms) and see the battle from the front line. Kearny’s entourage included Colonels Garnet Wolseley and Lord Abinger of England, Chef de Bataillon Jerome Napoleon Bonaparte II of France, Captain Fitzgerald Ross of Austria (who had ridden against Kearny at Solferino)…"

From “The North Carolina Campaign” by Thomas R. Yetters
Buffalo 2006

“As dawn broke General Hunt had his grand batteries open up a storm of shot and shell on the Confederate positions. Somehow Hunt had managed, by rail and cross country dragging, to bring up several larger siege guns and these contributed dramatically to the weight of shell being hurled at the rebel works.

In order to conserve ammunition General Porter ordered the Confederate guns not to respond unless an infantry attack commenced…

Under intense fire the Confederate artillery conserves ammunition and waits​

From “Kearny the Magnificent” by Roger Galton
NorthWestern

“The attack began at around 7:15 a.m. Lead parties of sharpshooters and engineers led the way in a screen designed to overwhelm rebel pickets and to remove obstructions that would delay the infantry advance. Kearny may have expected to loose this battle but he had not planned it half-heartedly. They were followed by nine groups of 100 men assigned to storm the rebel forts (Latta, Wedgewood and Lee) and stream back into the Confederate rear area. These men relied on surprise and speed—they set off before the artillery bombardment commenced with the intention of getting close enough to storm the works when it stopped before the rebels could emerge from their dugouts. Unlike those approaching Forts Wedgewood and Lee, the storming party at Fort Latta achieved complete surprise and fighting was fierce…”

Colonel Hall's attack from the riverside breaks into Fort Latta​

From “The North Carolina Campaign” by Thomas R. Yetters
Buffalo 2006

“General Anderson, the officer responsible for the attacked section of the line, heard the sounds of the cannonade, and rode to Fort Pickett, just to the south of Forts Latta and Wedgewood, which he found to be ready to defend itself. He sent a short note to General Longstreet “it looks like Phil Kearny has finally lost patience with us”. As he moved north, Anderson ordered the artillery at Fort Pickett to open fire on Union troops advancing on Fort Latta and ordered a reserve infantry regiment to reinforce Kemper’s hard pressed brigade there, which they did with fixed bayonets, briefly re-repelling the Union advance screen. Assuming that there would be no breach in the line, Anderson rode back to Fort Pickett. He recalled, "I crossed the parapet and beyond it saw some troops passing between Forts Latta and Wedgewood and advancing towards Fort Pickett down the North Road. I supposed the Union Generals would right them back to the attack on one or other fort but they seemed hell bent on advancing into the Hornet’s Nest." He suddenly realized that the men he was observing were the troops of the Irish Brigade and they intended to pass through the crossfire between the two advance forts, the field works on both flanks and capture Fort Pickett. He was taken aback by this foolishness. The Irish Brigade was marching into a no-man’s land through which none could live…

Baldly Smith soon arrived at the foot of Fort Latta and found General Caldwell. The attack had stalled but Caldwell believed that an advance via the riverbank flank, covered by Battery No.12 on the west bank could exceed their "most sanguine expectations." With Caldwell at their head, he led the troops of Colonel Norman J. Hall’s brigade. Within minutes they had swept up through a defilade and seized the western end of Fort Latta, opening a gap no more that 200 feet long in the Confederate line. Union artillerists following them tried to use the handful of captured guns to open up enfilading fire on the entrenchments to the east and south…

The attack began having difficulty on I Corps front to the east, where the Confederate defensive formed a seamless battle line and the Union troops were too confused by the maze of trenches and too few to attack it effectively. Kearny turned his attention to the centre of his attack and Fort Wedgewood, against which he launched the division of Willis A. Gorman. He was to support Hays and Stannard’s attacks there. The defenders successfully employed canister rounds from nine cannons, halting the assault by the three divisions, but two of Gorman’s brigades had gone awry. As Gorman led off the brigade of Samuel K. Zook to support Stannard, the following Irish Brigade under General Thomas Meagher, set off down the North Road, Meagher having misunderstood his orders. Colonel H. Boyd McKean’s brigade followed the Irish. Men from New York, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts and New Hampshire were marching into the worst place on the battlefield…

General James Kemper tenaciously held on to the eastern portion of Fort Latta, and while his troops fought to recapture the western portion, his artillery concentrated on the troops attacking Fort Wedgewood. In the smoke and confusion the advance of the Irish brigade and its fellows went unnoticed initially in Fort Latta…

The Union artillery from Battery 2 continued bombarding Fort Wedgewood and the rebel field artillery returned fire. When the Confederate flag was knocked down, the Confederate gunners outside the fort assumed that it had fallen to the Yankees and opened fire on their own men. Volunteers were found to raise the flag again and four of them were killed before the Confederate artillery ceased fire…

Smith sent a message back to Kearny that the attack was going well, but he was either exaggerating or unaware of the trouble developing. Only about half of Caldwell’s troops had managed to breach any of the rebel works and had still not yet taken Fort Latta completely. Two brigades had effectively disappeared into the Hornet’s Nest and no one had noticed as Gorman was too engrossed in the Fort Wedgewood assault. Finally the main Confederate reserve defense force was beginning to mobilize. Longstreet had acted decisively, ordering both Anderson’s reserve (Wilcox’s Division) to close the gap at Fort Latta while ordering Jackson’s (Dorsey Pender’s Division) reserve to take up positions south of Fort Pickett so it could reinforce either flank of the attacked section…

Meagher, in the words of historian James Douglas Kelly "was a man possessed. From the instant he received word to advance, Meagher pressed on furiously to come to grips with the Confederates. However and for whatever reason he had misunderstood his orders and targeted Fort Pickett rather than Fort Wedgewood". Colonel Patrick Kelly, when asked to explain the attack privately replied that “we were led by a drunk and a fool that day”. With the artillery at both Forts Latta and Wedgewood heavily engaged the Irish Brigade passed through their first trial between these pillars of wood and earth relatively unscathed. Beyond the forts they came under flanking fire from field works on both flanks manned by the brigades of John Pegram and G.B. Anderson. General Dick Garnett also observed the advancing Irish from Fort Pickett “They emerged from the smoke like shades of men; bent forward as those marching into wind and rain; never did I see an advance like it”…

As McKean’s men emerged behind the Irish into the crossfire between field works he, unlike Meagher, realized the gravity of his position. Wheeling his brigade to the right he attack Pegram’s field works in the rear of Fort Latta. McKean’s men would advance no further but they did briefly distract Pegram’s men from the Irish…

Kearny's "Bravest of the Brave"​

“I thought they would break long before they reached us” General Anderson was incredulous when the battered and reduced Irish Brigade reached the foot of the Fort Pickett works. General Longstreet now arrived and both he and Anderson watched in awe as the Irish commanders, men like Colonels Patrick Kelly and St. Clair Mulholland, formed their men to assault the fort under a hail of fire from above and both flanks. General Meagher lay stunned further back as his horse had been smashed by shot. Captain James McGee of the 69th New York later observed “we had been sent out from camp that morning and passed by General Kearny, who in earshot of many had turned to the foreign officers and said “the bravest of the brave”. Then turning to us he roared our own battle cry “Faugh a Ballagh” three times to us. After that Christ himself could not have stopped us while we still had breath”…

It was with no little indignity that a number of Confederate staff officers who had watched the advance of the Irish brigade with a certain amount of respect and awe scrambled back from the parapet as it became clear the Irish would press home their attack…

It was a tragic act of futile heroism. With no support, and with fast dwindling numbers the Irish attack evaporated on the walls of Fort Pickett but not before the colors of the 69th New York and 88th New York had been placed on the parapet. The worst was not over for the broken Irish could only retreat back into the hell though which they advanced. A dispirited Major Michael O’Rourke won the Kearny Cross by the simple fact of his walking back to Union lines for “he’d run from no man least of all damn rebs”…

From “A Thunderbolt on the Battlefield – the Battles of Philip Kearny: Volume III” by Professor Kearny Bowes
MacArthur University Press 1962

“General Kearny, who sat exposed just north east of Fort Latta, realized the attack had failed when his lead men started returning and reported remarkable Confederate resistance. Quickly deciding that he had achieved his objective and resolving not to give Longstreet any more of a victory than was necessary, Kearny scrambled to get his forces back to safety. Caldwell's men had particular difficultly extracting themselves from Fort Latta and further heavy casualties were incurred...

By 11:00am the Union troops had returned to their starting positions in semicircle north of the Confederate works…”

From “The North Carolina Campaign” by Thomas R. Yetters
Buffalo 2006

“Many of the Confederate commanders were jubilant. This was the victory they so desperately needed. Even General Longstreet seemed pleased. General Anderson observed that “a few more such victories and there will be no Army of the Potomac”. General Longstreet was under no illusion that the relative strengths of the two armies had changed much during the day’s fighting but if Kearny could be provoked into further such assaults matters might change. A messenger was dispatched to Atlanta to report the victory and Longstreet confirmed to General Johnson that he would not yet withdraw from Charlotte. The Federals had been badly defeated; a siege was not imminent; and further such opportunities of defeating the Federals might arise if he stayed in the works at Charlotte. Resolving to stay, for the moment at Charlotte, but intending to withdraw if the risk of siege manifested itself General James Longstreet managed to turn victory into defeat as General Kearny had anticipated…”

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter One Hundred and Sixteen

Corking the Bottle​

From “Kearny the Magnificent” by Roger Galton
NorthWestern

“General Kearny’s rage on receiving confirmation from Washington was unparalleled in his career. He utterly opposed the indictment of several senior Confederate officers currently held prisoner. They were military prisoners and should be dealt with primarily by the military. Those cases of treason that were most clear from the investigations of OMI were of United States Officers “conspiring” with domestic enemies while still in uniform. Such treason was a matter for military justice. Furthermore if the Confederate leaders were certain that they would face charges and an execution then they would fight to the last drop of their blood…

General Kearny considered the indictments an "ill-timed, foolish maneuver... that will extend the war"​

Kearny’s outrage focused on the Radicals who were clearly positioning themselves in advance of the fall elections. By their actions they almost guaranteed a bloodier end to the war. How many good Union soldiers would die because the rebels would not surrender to a certain death…?

Kearny’s response was predictable. As O.S. Halstead observed “nobody could muzzle Phil Kearny when he had something to get off his chest”. Kearny wrote to the President; to Edward Bates, the Attorney General, to General John Sedgwick in Virginia, and to General Joseph Holt, the Provost Marshal for the whole army. While Phil Kearny was commander of the armies of the Republic, no Confederate prisoner would be handed over to any “civilian tribunal” until he had either “faced justice at the hands of a properly constituted military tribunal or… the proper military authorities had confirmed no charges would be pressed against that officer”. General Kearny went on to express himself publicly in those terms to the Press declaiming the action by a politically motivated and self-interested section of politicians in the North who “have offered a choice to the Rebels: to fight and die or to surrender and be executed. Men being men they will choose to fight and to die, and so our gallant desk bound politicians; men who have never climbed an earthwork in the face of canister; men who have never bled on a battlefield; men who have bought substitutes and exemptions for themselves, their sons and their friends, these same politicians have, in the name of their ambition, signed the death warrant of 10,000 of our gallant boys; our sons...”. Kearny called them "our fire-eaters. Men who would build careers on the bodies of our nation's bravest". General Kearny had formally declared war on the radicals and Senator Ben Wade in particular…”

From “The North Carolina Campaign” by Thomas R. Yetters
Buffalo 2006

“The reports General Longstreet was receiving from Stuart, Hampton and other sources were troubling. It had been over a week since what was being called the Battle of Charlotte and no further attacks had been made. The Army of the Potomac had however extended its position around the city. General Humphreys had local control over three corps west of the Catawba River (his own V Corps, Stevens’ IX Corps and Williams’ XII Corps). Their position stretched from the Killen Farm in the north to Rock Hill in the south. The recent extension of Humphreys’ line to Rock Hill and the establishment of a battery there had the potential to threaten Longstreet’s line of retreat. The remaining four corps (Hancock’s I, Smith’s II, Sickles’ III and Wallace’s IV) remained tightly clustered north of the city from the Catawba River around to Pharr’s Mill in the north east. Beyond the Pharr’s Mill flank there was an impenetrable screen of Union cavalry as far as the Pee Dee River…

General Jackson had, privately, aired his discontent with General Longstreet’s surrendering initiative to the Union commanders. General Longstreet had hoped that they would try another direct assault on his works. However the extension of their lines and the realization that the Union army continued to bring up larger pieces of ordnance began to erode General Longstreet’s confidence in the position. One dramatic move by Kearny behind his cavalry screen with no more than two of his corps could place the Army of Northern Virginia in a difficult position. Although Kearny probably didn’t have enough troops to completely encircle the city without serious risk of a Confederate breakthrough or breakout, becoming involved in even a partial siege was anathema to Longstreet’s intentions. On 18th July he gave orders for stocks of supplies, ammunition and some artillery to be prepared for immediate movement to Lancaster and Camden. Longstreet knew if he decided to withdraw he might not find another defensible position north of Columbia, South Carolina…”

General Jubal Early was looking for a scrap. He found one.​

From “The Blue Eyed Prophet of War” by Robert Lee Thomas
Carlotta Press 1906

“Ever a loyal subordinate General Jackson did not voice his objections but they were apparent nonetheless. His staff reported him as stalking around his headquarters like a caged tiger. This was not the kind of war that appealed to General Jackson. He received further extremely disturbing news after the Battle of Charlotte. Federal newspapers trumpeted the capture of his wife and daughter and reported that they had been “shipped north” without further detail. General Jackson was visibly distraught. Furthermore news arrived that General Edward Johnson had been indicted for treason by a Federal Grand Jury in Richmond. John Pemberton was already the subject of such an indictment in Pennsylvania, and the newspapers heralded a similar indictment in preparation against Braxton Bragg by the hastily formed Unionist State Government of North Carolina under Bartholomew F. Moore. It appeared that the Federal Government meant to hang every Confederate for following his principles and his state…”

He sought any opportunity to strike a blow at the Federals. Thus when it became clear that General Longstreet planned to move supplies and ordnance out of the city, General Jackson saw an opportunity. With the railroad via Chester cut by the Federal move to Rock Hill, the supplies would have to move by wagon south down the Lancaster Road. Jackson expected they would be harassed either by Humphreys’ infantry if a way could be found across the river, or more likely by cavalry from the east…

Jackson ensured that General Early’s division, which now formed his corps reserve, would accompany the initial supply trains as far as the Rock Hill Crossing…”

General W.L. Elliott's Cavalry Division patrolling south and east of Charlotte​

From “The North Carolina Campaign” by Thomas R. Yetters
Buffalo 2006

“General Kearny had no issue with the Confederate’s denuding Charlotte of supplies, of ammunition; his commanders had orders to leave any such train unmolested. However his commanders had explicit orders not to allow the withdrawal of any troops from Charlotte. When Jubal Early’s division marched out with the first large wagon train it appeared to the local Union cavalry commanders that a retreat had begun…”

From “The Fighting Lambs – The Army of the James” by Geoffrey T. W. Werner
Radical Press 1928

“Brigadier General Washington Lafayette Elliott’s division of cavalry had been ordered to support the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac. The cavalry of the Army of the James had only faced militia so far in this campaign and now they faced a real challenge. Attached to the extreme left [south] of the Union cavalry screen they had the most important task of watching the Lancaster Road out of Charlotte. It was their videttes who spotted the column of infantry marching south. General Elliott was faced with a dilemma. It would take time for summoned help to come from Buford or Humphreys yet his orders were to stop any troops marching south…

Rather than launch a direct attack on a full division of infantry with his own small division of cavalry, he would straddle the road and slow the rebels down. Fight and retreat; fight and retreat; until help came up or he could maintain the fight no longer…

At least he had received some reinforcement in the last month in the form of two unusual regiments – the 1st North Carolina Mounted Infantry Regiment, a band of Red Strings now organized under Major W. Rollins and the 2nd Virginia Cavalry (as it would be known, as the Army of the James preferred state titles to the United States Colored Corps designation) made up of former slaves and freemen from Virginia under Colonel Jeptha Garrard, the first of its kind with the Army of the James…”

From “The North Carolina Campaign” by Thomas R. Yetters
Buffalo 2006

“Elliott’s delaying tactics on the Lancaster Road reflected the vast improvement in the confidence, training, and firepower of the Union cavalry over the course of the war. With a small cavalry division he successfully delayed Jubal Early’s division for much of the day. As Early brought sufficient force to bear, Elliott’s troopers would simply mount up and retire a short distance. A frustrated Early and sent back to the city and Jackson had dispatched two cavalry brigades to him (barely 400 poorly mounted men) under General Wade Hampton…

As night fell Early was confident of reaching Lancaster in the morning. Further, although the Union cavalry had harassed and annoyed his column, there appeared no serious threat from Humphreys on the west bank of the Catawba. Perhaps the noise from the wagon-drivers and their teams, encamped amongst the column, shielded Early from the noises of the night or perhaps it was one of the those strange acoustical anomalies common in war, but come the dawn it was a very surprised Early who surveyed the outskirts of Lancaster…”

From “The Life and Letters of John J. Peck” by John Watts de Peyster Jr.
Buffalo 1892

“Of the all the rebel formations I was glad it was Early, with his thrice cursed South Carolinians, we surprised…We had hard marching from Rockingham to Lancaster, but during the last day we could hear the sounds of W.L. Elliott’s fight and that spurred the men on… Now as General Kearny had explained it to me, my men and I were to put the stopper back in the rebel bottle…”

A rare picture of Peck's troops on the eve of battle​

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter One Hundred and Seventeen

A Last Throw of the Dice​

From “The North Carolina Campaign” by Thomas R. Yetters
Buffalo 2006

“After no more than 15 minutes of skirmishing General Early realized there was a substantial force to his south which outnumbered him significantly. Early sent urgent word to General Longstreet while beginning a rapid retreat. For once his truculent South Carolinians obeyed. A large portion of the wagon train was left behind to fall into Union hands…

General Longstreet was confused. General Stuart’s morning report had, but a few hours ago, confirmed with confidence the location of all seven Union corps. A report which General Stuart stood behind when re-examined by Longstreet. It left the General with a number of questions – was Early grossly exaggerating the number of troops at Lancaster? If not, from where had Kearny taken them? If the roads south of Charlotte were now covered where had Kearny weakened his lines…?

Stonewall sees off Hill's Division​

Further reports from Early clarified the position. Most of the Union troops were negros. The realization set in at Longstreet’s headquarters that it might be some portion of the Army of the James. All doubt was removed when a mud and blood spattered Wade Hampton arrived at headquarters. “He had latterly ridden his horse to death…it expired outside the staff tent” (G. Moxley Sorrell). Hampton had sought to assist Early but having sighted a huge cloud of dust to the south east sent a portion of his command to scout it. They reported the Army of the James. A disbelieving Hampton had gone to see for himself and almost lost his command as a result. Union cavalry covering the advance had been drawn to his force like sharks to blood. On an old Revolutionary war battlefield east of Lancaster (appropriately the Battle of Buford) Hampton had almost been cut off and prevented from reporting what he had seen. Almost. His troops had taken heavy casualties cutting their way back…”

From “The Blue Eyed Prophet of War” by Robert Lee Thomas
Carlotta Press 1906

“General Jackson had an inkling of what he was about to discover at Longstreet’s headquarters as some of Early’s dispatches had pass through his hands. (The fact that Early had bypassed Jackson with some reports going directly to the commanding general would be a matter for discussion between Generals Jackson and Early before the day closed)…

Jackson’s view was simple. They would loose a siege. The army must and could breakout if it was done right. The Federals would not yet have had time to dig in substantially to the east or south. The Federals would expect an attack to the south, and some diversion in that direction may be necessary, suggested General Jackson, but the main thrust of any breakout should be to the east towards the Pee Dee River. Once across that the Army of Northern Virginia would have a defensible barrier between themselves and the Federals behind which they could maneuver with some freedom…

In planning and execution the work was primarily Jackson’s not Longstreet’s…”

From “Kearny the Magnificent” by Roger Galton
NorthWestern

“General Kearny wished to prevent any unnecessary bloodshed and so quickly penned a letter to be passed through the lines to General Longstreet, informing him that Charlotte was encircled by 10 Union Corps, (it was a classic piece of misdirection by Kearny. There were only 9 corps – 7 of the Army of the Potomac and 2 of the Army of the James. Longstreet had Stuart waste valuable time [almost a day] trying to locate Kearny’s phantom corps) and requesting they discuss terms for surrender. Knowing the Southern character as he did, and the unnecessary provocation of the indictments for treason visited on other prominent rebels, General Kearny was not sanguine in his hopes…”

From “Yankee Dawdle - the Memoirs of a Private of Pennsylvania”
Cadogan 1891

“Old Magnificent had invited the boys from the James Army to join in the ball. So we all joined hands about Charlotte. The boys in the old regiment were all glad of the company for we all believed there would have to be one more dance before the ball was over…

I was not alone in hoping not to be knocked on the head during this final quadrille…”

From “The North Carolina Campaign” by Thomas R. Yetters
Buffalo 2006

“Jackson's attack started at 4:00am on 20th July with a diversionary attack by a brigade from Pender’s Division on part of the Army of the James’ lines. The main attack commenced at 4:30am. Lead parties of sharpshooters and engineers masquerading as deserting soldiers headed out to overwhelm the Union pickets to the east and to remove some of the hastily erected obstructions that could delay the infantry advance. The main thrust was on the more southerly route east on the Indian Trail Road towards the Pee Dee River led by General Ewell with A.P. Hill and Early in support, with a secondary thrust east on the Albemarle Road under General Richard Anderson and almost comprising three divisions…

Hoping that General Pender’s demonstration, about a brigade in size, would distract the attention of a portion of the Army of the James, General Jackson had planned to lead the main column. General Longstreet had vetoed this. It was Jackson’s plan and communication between the two columns may be difficult. Jackson would remain at headquarters to gauge progress and confirm when the wagons and remaining troops should begin to withdraw from the city. General Longstreet was to prove rather passive in the coming engagement...

General Kearny had, only the night before received a cordial but negative response to his note from General Longstreet. While an attack was expected on the Army of the James to the south, Sickles’ III Corps which stood in the way of the main rebel attack to the east was not particularly alert that morning. The initial rebel movement achieved almost complete surprise….

Having being caught “once or twice” by surprise it was General Sickles’ practice to ensure one of his divisional commanders was awake and on duty at any time, day or night, with authority to command the corps until General Sickles himself arrived on the scene. Major General David Birney was the divisional officer in charge that morning, though General Sickles heard the sounds of the attack and, dressing quickly in the predawn darkness, rode to the nearest front lines (near the Albemarle Road) which he found manned and ready as Birney had reacted quickly and ordered the rousing of the whole corps…

The III Corps were now long experienced and even the newer drafts knew to dig in quickly. There was therefore already a not insignificant line of defenses for the III Corps to man that morning as the sound of firing increased…

With Sickles having arrived at the Albemarle Road sector of the line, General Birney rode south to his own division based near the Indian Trail. "I moved up to a rough and ready artillery earthwork and meeting some men coming over the works and surrounding trenches, whom in the darkness I supposed to be a picket and part of my division, I established them inside the work, giving directions with regard to position and firing, all of which were instantly obeyed." He suddenly realized that the men he was ordering were Confederates but before they realized their own mistake Birney had ridden off, with the knowledge his lines were breached…

General Richard Ewell, leading this southern thrust, soon arrived at what had been I Division III Corps headquarters at the Peachland Estate and found his attack had so far exceeded his expectations. His division had smashed through the lightly defended entrenchments athwart the Indian Trail Road. He had a clear road to the Pee Dee which was but 10 miles away...

Confederate artillerists under Colonel Robert M. Stribling were ecstatic to get their hands on the few captured guns and their ammunition taken from the III Division’s line. They were quickly put to use in opening up an enfilading fire on the Union lines to the north (Mott’s II Division of III Corps) and south (Doubleday’s I Division I Corps and the leavings of Birney’s III Division)…

It was the more northerly attack on the Albemarle that was having difficulty. Union troops, firstly under Birney and then Sickles quickly fell into their entrenchments and the Confederates of Daniels’ Division were too confused in the pre-dawn dark to make a cohesive attack the badly sighted but confusing maze of shallow trenches, waist high breastworks and gabion clad artillery works, to attack it effectively. General Anderson, commanding this thrust overall, turned his attention to the northern flank of Daniels’ attack, against which he launched another division under Cadmus Wilcox…

Wilcox’s attack ran into two major adversaries: General Henry Hunt who personally brought up and sighted three batteries in quick succession, employing canister rounds which smashed Wilcox’s initial assault; and General Phil Kearny who had been inspecting a northerly part of the line (during the North Carolina campaign there were few nights when Kearny slept for more than 4 hours). Kearny had already detached Major General William Hays’ division from the II Corps and was personally directing its leading brigades (Nelson A. Miles) into position to repel Wilcox’s attack…

General Ewell had sent a message back to General Longstreet that the attack was going well, but he was unaware of the trouble developing to his north or that was soon to erupt to his south…

Stuart’s cavalry was no longer the formidable force it had been. The quality of the horse flesh on which it rode had deteriorated rapidly from poor feed in Charlotte and overuse. The plan that it should exploit any breakthrough, fanning out on both flanks into the Union rear areas was simply overambitious. At the first sign of serious resistance the bulk of the cavalry had dismounted and taken defensive position near the Peachland breakthrough. General Stuart was slightly injured exposing himself in an attempt to encourage greater efforts...

Rebels briefly capture some Union artillery in Sickles' lines​

General Jackson and Early were having an altercation. General Early had refused to lead his division while still under open arrest [Jackson’s response to Early’s “contempt for the chain of command and proper channels” during the fighting near Lancaster]. General Longstreet eventually had to personally intervene and confirm to General Early that he was no longer under arrest. Had Longstreet known sooner it is open to question whether Early’s Division would have been ordered to participate in supporting the initial attack or whether another general would have been confirmed in command of that division in time to make the attack…

Early’s division did not therefore arrive to support Ewell and A.P. Hill until 10.30am, too late to help exploit the breakthrough. General Birney had found Hancock who quickly mobilized a response from I Corps on the rebel’s southern flank: Major General George J. Stannard’s division was directed to attack the flank of Ewell’s breakthrough. Major General John Buford was also quick to respond, directing most of his cavalry screen to concentrate on the Pee Dee crossings to contest any attempted crossings by breakthrough rebel formations…

With the flanks stabilized, and the demonstration before Peck’s troops clearly marked for a diversion, the Union commanders began, separately at first but soon in concert with one another, to squeeze the rebel force…

General Kearny personally worked to prevent any Confederate penetration on the Albemarle Road and, once that objective had been confirmed, to eliminate the rebel force before him…”

The fighting to take and retake some of Sickles' positions was ofttimes brutal​

From “A Thunderbolt on the Battlefield – the Battles of Philip Kearny: Volume III” by Professor Kearny Bowes
MacArthur University Press 1962

“Having identified an opportunity to flank General Hood’s advancing troops, which sought to support Daniels and Wilcox, and in the immediate absence of either Baldy Smith, their corps commander, or William Hays of their division, General Kearny personally directed the brigade of Joshua T. Owen into position…

General Hood realized he was in a fix as Owen’s troops opened an effective fire on his column’s left flank. Hood responded by peeling off Barksdale’s brigade of Mississippians and directing them to attack Owen…

“What followed is a moment that still haunts my sleeping hourss” (General Chauncey McKeever formerly of Kearny’s staff in 1877). General Kearny had lingered a moment too long to observe the effect of Owens’ fire. The first volley from Barksdale’s Mississippians seemed meant for him. His horse, Magenta, and he both went down in full view of the Mississippians. General Kearny was as recognizable to them as he was to the Union troops. It was often said in the rebel camps that “any man who says he has been in a battle but didn’t see General Kearny is a liar on one subject or the other”. It was too much for the Mississippians: they surged forward towards his prostrate form. Colonel McKeever physically threw himself over Kearny’s body to protect him from further bullets or bayonets. Majors Briscoe and Fitzgerald of the staff both emptied their revolvers into the advancing host. Owen’s brigade, Ohioans and West Virginians, were not about to loose the commanding general, living or dead on their watch, and a brief but brutal combat ensued. Owen’s troops almost physically threw back the rebels, capturing General Barksdale in the process…

General Kearny and his horse collapse (with Majors Briscoe and Fitzgerald)​

A somewhat embarrassed General Kearny was raised to his feet when the opportunity permitted and though bruised, was otherwise unharmed. His horse had born the burnt of the volley. Major Briscoe was sure the General had been shot. General Kearny presented the empty left arm of his uniform. It had two holes in it. “It would appear I have been shot again in the same arm, but I guarantee Major you don’t feel a thing after the first one” (Briscoe). In the midst of the battle Colonel McKeever launched into a splenetic verbal assault on the General, condemning his risk taking, and reminding him in very forceful words that the army could not do without him. Not only was it out of character for Colonel McKeever, it was at the same time disrespectful, insubordinate, and probably court-marshalable. Everyone within earshot was taken aback. General Kearny’s response clearly indicated he had not forgotten that the Colonel had physically put himself between Kearny and danger: “Yes Mother-Colonel! You can be sure I will be more careful in future though I make no promises…and for goodness sake no one is to tell my wife about this!” (from Louis Fitzgerald’s “I Rode with Kearny”)…”

From “The North Carolina Campaign” by Thomas R. Yetters
Buffalo 2006

“General Hunt had now directed all available Union artillery into position, aware that the Confederates had few batteries in the field, and launched a punishing fire against them…

Ewell realized he was in serious trouble when Early confirmed that the road behind them had been cut (by Webb’s brigade of Hancock’s Corps initially). Cut off from immediate orders from Longstreet or Jackson, Ewell was drawn into an argument with Early and Hill about what to do next. Early wished to press on and make for the river. He believed that General Anderson could have broken through to the north and abandoning the attack would waste any opportunity to reinforce that breakthrough. Hill was for pushing back into Charlotte. Ewell dithered before agreeing to fight their way back into the city. Early refused. He asserted he was not disobeying General Ewell but was obeying General Longstreet’s earlier orders…

Ewell scrambled to get his forces back to safety, pushing Webb briefly off the road, though not before Webb had fought off one attack and captured General John B. Gordon. By 11:20am, 8,000 Union troops under Hancock were positioned in a semicircle of a mile and a half, ready to massively counterattack the withdrawing Ewell. It only then became apparent that a splinter had broken off and was pushing to the north west (Early’s troops). Hancock ordered his line to charge Ewell’s rear anyway, writing afterward that "I saw that the enemy had already commenced to waver, and that success was certain. I, therefore, allowed the line to charge; besides this, it was doubtful whether I could have communicated with the regiments on the flanks in time to countermand the movement." The retreating Confederates came under Union crossfire, suffering heavy casualties. Their attack had failed utterly in the south…

There was confusion in the rebel rear as they abandoned the Union works​

Stalemated in the north General Anderson became increasingly concerned about the exposure of his troops. Union forces were rapidly accumulating and the Union artillery was accurately raining shells on his formations. On his own authority he ordered a retreat…”

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter One Hundred and Eighteen

Have You Spades Enough?​

From “The North Carolina Campaign” by Thomas R. Yetters
Buffalo 2006

“It began on the 28th July and continued for 10 days. It was the largest land based artillery bombardment in military history to that point. Generals Henry Hunt and Herman Haupt had co-operated to bring substantial numbers of siege pieces via railroad to Charlotte. It was a particular achievement because Herman Haupt not only had to restore and improve on the quality of the existing Confederate railroad and rolling stock but he had also succeeded in connecting previously unconnected North Carolina networks with Virginia in a very short space of time…”

Hancock attacks​

From “Yankee Dawdle - the Memoirs of a Private of Pennsylvania”
Cadogan 1891

“We were all very glad not to be sat under wood, stone or canvas in Charlotte. Even at night the shelling continued until the city was lit up on the horizon like we had a fire burning in the hearth in the corner all night…”

From “The North Carolina Campaign” by Thomas R. Yetters
Buffalo 2006

“Fires burned uncontrollably for several days during the bombardment as Confederate soldiers and civilians sought to extinguish the flames in the midst of the bombardment. Notwithstanding efforts to bury supplies and ammunition much was lost. By 6th August no structure in or around Charlotte lay undamaged…

Much of the Confederate artillery, outmatched by the caliber and range of Union guns had been destroyed or dismounted. Confederate counter battery fire had faded away to naught…

Although there was food in Charlotte for another 14 days, the water situation was becoming critical. The plight of the wounded was also becoming extremely distressing. Medical supplies were in extremely short supply. Many suffered from burns from one of the many fires that had erupted. The worst indignity was that there was no safe place in Charlotte to locate the hospitals that was not likely to be subject to the bombardment…

On the 10th day General Kearny sent a second note to General Longstreet requesting his surrender. General Longstreet replied he would consider surrender but only on terms that his officers would be freed on parole as well as the men without fear of prosecution for treason. General Kearny did not rely but reopened the bombardment at 8am on 7th August…

On 10th August General Kearny launched at attack on the city. General Reynolds oversaw a major demonstration on the west bank of the Catawba in which Union troops sought to erect multiple pontoons bridges across the river. Three hours into this demonstration General William F. Smith attacked the rebel works from the north east. Finally four hours after the commencement of Reynolds demonstration General Hancock and his I Corps attacked the rebel works from the south east…

The Confederate forces, weakened by disease, desertion and demoralization were stretched to secure the Catawba’s east bank and reinforce Anderson’s troops in the north east. Hancock’s attack fell as a hammer blow on the exposed and undermanned works to the south east. Doubleday’s division secured Fort Waxhaw and Waxhaw Farm on the left on the attack. Gibbon’s division secured Morgan Mills and Fort Confederacy on the right of the attack. In the centre Stannard’s troops took Fort Monroe but having penetrated the first line were stymied in their further attack around Wesley Church by Confederate reinforcements led by Major General Dorsey Pender and Brigadier General Robert Hoke…

A major breach in the Confederate defenses had been achieved. General Kearny sent a third note to General Longstreet demanding his surrender. This time General Longstreet sought a meeting to discuss terms…”

From “Kearny the Magnificent” by Roger Galton
NorthWestern

“General Longstreet expected to meet outside his lines near the Union encampment. General Kearny responded that he “would put the General to no such trouble”. Just beyond General Hancock’s most advanced position, inside the Confederate lines, was relatively intact mansion (it had until recently been General Hill’s headquarters). Kearny suggested they meet there as it was effectively “neutral ground”. General Longstreet initially protested as he would allow General Kearny to see his defenses in the area. General Kearny responded that from General Hancock’s position he already had an exact idea of Longstreet’s dispositions…

How William Ayres' house looks today​

Not only did General Longstreet have qualms about General Kearny’s choice for a conference. Generals Reynolds and Howard were adamant that General Kearny should not risk himself so close to Confederate lines. What if the Rebels broke the brief truce and held Kearny? What if a nervous soldier fired while the Generals were in conference? General Kearny was resolved. Should anything happen to him, General Reynolds would accede to the command of both armies and was ordered to treat no further with the rebels but to “pound them to dust” irrespective of General Kearny’s position. General Kearny intended to show the Confederates his supreme confidence and his complete disregard for the threat they still thought they might pose to an attacking force…”

General Kearny’s party would include 4 general officers (Major Generals Daniel Sickles, Isaac Stevens, Oliver O. Howard, and John N.O. Buford) and 4 staff officers (Colonel Chauncey McKeever, Major Joseph C. Briscoe, Major Louis Fitzgerald, and Lieutenant Colonel George W. Mindel) and Kearny’s bugler boy (Gustave A. Schurmann). Both Generals Sickles and Stevens, as political generals sensing a major historic and therefore political occasion, all but demanded they accompany Kearny. He was happy to oblige. Kearny’s initial and extremely provocative decision to take a guard of 10 troopers from the 2nd Virginia Cavalry (negros) was changed on the advice of General Buford and 9 troopers from the 5th Michigan instead protected General Kearny’s party. Not wishing to miss the opportunity the commander of the Wolverine Brigade, Brigadier Russell A. Alger, chose to command the bodyguard himself…”

From “The Blue Eyed Prophet of War” by Robert Lee Thomas
Carlotta Press 1906

“General Jackson had opposed the meeting to discuss terms but attended the discussions under orders from General Longstreet. Jackson believed that every Union shell and bullet expended against the Army of Northern Virginia was one that could not be used elsewhere. Every Union soldier here was a Union soldier not in Georgia or South Carolina. Every Union soldier killed attacking Charlotte was a soldier Generals Hardee or Beauregard would not have to face. Jackson view was summed up in the notion that the Army of Northern Virginia was already lost. That being so they should sell their lives as dearly as possibly. His proposal fell on deaf ears with General Longstreet. Furthermore it seemed others, Richard Anderson, Richard Ewell, and influential James Kemper, supported Longstreet’s decision to discuss surrender…”

From “Kearny the Magnificent” by Roger Galton
NorthWestern

“Dressed in his best uniform, Longstreet waited for Kearny to arrive. Kearny arrived in immaculate full dress uniform and lingered on the porch for several moments so the Confederate troops could “gawp at the Union’s God of War” (Fitzgerald). It was the first time the two men had ever met. General Richard Ewell made the introductions. Generals Ewell and Kearny reminisced briefly about the charge at Churubusco Bridge. When Captain Kearny had been injured, the injury that would cost him his left arm, it was Ewell who saved Kearny by grabbing him by the waist and having his horse carry them both back to safety. The regaling of this tale, though brief, helped remind the men in the room that they had once all be countrymen and in some cases comrades. Tension eased a little…”

James Longstreet and Philip Kearny discuss terms​

From “The North Carolina Campaign” by Thomas R. Yetters
Buffalo 2006

“General Longstreet raised the issue of the terms that would be offered, and General Kearny proceeded to set out his terms:

I propose to receive the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia on the following terms, to wit: Rolls of all the officers and men to be made and presented to an officer designated by me. The officers, of the rank of captain and above in all branches of all services, to be taken into custody as prisoners of war and offered all the courtesies accruing to such. The senior remaining officer or non-commissioned officer of each company will sign a parole for the men of their commands not to take up arms against the Government of the United States until properly exchanged. The arms, artillery and public property to be parked and stacked, and turned over to the officer appointed by me to receive them. This will not embrace the private horses or equipage of paroled officers and men. This done, the men will be allowed to return to their homes, not to be disturbed by United States authority so long as they observe their paroles and the laws in force where they may reside. The officers taken into custody as prisoners of war will be released at the conclusion of hostilities unless required to answer charges…

The terms for the men were as generous as Longstreet could have hoped for; those for his officers were as bad as he expected. His officers would be imprisoned and likely prosecuted for treason. General Longstreet strongly expressed his rejection of this article. He would not hand over his officers to a vengeful Northern populace for the radicals to hang them later. “We would rather die now and be done with it” declared Longstreet to which General Jackson added “We will go back and dig our graves behind those fieldworks rather than surrender on such terms”. Before General Kearny could speak General Sickles broke in “Have you spades enough? If not my corps can lend you a wagonload”…

“The atmosphere darkened considerably” according to G. Moxley Sorrel. General Kearny pausing briefly proceeded to declare that he was fully authorized by the President to negotiate terms and on that basis he would offer a compromise rather than see many a good northern or southern boy suffer further. The Confederate officers must become prisoners of war. There could be no compromise on that. Those guilty of crimes must face justice. Officers had committed treason. Some willful murder. A number of Confederate officers sought to interject but were stopped by Longstreet so Kearny could finish. General Kearny could give only two guarantees – no officer becoming a prisoner under the terms of surrender would be tried by any other than a properly convened military court and that no man would face penalty of death. Then looking squarely at General Jackson, Kearny confirmed these terms would only apply to those officers surrendering with General Longstreet. Those taken separately, earlier in the campaign and any taken after, would have to “submit to unconditional surrender and confinement…”

From “Kearny and the Radicals” by Hugh W. McGrath
New England Press 1992

“General Kearny's declaration to Longstreet was clearly meant for, among others, Generals Jubal Early and most significantly for Robert Barnwell Rhett. Whatever Kearny’s perceived authority from President Lincoln, and despite Lincoln’s silence on the subject he may have had none, not even General Kearny at the height of his popularity and influence could have protected Rhett from the full force of Union judicial revenge for the killing of David Hunter. Nor at any time would Kearny have considered it. His offered compromise reflected his own views on the proper settlement of the post-bellum reconstruction and he knew he could rely on the President’s support for any proposal that spared lives and brought the war to a swifter conclusion. Nonetheless the Radicals in future years would declare that Kearny, as commander of the Union Armies, had no authority to give either guarantee, and through his action many a southern traitor and criminal escaped justice…”

From “The North Carolina Campaign” by Thomas R. Yetters
Buffalo 2006

“Reluctantly General Longstreet accepted those terms knowing he could hope for no better. As the Confederate officers, with the exception of General Jackson, seemed to “shrink” (O.O. Howard) on Longstreet’s acceptance of Kearny’s terms, Kearny sought to lift them: in addition to his terms, Kearny offered to allow the defeated soldiers to take home their horses and mules and undertook, not only to provide the defeated rebels with an immediate supply of food rations but also to ensure that they were put in food and passes so that they could make their way home wherever that maybe; Longstreet said it would have a very happy effect among the men and do much toward reconciling the country and took General Kearny’s hand...

The brooding Jackson would not ask anything personally for himself but General Longstreet inquired as to the location and health of General Jackson’s wife and daughter (Longstreet himself had barely recovered from the loss of three of his children in 1862 to scarlet fever). After consulting with General Howard, Kearny was able to confirm that Mrs. Jackson and her daughter were well when last he heard and had been removed on his orders as a courtesy to avoid the hazards of war in North Carolina. They were currently residing with General Jackson’s Unionist sister Laura Arnold in Beverly, West Virginia and that any guard they had had most certainly been removed by now. “At that moment even General Jackson seemed to accept it might be better not to die at our enemies hands in the burning ruin of Charlotte” (Moxley Sorrel)…

The terms of the surrender were recorded in a document completed around 3pm, 12th August. As Kearny mounted to leave he asked the name of house in which the surrender document had been signed. Ewell was not sure and asked General Hill whose headquarters it had been. It was the home of a Virginian, William Ayres, who ironically had fled the fighting in northern Virginia during the first year of the war. He had named it for his home town in Virginia. The mansion was called Chantilly…”

The surrender of Confederate troops​

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter One Hundred and Nineteen

Details and Details​

From “Kearny the Magnificent” by Roger Galton
NorthWestern

“This was the beginning of what Kearny often referred to as “the War on Paper”. The surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia presented major practical issues for the Commander in Chief to overcome…

General Kearny was keen to ensure there was no confusion between the officers who had surrendered under the Chantilly Terms and those taken unconditionally in the field. General John Buford’s capture first of Jubal Early and later of Robert Barnwell Rhett (alleged to have been captured disguised as a Confederate chaplain on the road to Wilmington) had created a national sensation which immediately quieted the voices in the North raised but a few days earlier against the Chantilly Terms. Early and Rhett, along with existing senior captives, like Bragg and Pemberton, would be subject to the “whim of the President, Congress and the Mob” (Thomas Seymour). However Kearny had staked his honor on upholding the Chantilly Terms…

The general officers from Longstreet’s army were to be transported to and imprisoned at Fort Delaware, away from the eye of the press and the reach of the mob. Early and Rhett would join the other unconditional prisoners in the more forbidding atmosphere of Fort Warren in Boston Harbor…the Colonels, Lieutenant-Colonels, Majors and Captains would be housed in separate camps at Point Lookout in Maryland within sight of Virginia. Oliver O. Howard had suggested each rank have its own camp “if they have an ounce of the old army spirit they will be too busy arguing about seniority to created any difficulties”…”

Fort Warren today​

From “The North Carolina Campaign” by Thomas R. Yetters
Buffalo 2006

“The capture of an army dramatically hindered the operations of the Army of the Potomac. Identifying and processing the officers proved challenging, with scores casting off their uniforms and hidden among loyal elements of the rank and file. The supply and transport of Confederate enlisted parolees also had to be arranged to “pacified districts”. For the moment those seeking to return to South Carolina, Georgia, Florida and Texas had to be held in North Carolina. That in itself proved difficult…

However General Kearny was not happy to let the army sit idle. General Peck was dispatched to finally seize the port of Wilmington to confirm the occupation of all of North Carolina…

Fort Delaware - The prison for General Officers surrendered on Chantilly Terms​

Having read General Rodman’s reports on the chaos believed to exist beyond Tidewater South Carolina (over which Rodman had largely established control) General Kearny sought to exacerbate Confederate difficulties by launching three major cavalry raids into the state.

The first (Gregg’s and Devin’s Divisions) under Buford himself would head south west through Spartanburg and Greenville towards the Savannah River. Buford was to judge whether, by demonstrating to the east of Atlanta he could be of any assistance to General Grant’s forces.

The second under George Armstrong Custer (three brigades, his own division plus Hugh J. Kilpatrick’s brigade) would strike out south towards Columbia. It was believed General Beauregard had headquartered there and was seeking to rally state forces. Custer was to ensure he was “an extreme inconvenience” (Fitzgerald) to General Beauregard.

The third, the cavalry of the Army of the James under Elliott, was to led Peck to Wilmington and then swept south down the hinterland of the coast as far as Charleston to break up any resistance to Rodman’s occupation of South Carolina’s ports. Rodman had been prevented from penetrating too far inland by want of cavalry and General Elliott’s force would remedy this…”

There was a limit to what Rodman could do beyond the South Carolina coast without cavalry​

From “Kearny the Magnificent” by Roger Galton
NorthWestern

“General Kearny was concerned that matters be resolved in Georgia as soon as possible. He was already planning to release some part of the Army of the Potomac to follow Buford’s spearhead south westwards towards Hardee’s rear. The war was not over yet and Kearny angrily refused requests from senior officers for leave. “Our work is not yet complete…Hardee is still abroad in Georgia…until subdued the place of all loyal men is with the army”. Kearny was not the only man yearning for news from Atlanta…”

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter One Hundred and Twenty

A Bridge Too Far?​

From “The Road to Hell and Atlanta” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 2004

Grant used Thomas’ arrival to reorganize the armies in the Western Theatre and to assume clear overall command, much to Hooker’s chagrin. Hooker’s Army of the Cumberland remained unchanged – three full corps (Rousseau’s XIV, Richardson’s XXI and Granger’s XXIII) and a weak fourth corps (Davis’ XX). George Thomas was given command of an expanded Army of the Ohio including the XXV Corps under Schofield just arrived from East Tennessee plus Logan’s XVII Corps. E.O.C. Ord was promoted to command of the Army of the Mississippi now containing three corps (Carr’s XIII, Warren’s XV and Grenville M. Dodge’s XVI)…

The Battle of Pace's Ferry was an engagement fought on June 17, 1864. Troops of Major General Gouvenor K. Warren’s XV Corps sought to create two pontoon bridges over the Chattahoochee River, which would enable Union troops to continue their offensive to capture Atlanta….

Gouvenor K. Warren launches the first attempt to cross the Chattahoochee​

Warren sought, with Grant’s approval, to use a road which led east toward Atlanta, crossing the Chattahoochee River at Pace's Ferry, where the Confederates themselves had constructed a pontoon bridge but which Thomas Churchill’s troops had destroyed following their retreat. Warren’s engineers sought to erect two pontoon bridges at the same point…

Frederick Steele’s skirmishers [I Division XV Corps] sought to drive off the Confederate defenders, initially only the brigade of States Right Gist, with the support of several batteries of artillery. However as the pontoon bridges extended into the river, the engineers and workers became increasingly exposed to accurate fire from the Confederate bank. The advance of the pontoons stalled…

Warren sought to recommence works during the night but Churchill, anticipating the move, had ensured Gist (now supported by Roger W. Hanson’s brigade) had an ample supply of flares. The pontoon parties suffered severe casualties and were driven back despite great courage…

Furthermore the Confederates had used the cover of night to further expand their defenses at Pace’s Ferry, using large numbers of impressed slaves who toiled at the defenses while under sporadic fire from the Union batteries…

Not seeing a suitable opportunity to attack the strong Confederate positions across the Chattahoochee, Warren abandoned the pontoon construction and ordered his corps into camp on high ground facing the river. He informed Grant that any attempt to cross the river at Pace’s Ferry would be prohibitively expensive in lives…”

The erection of a traditional pontoon bridge exposed the engineers and troops to constant rebel fire​

From “The Life of General William J. Hardee - Teach Them How To War” by Christopher L. Pike
Bison 1965

“General Hardee had realized the tenuous state of his defensive line on the Chattahoochee and he used the weeks, wasted by Grant while waiting for Thomas, to reinforce those defenses. Brigadier General Danville Leadbetter, having served in both the US army engineers and artillery, had been appointed as Chief of Engineers in Hardee’s army. Even before the army had retreated across the river, Leadbetter had begun to design a series of small but sturdy earthworks to reinforce the river’s natural defenses. General Johnson in Atlanta had given Leadbetter carte blanche to use whatever labor was available to be pressed into service…

They would create the Leadbetter Line – 53 independent earthworks which, at critical likely crossing points in the river, created a lethal zone of crossfire. The Leadbetter Line initially extended from Lick Skillet to Cavalry Ford…”

From “Fighting Joe Hooker” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 1999

“The problem with Grant, according to Dan Butterfield, was that he was only 3/5ths of a great general. He had “the strategy right...the men well cared for...and determination…” but he was a “poor tactician and lacked any style or imagination”... So it was that the Lick Skillet attack was conceived…”

From "U.S. Grant - Hero of Three Wars" by John W. Eisenhower
Edison 1953

“Grant prepared more thoroughly for a second crossing, managing the details himself. It would be spearheaded by General Ord’s Army of the Mississippi further south west near the township of Lick Skillet. General Thomas, having taken over the area near Pace Ferry, was to demonstrate in support of the attack…”

From “The Road to Hell and Atlanta” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 2004

“Union engineers began to assemble six pontoon bridges before dawn on June 23, two just north of the township, a third opposite Mason’s Church, two farther south near Bethlehem Church, and the sixth well south of the Leadbetter Line near Sandtown…

Once again the engineers constructing the bridge directly across from the hamlet came under punishing fire from Confederate sharpshooters, primarily from the corps of Thomas Churchill, in command of the southern sector of the river defenses. Union artillery attempted to dislodge the sharpshooters, but the positions in the Leadbetter fortifications, which included fortified farm houses, rendered the fire from 40 guns mostly ineffective. Eventually Ord decided to send infantry landing parties over in the pontoon boats to secure bridgeheads and drive off the sharpshooters. Colonel Isaac C. Pugh of Illinois volunteered his brigade for this assignment at Lick Skillet. Colonel Milton Montgomery of Wisconsin led the crossing at Bethlehem Church…

General Jacob G. Lauman, commander IV Division XVI Corps and Pugh’s superior, was reluctant, lamenting to Pugh in front of his men that "the effort means death to most of those who should undertake the crossing." When his men responded to Pugh's request with three cheers, Lauman conceded and ordered the attack. At 3pm, the Union artillery began a preparatory bombardment and 239 infantrymen from the 15th and 32nd Illinois crowded into the small boats, and the 53rd followed soon after. The 15th were notable in that most of the men had responded several months previously to General Kearny’s personal plea to re-enlist for the duration of the war. Only a handful had accepted mustering out which had occurred but two weeks earlier…

The 32nd Illinois crossing in pontoon boats​

Confederate firing increased to a towering crescendo of noise as many blue troops died in the river. “Had they more than a handful of artillery none of us would have survived” (Colonel George C. Rodgers 15th Illinois). The Lick Skillet crossing faced fire from Leadbetter posts 15, 16 and 17 manned by troops from the brigades of Brigadiers Colton Greene and Edmund Pettus. Their divisional commander, Ben Helm, had already ordered up his third brigade, Colonel Burbridge’s, as soon as the Union engineers had appeared on the riverbank…

The crossing at Lick Skillet was bloody failure. Many of the Illinois boys never made it to the rebel east bank, those that did found themselves subject to terrific small arms crossfire. Although many of the Union troops surrendered, fighting went on in isolated pockets for several hours. It was a soaking wet and bloodied Colonel Pugh who reported to General Lauman. Quietly confirming General Lauman was right Pugh expressed his regrets at not being “dead on the right side of the river with my men”…

Though less bloody Colonel Montgomery’s attack into the very teeth of half of Bushrod Johnson’s division was no less a failure. General Kimball of III Division had personally taken a hand in ensuring as many of Wisconsin’s sons a possible returned to the Union bank…

Grant’s grand crossing of the Chattahoochee was another failure. Twice the Union army had loudly announced its intention to cross and had failed in the face of robust Confederate responses…”

From “The Irish Corporal – The Life and Battles of Patrick Ronayne Cleburne” by James Fitzgerald Maguire
Trinity Press

“Grant had shifted his weight southwards and attacked twice, seeking to secure a crossing. Thomas Churchill had borne the brunt of the fighting so far. Opposing Cleburne in the northern sector was Joe Hooker’s Army of the Cumberland. Hooker’s army had been surprising lethargic during these engagements. The Yankee newspapers which still crossed the river comfortably where Grant could not, trumpeted another row between the ambitious Hooker and his superior Grant…

Paddy Cleburne could never be described as complacent but he neither mastered nor understood the intricacies of army politics. In many ways he was naïve about the effect of disagreement and professional rivalries, both as they concerned him, and as he observed them from outside. This led to the greatest error of his career. Assuming Hooker, “Huffer-in-Chief” according to pro-Grant Illinois newspapers, would sit out Grant’s next move, Cleburne agreed to send some of his troops to support Churchill in the southern sector. Once again Grant seemed to be shifting his weight further south, towards the southern end of the Leadbetter line…

In Cleburne’s defense Churchill had requested the transfer and Hardee had endorsed it. Off went Polignac’s small division along with 3 brigades of A.P. Stewart’s division. Cleburne kept one brigade, Otho Strahl’s as a reserve to support Withers’ and Smith’s divisions in the northern sector…”

From “Fighting Joe Hooker” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 1999

“General Hooker had seen an opportunity in Grant’s defeats. Remaining closeted with his chief of staff Dan Butterfield and his chief of artillery William Barry they prepared their own plan for a crossing of the river by the Army of the Cumberland. General Hooker had one secret weapon – Brevet Major General George P. Buell. Known in the Army of the Cumberland as “The Great Pontoonier” Buell had perhaps accumulated more experience of river crossings, contested or otherwise, than any man in the Union army…

Buell had scouted an ideal spot for a pontoon bridge north of Cavalry Ford where the river had worn away a stretch of flat riverbank on the eastern shore before rising quickly, and steeply, to merge with the main line of the eastern bank. It was ideal for two reasons: Confederate positions were too far back to fire into the dead ground on the eastern bank, or for that matter observe it much; and it was close enough to Cavalry Ford such that a flanking force, breaking out could take the Leadbetter posts defending it in the rear. Buell had also perfected a pre-fabricated pontoon bridge in two parts which, he believed, could be put in position and secured in minutes…

General Hooker decided to commit his whole force to the attack. For reasons of security he failed to inform General Grant…”

From “The Road to Hell and Atlanta” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 2004

“On the morning of June 27th, without a hint of a preparatory bombardment, engineers of the Army of the Cumberland raced out into the Chattahoochee under the personal supervision of George Buell to erect the pontoon bridge. At the same time Lovell Rousseau ordered John Turchin’s division to assault Cleburne’s main position head on at Cavalry Ford…

Patrick Cleburne’s attention was initially focused on Rousseau’s attack at Cavalry Ford against Manigault’s and Chalmers’ brigades. General Barry had managed to concentrate a reasonable proportion of the Army of the Cumberland's artillery without drawing too much attention. That was now being unleashed on the Leadbetter fortifications at Cavalry Ford as Turchin’s men raced forward…

Brigadier George H. Cram, son of Pennsylvania, officer of Kentucky​

Brigadier General George H. Cram looked about with some surprise. The other brigade commanders who had set foot on the rebel bank at Pace’s Ferry and Lick Skillet had fallen in seconds. He led the first of Buell’s brigades to cross the river. Only with his whole brigade across did his skirmishers report rebels advancing on the bank. The race was on – Cram would need to get his brigade up the steep bank and hold it before the rebels arrived or they would be shot down from above like fish in a barrel and to make matters worse Cram could see General Richardson, commander of the XXI Corps, on the west bank preparing to cross at the head of Buell's second brigade…

Brigadier John K. Jackson, commanding a brigade in Preston Smith’s Division, was a veteran of many battles. He had distinguished himself at Pulaski and particularly in fighting all over the field at Elk River. Though he had sent an urgent runner to Cleburne he knew if he did not drive back the Union bridgehead the whole defensive line was lost. William Bate and his brigade was coming up slowly. He had to vacate the Leadbetter posts he manned, which gave no angle to fire on the Union bridgehead. It would take time for him to form up and join the attack. He knew not where Preston Smith was with Colonel Carter’s and Kelly’s brigades…

Brigadier John K. Jackson of Georgia​

Jackson’s Georgia brigade would make the decisive attack, for good or ill, defending their own state. They were not completely alone. Lieutenant Colonel Peter Snyder, formerly of the Prussian Rhineland and Arkansas, commanded one of Cleburne’s special sharpshooter battalions which had been attached to Jackson’s command. Racing forward in a cloud to drive off the Union skirmishers who had already crested the steep bank, they covered Jackson’s attack…

Sword aloft Jackson roared to his troops “Our state will rise or fall on the outcome of this attack. Now Sons of Georgia: With me! Who will come with me?!” (Lieutenant Colonels Joseph S. Cone, 47th Georgia). With their trademark rebel yell eight Georgia regiments, banners unfurled, charged forward…”

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter One Hundred and Twenty One

Hooker’s Left Hook​

The Rebel Charge at Chattahoochee​

From “Civil War Medals and Honors” compiled by Rufus J. Howell
Great Bear Books 1993

[A limited extract of awards relating to the pontoon crossing at Cavalry Ford by 3rd Brigade, 3rd Division, XXI Corps, Army of the Cumberland comprising 35th Indiana, 8th and 21st Kentucky and 51st and 99th Ohio…]

CLARK, JOHN S. – Medal of Honor

Major, 8th Kentucky Infantry. At Cavalry Ford, Ga., 27 June 1864. Citation: Gallant conduct in resisting attack, where, after his colonel, and senior major, and one third the company officers had fallen, he gallantly assisted in rallying the remnant of the command to hold its position.

CORRELL, ISREAL – Kearny Cross

2nd Lieutenant, 51st Ohio Infantry. At Cavalry Ford, Ga., 27 June 1864. Citation: On his initiative led a platoon of volunteers into a copse of trees on the left flank, where a squad of the enemy’s sharpshooters were sheltered, and compelled their surrender.

CRAM, GEORGE H. – Medal of Honor

Brigadier General. At Cavalry Ford, Ga., 27 June 1864. Citation: Daring heroism and great tenacity in holding his position on the east bank of the Chattahoochee River against repeated assaults, and carrying the advance fortifications known as Leadbetter posts 6 and 7.

HELWIG, SIMON – Medal of Honor

Private, 51st Ohio Infantry. At Cavalry Ford, Ga., 27 June 1864. Citation: Rushed in advance of his brigade as a volunteer skirmisher, shot a rebel officer who was rallying his men to charge and then was wounded holding his advanced position resisting with the bayonet.

KEITH, WILLIS B. – Kearny Cross

Private, 35th Indiana (1st Irish) Infantry. At Cavalry Ford, Ga., 27 June 1864. Citation: In hand to hand fight at the pontoon crossing he recaptured the regimental colors despite being wounded.

REAM, ELI – Medal of Honor

Private, 99th Ohio Infantry. At Cavalry Ford, Ga., 27 June 1864. Citation: Capture of enemy flag in resisting charge.

RICHARDSON, ISRAEL B. – Kearny Cross (2nd Award)

Major General. Cavalry Ford, Ga., 27 June 1864. Citation: Personally leading a charge which broke a supporting enemy formation despite having been severely injured in the river crossing by the loss of an ear.

From “The Road to Hell and Atlanta” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 2004

“The failure of Jackson’s gallant charge and the subsequent defeat of William Bate’s supporting brigade had a dramatic impact on the Confederate position. Israel Richardson secured the immediate Confederate works with elements of Buell’s division. However he promptly dispatched the next formation to cross the river, William P. Carlin’s II Division southwards to flank the Confederate works at Cavalry Ford itself. The right flank of the rebel defensive line had been turned…

General Richardson’s macabre sense of humor was on full display in the aftermath of the clash on the east bank. When a staff officer arrived at Richardson’s hastily formed headquarters with a request for a meeting from the captured rebel General William Bate, Richardson responded by producing his handkerchief, “Tell that rebel he can have my ear for a long as he likes but the rest of me is presently otherwise engaged”. The handkerchief contained the remains of Israel Richardson’s right ear…”

From “Fighting Joe Hooker” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 1999

“It was an extremely happy and satisfied General Richardson who reported the successful crossing of the river, and he did so by another innovation introduced by General Hooker – front line telegraph. Major Samuel T. Cushing, Chief of Signals for the Army of the Cumberland, had received orders to be prepared to “rapidly extend the line to and beyond the river to follow the advance as practical”. Telegraph wires had already been erected to the western end of the pontoon bridge by Cushing’s “wire dogs” in time for General Richardson to report the successful engagement against John K. Jackson’s troops. Within 30 minutes of the securing of Leadbetter Post 6, in which Richardson established a forward headquarters, he was connected to the army’s headquarters and could receive direct and immediate instructions from the commanding general. Joseph Hooker had ensured the face of command on the battlefield had changed forever…”

Battlefield Telegraphy​

From “The Irish Corporal – The Life and Battles of Patrick Ronayne Cleburne” by James Fitzgerald Maguire
Trinity Press

“It was as though a damn had burst and a blue tide flooded across the Chattahoochee, first overwhelming Jackson’s and Bate’s brigades, and then washing away Manigault’s and Chalmers’ brigades. Preston Smith and his two remaining brigades were now completely cut off from the army on the extreme right with most of a Union army corps intervening…

Cleburne realized quickly that there was no prospect of driving Hooker’s bridgehead back across the river and ordered his remaining forces on the right to withdraw. Orders were dispatched by a circuitous route to Preston Smith for him to, somehow, return to Atlanta…

Cleburne urgently sought out Hardee and Churchill to decide what they might do next and whether by any action they could yet save Atlanta…”

From "U.S. Grant - Hero of Three Wars" by John W. Eisenhower
Edison 1953

“The first indication that General Hooker had launched he assault was the sound of cannon fire that could clearly be heard from Grant’s Headquarters at Smyrna. Yet Grant received no response to his requested for an urgent report until midday when a staff officer arrived from General Hooker to report that a bridgehead had been established. It is telling that General Hooker managed to maintain regular contact with General Richardson on the frontline by means of the telegraph and yet could not do likewise with General Grant’s Headquarters…

General Grant attitude spoke volumes about the man. He had no intention of “looking the proverbial gift horse in the mouth” (James Wilson) and quickly alerted his commanders to prepare for immediate orders to move. The followed a period where Grant sought to locate Hooker for a direct meeting to assess the bridgehead and decide how best the other army formations might support Hooker’s attack. Many on Grant’s staff assumed General Hooker was deliberately avoiding Grant to ensure the crossing was fully secured without input from the commanding general so Hooker could be sure of all the credit. In any event the delay in locating Hooker was crucial in that valuable time was wasted before the Armies of the Mississippi and Ohio were put in motion both because of the lack of warning of the likelihood of urgent orders to march and in deciding where they could apply the most pressure on the rebels…”

From “The Road to Hell and Atlanta” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 2004

“The confusion arising from Hooker’s sudden decamping onto the eastern bank seemed to disorder the Union forces more than the Confederates. Having rapidly concluded the river line was lost General Hardee was able to quickly withdraw his troops from the more exposed positions and retreat towards Atlanta. It was some time before elements of the Armies of the Mississippi and Ohio began to cross the river and secure their own bridgeheads on the eastern bank. In fact it would be over 32 hours before significant elements of any unit outside the Army of the Cumberland would be present on the eastern bank…”

Davis could not conceive how the Confederacy could survive the loss of Atlanta having lost Richmond​

From “The Unyielding Office – the Presidency of Jefferson Davis” by James L. Caney
Buffalo

“Though a veneer of calm seemed to permeate the city Panic lurked just below the surface. For some citizens of the de facto capital this was not their first time in a city as a Union army approached threateningly. This time the President had no intention of allowing events to be dictated to him by soldiers and cabinet officials. He made his appeal directly to the people of Atlanta, Georgia and the Confederacy in speech after speech ever day for a week. If the city was abandoned without contest “the world will judge us unworthy of the title nation”; if the city was lost through misguided state jealousies or concerns “we will forever stain the legacy of the great father’s of American Independence”; it was only through “blood and tears; the supreme sacrifice that we can confirm to the world the established fact of our independence”…

Whether through President Davis’ efforts or not the cabinet and General Johnson were, for once, united. General Hardee would be pressed to aggressively defend the city and whatever resources were left to the rump Confederacy would be pressed into service…”

The Final Round?​

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter One Hundred and Twenty Two

The Atlanta Waltz​

From “The Road to Hell and Atlanta” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 2004

“From June 29, the very day Grant’s Headquarters crossed the river, there would be an engagement every day for the next 40 days ranging from furious brigade sized skirmishes to army sized clashes…”

Decatur (July 4, 1864)​

From "U.S. Grant - Hero of Three Wars" by John W. Eisenhower
Edison 1953

“After crossing the Chattahoochee, Grant intended to re-establish complete control over the movement of his three armies. He intended initially to split his army into three columns for the assault on Atlanta with Thomas' Army of the Ohio, on the left, moving from the north largely as a feint. Hooker and Ord would draw away to the east with the intention of circling the city and cutting it off from the south…”

From “The Life of General William J. Hardee - Teach Them How To War” by Christopher L. Pike
Bison 1965

“General Hardee read General Grant’s strategy and prepared an appropriate response. Screening Thomas with some troop from the Atlanta garrison under Loring, and then largely ignoring him, Hardee allowed the larger Union wing to march some distance to the east. General Cleburne pressed for an attack at Peachtree Creek but Hardee wished for more distance to develop between the two Union wings so that Thomas would not be able to support Hooker and Ord. Hardee prepared his attack to occur just north of Decatur…”

Lieutenant General Patrick Cleburne at Decatur​

From “The Road to Hell and Atlanta” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 2004

“In fact Ord’s leading troops were divided out of the necessity of crossing several creeks and streams in the area. Hooker’s troops were still all north of Peachtree Creek when the rebels struck. Cleburne’s troops struck the head of Ord’s force (Dodge’s XVI Corps) from the south while Churchill attacked from the south west. The determined assault threatened to overrun the exposed head of the Union advance, and Ord became increasingly concerned. Dodge was pleading for help but the few good roads and the rarer good crossings were becoming clogged with Union troops. In concert with Hooker, Ord decided to withdraw Dodge’s XVI Corps and the leading elements of Warren’s XV Corps from, what he considered their exposed position. The advance of the larger Union wing was temporarily halted…”

Peachtree Creek (July 7, 1864)​

From “The Life of General William J. Hardee - Teach Them How To War” by Christopher L. Pike
Bison 1965

“The critical task now for General Hardee was to maintain the initiative and keep the Union forces off balance. General Cleburne pressed for an attack on Thomas’ weaker Army of the Ohio on the left. However the Secretary of War and Chief of Staff both agreed with General Hardee’s assessment that the larger column north of the city remained the greater threat for the moment…

Hardee choose to attack the seam between Hooker’s army and Ord’s at Peachtree Creek. The attack was made by General Churchill’s II Corps with artillery support from Cleburne’s ordnance. The rear of Ord’s Army was manned by the division of Alvin P. Hovey of Eugene Carr’s XIII who eventually repelled the assault by General William Preston’s Division. However the lead of Hooker’s column comprised Steedman’s division of Granger’s XXIII Corps. Hit by both Bushrod Johnson’s division and that of Liddell’s, Steedman’s division crumpled and fell back on Cox’s division. The determined assault threatened to overrun Granger’s Corps at various locations, but eventually the Union held, stiffened by the arrival of General Hooker, and the Confederates fell back…

The question remains what would have been the outcome had Hardee, instead of mauling the larger Union force he could not realistically expect to defeat, attacked Thomas’ isolated Army of the Ohio…?”

Utoy Courthouse (July 14, 1864)​

From “The Road to Hell and Atlanta” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 2004

“Grant’s forces had previously approached Atlanta from the east and north and had not been able to break through, so Grant decided to shift emphasis and attack from the west. He ordered Hooker's Army of the Cumberland to move from the left wing to the right to support Thomas. Their combined objective would be to cut Hardee’s last railroad supply line between East Point and Atlanta…

The movement of troops to the west was not lost on Hardee who sent Cleburne’s Corps to intercept the Union force. Attached to Cleburne’s force was the newly constituted IV Corps of the army which had formerly been the garrison of Atlanta under William Wing Loring. The garrison troops, militia, home guard units and convalescents from Atlanta’s hospitals had been formed into two divisions under Loring. However neither Generals Hardee nor Cleburne put much faith in their performance…

General Thomas had anticipated such a thrust, and had cleverly side stepped the first Confederate attack at Ezra Church. Instead he had swung his force wide to the west, covered by a thick screen of skirmishers, and entrenched further south at Utoy Courthouse. Having been misled as to the location of Thomas’ force, the attack fell to the left hand wing of Cleburne’s force – Loring’s troops. The leading division under Franklin Gardner (one of the last prisoners released under the cartel before General Kearny suspended it) led the assault but was repulsed by men of Black Jack Logan’s XVII Corps inflicting numerous casualties. However General Cleburne reported that “the performance of Gardner’s division, their gallantry in advance and steadfastness in retreat, were in accordance with the highest standards of this army”. Such heroism and enthusiasm among Loring's troops would not last…

However the Union troops failed to cut the railroad. While Thomas sparred with Cleburne and Loring at Utoy, an attempt by a column of Union cavalry to cut the railroads south of Atlanta ended in failure, with one division under Brigadier General Eugene Crittenden completely smashed at the Battle of Connally’s Farm…”

Hopewell Church (July 22, 1864)​

From “The Road to Hell and Atlanta” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 2004

“Thomas waited for a few days to see if the rebels would be foolish enough to attack again. He deliberately left a gap between his own position and that of Hooker in order to further encourage Confederate aggressiveness. The rebel commanders would not oblige him…

General Thomas reorganized his troops for a further advance on the railroad. They crossed Utoy Creek on July 20, but by July 21 they had discovered a substantial series of defenses with lines of abatis near Hopewell Church which slowed the Union attack when it restarted on the morning of July 22. Thomas sent in Schofield’s corps but his troops were repulsed with heavy losses and failed in the second attempt to break the railroad…”

Rough & Ready (July 28, 1864)​

From “The Road to Hell and Atlanta” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 2004

“General Thomas next suggested another cavalry raid on the railroad, larger and better organized than the last. General Grant consented and General George Crook was instructed to lead the bulk of his cavalry corps on the raid. The objective would be to strike somewhere between East Point and Morrow Station…

Union cavalry tear up railroad tracks​

Leaving on July 25, Crook hit the Atlanta & West Point Railroad later that evening, tearing up a small area of tracks. Next, he headed for the station with the incongruous name of Rough & Ready on the Macon & Western Railroad. In transit, on July 27, Kilpatrick's men hit the Morrow Station supply depot on the Macon & Western Railroad, burning great amounts of supplies. On July 28, they reached Rough & Ready Station and began their destruction. Confederate cavalry under Abraham Buford quickly appeared, having been alerted by the raid on Morrow Station. Buford’s two divisions, under Joseph Wheeler and John A. Wharton, fought into the evening with George Crook’s two divisions under Robert Minty and Edward M. McCook. It was a fierce fight with neither cavalry wishing to give way. Eventually Crook’s raiders were forced, having fought into the night, to finally withdraw in order to avoid encirclement as Confederate infantry appeared to come up from the south…

Although Crook had destroyed supplies and track at Rough & Ready, the railroad line was back in operation in three days. Most important was the sole infantry prisoner Crook’s cavalry had taken from the Confederate troops coming up from the south. After interrogating the prisoner himself Crook reported to Thomas who in turn sent a message to Grant – John Bankhead Magruder’s III Corps had arrived…

McClernand’s Army of the Alabama had become fixed by the discovery and liberation of the giant prison camp at Andersonville. Many of the prisoners were too ill to move and further there was some question as to the safety of ferrying prisoners back down his tenuous supply line to Mobile. Having scored a propaganda victory through having reporters and photographers record the horrors of Andersonville, McClernand now seemed rooted to the spot as he tried to work out what to do next. Any further advance would seem to imperil the freed prisoners upon whose recent liberation he had puffed his reputation…”

Second Utoy (July 31, 1864)​

From “The Life of General William J. Hardee - Teach Them How To War” by Christopher L. Pike
Bison 1965

“McClernand’s paralysis was an opportunity for Hardee and Magruder. Leaving nothing more than a cavalry brigade to watch McClernand, and relying on the Union troops to remain fixed, Magruder marched north towards Atlanta will all haste. The Army of Tennessee would finally be united in the defense of Atlanta. As one Yankee reporter was to put it “The rebel Hardee now has four corps with which to try to stop three mighty armies – Patrick Cleburne’s I Corps, Hardee’s sword arm, Thomas James Churchill’s II Corps, Hardee’s shield, John Bankhead Magruder’s III Corps, past masters of deception and battlefield misdirection, and William Wing Loring’s IV Corps, the dregs of a rebellion and an army who have shown in this campaign that they can fight like the Duke of Wellington’s own scum”…”

From "U.S. Grant - Hero of Three Wars" by John W. Eisenhower
Edison 1953

“With confirmation of the imminent arrival of some or all of Magruder’s Corps, Grant expected that the desperate rebels would go on the offensive. Reports from North Carolina spoke of catastrophic reverses for the rebels there. Grant knew Hardee would be under intense political pressure to secure a victory. The question would be whether Hardee would attack Ord on the left, Hooker in the centre, or Thomas on the right. In any event Grant drew in forces in one both flanks, with Ord falling behind Peachtree Creek and Thomas behind Utoy Creek…”

From “The Road to Hell and Atlanta” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 2004

“On the night of July 30, General William Sooy Smith, commanding Ord’s front line reported substantial noise and movement before his lines at Peachtree Creek. It seemed clear to Ord and Grant that the blow would fall there come the morning. In was in fact General William Wing Loring staging a demonstration, though his own division commanders expected an order to attack in the morning. Hardee judged correctly that Loring’s mixed bag of troops could not but make the Union commanders aware of their presence as they moved into position at Decatur. In fact the force of Hardee’s attack would fall on George Thomas, west of Atlanta, at Utoy Courthouse…

Thomas Churchill’s troops held the wooded ridge south of Utoy Creek which effectively ran south west from Atlanta almost all the way to East Point. His task was to attack Thomas’ lines north of the creek to fix him in place. Cleburne’s corps was massed within the city itself. His task was to strike the Union left to sever Thomas from any support from Hooker. Finally Magruder’s corps loitered near Connally’s Farm. His objective was to swing around Thomas’ right, flanking it and getting behind him. His objective was Utoy Courthouse. Hardee’s plan called for no less than the encirclement of Thomas’ Army of 2 corps/5 divisions by 3 Confederate corps comprising 9 divisions (the Confederate government had demanded two divisions remained in the city’s works to defend it lest Hooker fall on it from the north while the Confederate army was engaged on both flanks. Preston Smith’s battered division from Cleburne’s corps and Ben Helm’s under strength division from Churchill’s corps would remain in the city’s defenses)…

Major General Thomas James Churchill on the morning of Second Utoy​

What followed was one of the most costly battles for the Confederacy and a classic defensive battle for the Union. General Thomas was little troubled by Churchill’s attack to his front. Churchill’s position on the southern bank of the Utoy Creek was an excellent defensive position but it was poor ground from which to launch an attack against dug in veterans over an exposed creek…

As the attacks developed on both flanks General Thomas remained campaign. On his left where Cleburne’s assault came from the city, he had General Logan refuse his flank, drawing the divisions of John E. Smith and John McArthur back so that the Union left resembled the letter C, with the division of Isaac Quinby holding the upper part facing Churchill across the creek (Francis J. Herron’s division had been detached to guard supply lines). “Two forces of nature clashed near the Brune House as Black Jack Logan showed Paddy Cleburne Illinois’ mettle” (Chicago Tribune)…

On the Union right Schofield’s XXV Corps only had two divisions. John F. Miller’s largely Ohio force and August Louis Chetlain’s Colored Division. They would be hammered head on by Mansfield Lovell’s division of Marguder’s corps. While Lovell attacked, the divisions of W.H.T. Walker and Dabney H. Maury deftly swung around the flank. Again the ever present Thomas sensed the danger and refused his flank, pulling Chetlain’s division around at right angles of Miller’s line. Fierce fighting erupted between Chetlain’s men and Walker’s…

General Hardee had anticipated that an attack on Thomas would heavily involve colored troops in Union service. His orders had been explicit. All Union troops, regardless of race, were to be treated as lawful combatants and afforded the full courtesies as soldiers and prisoners of war. There were nonetheless still a few recorded instances of the killing of wounded men and surrendering soldiers on this part of the battlefield…

General Dabney H. Maury had swung clear of both Lovell’s and Walker’s fights. He achieved his objective by swinging behind Thomas army as far as Utoy Courthouse. Thomas’ retreat was effectively cut off and Thomas had no reserves to deploy. Maury’s triumph was brief. Within 15 minutes of securing the courthouse he was attacked from the north by the division of Anson George McCook. General Hooker had answered Thomas’ request for help promptly by dispatching Rousseau’s XIV Corps to his aid. McCook’s troops were often said to be the best armed division in the Union army with almost every man carrying a repeating rifle. Though Maury’s three brigades (Lloyd Tilghman’s, Alpheus Baker’s and John A. Orr’s) outnumbered McCook’s, McCook did not need the assistance of a single man of John Turchin’s following division to help route Maury. Now Maury was in the difficult position of having McCook before him, and Thomas’ lines behind him. He found himself having to give the invidious order to retreat around Thomas’ flank in the face of an overwhelming fire…

Major General Dabney H. Maury​

Second Utoy was the battle that was supposed to smash George Thomas’ Army of the Ohio. Instead the smallest army in Grant’s force had given a stellar performance in battle with both John Logan and John Schofield performing admirably. Instead Magruder’s III Corps had taken heavy casualties the Army of Tennessee could ill afford; the normally victorious Cleburne’s attack had petered out, his troops exhausted from weeks of fighting; and Thomas remained in position exactly where he had at the battles commencement…

The outcome of the battle seemed to have a dramatic effect on Confederate morale and, combined with rumors from North Carolina, increasing numbers of troops (particularly in Loring’s formation) began to either drift away or to simply ignore orders…”

Panthersville (August 7, 1864)​

From “Fighting Joe Hooker” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 1999

“General Hooker had been appalled that General Grant had surrendered the initiative to the rebels. Though the rebels had been defeated, Hooker was not alone in thinking that Atlanta was no closer to capture. General Hooker strongly and repeatedly demanded that the Union armies return to the offensive…”

From "U.S. Grant - Hero of Three Wars" by John W. Eisenhower
Edison 1953

“Grant’s forces had successfully cut Hardee's supply lines in the past by sending out cavalry detachments, but the Confederates quickly repaired the damage. In August, Grant determined it was time to return to the offensive after the rebels had worn themselves out in futile attacks. Grant believed that if he could cut Hardee's railroad supply lines, the Confederates would have to evacuate Atlanta. He therefore decided to move the majority of his corps against the supply lines. The army began pulling out of its positions on August 2 to hit the Macon & Western Railroad between Rough and Ready and Jonesborough. To counter the move, Hardee sent Cleburne with two corps (his own and Loring’s) to halt and possibly rout the Union troops, not realizing Grant's army was shifting to the east in force. On August 7, Cleburne attacked two Union corps west of Panthersville. This time General Ord had been ready for the attack and Eugene Carr’s XIII easily repulsed Loring’s half-hearted assault…

After the hard fought battles of the campaign, this easy Union victory shook Confederate confidence and morale to its core. The poor performance of Loring's troops led to a breakdown in trust between different formations in Hardee's army. The end for Atlanta was coming quickly and much faster than anyone on either side had foreseen...”

Morrow’s Station (August 12, 1864)​

From “The Road to Hell and Atlanta” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 2004

“Panic was building within Atlanta. The news that Cleburne’s attack had been brushed aside and that Ord and Hooker advanced on the railroad was poorly received. Thomas’ troops now appeared north of the city and wild stories began to circulate in the city that Chetlain’s colored troops would be released to sack the city like some “marauding horde from the Dark Ages”…

On August 11 Hardee gave the order to move all his forces to the east. The next day, a Union corps (Carr’s XIII) broke through Cleburne's hastily erected line between Elam Church and Morrow Station, and some of his troops retreated south towards Jonesborough. Hardee had realized on the night of August 11 his exhausted troops were reaching the end of their endurance. Furthermore replenishing ammunition was becoming a serious issue for the army and it was suggested that some of Loring’s troops had gone into battle with nothing more than empty rifles and substandard bayonets…

It took longer for the government to realize Atlanta’s time was up. Only on the morning of August 13 did the Chief of Staff issue the order for the evacuation of Atlanta. For many it was too late. Leading elements of Ord’s army were already in possession of parts of the railroad at Morrow Station. Sensing that Second Utoy and Panthersville had broken the spirit of the defenders Grant had also released his cavalry to raid indiscriminately in the rebel rear around Jonesborough and Lovejoy Station…”

Lovejoy Station (August 15, 1864)​

From “The Road to Hell and Atlanta” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 2004

“Hardee’s troops’ morale collapsed quickly following the defeats at Utoy, Panthersville and Morrow Station. It was now widely rumored that Longstreet had surrendered the Army of Northern Virginia in North Carolina, and Kirby Smith’s attempt to break out of Texas had been defeated by James Blunt at Sabine River (which had occurred on July 12th)…

The troops had retreated largely at their own discretion as far as Fayetteville and beyond Lovejoy Station. This precipitous retreat had caught both the General Grant and the population of Atlanta by surprise. Many members of the Confederate government were now effectively cut off in the city while many others sought to sneak out through the still porous lines…

General Hardee sought to make on last ditch effort to reopen the railroad to the city and attacked the leading elements of Ord’s Army of the Mississippi at Lovejoy Station. General Eugene Carr again led the Union forces, commanding both his own XIII Corps and the cavalry of John Wynn Davidson. The cavalry brigades of James H. Wilson and Eli H. Murray fanned out on both flanks and opened up an unrelenting fire on the attacking rebels…

To press the attack Hardee had rounded up Stewart’s and Polignac’s Divisions of Cleburne’s Corps, Bushrod Johnson’s Division of Churchill’s Corps and Mansfield Lovell’s Division of Magruder’s Corps (Loring’s Corps had quickly dissolved from its route at Panthersville to barely a man with the colors)…

With no artillery to support the attack it was a forlorn hope. Carr was sufficiently comfortable in his ability to repel the attack offered by Hardee that he refused General Warren’s offer to dispatch General Ewing’s division as reinforcement from its position near Hebron Church…

The railroad to Atlanta was now permanently severed. Hardee’s fast diminishing army was falling back southwards away from Lovejoy Station and half the Confederate Government was still in and around Atlanta as Grant’s forces moved in…”

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter One Hundred and Twenty Three

Endgame​

From “The Road to Hell and Atlanta” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 2004

“The collapse of the Army of Tennessee had come quickly and to a degree unexpectedly to the population of Atlanta. Many government officials had behaved stoically remaining at their posts and offices through the climax of the crisis in order to reassure the city’s inhabitants…

When word arrived that Hardee had been defeated and that Union forces would soon cut off the city panic erupted. Some sought to flee the city by any means in any direction. There were, however, still a number of armed formations in the city who remained under orders. A proportion of these began to barricade streets, block up houses and hotels, and to generally prepare for street fighting. This was largely at the inspiration of President Davis who stoutly refused to flee the city…”

From “The Unyielding Office – the Presidency of Jefferson Davis” by James L. Caney
Buffalo

“Why did Davis remain in Atlanta? Vice President Stephens was with Hardee’s army; Secretary Breckinridge and General Johnson would find a way through the forces imperfectly surrounding the city to join Hardee; Secretary Mallory and Postmaster General Reagan would escape to the west. Escape was possible if difficult at this point. Secretary Memminger would be captured by James Wilson’s cavalry trying to sneak through Union lines. Yet President Davis remained in the city…

He later claimed it was his intention to fall fighting in defense of the “last city of the Confederacy”. Colonel William Preston in his memoirs however states that Davis’ decision to stay was “one part indecision; one part pique at the cowardice of his cabinet colleagues fleeing the city…The President still believed General Hardee would win through… somehow”…

From “The Road to Hell and Atlanta” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 2004

“The troops tasked with the securing of the city were from Thomas’ Army of the Ohio. That meant that the leading troops were the negro troops of Chetlain’s division. At first they only had to endure occasional sniping. However as they neared the centre of the city they found government buildings barricaded. The self inspired terror of negro troops had caused the remaining Confederate diehards to fight to the last in defense of their womenfolk and children…

It was bloody work. Trout House; the Atheneum; the Masonic Hall and City Hall all had to be taken from their defenders. General Chetlain was sickened by the casualties sustained in taking the first three government buildings. Instead of storming City Hall, the last thus held, he had artillery brought up and shelled the building until its occupants surrendered…

To General Chetlain’s surprise the defenders included among their number some of the most distinguished members of the Confederate Government: Governor Thomas Watts of Alabama and former Attorney General, his left arm hanging useless, shattered by a shell fragment; Governor Richard Hawes of Kentucky who had not stepped foot in his home state in two years; the shrouded body of Attorney General Wade Keyes killed in the bombardment; and finally the last to emerge from the smoke ringed broken building, President Jefferson Davis…

“I am not sure who was most astonished, Mr. Davis by the courtesy shown him by my men who acted as though he really was a head of state, defeated yes, but still deserving of the respect of his office, or my men whom Mr. Davis complimented on their capture of the city, their good conduct and appearance” (August Louis Chetlain)…

The haul of prisoners would also go on to include Secretary of State Judah P. Benjamin who was found hidden in the cellar of one his clerks’ homes…”

The damage to Atlanta's City Hall, the Seat of Government Government, was extensive​

From "U.S. Grant - Hero of Three Wars" by John W. Eisenhower
Edison 1953

“It was a great relief to General Grant that the “worst portion” (Salmon P. Chase) of the Confederate Government had been captured in the city. Had Davis been with Hardee and the Army of Tennessee they would have been no circumstances under which he could have offered the Chantilly Terms to Hardee…

Nonetheless there were several officers of the Confederate Government who had escaped to join Hardee’s force or had attached themselves to it some days earlier. Grant’s orders from Secretary Stanton were unequivocal. Alexander Stephens, John C. Breckinridge, Stephen Mallory, John Reagan, Isham G. Harris and Joseph E. Brown who were all believed to be with Hardee were to be surrendered unconditionally. Within 24 hours, after a disputatious cabinet meeting, that list was expanded to include any members or former members of the Confederate Congress...

It was clear to General Grant that his fighting might not yet be done…”

From “Kearny the Magnificent” by Roger Galton
NorthWestern

“General Kearny had given a great deal of thought to the terms he might offer General Longstreet. The surrender document seemed comprehensive. However one prisoner, a staff officer, taken with Longstreet’s army eventually presented General Kearny with an unexpected quandary when at last he was discovered. Governor Zebulon B. Vance had been in Charlotte and had surrendered himself with Longstreet’s general officers. Vance considered himself clearly governed by the Chantilly terms and General Longstreet had provided the Governor with written confirmation that, at the time of the surrender, Governor Vance was serving in the army as a volunteer staff officer…

Zebulon P. Vance, Governor of North Carolina​

For the moment General Kearny accepted this proposition and sent the former governor to Fort Delaware. The fate of a number of leading Confederate officials and politicians serving in such capacities would remain a headache for General Kearny and the Administration for some months…”

From “Isaac Peace Rodman - Soldier, Statesman, Quaker” by Leonard H.K. Wool
Empire 1918

“As soon as Elliott’s cavalry sweep down the South Carolina coast reached Charleston, General Rodman had them on the move again. Cavalry was all he needed before striking into the South Carolina hinterland. Elliott’s cavalry would lead a thrust towards Columbia, the main boy of which would be made up of the majority of William T.H. Brooks X Corps…

Brooks would have to fight only one battle, near Orangeburg. It was an overwhelming victory against militia and home guard units led by the Governor Milledge L. Bonham. An injured Bonham was among the prisoners taken…

Brooks’ health however was shattered by this stage and he was invalided back first to Charleston and later to the north. For the moment General Rodman took personal command of the column and pressed on…

Driven south by the recent raid on Columbia by John Buford’s cavalry based in the north western section of the state, it was as though Beauregard and his ragtag band had been beaten like game birds onto the guns of Rodman’s advancing force. There was no battle. Beauregard did not command sufficient numbers to merit a battle. After the briefest of skirmishes Elliott’s cavalry captured Beauregard’s little band…

General P.G.T. Beauregard​

Many stories of Beauregard’s capture have grown in the intervening years. He was dressed as a woman as he tried to escape. He was dressed as a French officer and trying to pass himself off as an observer. He tried to kill himself as he was taken but his gun misfired. However General Rodman’s own words give lie to all these stories: “When General Beauregard was brought before me he was dressed in the finest dress uniform I have ever seen. He presented his sword to me as a token of his surrender which I accepted and which I still have…To my great discomfort he asked if he was to be shot immediately or sent north to be hung for the satisfaction of my government. I told him unequivocally he would be treated respectfully while under my jurisdiction but that he would be sent north to face the consequences of his actions in this war"…

Colonel William True Bennett records the end of the exchange: “I take it, sir, you refer to Charleston. If you knew that city as I know it, as any southern gentleman knows it, you would understand. All I did in Charleston I did in the name of peace and sanity” “Nevertheless General you must answer for it, to the people of Charleston, to the nation and at the last to God the most high”…”

From “The Life of General William J. Hardee - Teach Them How To War” by Christopher L. Pike
Bison 1965

“By August 25 Hardee had gathered the remains of the Army of Tennessee at Macon. Joe Hooker was now leading the Union advance and was approaching the town of Forsyth. McClernand’s Army of the Alabama had finally retreated from Andersonville but only as far as Columbus, Alabama. To the north east Augusta was still in Confederate hands, but beyond that no word had been received from Beauregard or Governor Bonham in South Carolina for several days. To the south east Savannah was also still held but it was only a matter of time before an attack was made there. Already a Union fleet had begun to gather there…

General Hardee was seriously considering surrender if he could obtain acceptable terms. In this he was supported by General Joseph Johnson (who in theory at least could have assumed command as Chief of Staff but choose not to) and perhaps surprisingly by General Patrick Cleburne. Generals Churchill and Magruder were for fighting on. Secretary of War Breckinridge and Governor Brown of Georgia were also for fighting, perhaps because they expected to hang after any surrender…

However the final decision fell to an increasingly frail Vice President Stephens who, with the suspected loss of President Davis in Atlanta, was now the acting head of the Confederate Government…

Stephens decided that Hardee should send an emissary under flag of truce to seek terms, but that anyone who did not wish to surrender should be given 24 hours to leave camp. This compromise caused uproar in the army. Many officers wished to fight on having heard that their comrades in the Army of Northern Virginia had been shipped north to an unknown fate. Many, but not all, of the rank and file wished to surrender, to end the bloodshed…

In the end it was decided that General Magruder would lead all troops wishing to fight on southwards. Hardee would transfer all the ammunition and supplies they could carry to Magruder’s force. Magruder’s force would number between a fifth and a quarter of the army. The rank and file were, in the main, western troops looking to find a way home with a leavening of diehards from the eastern states. It would be one of the most heavily officered forces seen in the war as many more officers volunteered to join…

Vice President Stephens and Joseph Johnston decided to remain with Hardee while Secretary Breckinridge and Governor Brown would accompany Magruder. The hardest decision was perhaps General Churchill’s. He wished to remain fighting; had been one of the foremost spokesmen for it. However he had served and risen with Generals Hardee and Cleburne since the Battle of Richmond, Kentucky two years earlier. In the end he would not abandon them. He remained in Macon with his brothers in arms…”

Major General Joseph Hooker, Commander, Army of the Cumberland​

From “Fighting Joe Hooker” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 1999

“General Hooker knew very well the nature of General Grant’s instructions on the surrender of the remaining Confederate field armies. With the arrival of General Hardee’s envoy General Hooker assumed responsibility for the surrender negotiations. They were brief: General Hooker would accept the surrender of General Hardee’s force on the Chantilly Terms but any official of the so called Confederate Government or any so called Confederate State Government must be excluded and surrender unconditionally…

Those terms were not unexpected and although the rebel leaders took a full three days to consider them ultimately they agreed and on August 31 General Hooker accepted the surrender of the Confederate Army of Tennessee to great acclaim…”

From "U.S. Grant - Hero of Three Wars" by John W. Eisenhower
Edison 1953

“General Grant was furious. Not only had General Hooker failed to make any report for four days, it then emerged he had assumed responsibility for negotiating the surrender of the Confederate Army. General Hooker presented General Grant with a fait accompli. Indeed his report to General Grant coincided with the news being released to the northern press. As the terms reflected Government policy General Hooker was untouchable in terms of public opinion. Nonetheless he had usurped General Grant’s authority and behaved in a grossly insubordinate manner. It took General Ord and the recently returned General Sherman (who was initially attached to Grant’s Headquarters until a post could be found) to dissuade General Grant from taking any further action…

It was several days before the “absence” of a portion of the Confederate Army was realized. No one in the Union army knew the exact size of the much reduced Army of Tennessee nor what supplies it might be carrying. In the end it was General Grant’s attempts to locate General Magruder that alerted him to the absence of a number of senior rebel officers. By that time General Magruder’s small force had a start of almost 9 days…”

Lieutenant General John Bankhead Magruder​

From “The War Between the States” by Otis R. Mayhew
Sword & Musket 1992

“The last great spectacle of the Slaveholder’s Rebellion had begun – Magruder’s March to the West…”

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter One Hundred and Twenty Four

Marching With Prince John​

From “The War Between the States” by Otis R. Mayhew
Sword & Musket 1992

“Magruder’s objective was not to fight. His objective was to get as many men as possible to the comparative safety of Texas. Many of the men under his command rightly believed it was an impossible task. The majority of men were infantry; the country through which they would pass had been in Union hands for some time; no one had any idea about how they might cross the Mississippi should any element of the command reach it; and as the last major force in the field east of the Mississippi the entire Union army could be in pursuit of them…

Magruder however did have some advantages: by swinging south of McClernand he would likely travel through southern Alabama and Mississippi, areas more sympathetic to the Confederate cause than the northern elements of those states; there were no major Union forces between him and the Mississippi yet which realistically engage him in battle – the country was littered with garrisons and light patrols; and in the beginning the Union high command could not believe he intended to march to the Mississippi. The perceived impossibility of the task made in inconceivable to many in the Union high command…”

From “Kearny the Magnificent” by Roger Galton
NorthWestern

“General Kearny was not surprised that a rebel splinter force ha broken off. It was inevitable given some of the rumors circulating about the intentions of the Radicals in Congress. Waging civilized warfare in the midst of an emotive election campaign was taxing the General’s patience…

Kearny did not want to be completely drawn from the subjugation of Georgia. General Grant was directed to remain in Georgia with the armies of General Thomas and Ord. They would process Hardee’s surrendered army and march on Savannah to secure the last major rebel port in the east…

General Hooker was given the opportunity to redeem the slur some had made against him for Magruder’s ‘escape’. With the Army of the Cumberland and McClernand’s Army of the Alabama placed under his command he would be given the task of rounding up Magruder’s band. Kearny’s greatest fear was that Magruder’s force would disperse with its arms throughout Georgia, Alabama and Mississippi and wage a partisan war against the Union…”

From “Fighting Joe Hooker” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 1999

“General Hooker quickly realized that a standard pursuit by the armies under his command might achieve little except to drive Magruder on faster. He realized he needed cavalry. He had at his disposal General George Crook’s cavalry division attached to the Army of the Cumberland containing the brigades of Eugene Crittenden, Robert Minty and Edward McCook. Of those officers Hooker only considered Robert Minty talented, while McCook was “competent”. Crittenden was a “political necessity under which we must labor”…

Hooker petitioned Grant for elements of his cavalry. Grant refused. The small division of John Wynn Davidson would be needed to help secure Georgia. It was a petty attitude that was the hallmark of General Grant’s relationship with Hooker…

General Hooker also requested assistance from General Buford whose Potomac horsemen were in South Carolina and Georgia. John Buford however was being invalided north at this time. As General Pleasanton lobbied Kearny for the command, there was a delay in designating a senior commander, before Pleasanton was dispatched to Missouri and Gregg was placed in command (to the disgust of Percy Wyndham, B.F. Davis, and an overly ambitious George Custer). Hooker would begin his pursuit of Magruder without help from the Army of the Potomac for 3 weeks…”

From “I Rode With Prince John” by Colonel Ambrosio José Gonzales
Carlotta 1885

“With only two batteries of horse artillery there was no place in the artillery for me. Luckily I was assigned to General Magruder’s staff. He told me that if we survived to see Texas my language skills could prove very useful. At that point I spoke Spanish, French, Italian as well as English…

General Magruder discussed with the staff many times that this was not an ordinary column on the march. If he deployed according to the ‘book’ the whole column would be swept up in days. General Magruder had to write his own book…

He kept only a handful of mounted scouts miles ahead of the main column to warn of Federal garrisons or patrols and to make contact with our friends to arrange supplies of food. No cavalry was kept in the rear; the General worked on the assumption that the Federals were never more than a day behind and no rest of delay would be tolerated…

What cavalry and mounted infantry we did have he sent out in all directions with instructions to ‘raise hell’. Railroad bridges were a primary target. They were also to threaten any Federal garrisons but not attack. Above all they were misled anyone the met with false tails of our force, its direction and intentions. Prisoners were not to be taken along, so they were told a tale and released a few miles down the road…

We must have seemed like the hordes of Genghis Khan if all the rumors were to be believed…

There were bands of men, mainly Alabamians to begin with, who wished to leave the column and make for their homes. General Magruder always generously consented there being little purpose in trying to compel men to march with us. His only condition was that they march noisily to some point away from our line of march before quietly dispersing. The General sought any opportunity to confuse and mislead our pursuers…”

Colonel Ambrosio José Gonzales​

From “Fighting Joe Hooker” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 1999

“Magruder had crossed into Alabama through the swampy territory near Eufaula. McClernand had followed what he believed was the main column towards Tuskegee. McClernand’s scouts had received intelligence that Magruder intended to reinvigorate the rebellion by an attack on the garrison at Montgomery. General Hooker was naturally skeptical…

Crook’s cavalry was dispersed throughout southern Alabama following obvious signs of troops on the march and cavalry columns. Telegraph warnings of impending attacks and raids came in from Dothan, Ozark and Enterprise. All proved to be the work of wraiths. Infantry trails would simply disappear. Cavalry hosts would turn out to be small bands of raiders who would disperse at Crook’s approach…

It was not long before General Hooker began to ignore the telegraph reports. “The reports we did receive we were meant to receive by Prince John. We began to look not towards the noise of alarms but towards the regions of silence” (Dan Butterfield)…

Duncan J. Jackson of the 14th Alabama was captured at his home in Inverness, Alabama by regiment from Robert Minty’s brigade having just left Magruder’s column. He provided two vital pieces of intelligence – Magruder was making for the Mississippi River with the intention of marching to Texas, and that although Magruder meant to break up the column to cross the Alabama River at several locations the rally point was Waynesboro, Mississippi…

With that intelligence General Hooker, making full use of the modern mechanisms of war, would conceive a plan to end Magruder’s quixotic march. General Hooker with the XIV corps of John Turchin (Lovell Rousseau was on leave as he campaigned for a congressional seat in Kentucky), the XXIII corps of Gordon Granger, and Crook’s cavalry would continue to drive Magruder’s column giving it no rest. General McClernand with Fitzjohn Porter’s XIX Corps (aka the Army of the Alabama) and Israel Richardson’s XXI Corps would be transported by rail from Montgomery to Pensacola and, with the assistance of Admiral Farragut to New Orleans. From New Orleans they would take the railroad to Brookhaven and Jackson, Mississippi. General Hooker’s intention was that when Magruder emerged in Mississippi a solid blue line of Union troops would stand between him and the Mississippi…”

General John McClernand's relationship with General Hooker in years to come, though initially beneficial, would ultimately bear the bitterest fruit for Joseph Hooker​

From “I Rode With Prince John” by Colonel Ambrosio José Gonzales
Carlotta 1885

“Not everyone believed that the General would be successful and there were many instances of small bands breaking away from the columns to make their own way. Of the 10,000 men who began the march less than 6,000 divided into three main columns as we crossed the Alabama. There perhaps another 1,000 men off raiding or misleading the Federals under the General’s orders…

Among those who slipped away at this time were 12 officers and 3 clerks of the Government who accompanied us. With then went Secretary Mallory and Postmaster Reagan. They had not to my knowledge discussed their departure with Magruder though they had previously discussed making for the coast to find a fisherman or other boat to take them to Texas…

As we reached Waynesboro the most alarming rumors awaited us. The country was alive with news that assassins had struck in Washington. The situation was very confused. Lincoln was dead; Lincoln was injured; Phil Kearny was injured; Vice President Hamlin had been shot; he had shot his assassin; Seward was dead; Seward was alive. Contradictory reports arrived by telegraph with each minute but we could not linger to make sense of them…

A new resolution motivated the men. If the rumors were true we could expect no mercy from Federals now…”

From “Fighting Joe Hooker” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 1999

“General Hooker succeeded where Grant had failed in establishing a cordial relationship with General McClernand. General Hooker placed the heavy responsibility of being the anvil to his hammer and General McClernand rose to the trust…

The rebel column under General William H.T. Walker was smashed by Fitzjohn Porter near Laurel, Mississippi. Generals McClernand and Porter had successfully concentrated their forces preventing any forward or lateral movement down the roads emanating from the town. Walker could either fight or retreat the way he had come. He fought and the outcome was inevitable. Almost 3,000 rebel troops were killed or captured at Laurel…”

From “I Rode With Prince John” by Colonel Ambrosio José Gonzales
Carlotta 1885

“The gallant Walker fought to buy time for the main column under Magruder and a secondary column under Camille Polignac to swing south of the Federal forces of McClernand. We did not get far…

With McClernand behind us, our scouts reported a large Federal force moving into Hattiesburg. General Magruder would not countenance a retrograde movement and so we resolved to attack this Federal force. The main column would assault the town while Polignac would seek to flank it to the east crossing the Leaf River to attack from the south east…”

From “Fighting Joe Hooker” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 1999

“General Richardson’s later report to General Hooker was frank. He had not expected to be attacked by Magruder but would rather have to bring on a battle himself. Therefore Magruder’s attack initially caught G.P. Buell’s leading troops by surprise. However the Leaf and Bouie Rivers formed natural defensive barriers behind which Buell quickly organized his defenses. The lack of artillery on the rebel side also reduced the effectiveness of the attack. With the assistance of brigades from Hazen’s division, Buell went on the attack driving Magruder’s troops back up the road from Laurel…”

From “I Rode With Prince John” by Colonel Ambrosio José Gonzales
Carlotta 1885

“It was a terrible miscalculation. There were at least two Federal divisions at Hattiesburg and the main attack was promptly repulsed and put on the defensive…

General Polignac indicated the flank was open, but with the intention of having the remaining mounted troops and such lightly burdened infantry as could follow to bypass the Federal force, not to engage it. Magruder’s second, General Benjamin Helm, was adamant. General Magruder must join with General Polignac’s column and seek escape. General Helm volunteered to command the remains of the main column to try to hold up the Federal force. Indeed the commanders were unanimous that General Magruder must accompany General Polignac…”

From “The War Between the States” by Otis R. Mayhew
Sword & Musket 1992

“By the time Magruder reached McComb he had less than 500 men with him, all mounted. His supplies were gone, as was his artillery. There were Union troops all around. Infantry at Brookhaven, Woodville and Kentwood. Cavalry coming up fast from Tylertown. It was at this point that General Magruder ordered the column to disperse and for each man to make for the Mississippi as he may…”

From “I Rode With Prince John” by Colonel Ambrosio José Gonzales
Carlotta 1885

“General Magruder and 4 others were bound on horseback as the Federal cavalrymen flagged down a small steamer not far from St. Francisville. They had orders to convey the General to New Orleans as quickly as possible. It was a supply vessel with only a handful of troops aboard who were quickly overpowered…

It had been the general’s own idea to masquerade as Federal troops, and though being shot out of hand was the likely fate for us anyway he sought only volunteers to wear the Federal blue as that would guarantee a death as a spy if we were taken. Needless to say out of our party of 25 all volunteered. Indeed General Polignac made a fine impression as a dandified European Yankee officer though I am sure he would not consider that a compliment…”

General Benjamin Hardin Helm, captured at Hattiesburg, was President Lincoln's brother-in-law​

From “The War Between the States” by Otis R. Mayhew
Sword & Musket 1992

“Of the approximately 9,000 men who marched out with General Magruder, many of whom had no intention of marching to the Mississippi, never mid Texas, it is hard to estimate the numbers who join Kirby Smith’s command there. Certainly the numbers were small. During the end of October and the month of November it is certain that at least 215 men (mainly officers or Texan enlisted men) reported to Smith from Magruder’s command. Those men included Generals Camille Polignac, Felix Huston Robertson and of course John Bankhead Magruder himself. Surprisingly the cabinet members, Texan John Reagan and Stephen Mallory also reached Texas, albeit after an extremely fraught journey by hopping along the coast in a large fishing vessel…

General Hooker had achieved a significant haul of prisoners nonetheless. He had captured Governor Brown of Georgia at Laurel; the President’s brother-in-law General Benjamin Hardin Helm had been taken at Hattiesburg; Secretary of War John C. Breckinridge had been captured with a small party by Robert Minty’s cavalry east of Natchez. Indeed another dozen former rebel generals now graced Northern prisons thanks to General Hooker’s operation to destroy Magruder’s column…

Now after the events in the newly reopened Ford’s Theatre during the opening performance of Julius Caesar the nation was crying out for the conspirators to face the same fate as Cassius and Brutus…and for the Radicals those conspirators included every last man bearing the title Confederate…”.