A Glorious Union or America: the New Sparta

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter Thirty-Seven​

Grant & the Two Porters
-v-
the Gardner of Port Hudson​

From “The Fighters – Grant v Bragg on the banks of the Mississippi” by Nelson Cole
LSU 1991​

“The Siege of Port Hudson occurred from May 4 to June 2, 1863, when Union Army troops assaulted and then surrounded the Mississippi River town of Port Hudson, Louisiana. In cooperation with Major General Fitz-John Porter's advance from Baton Rouge, Major General Ulysses Grant’s army moved against the Confederate stronghold at Port Hudson...​

According to historian Morgan Withers, "Port Hudson, unlike Baton Rouge, was one of the strongest points on the river, and batteries placed upon the bluffs could command the entire river front." ​

In May 1863, Union land and naval forces began a campaign they hoped would give them control of the full length of the Mississippi River. One army under Grant commenced operations against the Confederacy's fortified position at Vicksburg at the northern end of the stretch of the river still in Southern hands. At about the same time, another army under Fitz-John Porter moved against Port Hudson, which stood at the southern end…​

The renewed support for the war brought about by the death of General Hunter galvanized the Lincoln administration into action. Major General Fitz-John Porter was diverted from a possible expedition to Mobile and given orders to take Port Hudson. The Union commander of all armies, Henry Wager Halleck stated to Porter that President Lincoln “regards the opening of the Mississippi River as the first and most important of all our military and naval operations, and it is hoped that you will not lose a moment in accomplishing it”…”​

From “The Bloody Crucible – The Siege of Port Hudson” by Morgan Withers
LSU 1983​

“Port Hudson began as a village sited on an 80 foot bluff on the east bank above a hairpin turn in the Mississippi river 25 miles upriver from Baton Rouge. The hills and ridges in the area of the town represented extremely rough terrain, a maze of deep, thickly forested ravines, swamps, and cane brakes giving the effect of a natural fortress. The town had appeared and grown as a point for shipping cotton and sugar downriver from the surrounding area. Despite the growing shipping business the town itself remained small, consisting of a few buildings and 200 people by the start of the war… ​

General Bragg had by this time realized that linking the Port Hudson and Clinton railway to Jackson, Mississippi would be invaluable in allowing reserves to be switched between Vicksburg and Port Hudson, depending upon which was most threatened. A desperate shortage of iron and transport within the Confederacy made this move impossible…​

Poor supply lines, starvation, and disease were to remain the constant problems of the Port Hudson position, and overwhelm efforts to improve conditions for the soldiers of the garrison. Louisiana Private Robert D. Patrick wrote: “never since I have been in the army have I fared so badly and in truth I have been almost starved.” At the same time commercial activity between Port Hudson and areas west of the Mississippi increased, because Port Hudson and Vicksburg were the last remaining links with the Trans-Mississippi. This tended to tie up even more of Port Hudson’s limited transport facilities…​

The arrival of Lincoln’s new commander of the Gulf, Fitz-John Porter, appeared to herald renewed action for the approximately 31,000 Union troops in New Orleans and the southern Louisiana area. The Confederate command reacted to this increased Union commitment by sending a new major general to take command of Port Hudson. Major General Franklin Gardner arrived at his post on the 27th of December 1862. Gardner was a career army officer who graduated from West Point 17th in his class in 1843. The native New Yorker commanded a cavalry brigade at Shiloh and was 39 years old at the time of his arrival. Upon taking command he reorganized the defenses at Port Hudson, concentrating the fields of fire of the heavy guns and setting up more earthworks using packed earth and sod rather than the traditional gabions or sandbags…​

Fitz-John Porter busied himself in anticipation of the attack on Port Hudson with his usual slow but thorough preparations. What finally brought him to move on Port Hudson was the prospect of uniting with Grant’s army, currently maneuvering against Vicksburg, and word that a significant part of the Port Hudson garrison had been sent to Bragg in Vicksburg. When Grant’s attempts to force a lodgment south of Vicksburg stalled at Port Gibson, he sent word to Porter to meant him at Port Hudson…

Leading the advance was the cavalry brigade of Colonel Benjamin Henry Grierson, which had just joined Porter’s forces on April thirtieth after its raid through the Rebel lines. The entire advance involved a pincher movement with three army divisions advancing from the northwest from Bayou Sara meeting two divisions advancing from the south from Baton Rouge. The meeting of the two groups would surround Port Hudson pending the arrival of Grant’s force…​

Once Porter had completed the investment of the Port Hudson defenses he anticipated a formal siege. The arrival of Grant with the corps of McClernand and Sherman changed that. Grant hoped to overrun the entrenchments quickly, then take his army northward to attack Vicksburg…​

General Gardner chose to reinforce the picket lines shielding the Confederate grain mill and support shops of the areas near Little Sandy Creek because he did not consider a siege probable, and had not fortified that perimeter. Other Confederate troops remained outside the fortifications, consisting of 1200 troops under the command of Colonel John L. Logan. These represented all of Gardner’s cavalry, the 9th Louisiana Battalion, Partisan Rangers, and two artillery pieces of Robert’s battery. These troops slowed the encirclement of Porter’s troops, and prevented them from discovering the weaknesses in the defenses. With Grant’s arrival the infantry assault was scheduled for the 8th of May. The short delay between the encirclement by Porter and the arrival of Grant had allowed Gardner to complete the ring of defenses around Port Hudson. He also had sufficient time to move some artillery from the river side of the fort to the east side fronting the Federal forces…​

Grant had set up his headquarters at Riley’s plantation and planned the attacks with his staff and corps commanders. Porter was opposed to the idea of trying to overwhelm the fort with a simple assault, but Grant wanted to end the siege as quickly as possible in order to move on Vicksburg before the rebels could react in force, and felt that the 50,000 troops available to him would easily force the surrender of the 7,500 troops under Gardner, a seven to one advantage. Despite his reluctance, General Porter was given the task of organizing the assault. Four different assault groups were organized, under the commands of generals Godfrey Weitzel, Cuvier Grover, James B. Ricketts, and Thomas W. Sherman. Porter indicated dawn for his intended simultaneous attack…​

Generals Weitzel and Sherman attacked on the north and northeast sides of the fort at dawn. However Ricketts was slow to get into action and Grover held off pending confirmation that Ricketts was ready. This meant that the attack on the east and southeast sides commenced at 10.30am. The naval bombardment began the night before the attack, firing most of the evening, and the upper and lower fleets beginning firing for an hour after 7am. The army land batteries also fired an hour bombardment after 5am. Weitzel’s and Sherman’s two divisions began the attack at 6am on the north, advancing through the densely forested ravines bordering the valley of Little Sandy Creek. This valley led the assault into a salient formed by a fortified ridge known as the “Bull Pen” where the defenders slaughtered cattle, and a lunette on a ridge nicknamed “Fort Desperate” which had been hastily improvised to protect the fort's grain mill.​

At the end of this ravine between the two was a hill described as “Commissary Hill” with an artillery battery mounted on it. The Union troops were caught in a crossfire from these three positions, and held in place by dense vegetation and obstacles placed by Rebel troops that halted their advance. The combination of rugged terrain, a crossfire from three sides, and rebel sharpshooters inflicted many casualties. The Union troops advancing west of the Bull Pen were caught between the Bull Pen, which had been reinforced with three Arkansas regiments from the east side of Port Hudson, and a more western fortified ridge manned by Lieutenant Colonel M. B. Locke’s Alabama troops. Once again the combination of steep sided ravines, dense vegetation, and a rebel crossfire from ridge top trenches halted the Union advance. Premature shell bursts from the supporting artillery of the 1st Maine Battery also caused Union casualties…

​

​

A Zouave regiment of Porter's XIX Corps stood out among Grant's Westerners​

Seeing that his advance had been stopped, Brigadier General William Dwight ordered the Louisiana Native Guards forward into the attack. These troops were not intended to take part in the attack due to the general prejudice against negro troops on the part of General Porter. Dwight was determined to break though the Confederate fortifications however, and committed them to the attack at 10 am. Since they had been deployed as pioneers (for which they had initially been raised), working on the pontoon bridge over Big Sandy Creek near its junction with the Mississippi, these troops were in the worst possible position for an attack than all the units in Weitzel’s northern assault group.

The Guard first had to advance over the pontoon bridge, along Telegraph Road with a fortified ridge to their left manned by Mississippi troops supported by a light artillery battery, the Confederate heavy artillery batteries to their front, and the Mississippi river to their immediate left. Despite the heavy crossfire from rifles, field artillery, and heavy coast guns, the Louisiana Native Guards advanced with determination and courage, led by Captain Andre Cailloux, a free black citizen of New Orleans. Giving orders in English and French, Cailloux led the Guard regiments forward until injured by artillery fire. Taking heavy losses, the attackers were forced to retreat to avoid annihilation. This fearless advance did much to dissipate any remaining doubts in the Western armies that negro troops were unreliable under fire…​

The attack of the Louisiana Native Guards​

While the infantry attacks raged against the northern section of the fortress, General Porter had sought to line up 38 cannon opposite the eastern side of the fortress and conducted a steady bombardment of the rebel works and battery positions, supported by sharpshooters aiming for Confederate artillery crews. This effort had some success, but General Grant, upon hearing no massed rifle fire from the Union center, visited Grover’s headquarters and threatened to relieve him of command unless he advanced his troops. Grover then began the attack on the eastern edge of the Port Hudson works at about 10.30am.

These attacks included some of the troops of Ricketts as well as his own, and had less in the way of natural terrain obstacles to contend with, but in this area the Confederates had more time to construct fortifications, and had put more effort and firepower into them. One feature of the earthworks in this region was a dry moat and more abatis in front of the parapet. The Union negro pioneer companies, mostly former Louisiana slaves, carried axes, poles, planks, cotton bags and fascines to fill in the ditch and effectively led the attack...​

When the Union infantry closed within 150 yards they were met by a hail of rifle and canister fire, and few made it within 50 yards of the Confederate lines. Grover was wounded in these attacks, and Lieutenant Colonel James O'Brien, commanding the pioneer companies, was killed. At 3pm Union troops raised a white flag to signal a truce to remove the wounded and dead from the field. This ended the fighting for the day. None of the Union attacks had even made it to the Confederate parapets…​

The successful defense of their lines brought a renewed confidence to Gardner and his garrison. They felt that through a combination of well planned defensive earthworks and the skillful and deliberate reinforcement of threatened areas, the superior numbers of attackers had been repulsed. Learning from his experience, Gardner organized a more methodical system of defense. This involved dividing the fortifications into a network of defense zones, with an engineering officer in charge of strengthening the defense in each area. For the most part this involved once again charting the best cross fire for artillery positions, improving firepower concentrations, and digging protective pits to house artillery when not in use, to protect them from enemy bombardment…​

Spent bullets and scrap metal were sewed into shirtsleeves to make up canister casings for the artillery, and the heavy coast guns facing the river that had center pivot mounts were cleared for firing on Union positions on the eastern side of the fortress. Three of these guns were equipped for this, and one 10-inch Columbiad in Battery Four was so effective in this that Union troops referred to it as the “Demoralizer." Its fearful reputation spawned the myth that it was mounted on a railroad car, and could fire from any position in the fortifications. Rifles captured from the enemy or taken from hospitalized soldiers were stacked for use by troops in the trench lines.​

Positions in front of the lines were land mined with unexploded 13-inch mortar shells, known as “torpedoes” at the time. Sniper positions were also prepared at high points in the trench works for sharpshooters. These methods improved the defense, but could not make up for the fact that the garrison was short of everything except gunpowder. The food shortage was a drag on morale, and resulted in a significant level of desertion to the enemy. This drain on manpower was recorded by Colonel Steedman who wrote, “Our most serious and annoying difficulty is the unreliable character of a portion of our Louisiana troops. Many have deserted to the enemy, giving him information of our real condition; yet in the same regiments we have some of our ablest officers and men”…​

On the Union side, astonishment and chagrin were near universal in reaction to the decisive defeat of the infantry assaults. Grant was furious at the setback. Porter too was unimpressed with the performance of several of his commanders notwithstanding his previous opposition to any attack. Ricketts was promptly relieved of his command for his delay. He would not be re-employed…​

The resources of the entire command were now called into play, and men and material poured into the Union encirclement. General Porter took command of all the artillery at hand and began a relentless bombardment of the Rebel works…​

Union batteries during the Siege of Port Hudson​

The second assault began with a redoubled shelling of the Confederate works beginning at 11:15am on June 1 and lasting an hour. Grant then sent a message to Gardner demanding the surrender of his position. Gardner’s reply was, “My honor and my duty require me to defend this position, and therefore I decline to surrender”. Porter continued the bombardment during the night, and Grant gave the order for what was to be a simultaneous three prong infantry attack at 1am on June 2. The attack began at 1:30am. McClernand’s corps led the assault from the north.

McClernand was keen to swipe anyway any stain on his reputation from Port Gibson. It was the most difficult sector to assault but as William T. Sherman observed “McClernand was aggressive. Regardless of the position or odds. Perhaps the most aggressive general in Grant’s army. He was the only person who wanted to fight even when Grant did not”. His column struck the Confederate line at “Fort Desperate” before the other columns reached the Rebel lines, and the same formidable terrain combined with the enhanced Confederate defense almost stopped the attack outside the rebel works. William T. Sherman's attack in the center, spearheaded by Steele’s Division, and the attack on the southern end of the line by Fitz-John Porter’s troops, arrived in time to prevent any attempts by Gardner to reallocate his troops within the works – he was attacked all along the line.

Porter’s troops redeemed themselves by being the first to break through the defenses, closely followed by McClernand’s troops under Eugene Carr. Rebel troops quickly began to stream from the outer defenses into the small town and inner defenses…

As dawn broke General Grant demanded the surrender of General Gardner. Gardner prevaricated for a almost a day before surrendering on June 2. General Porter assembled some of his “eastern” troops at the corps headquarters and thanked them for their brave efforts and sacrifices. In response General McClernand gave a speech of praise to his “westerners”. In historian John Murdoch’s opinion “a war of words now erupted between the easterners and westerners in Grant’s army that was to poison some relationships, while prompting a competition that would spur both factions to greater deeds”…”​

From “Vicksburg or Bust” by John W. Scharf
Empire 1984​

“The surrender gave the Union almost complete control of the Mississippi River and its major tributaries, save for Vicksburg. Both sides suffered heavy casualties: between 5,000 to 5,750 Union men were casualties, and an additional 7,000 fell prey to disease or sunstroke; Gardner's forces suffered around 1,300 casualties, from battle losses and disease...

In the west the reputation of black soldiers in Union service was enhanced by the siege. The advance of the Louisiana Guard had gained much coverage in northern newspapers. The attack was repulsed, due to its hasty implementation, but was bravely carried out in spite of the hopeless magnitude of opposing conditions. This performance was noted by the army leadership: “One thing I am glad to say, that is that the black troops at P. Hudson fought & acted superbly. The theory of negro inefficiency here is, I am very thankful at last thoroughly exploded by facts. We shall shortly have a splendid army of thousands of them.” General Porter, under who command the bulk of negros served, also noted their performance in his official report, stating, “The severe test to which they were subjected, and the determined manner in which they encountered the enemy, leaves upon my mind no doubt of their utility as disciplined troops.” These observations did much to support the substantial efforts already underway to recruit free blacks for the Union armed services following the death of General Hunter… ​

Grant’s mind now turned to Vicksburg with Fitz-John Porter’s XIX Corps as a sorely needed reinforcement…”​

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter Thirty-Eight​

Two Brawlers Meet​

From “The Fighters – Grant v Bragg on the banks of the Mississippi” by Nelson Cole
LSU 1991

“The Confederacy should have been able to do more to relieve Gardner during the month long siege. Braxton Bragg certainly wished to. However, despite having resolved to defend Vicksburg at the banks of the Mississippi and not from the city’s defenses, Bragg could not completely cast off from the city. While Grant’s army remained by the river, he could move his forces along it faster than Bragg could over land. Bragg could only march so far with so many troops before he exposed himself to a river borne landing in his rear…

Bragg however sought the co-operation of General Joseph Johnston’s command. With Fitz-John Porter having marched out of New Orleans and Baton Rouge with the bulk of his troops Johnston finally saw an opportunity, however slim, to effect the purpose of his Department of the Gulf. That did not involve co-operating with Bragg. Indeed the further Grant took Porter’s XIX Corps north and away from Baton Rouge and New Orleans the better for Johnston. The resulting telegrams and arguments between to the two departmental commanders ultimately meant that Port Hudson fell before either had acted to relieve…”

From “Vicksburg or Bust” by John W. Scharf
Empire 1984

“With the news of the fall of Port Hudson, Bragg order Loring’s Corps back to Vicksburg. Furthermore all reinforcements arriving at Jackson were ordered to remain there for the moment. Magruder’s scouting parties and Van Dorn’s cavalry reported that Grant was moving up the line of the Great Northern railroad towards Jackson…

Confederate Generals Earl Van Dorn and William H.T. Walker​

Leaving Walker’s Division in the works at Port Gibson, Magruder marched north east towards Raymond. There he was to meet Bragg with Loring’s Corps. Bragg intended to go on the offensive and met Grant in the field…

There was a serious skirmish at Union Church, south east of Port Gibson, when Van Dorn’s cavalry supported by one of Walker’s brigades attempted to effect an ambush on some Union troops who seemed separated from Grant’s main force. The Union troops turned out to be the leading elements of Brigadier General Paine’s Division of the XIX Corps under Porter. Van Dorn decided to dispute the position along a low ridge north west of the Church and arrayed his men and artillery accordingly. As Paine's men approached, the Confederates opened fire, initially causing heavy casualties. Some Union troops broke (this had formerly been General Rickett’s rather ineffective command), but Fitz-John Porter arrived and rallied a force to hold the line. Confederate troops then attacked but were forced to retire. Additional Union troops arrived in the form of Weitzel’s Division and counterattacked. Heavy fighting ensued that continued for six hours, but the overwhelming Union force prevailed. Van Dorn's men left the field. Although they lost the battle, his cavalry and infantry supports had held up a much superior Union force for a day. More importantly it indicated that Porter was not marching north with Grant but west towards Port Gibson and “the underbelly of Vicksburg”…

Union Generals Halbert E. Paine and Godfrey Weitzel​

Despite Porter’s victory, the presence of Confederate forces attacking Grant's left flank was a cause for concern. The Rebels were in greater force in this theatre than he had expected. Furthermore he learned that General Joseph E. Johnston had crossed into the state of Mississippi. Rumor placed him at Meridian, from which he could march to Bragg’s support, or else in Hattiesburg from where he could march to Baton Rouge, New Orleans or perhaps Grant’s rear. In either case Grant’s army could find itself between enemy forces to the front and rear. Grant was not concerned about a descent on New Orleans. The overland approaches were difficult and the navy would pound an attacking force from the sea. But although Johnston’s force was largely made up of Alabamian and Mississippian militia and home guard units, it did include Richard Taylor’s division of regulars. If it attacked his rear or joined with Bragg his position could be become difficult…

The Battle of Crystal Springs - On June 18, Bragg received confirmation that three army corps—Sherman's, McPherson's and McClernand’s—were advancing on Jackson. Bragg resolved to meet him with his two corps. The armies met at Crystal Springs just south of Harpersville…

On June 21, about 7 am, the head of the Union column, Sherman’s XV Corps were engaged by the Confederates of William Wing Loring's Corps, specifically the divisions of Forey and Maury. Loring’s force was drawn up into a defensive line along a crest of a ridge. As Sherman shook out his column into line of battle he was unaware that Magruder’s corps was swinging out on his left against his unprotected left flank. Blair, one of Sherman's divisional commanders, did however spot the Confederate attack in time and refused his left flank. Simultaneously Grant had directed MacPherson’s leading divisions of Quinby and Herron to reinforce and extend Sherman’s left flank. Quinby’s troops were still in column when they were hit by M.L. Smith’s 4 brigades. As a confused (at least on Quinby’s side) firefight erupted, the Union troops quickly got the worst of the fight…

"Prince John" had only two of his divisions - Martin Luther Smith's and Carter L. Stevenson's​

Herron did succeed in forming a line of battle before Carter L. Stevenson’s 5 brigades swept towards him, led in person by General Magruder. Just as it looked as though the line had stabilized on the left, General Smith personally lead one of his brigades against Quinby’s wavering regiments. The charge stampeded one of Quinby’s brigades which quickly infected the other two. Suddenly there was a huge gap in Grant’s line with both Sherman’s left and Herron’s right open to flanking fire. Sherman personally steadied his flanking brigade, but Herron’s troops began to withdraw without orders…

Isaac F. Quinby, Francis J. Herron, John A. Logan and John McArthur​

Witnesses observed that Bragg was visibly elated as the battle progressed. It looked as though Magruder might succeed in turning Grant’s flank before the Union general got get all his troops into the fight. With Quinby broken and Herron in retreat Bragg urged Magruder to press on. As he advanced with Stevenson’s and Smith’s divisions it was then that Magruder realized that there was a second line. McPherson had formed up Logan’s and McArthur’s Division in the rear. Furthermore a third force, A.J. Smith’s Division from McClernand’s Corps was marching at the double quick to close the gap between this new line and Sherman’s. Logan and McArthur both had their divisions well in hand and there was no question of retreat or withdrawal. The force of Logan’s personality assisted Herron in reforming an element of his command on the extreme left.

Eugene A. Carr, Andrew Jackson Smith, Alvin P. Hovey and Peter J. Osterhaus​

What had looked briefly like a supreme opportunity for the Confederates now turned into a stand up firefight between two determined foes. On both sides the senior officers were conspicuous in their example and bravery. “It was a miracle Prince John came through in one piece” according to one Tennessee private “he wore the most owtstandin [sic] gettup covered in gold braid. He was a prime a target for the Yankee. Its lucky for him they’re such bad shots”…

Surveying the left Grant realised neither side were likely to achieve a breakthrough on that flank, so he ordered McClernand’s remaining three divisions to the right in order to launch a counterattack there. McClernand had sought to place Osterhaus at the point of the attack but Grant had vetoed this. “Let Carr lead the attack. He knows what must be done”. Union forces on the right reached the Confederate main line between 12 and 1pm. Marmaduke’s three Arkansas brigades held Loring’s left and until that point had been unengaged. They faced a attack by divisions, led by Eugene Carr supported by the divisions of Osterhaus and Hovey.

Marmaduke’s troops stood the attack bravely for longer than they ought but eventually Carr pulled together an assault that broke Marmaduke’s line and the division retired in disorder. The Federals swept forward, with the aim of capturing the crossroads near Harpersville, in Bragg's rear, and closing the Jackson Road escape route. Bragg had however stripped Stevenson and M.L. Smith, as Carr's attack commenced, of a brigade each and with this hastily formed force formed a new line in Loring’s rear to halt Carr’s advance. But Bragg’s men could not stand this pounding for long so, much to his disgust, he ordered his men from the field towards the Terry Crossroads several miles away where he would have to decide whether to retreat to Jackson or back towards Vicksburg...

Dabney H. Maury, John S. Marmaduke and John H. Forney​

Major General Dabney Maury’s division formed the rearguard, and they held at all costs, including the serious injury of Maury before withdrawing. The Union troops were exhausted by Grant maintained a pursuit using elements of XIII Corps for several miles…”

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter Thirty-Nine​

Encounter on the Big Black​

From “The Fighters – Grant v Bragg on the banks of the Mississippi” by Nelson Cole
LSU 1991

"Bragg made a major strategic decision. His army would not retreat to the Vicksburg defenses. Instead Walker’s division of Magruder’s Corps was ordered back to the defenses as it retreated from Union Church to join Bowen’s Division. Bragg meant for Pemberton to hold Vicksburg with just two divisions plus elements of militia, home guard and a regiment of heavy artillery.

While this might seem like a hopeless task, Bragg intended to hamper any siege with his remaining force – Magruder’s Corps of Smith’s and Stevenson’s Divisions and Loring’s Corps of Forney’s, Marmaduke’s and Maury’s (now commanded by Stephen D. Lee) Divisions. Bragg still had hopes of being joined by Johnston’s force and crushing Grant “between the hammer of our united forces and the anvil of the Vicksburg works”. Bragg withdrew the remains of his army to Jackson to await Grant’s move towards Vicksburg and a response from Johnston to his latest request for that officer to join the so called “Army of the Gulf” with Bragg’s…"

From “Vicksburg or Bust” by John W. Scharf
Empire 1984

"Grant was not to be distracted. XIX Corps under Fitz-John Porter was the first to make contact with the works around Vicksburg from the south. Grant moved slowly with the main body to Raymond, and from there via Edward’s Station across the Big Black River. His force was shadowed the whole way beyond Raymond by Bragg who sought any opportunity to strike.

Bragg seized an opportunity at the Big Black River. Sherman’s Corps had formed the rearguard as Grant crossed with McPherson’s Corps which was followed by McClernand’s Corps. McClernand’s Corps had taken several hours longer than Grant had planned for its crossing and as night fell, Sherman found himself facing the quandary of trying to cross at night or waiting until morning to cross. Bragg did not give him the opportunity to decide. At 11pm Bragg launched three divisions at Sherman’s isolate corps – Smith and Stevenson in front with Forney in reserve.

The fighting was shambolic: an errant brigade of Forney’s division fired into the rear of Stevenson’s. Artillery belonging to McClernand shelled elements of Sherman’s force. Sherman was lucky to survive the night unscathed as reinforcements from McClernand fired at his party as they arrived in his corps rear...

Blair’s and Steele’s Divisions stood up well to the attacks. Tuttle’s Division was badly mauled as elements of Smith’s Division managed, in the dark, to get on both its flanks at one point. Grant rushed troops from McClernand’s command back across the river and by 3am the attack had fizzled out...

While certainly not as large as Crystal Springs, the Battle of the Big Black was to have serious repercussions. It convinced both Sherman, and to a lesser degree McPherson, that Bragg was a serious threat and that any division of Grant’s force to invest Vicksburg would expose it to being attacked in detail by Bragg’s roaming force. If Johnson joined Bragg then a major battle was inevitable but the odds would be against Grant this time…

Stephen Hurlbut’s XVI Corps was already on its way to Grant, or at least three divisions of it were (Smith’s, Dodge’s and Lauman’s). Dodge’s division was the first to arrived and joined Porter’s force already at Vicksburg about this time…"

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter Forty​

Ulysses Caesar Grant​

From "U.S.Grant - Hero of Three Wars" by John W. Eisenhower
Edison 1953​

"Grant did not suffer from the same anxiety that seemed to plague his senior officers. Grant wanted to overwhelm the Confederates before they could fully organize their defenses and intended to order an immediate assault against the Railroad Redoubt. However he could not afford to ignore the risk Bragg posed altogether, but Grant understood that Bragg alone was a painful nuisance. The longer the Union Army sat in front of Vicksburg the more likely it was that Johnson would join Bragg. Together they would be a serious threat…​

Grant adopted an interesting tactic, while Fitz-John Porter and McClernand prepared to assault the rebel defenses, Sherman and McPherson were preparing their own outward facing defenses in Grant’s rear. Grant did not believe these would be necessary but Sherman’s pessimism (which had colored Sherman’s advice to Grant throughout the Vicksburg Campaign) and his own previous experience caused him to take these precautions before ordering any assault…"

From “Vicksburg or Bust” by John W. Scharf
Empire 1984

"Troops from McClernand's corps had a difficult time approaching the position under rifle and artillery fire from rebel Missouri infantry and elements of the city’s heavy artillery regiment. They had to negotiate a steep approach studded with abatis and a “moat” (a 7 foot wide badly drained ditch) before attacking the 15 foot high timber and earth banked walls of the redoubt. Grant expected McClernand to steamroller over “hand fulls of militia and home guard left in the city”. This first attempt was easily repulsed. At Porter’s suggestion Grant ordered a massed artillery bombardment to soften the defenses and at about 3 p.m., Major General Peter Osterhaus tried again, but only a small number of men were able to advance even as far as the ditch below the redoubt. 1st Sergeant William Wesley Kendall, Company A of the 49th Indiana was the only man to breast the redoubt walls where he was seriously injured and captured.His civil war record contains the unusual distinction of containing three written commendations from Confederate officers of the Vicksburg garrison including General Bowen who saw him in action…

The assault collapsed in a melee of rifle fire back and forth…

The failed Federal assaults damaged Union morale, deflating what confidence the soldiers felt (Crystal Rivers, Port Hudson and Union Church were victories, Big Black River was consider by the rank and file to be a draw, and no one had forgotten the unexpected bloody nose at Port Gibson). They were also costly, with casualties of 259 killed, 973 wounded, and 5 missing, versus Confederate casualties of 8 killed and 62 wounded. The Confederates, assumed by Grant to be under strength demoralized militia and home defense force, had retained their fighting edge. The assault itself had been obvious and isolated. General Pemberton had been able to redeploy his limited forces to repel the attack without fear of weakening the line elsewhere…

Grant planned another assault for a week later, but this time with greater care; they would first reconnoiter thoroughly and soften up the defenses with artillery and naval gunfire. The lead units were supplied with ladders to ascend the fortification walls. Grant did not want a long siege, and this attack was to be by three corps across a wide front.

Union forces bombarded the city all night, from 220 artillery pieces and naval gunfire from Rear Admiral David D. Porter's fleet in the river, and while causing little property damage, they damaged Confederate civilian morale. In the morning, the defenders were bombarded again for four hours before the Union attacked once more along a three-mile front at 11am.

Hurlbut, with the divisions of Smith and Dodge on hand, attacked down the Graveyard Road, with 150 volunteers (nicknamed the Forlorn Hope in true Napoleonic style) leading the way with ladders and planks. This attack was to be followed by the division of Logan borrowed from McPherson’s Corps. Hurlbut, formerly a politician, did not concentrated his attack but rather assaulted the works in a long, but solid, line. They were initially driven back in the face of heavy rifle fire. When Hurlbut sent for Logan, as we will see, he was not in position…

Fitz-John Porter's corps was assigned to attack the center along the Jackson Road. On their right flank, the brigade of the Louisiana Native Guards succeeded in advancing to within 100 yards of the Confederate line, but halted to avoid dangerous flanking fire from Green's Redan. On Porter's left flank, the division of Brigadier General Godfrey Weitzel was assigned to assault the Louisiana Redan and the Great Redoubt. He was slowing getting into position and his attack was initially poorly handled until Porter arrived and directed the leading elements in person. It was an act of thoughtless courage by that officer that earned him a good deal of respect from General Grant and his westerners."

From "The Black Bearded Cossack - Eugene Asa Carr" by Morris K. Carr
New York 1987

"On the Union left, McClernand's corps moved along the Baldwin Ferry Road and astride the Southern Railroad of Mississippi. The division of Brigadier General Carr was assigned to capture the Railroad Redoubt and the Texas Lunette. Carr's men achieved a small breakthrough at the Texas Lunette and requested reinforcements. On receipt of the message Grant is supposed to have exclaimed “I’ll see Carr a Major General before month end if he can give me Vicksburg before nightfall” (Rawlins).

Re-enforcements were ordered by McClernand, but an order addressed to Hovey arrived at A.J. Smith’s headquarters and he failed to either act on it or redirect it. Carr pulled back but was prepared to make a second assault. It was clear that although a breakthrough was not forthcoming yet, Carr had found a weak spot. The dearth of numbers in the Vicksburg garrison was now beginning to show. Pemberton had put every man into the line. Even the hospitals had been emptied."

From “Vicksburg or Bust” by John W. Scharf
Empire 1984
​

"Just then, Grant received a message from McPherson, which stated that he was heavily engaged – Bragg had crossed the Big Black River north of Canton and was attacking the rather battered divisions of Quinby and Herron. These divisions were stationed north of the siege lines, behind Hurlbut’s lines…"

From “The Fighters – Grant v Bragg on the banks of the Mississippi” by Nelson Cole
LSU 1991

"The purpose of the huge preparatory bombardment had not been lost on Bragg and he was prepared to attack Grant in the rear in the midst of any new assault. He committed Magruder to attack McPherson’s lines in the north, while Loring, with support from mounted and dismounted elements of Van Dorn’s cavalry, was to apply pressure to Sherman’s position.

McPherson’s message also confirmed he had already reclaimed Logan’s division which was marching to assist Quinby. Sherman also reported a substantial increase of skirmishing on his front (east of the city) and confirmed the presence a large numbers of cavalry (Van Dorn’s command)."

From “Vicksburg or Bust” by John W. Scharf
Empire 1984

"Grant approved McPherson’s withdrawal of Logan from Hurlbut’s offensive. However he was initially reluctant to abandon the assault and ordered McClernand and Porter to resume the attack, telling McClernand to use his own reserve forces for assistance. Grant was mistakenly under the impression that McClernand had been lightly engaged and Porter heavily, although the reverse was true.

McClernand followed up with a message that was partially misleading, implying that he had captured two forts—"Old Glory is flying over them"—and that another push along the line would achieve victory for the Union Army. Carr had, at great cost to his own division, made a second lodgment in the rebel lines. McClernand ordered Osterhaus to support Carr, but Osterhaus demurred. Night was falling and the path difficult, the lodgment uncertain. A powder stained and bloody Carr returned in person to locate his reinforcements to find McClernand, Osterhaus and Porter arguing over the best course in a hollow near McClernard's headquarters (none wish to suggest to Grant that the attacks had failed)."

From "The Black Bearded Cossack - Eugene Asa Carr" by Morris K. Carr
New York 1987
​

"Porter described Carr as “looking like a wild man”, McClernand called him “an escapee from hell’s inferno”. On learning that Osterhaus had been ordered to support his attack and had failed to do so Carr “struck Osterhaus to his knees before being restrained”. Carr returned to his troops until ordered back to his starting position by Grant. “I could see into the city and there was not a single armed rebel between my foremost man and the Mississippi River. The rebels had spent their men in the defense. Had I been supported by any other man Vicksburg would have fallen that night”…"

From “The Fighters – Grant v Bragg on the banks of the Mississippi” by Nelson Cole
LSU 1991​

"Hurlbut did not renew his attack. He found himself in the odious position of being the subject of artillery fire from the city and on receipt of Magruder’s overshoots meant for McPherson… Formations with Bragg in the rear and a “hornet’s nest of a fort” in front quickly became confused as conflicting orders arrived from Grant, McPherson and Hurlbut…

In the north Magruder pressed his attack with his now customary firmness. Both Smith, by training a military engineer, and Stevenson, a veteran of 3 wars prior to this, had matured into their divisional roles under Magruder and facing their old foes, Herron and Quinby, quickly had the Federal troops drawing back. Logan’s arrival stiffened Union resolve. The unsophisticated but aggressive response by Logan was the immediate launch of one of his brigades in a bayonet charge which staggered and utlimately stalled Stevenson’s attack and allowed the Union line to stabilize before McPherson had yet brought up McArthur’s Division…

Sherman was well entrenched and Loring was reluctant to launch anything approaching a full scale attack and therefore Sherman did not come under anymore than a very vigorous attack by a cloud of skirmishers. Darkness fell before Bragg could find Loring to try to push him into the attack…"

From "U.S.Grant - Hero of Three Wars" by John W. Eisenhower
Edison 1953
​

"Historian Morgan Withers wrote that Grant "did not regret having made the assaults; he only regretted that they had failed." Grant reluctantly settled into a siege. Lieutenant Colonel John A. Rawlins issued Special Orders No. 140 for Grant: "Corps Commanders will immediately commence the work of reducing the enemy by regular approaches. It is desirable that no more loss of life shall be sustained in the reduction of Vicksburg, and the capture of the Garrison. Every advantage will be taken of the natural inequalities of the ground to gain positions from which to start mines, trenches, or advance batteries. Furthermore this army will not again be exposed to attack in the rear...".

Grant wrote in his memoirs, "Porter [Fitz-John] kept referring to some classical siege. [Alesia?] He was unduly impressed with our double lines of works. One facing Vicksburg and the second facing Bragg. It was common sense for I had resolved to incur no more losses in dealing with Bragg."
Federal troops began to dig in, constructing elaborate entrenchments that surrounded the city and moved closer and closer to the Confederate fortifications, with their backs to a second set of fortifications to keep Bragg at bay while they reduced Vicksburg. Pemberton and the citizens of Vicksburg alike were trapped. Pemberton was determined to hold his few miles of the Mississippi as long as possible, hoping for relief from Bragg, Johnston or elsewhere..."

From "The Black Bearded Cossack - Eugene Asa Carr" by Morris K. Carr
New York 1987​

"In the meant time Grant had to deal with an outraged Osterhaus seeking to press charges against Carr. McClernand tried to mediate the dispute with a perceived bias towards his favorite, Osterhaus. Grant cut through the dispute quickly. Osterhaus was dismissed. His division broken up between McClernand’s other three divisions. “I’d rather have Carr here than Osterhaus. Osterhaus talks and talks. Carr just fights…” (comment of Grant reported by Rawlins)."

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter Forty-One​

Where in Hell or Mississippi is Joe Johnston?​

From "The Side Show - Joseph E. Johnston and the Baton Rouge Campaign" by Prof. Guy Enterton
LSU 1992​

"While Bragg was trying to distract Grant from the siege of Vicksburg, Joseph E. Johnston was ignoring Bragg’s pleas to come to his assistance. Instead the Army of the Gulf marched into Louisiana. Johnston’s objective was to liberate Louisiana’s state capitol, Baton Rouge, and to retake Port Hudson. His advance from Hattiesburg, Mississippi was well organised and largely unopposed, but elements of the advance were slow. Johnson had insisted in carrying along a “miniature siege train” made up of heavy caliber pieces taken from what Johnston considered redundant garrisons. The lack of proper carriages for the artillery and an inability to use either water transport or rail made it an extremely difficult (and in some cases impossible) task moving many of these pieces…​

Generals Alfred Moulton, Camille-Prince de Polignac, Mansfield Lovell and Richard L. Page​

While Grant was digging his “Alesia Fortifications” as they became known around Vicksburg, Johnston arrived before Baton Rouge. Fitz-John Porter had only left behind a hand full of untrained colored troops and some short service regiments approaching their expiry time, to defend the uncompleted works. Although many of Johnston’s troops could also be classed as militia and short term service formations, he did have two well trained experienced divisions under Richard Taylor – Major General Alfred Moulton’s Salamanders, Louisianans and Texans, and Brigadier General Camille Polignac’s Texans. Major General Mansfield Lovell commanded a division of mixed Alabama troops – mostly militia and former garrison troops but with a solid brigade of Alabama regulars under Brigadier General Richard L. Page. Johnston also had a scratch brigade of cavalry to hand though many considered them “the worst dregs in the Gulf. Attila’s Huns had more discipline” (Richard L. Page)…

The Corps D'Afrique at Port Hudson​

Johnston “waltzed” into Baton Rouge scooping up the short term servicemen. Only the colored troops fought with any determination. Although they fought bravely with inferior weaponry in unfinished defenses they could not withstand Johnston’s force. Horrible incidents followed as the less disciplined elements of Johnston’s command ran wild. It is estimated that of the 480 casualties among the colored formations at Baton Rouge, upwards of 210 officers and men were executed or simply murdered after surrendering before order could be restored…

Brigadier General Daniel Ullman​

Johnson moved on Port Hudson quickly. It was defended by Daniel Ullman’s Corps D’Afrique – 5 almost full strength field regiments, the 1st Louisana Heavy Artillery Regiment and the 1st Louisiana Engineers Regiment…

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter Forty-Two​

Vexed to the Sea
​

From “Vicksburg or Bust” by John W. Scharf

Empire 1984​

"A new problem confronted the Confederates. The dead and wounded of Grant's army lay in the heat of Mississippi summer, the odor of the deceased men and horses fouling the air, the wounded crying for medical help and water. Grant first refused a request of truce, thinking it a show of weakness. Finally he relented, and the Confederates held their fire while the Union recovered the wounded and dead, soldiers from both sides mingling and trading as if no hostilities existed for the moment. That is until the Union troops tried to remove the bodies of their fallen African American comrades. The truce collapsed as Confederate “snipers” opened up on the Union troops. It was another “dreadful southern atrocity to add to the list perpetrated by these godless rebels” trumpeted one Chicago newspaper…"​

From "The Side Show - Joseph E. Johnston and the Baton Rouge Campaign" by Prof. Guy Enterton
LSU 1992​

"Johnson’s effort to distract Grant by attacking Port Hudson failed. It was mainly defended by now veteran colored troops, who repulsed the initial assaults with help from Admiral Porter’s gunboats which inflicted a horrible toll on the rebels. The gunboats also prevented Johnston from maintaining the siege he had envisaged might be necessary. This loss at Port Hudson left the Confederate Army of the Gulf temporarily purposeless as the ambitious Johnston continued to avoid joining with argumentative Bragg.​

In response to the growing Confederate activity in the area, Grant decided to dispatch troops from the Vicksburg trenches down the river. Brigadier General Alfred W. Ellet's Mississippi Marine Brigade and Joseph A. Mower's brigade from Sherman's corps were ordered to the vicinity of Port Hudson. Mower and Ellet were to use the river transport to cooperate against outlying elements of Johnston’s command, which remained stationed in the vicinity of Port Hudson. On July 15, Ellet and Mower defeated elements of Lovell’s Division and destroyed a portion of Johnson’s supplies…"​

From “Vicksburg or Bust” by John W. Scharf
Empire 1984​

"We have our trenches pulled up so close to the enemy that we can throw hand grenades over into their forts. The enemy do not dare show their heads above the parapet at any time, so close and so watchful are our sharpshooters. The town is completely invested. But my position is not so strong that I feel myself able to leave it to challenge Bragg yet. (Ulysses S. Grant writing to George G. Pride July 1863)…​

Pemberton was boxed in with lots of inedible munitions and little food. The poor diet was showing on the Confederate soldiers. By mid July, the number of sick or hospitalized had risen substantially. Scurvy, malaria, dysentery, diarrhea, and other diseases cut their ranks. However Bragg’s decision to keep the bulk of his army in the field meant that the situation was not yet dire in the city…​

During the siege, Union gunboats lobbed over 22,000 shells into the town and army artillery fire was even heavier. As the barrages continued, suitable housing in Vicksburg was reduced to a minimum. A ridge, located between the main town and the rebel defense line, provided a diverse citizenry with lodging for the duration. Over 500 caves were dug into the yellow clay hills of Vicksburg. Whether houses were structurally sound or not, it was deemed safer to occupy these dugouts. People did their best to make them comfortable, with rugs, furniture, and pictures. They tried to time their movements and foraging with the rhythm of the cannonade, sometimes unsuccessfully. Because of these dugouts or caves, the Union soldiers gave the town the nickname of "Prairie Dog Village." Despite the ferocity of the Union fire against the town, fewer than a dozen civilians were known to have been killed during the entire siege…"​

Taken from "The Gallant Fitz - The Life and Letters of Major General Fitzjohn Porter" Edited by Terence O. Oliver
Great Bear Books 1982​

"In the siege lines McClernand was senior to Fitz-John Porter, and despite his initial disgust at serving under an amateur, Porter quickly found a way to work with his superior. Stephen Hurlbut was junior to both…"​

From “Vicksburg or Bust” by John W. Scharf
Empire 1984​

"In the outer lines watching Bragg, Sherman had command over his own and McPherson’s Corps. McPherson’s performance had been disappointing so far in the campaign and Sherman had resolved to keep a close eye on him…​

Lieutenant General Edmund Kirby Smith, commander of the Trans-Mississippi Department, received a telegraph from Bragg in June requesting a movement against Grant's communication lines along the Mississippi River. Grant had established important supply depots at Milliken's Bend, Young's Point, and Lake Providence within Smith's jurisdiction, but Smith had been stripped of many of his best troops to support Bragg and Johnston already. Smith also remained hostile to co-operation with Bragg following his injury in Kentucky. Little was done by Smith beyond a demonstration before Milliken’s Bend which amounted to very little…​

Union troops tunneled under the Louisiana Redan and packed the mine with 2,200 pounds of gunpowder. The explosion blew apart the Confederate lines on July 28, while an infantry attack made by troops from Porter’s Corps, followed the blast. These troops charged around the deep crater with ease, and could not be stopped by recovering Confederate infantry. ​

Union engineers directed McClernand’s supporting attack to a “weak spot” in the defenses in his sector which allowed him to break through the rebel lines. It was the same spot at which Carr had made his break through at 2 and a half weeks earlier, an irony not lost on Carr or Grant...​

Confederate soldiers fell back to an inner defensive line but Union numbers were too great and they were overwhelmed within an hour. On July 29 a captured Pemberton was brought before Grant to surrender his sword. Pemberton sought parole for all prisoners. The political generals, McClernand and Hurlbut both advised against this, as did Sherman. Reluctantly Grant made arrangements to ship the prisoners north. It would take another three weeks for Grant to reorganize his men, deal with the prisoners and garrison the city...​

Although the Vicksburg Campaign was both then (and indeed subsequnetly) overshadowed by events in Virginia, particularly the fall of Richmond, the fortress city had fallen and, with the successful defense of Port Hudson, the Mississippi River was firmly in Union hands and the Confederacy split in two. As McClernand famously observed in another of his proclamations to his westerners, "The Big Muddy again flows free down to the Sea"…​

Grant still faced two rebel armies in Louisiana and Mississippi that combined could stand up to the Army of the Mississippi in a fair fight. With the restoration of a degree of Confederate Government organization in Atlanta, the new Secretary of War ordered Johnston to unite his force with Bragg. To Johnston’s disgust he was then ordered to hand over command to Bragg and was to return to Atlanta for discussions with the cabinet. The Department of the Gulf experiment was over…"​

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter Forty-Three​

Hard Times for Hardee
Part I
​

The Heartlands Campaign Discussion Group at the 38th Annual Civil War Conference at Louisiana State University hosted by Professor Douglas Lee Bannerman...​

"Today we are examining the often overlooked Heartland Campaign and the performance of the generals on both sides. The period of January through June 1863 in Tennessee is often overshadowed by the campaigns in Virginia and on the Mississippi, but in recent years the spotlight has more and more frequently been shone on Hardee and Rosecrans. ​

We will be looking at a campaign that included 5 major battles – Spring Hill, Williamsport, Mount Pleasant, Pulaski and Elk River. Joining me today in examining the campaign are:​

Jones N. Keegan, historian, park guide and author of “The Battle of Shelbyville” and “First Light – The Battle of Spring Hill”;
C.M. Townsend, lecturer in 19th century history at MacArthur University, and author of “The Battle of Duck River” and “The Southern Trinity – Hardee, Cleburne and Churchill”;
James Fitzgerald Maguire, retired attorney, historian, and author of “The Irish Corporal – The Life of Patrick Ronayne Cleburne”, “The Irish in the Western Armies” and “The San Patricios Reborn”; and finally
Col. J.T. Starke (ret), author of “Army of the Heartland” and 7 regimental histories of units in both the Army of the Cumberland and the Army of Tennessee.​

Hardee would go into this campaign with a substantially altered command structure following the Battle of Shelbyville/Duck River (I know Jones and Charles disagree to this day about the proper name for the battle). The death of Polk caused Hardee to split his army into three wings or corps: Cheatham’s Left (divisions of A.P.Stewart and Jones M.Withers), Cleburne’s Centre (divisions of Bushrod Johnson and Preston Smith) and Breckinridge’s Right (divisions of John P.McCown and Thomas James Churchill). Hardee’s promotion to full general had also been authorised by Congress after his recent successes.​

Rosecrans had not altered his command structure after the Duck River Campaign but he had been joined by two divisions of the newly constituted XXIII Corps under William “Bull” Nelson as they rested at Spring Hill. A third division would soon join them. ​

Although the period in Tennessee had been good for the Army of Tennessee in terms of supplies (and particularly in horseflesh) there had been no widespread volunteerism, and although conscription had been enforced to an increasing degree in the Confederate controlled areas in Tennessee, the Confederate Army was still substantially outnumbered by the Army of the Cumberland.​

Spring Hill​

Gentlemen let’s start with the Battle of Spring Hill. Forrest’s cavalry sweeps across the Duck River pushing the Union cavalry back. What looks like just another Confederate cavalry raid in a long succession, is in fact cover for the Army of the Tennessee crossing the River in a lightening march on Rosecrans encamped army at Spring Hill. The Confederates surprise the Union army at dawn on the morning of 20 March 1863.​

Crittenden’s XXI Corps is quickly scattered and put to flight in the course of less than an hour by Cleburne’s wing. Breckinridge manages to stampede Johnson’s Division of McCook’s XX Corps, and McCook is knocked unconscious in the rout. However Davis and Sheridan steady their commands and halt Breckinridge’s momentum. Finally Cheatham’s wing attacks the division of Lovell Rousseau, later than planned, and Rousseau, warned by the sounds of battle elsewhere, manages to form his brigades into a line of battle and fights a lone struggle until Thomas can get the other elements of XIV Corps into the fight. What in the early morning looks like a disaster for the Union, is a stalemate by midday, and with the arrival of elements of Nelson’s XXIII Corps turns into a Union victory in the afternoon.​

Keegan – It's a classic case of over confidence among the rebel command. While I acknowledge Hardee’s tactical expertise, he was no strategist. The Battle of Spring Hill was not one the south could win. All the elements of Rosecrans’ army were in supporting distance of one another, which to date had not been the case on other battlefields. Hardee exposed his army to disaster with an over ambitious plan, all be it well executed, that left him with his back to the river.​

Townsend – Firstly I don’t think you can either credit or blame Hardee for the notion of an aggressive move. His departmental commander, Bragg, had ordered an attack on Rosecrans to try to uncover Nashville following Hardee’s victories on the Duck River. Bragg was probably one of the most aggressive commanders the south had so I see him as the impetus for the move and his wirtten orders back up that conclusion.​

I fundamentally disagree with Jones about the prospects for the move. Rosecrans had taken no serious precautions and had not entrenched. Both Cleburne’s and Breckenridge’s attacks put large elements of the Federals to flight. The failure generally can be attributed to the execution of Cheatham’s part of the plan. His delay on moving against Thomas corps, arguably the best led corps in Rosecrans’ army, allowed Rousseau to prevent any panic. Cheatham’s delay and Rousseau’s resolve changed the outcome of the battle. Spring Hill in my mind is a major lost opportunity for the rebels.​

Starke – I have to agree with Jones that Spring Hill strategically was a step too far for the Confederates. The chances of their scoring a sufficiently decisive victory to permit the recapture of Nashville were minimal. Bear in mind that Rosecrans effectively had a full corps unengaged in reserve, Nelson's encamped well north of Spring Hill, as well as the garrison of the city.​

On the other hand tactically Hardee performed very well indeed. The movement from Duck River to Spring Hill was fast and with little straggling among the troops. Forrest’s sweep of Union patrols and pickets meant that Rosecrans hadn’t an inkling of the approaching threat. The tactical plan for the assault itself was excellent. Cleburne achieved a success in the centre beyond all expectations. Breckinridge quickly achieved his initial objectives as well. On the day Rosecrans was saved, not by his three on-hand corps commanders, but by three divisional commanders – Lovell Rousseau, Phil Sheridan and “Union” Jeff Davis. Once the Union troops had halted Hardee’s momentum it became a game of numbers and the Army of the Cumberland was always going to win a numbers game.​

Maguire - Yeah I thinks its important to focus on Rousseau here. This is where Rousseau makes his first big splash. Prior to Spring Hill he was really at bit of a footnote at Mount Vernon and at the Duck River. But in the words of some of his later political opponents Lovell Rousseau wrote his name large at Spring Hill "in the blood of his division". This battle and indeed the subsequent campaign were a significant launch pad for his return to Congress and his subsequent political career.​

Starke - Going back to Rosecrans my big problems are with his initial failure to entrench his camps in the first place and his failure to immediately pursue Hardee when he began to withdraw. Certainly there was disorganisation in XXI Corps but Thomas’ and Nelson’s corps were fit to pursue the retreating rebels immediately. That 24 hour delay is unforgivable. At that point the battle might have been accounted a draw had not Rosecrans eventually let Nelson off the leash.​

Yes let’s look at what happened next. As Hardee withdrew across the Duck River, Nelson was pleading with Rosecrans for a prompt pursuit of the rebels. Rosecrans gave the order: Nelson would lead with his two divisions, then Thomas, the largely recovered McCook would follow Thomas and finally Absalom Baird’s Division marching to join Nelson’s corps, which was expected hourly, was to bring up the rear. Crittenden claimed it would take at least two days to reorganise his formations.​

Thomas however suggested he should follow Hardee closely but that Nelson and the others should swing wide and cross the Duck River at Williamsport. Rosecrans approved the plan. The next action would occur on 23 March 1863 as Nelson clashed with Forrest at Williamsport…"​

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter Fourty-Four​

Hard Times for Hardee
Part II​

From Left to Right: Jones N. Keegan, C.M. Townsend, James F. Maguire and J.T. Starke​

The Heartlands Campaign Discussion Group at the 38th Annual Civil War Conference at Louisiana State University hosted by Professor Douglas Lee Bannerman...​

Forrest discovers the move by Nelson to cross at the now unguarded Williamsport Bridge. Forrest races to the scene. Holds the bridge for upwards of 24 hours but in the absence of any reinforcements has to withdraw and Rosecrans finally gets a bridgehead over the Duck River.

Starke - Forrest used his horsemen as a modern general would use motorized infantry. He liked horses because he liked fast movement, and his mounted men could get from here to there much faster than any infantry could; but when they reached the field they usually tied their horses to trees and fought on foot, and they were as good as the very best infantry. Not for nothing did Forrest say the essence of strategy was 'to git thar fust with the most men'. That was only partially the case at Williamsport. He certainly got there first but he was quickly outnumbered as Nelson brought up reinforcements.

Keegan - Nelson really falls down at Williamsport because there is no means by which Forrest could have held the bridge all day, with just his cavalry division, if Nelson had attacked with his full force or reconnoitred the surrounding area. I mean there were several nearby fords that he could have used to flank Forrest. Forrest is given credit for this masterful defense but in reality Williamsport is all about Nelson's inadequcies as a corps commander.

Townsend - In Jones worldview there are no good Confederate commanders, just bad Federal commanders who loose to the Rebels until a Kearny, Reynolds, Rodman or Hooker turns up. To admit there were good, and indeed great Confederate commanders, is not to sympathise with the motivations behind the Slaveholders Rebellion. Unlike Jones I am happy to say that Forrest's defence at Williamsport was masterful even if ultimately he had to abandon his positon.

Maguire - I understand the view that Forrest ultimately lost the battle while holding up the Union troops for a very useful day. It was nonetheless both a tactical and a strategic defeat. But Nelson didn't win the fight. Gordon Granger did. Its Granger that finally sends out the scouts that discover the fords that allow Whittaker's Brigade to cross and attack Forrest's left flank. Granger doesn't get enough credit for Williamsport. Yet its his victory, not Nelson's.

Starke - I heartily endorse James' view on Granger. Granger was three times the general William Nelson was.

Moving on Forrest's warning arrived with Hardee at Columbia by a delayed roundabout route. Hardee was expecting to be attacked by Rosecrans full force at Columbia. Thomas' Corps was certainly in front of him. But Forrest's warning said the bulk of the Union army was marching on Williamsport. Hardee choose to believe Forrest but it was too late. By the time Hardee had dispatched Cleburne and Breckinridge to his aid, Forrest was already withdrawing.

Nelson was already across the river and marching south for the crossroads at Mount Pleasant. From there he could turn east with the intention of getting into Hardee's rear at Columbia. Nelson was supported by McCook's Corps and Absalom Baird's Division. Cleburne would be waiting for him at Mount Pleasant with Breckinridge not far behind...

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter Forty-Five

Hard Times for Hardee
Part III​

The Heartlands Campaign Discussion Group at the 38th Annual Civil War Conference at Louisiana State University hosted by Professor Douglas Lee Bannerman...

So James we can't really talk about Mount Pleasant without starting with you as you are our resident Don Cleburne specialist. Or do you prefer Cleburne Pasha?

Maguire: Ha well I think good old original General Cleburne will do for me. Mount Pleasant is an example of Cleburne at his best. Cleburne picked the ground taking a northwest-southest line. One leg of a V really with Breckinridge to come up and form the other angle. It was rising forested ground. And of course Cleburne has gathered together and begun to train companies of sharpshooters. They would prove lethal at Mount Pleasant. In defense of good ground no one was a tenacious as Paddy Cleburne - in the Americas, Europe or Asia Minor.

Townsend: And indeed Mount Pleasant is where we see the worst of the Army of the Cumberland on display again. Rosecrans was always to quick on the advance to let his formations get strung out on the Tennessee roads. They were either at risk of being counterattacked and defeated in detail or of committing to an attack piecemeal. This time it was Bull Nelson in front, and although he had one good divisional commander in Granger and later Baird, Nelson never listened to reason when he could attack. One general who never learned a single lesson in the Civil War was Bull Nelson.

Keegan: There's no denying Bull Nelson's attacks were shambolic. A head on attack with Steedman's division first, before trying Granger's idea of flanking Cleburne to the west by Taylor's Store. A premature move with too few men that was easily blunted by Cleburne with Helm's Brigade. Then Baird comes up with his division and its another head-on attack on Cleburne which would have be a farce but for its tragic losses. Then to cap it all McCook comes up. Now some people say he hadn't recovered from that blow to the head. Thats about the best excuse I can see for him extending Nelson's left down past Cross Bridges Baptist Church. Nelson and McCook seem to have forgotten the rebel army to their left rear and acted like Cleburne was the whole Reb army. Richard Johnson's Division certainly hadn't recovered from Spring Hill so its hardly surprising how quickly that division folded when Breckinridge arrived in their rear. Once again its Sheridan that takes decisive action, refusing the right and enaging in some of the hardest fighting seen in Tennessee around Cross Bridges Church.

Starke: Cleburne performed very well. He read the ground well; He positioned his troops well; He responded to Granger's flanking threat promptly and decisively. Nelson turned in his usual disastrous performance. McCook tactically was poor. But from a morale point of view he was everywhere exhorting the troops. Not the right place for a Corps commander but not the worst. Sheridan acts decisively again to compensate for McCook's failures.

However we have avoided the one really controversial issue - Breckinridge's slow arrival on the field and the piecemeal commitment of his troops. Sheridan, as good as he was, should never have been allowed to stand and hold the flank at the Church as he did. Had Breckinridge committed the bulk of his force Sheridan would have been overwhelmed. Breckinridge failed to do so and acted like Bull Nelson.

The rumors of drinking and of his being drunk on the field at Mount Pleasant just will not die. Now whether its McCown's libel against a commander he feuded with or whether its President Jeff Davis' anti-Breckinridge stance after the so called Atlanta Cabinet Coup, it doesn't matter. Breckinridge's performance at Mount Pleasant was sub par.

Keegan: Drunk!

Townsend: Lies and a Bad Day. We all have them.

The unimpressive Cross Bridges Church would become doubly hallowed ground to the men of Sheridan's Division​

Well the bloody repulse of Nelson's troops could not undo the fact that the Union Army was across the Duck River in force. Thomas' clever side stepping of Hardee, at long last, meant that Rosecrans had 3 corps across the river and one on its way. Furthermore Hardee's troops were spread in a soft "U" shape with Thomas' corps poring into the hollow between Cheatham and Cleburne/Breckinridge. Hardee was quickly back on the retreat. This time Rosecrans did not pause. The Army of the Cumberland kept on the heels of the Army of Tennessee, keeping it off balance until Hardee turned at bay on some ground east of Pulaski. In the words Lovell Rousseau "the worst damn place for men to fight a battle I ever saw. A maze of ridges, gullys, woods and rocks. It was hell in there"...

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter Forty-Six

Hard Times for Hardee
Part IV​

The Heartlands Campaign Discussion Group at the 38th Annual Civil War Conference at Louisiana State University hosted by Professor Douglas Lee Bannerman...

Now the Battle of Pulaski of the 15th and 16th of April is legendary among historians of the civil war because it defies large scale tactical study after the first hour or so. We know roughly where Hardee's troops started off - Cleburne was east of the town; his brigades spread over a number of connected wooded ridges and that his position was also astride the road to Lewisburg. Now the rebel position curved in a reverse C with Cheatham in the centre on more of those ridges and astride the Fayetteville Pike. Finally Breckinridge is south of the town slightly in advance of the ridges to take advantage of the killing ground of open farmland which is now Churchill Field aerodrome and the natural barrier of Richland Creek.

Rosecrans is coming down the road from Lawrenceburg hard on the rebels heels. This time Rosecrans carefully shakes out his formations: McCook to the right/south first; then Crittenden in the centre; and Thomas to the left/north. Nelson is still coming up to be held in reserve when Rosecrans orders McCook's attack across the open ground south of the town...

Liddell's Brigade halts G.A.McCook's and Turchin's attack ​

Starke: Rosecrans meant for McCook's attack to be a diversion with Crittenden and Thomas making the main assault, but McCook and the men of XX Corps get out of hand and in many ways turn in their performance of the war to date. While Sheridan's boys go toe to toe with Churchill's Division just south of the town, Johnson's Division, who have broken twice already in this campaign, pore across the fields of the Donahue farm. Richard Johnson realizes his men will have to wade across the creek and is inspired for the first and last time in his career - he directs some pioneers to take the doors off Donahue's barn and uses them as a makeshift bridge. It's inspired and unfortunately its his last act as he is killed leading his men across it. August Willich takes command of the division and actively leads it across in-spite of McCown's best efforts. Further south Union Jeff Davis is getting his division across the creek and onto McCown's left flank. Neither Breckinridge or McCown is really at fault here - Rosecrans outnumbers Hardee, therefore sooner or later Rosecrans would find Hardee's flank on one battlefield or another.

Breckinridge has the sense not to stand but orders a fighting retreat of McCown's and Churchill's Divisions back to the ridge line.

Keegan: And this is about where we stop mentioning army commanders, corps commanders, and even divisional commanders. With Breckinridge's withdrawal the whole rebel force is now positioned on these interconnected wooded ridges. Even today the ground is littered with little woods and hollows, surprising little glens and streams. In 1863 it was heavily wooded. From a command and control perspective for both attackers and defenders it was a nightmare.

It does however give us the opportunity to talk about the brigade commanders on both sides who excelled during the two day battle, that I for one class as the most confusing of the war. Who performs conspicuously?

Starke: No one after Breckinridge withdraws on the first day. Rosecrans' front lines make probing attacks to try to develop Hardee's line in the woods. Its damn difficult. Its only towards late afternoon and evening that Thomas is confident enough in his knowledge of the ground to launch attacks on Cleburne. Crittenden less so because to attack Cheatham he must expose his left flank to Cleburne.

Keegan: For me, on the second day, its Colonel Anson George McCook, of First Division XIV Corps and Brigadier General John Turchin of Third Division XIV Corps. Thomas struggled to make any impact on Clerburne's position. Cleburne's boys where quick to form barricades of logs and branches to the point where James S. Jackson believed the ground had somehow been prepared with abatis days in advance. The only scare put into Cleburne was just after dawn on the second day. A.G.McCook had reconnoitered the ground in front of him during the night and found a gap in Cleburne's line. The only problem was he couldn't find Rousseau or any other brigade commanders in First Division to back his own brigade in an attack. He did however find John Turchin, who frankly didn't care a damn for orders or the chain of command, and committed his troops in support of McCook's. They go through Archibald Gracie's brigade like a knife, killing Gracie. Preston Smith had a narrow escape himself.

Maguire: Ah but its Cleburne himself who stems the attack, personally leading Liddell's Brigade into the fray. Liddell does damn well, despite having two horses shot from under him. He takes the point and remains on foot for the remainder of the battle.

Keegan: Yes but the McCook-Turchin attack unhinges Cleburnes main line. He is forced to withdraw, in the end almost a mile! To what's now called the the Beech Hill-Blooming Grove position.

A 1980s photo of the stream bed up which G.A. McCook attacked.
The whole battle line was made up of similar ground ​

Starke: Now Cleburne gave Hardee good warning of his withdrawal, but Hardee's staff struggle to find Cheatham, so Cheatham's Corps stays put after Cleburne withdraws. Its John Palmer, commander of Crittenden's Second Division, who spots it. He has three solid brigade commanders in Charles Craft, William B. Hazen and William Grose. Palmer launches them at Cheatham's now exposed flank. All three brigade commanders go in on foot at the head of their brigades. Zachariah Deas' brigade is routed; then Chalmer's breaks. Walthall and Patton Anderson stand for a time until Withers, their divisional commander, orders the remains of his division to retreat. Of Crittenden's other commanders, only George P. Buell marches his brigade to the sound of the guns when Palmer attacks. He runs straight into George Maney of A.P. Stewart's division, half of whose troops are now facing the wrong way and puts them to their heels. Stewart promptly withdraws his whole division on his own authority without any clear sense of what's happening on his front. You begin to sense some panic beginning to spread among the rebels. Hardee's gamble of trying to use the ground at Pulaski to off set Rosecrans numbers is not working.

Townsend: The Confederates were not finished the fight yet. The Second Day of Pulaski is where Thomas James Churchill shines. He and his five brigade commanders, J.K.Jackson, McNair, Ector, Rains and DeLamar Clayton do what all good rebs do when under pressure - they counterattack. Churchill is adamant that Breckinridge was not around to be consulted. Its Churchill's fight. At around 1pm he hits Sheridan who is preparing his own attack and catches him by surprise. Colonel Schaefer is killed, General Sill injured, so only Lytle of Sheridan's original brigade commanders remains on his feet. The sight of some of Sheridan's men streaming from the wooded ridge into the open was an unnerving one for Rosecrans who redirects a division of Nelson's - meant to reinforce Thomas south to McCook instead.

Maguire: The most impressive thing about Churchill was not the attack but his ability in that ground to stop it and withdraw to his starting position.

A Union soldiers sketch of Palmer's attack on Cheatham's flank​

Townsend: Then not satisfied, he pulls out McNair and Ector, marches behind McCown's line, picks up Roger Hanson's brigade from an uncooperative McCown, and attacks again. This time at about 5.30pm and against Jeff Davis. Davis is caught, literally by surprise. Carlin, Woodruff and Post, the brigade commanders of First Division XX Corps, don't panic but they do withdraw a good distance. That's enough for Rosecrans to pull Nelson's remaining two division from supporting Crittenden and Thomas and sending them south.

Churchill's attack is enough to distract Rosecrans from Hardee's troubled centre. There is no third day as Hardee manages to get the word to withdraw to all his commanders. Hardee's gamble at Pulaski was a failure, but he would turn at bay one more time - at the Elk River on May 1st...

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter Forty-Seven

Hard Times for Hardee
Part V​

The Heartlands Campaign Discussion Group at the 38th Annual Civil War Conference at Louisiana State University hosted by Professor Douglas Lee Bannerman...

Hardee's forces know the route and ground through this part of Tennessee better than the Union forces. Through country bereft of anything we would recognize as a road Hardee's forces withdraw eastwards, staying north of the Elk River until it reaching the eastern end of the river and crossing in the vicinity of the towns of Winchester and Decherd.

Hardee stops and immediately begins digging in again. From Mann's Ford in the west to further north than the Bethpage Church, Hardee's troops dig in. Now in order to lure Rosecrans on, Hardee is careful to keep Forrest's Division in the rear with the brigades of Armstrong, Dibrell and Davidson ambushing and raiding the Yankees to keep their "appetites whetted". Once again Rosecrans' force gets strung out in the pursuit. Joseph J. Reynolds in the van, pursues Forrest to a point well north of Estill Springs before Thomas realises the rebel army has in fact crossed the river and that Reynolds is being led on a wild goose chase.

One of Forrest's Ambushes in the offing​

Rosecrans has had plenty of experience fighting Hardee at river crossings before. Thomas is around Estill Springs (boggy ground with a creek at his back - Thomas hates the ground). Crittenden has Samuel Beatty's Division covering Island Ford, and then west of another tributary creek is Brannan covering Hinton's Mill Crossing, with Palmer in reserve. McCook covers Lee Ford with August Willich's Division, William Passmore Carlin covers Owl Hallow with Sheridan drawn up in reserve at Shasteen's Mill. Then beyond both the Little Hurricane and Hurricane Creeks Nelson is coming up with XXIII Corps to cover Mann's Ford. Rosecrans plan is simple. Quietly Rousseau, Brannan and Sheridan will shift to Rosecrans' right, overnight, to support a flanking attack by Nelson, led by Stanley's Cavalry Division which is to secure the two lightly guarded fords west of Mann's Ford. With his line unhinged Hardee will have to withdraw to Chattanooga. Rosecrans' attack was to begin on the morning of May 2nd. Hardee's began on May 1st...

Starke: Hardee is a man, who in private correspondence expresses doubts about his fitness to lead an army. Particularly in the aftermath of Pulaski. But at Elk River you get to see why Hardee was by then a full general and why the Army of Tennessee (perhaps with the exceptions of Cheatham and McCown) was completely confident in him. Previously in these type of river engagements, and there had been several, Hardee defended and Rosecrans attacked. It was a simple formula and Rosecrans expected this one to be no different. Hardee however is close to being forced out of Tennessee and has begun to get the measure of Rosecrans and his corps commanders.

Hardee holds his flanks with reduced but heavily entrenched forces - Withers, with Buford's cavalry dismounted in support on the left between Simmons Mill and Mann's Ford, and McCown on the right between the Allisonia Crossing and the Bethpage Church ford. A.P. Stewart is behind Lee Ford ready to move but the real strength in depth is at (1) Hinton Mill Crossing - Preston Smith's Division plus McNair's and Rains' Brigades of Churchill's; (2) Island Ford - Bushrod Johnson's Division; and (3) The Railroad Crossings - Churchill with his remaining 3 brigades. On the flanks of this attacking force Hardee has placed his artillery in two batteries. One between Boiling Creek and the Widow Curl's House, and the second in the river bend at the Railroad Crossings. With artillery sweeping the Union position from the Fanning Farmhouse to the Emory Mill and beyond, Hardee hoped the attack, led by Cleburne would split the Union Army, already divided by the numerous creeks and tributaries on the north bank. It was a daring in many respects.

One of Robertson's artillery batteries​

Maguire: Yes Hardee had experienced at Pulaski that at a brigade level, the Army of the Cumberland could match the best of his own brigade commanders and the ground was such as to pit one against the other. At Elk River Hardee could fight on a level where the Union was weakest - Cleburne versus Crittenden and McCook.

Townsend: Lets not forget how courageous this move was. Hardee is still seriously outnumbered by the Federal forces. He is not being pressured by Richmond to attack (they are too busy with their own problems). Its his own choice in consultation with Cleburne and Breckinridge.

Hardee is a bit like the Duke of Wellington. We remember him as a defensive general. Wellington and his ridge lines; Hardee and his rivers. But like Wellington at Salamanca or Assaye, Hardee was capable of daring, if not always as successful, attacks. Now Jones, come on, lets here you explain away the Federal performance at Elk River?

Keegan: Hardee's attack would have been a foolish move against Kearny, Reynolds, Hooker or even Grant, but I will admit that Rosecrans was not in their league. Rosecrans biggest failure was in not doing something more active about getting rid of his under-performing corps commanders. Nelson was a disaster waiting to happen, Crittenden unreliable, McCook was very average and had been saved by the performance of his divisional commanders more than once. No only Thomas was any good and at Elk River he was in a terrible position against his better judgment.

Well then lets look at the battle then as Cleburne launches his attack at 5.30am on May 1st...

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter Forty-Seven

Hard Times for Hardee
Part V​

The Heartlands Campaign Discussion Group at the 38th Annual Civil War Conference at Louisiana State University hosted by Professor Douglas Lee Bannerman...

Now I don't want to get bogged down in the tactical detail of the battle but to summarize for those less familiar with the battle: Cleburne's two division attack in the centre made up of Bushrod Johnson's and Preston Smith's Divisions steamroller over Samuel Beatty's surprised division, with only George Buell's brigade putting up much of a fight. Brannan's brigades are attacked in camp so the fail to form up cohesively and are also quickly put to flight. A.P. Stewart pushes across the river and pushes August Willich's Division back quickly. Only on the left where William Passmore Carlin forms his division and artillery into a square atop the Fanning Ridge, and on the right where Thomas quickly pulls the division of Jackson back across the stream behind Estill Springs, are the attacks blunted.

Carlin's Division uses fencing to fortify Fanning Ridge and fires on Stewart's advancing division
​

John Palmer's Division is placed into line by Rosecrans just south of the Hudgens Crossroads. Although they must face the bulk of Preston Smith's attack alone for a short while, Sheridan quickly forms on Palmer's right. These two divisions form a continuous thin line between Little Hurricane Creek and Rock Creek, as Willich forms his battered division in the rear. Brannan's men are too scattered and play on further part. Smith and Stewart try to break this hastily formed line, but all the while Carlin is still at the river, harassing Stewart's flank, while keeping Withers firmly on the south side of the river.

Churchill meanwhile likes the "Estill Springs Box" as little as Thomas does, so leaving two brigades to hold the sunken road south of the town, he sends John K Jackson's brigade to support Bushrod Johnson's Division. In the meantime Breckinridge "encourages" McCown to try to keep Thomas' attention away from the fulcrum of the battle at the crossroads. McCown threats to cross the river against the now alert division of Joseph J Reynolds, while Forrest crosses further north and seeks to harass the left flank of the Union army.

Thomas James Churchill leads the crossing of the Elk River
​

The key to the battle however is with Cleburne and the ground between Rock Creek and Spring Creek. With Beatty routed Rousseau tries to cover the road from Estill Springs, forming his men in a line between the Wade Farm and the Mount Olivet Church. As Thomas withdraws Jackson's Division back over Spring Creek these regiments are sent to support Rousseau's left. Cleburne cares nothings for Rousseau's left. His attack falls on Rousseau's right, forcing him back from the Church. Cleburne wants clear access to the road from Estill Springs to Hudgens Crossroads which means he can send troops into Palmer's rear. If Cleburne can push as far as White's Mill Crossing, he can get into the rear of Palmer and Sheridan.

Cleburne succeeds in pushing Rousseau back. The spare brigade from Churchill arrives just in time. Cleburne sends John K. Jackson across Rock Creek into Palmer's rear. The brigade on Palmer's left, alongside the creek, then does something amazing. William B. Hazen has his rear files turn about to fire on Jackson, back to back with the front files fighting Preston Smith's boys. It is only a temporary delay, and things look grim for Palmer. Hazen pulls out first down the Hudgens Roads. Then Grose and finally Craft. Importantly Palmer is not routed and seeks to form up again at the Hudgens Farm.

The Union position looks bad. Thomas is attacked on three sides. Crittenden only has one complete corps still on the field fighting. Carlin is now isolated. Sheridan is under pressure, and Willich has only reformed two rather shaky brigades. But Hardee has shot his bolt. He has no more reserves to put in. Rosecrans does. James B. Steedman, in command of the II Division of XXIII Corps ignored his commanders orders and immediately to the sound of the guns. He had to cross Hurricane Creek and march around the Little Hurricane, but at this critical juncture he could put the fresh brigades of Croxton and Francis T. Sherman into Rosecrans' line. Rosecrans directed the third brigade to White's Mill. Furthermore Thomas has realized Forrest, now dead in the camp of Reynolds' Division, and McCown were distractions. He focused on getting Jackson's division into a position to support Rousseau properly in preventing Cleburne's free access to the crossing over Rock Creek.

Hardee realized the battle would not be won by 2pm, as Nelson's remaining troops might arrive at any minute, and ordered Stewart and Cleburne to extract themselves as best they could back over Elk Creek, Smith covered the retreat and Churchill abandoned the Sunken Road. By about 4pm the rebel army was south of the river again. It looked like a bit of a drawn battle, but Union losses in dead, wounded and most importantly captured, were almost three times the Confederate losses. Although several Confederate Generals were injured or had close calls (John K. Jackson had 3 bullets holes in his coat and 2 horses shot from under him) and Nathan Bedford Forrest was dead, the Union casualty list among generals was considerably longer. Generals Edward Kirk and George D. Wagner were injured. Generals Thomas L. Crittenden and Milo S. Hascall were dead. General Samuel Beatty was captured. Losses among colonels were considerably higher.

Starke: I would like to mention Thomas and Churchill. We get caught up in the actual fighting that sometimes we miss that the best tactical decision is not to fight. When Churchill attacked James S. Jackson's division Thomas realized he would never be able to bring his superior numbers to bear in the little box formed by the Spring Creek and Elk River. So he personally pulls out the division as quickly as possible. With Jackson and Rousseau safely on the west side of Spring Creek and Reynolds' Division forming a "lid" on the box, it was a trap for Churchill to pour his men into. Churchill in turn reads the ground well and realizes that Thomas has no appetite to put troops back into the box. So he holds the sunken track way with as few men as possible and channels the remainder into a more promising attack. We see two insightful commanders who both read ground very well indeed.

Maguire: For me Elk River, unsurprisingly, is all about Patrick Cleburne. The three divisions directly or indirectly under his command - Johnson, Smith and Stewart, surprise and rout the Federal divisions of Beatty, Brannan and Willich. They effectively isolate Carlin, hold off Rousseau and Sheridan and in my book successfully drive back Palmer. With another division the day would have been his.

Keegan: "Another division". The eternal cry of the rebels in the Slaveholders Rebellion - "but for another brigade". I grant you its not a great day for the Army of the Cumberland but there are performances to be proud of. George Thomas, George P. Buell, John N. Palmer, William Passmore Carlin, William B. Hazen and James B. Steedman all performed well. I agree with Sheridan's assertion that "Steedman is one of the best of the type of volunteer generals". His actions stablised the battle and therefore turned it in favour of the Union.

Townsend: Jones ignores the unholy trinity of Nelson, who ignores the battle but doesn't press a crossing either, McCook who out his two virgin divisional commanders in front and then spent the day acting as Sheridan's shadow, and Crittenden finally who is a non-runner. We know little of what Crittenden did after Beatty brook but it was not much. His death by the hands of one of Cleburne's trained sharpshooters saved him the disgrace that would soon come to others.

Keegan: I forgot to mention the best Union performer of the day...Nadine Turchin! The slayer of Nathan Bedford Forrest during his raid on Joseph J. Reynolds camp and supplies. A better deed was not done that day. A fitting end for a raider, bushwhacker, overseer and lyncher.

Maguire: It is remarkable how the army, for morale purposes, raised up Mrs. Turchin's deed to offset its poor performance in the battle. I love the quotes it generated. Kearny's "If one woman in the Army of the Cumberland can whip the rebel cavalry, I suspect the Army might be capable of better" or Lincoln and Seward "William, I should put that woman in charge of the army don't you think. She fights", "Mr President, you already have a woman in command of the Army of the Cumberland. It just happens to be wrong one!"

The enviable husband of Nadine Turchin, John Basil Turchin​

Starke: The bottom line, the Army of the Cumberland has been poorly led, certainly at a corps level up to this point. They have never been able to bring their full weight to bear against the Army of Tennessee. The Confederates on the other hand are coming into there own at a command level. Hardee, Cleburne, Churchill and indeed Breckinridge sometimes have worked well together. But its a numbers game and Hardee didn't have them.

After Elk River both sides pull back for a bit to rest and re-equip. It was quite an intensive campaign with 5 major engagements and a score of smaller skirmishes. Rosecrans builds up Tullahoma as his supply base. Hardee knows he must defend Chattanooga. Both sides know this is a temporary respite but as both sides continued to skirmish on the Duck River for the next few weeks, none expected the terrific news from Richmond and then from Vicksburg...

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Appendix To Chapter Forty One​

From "Illinois Cossack and Union Princess" by Steven Chicoinot
Buffalo 1996

"Princess Nadezhda Lvova descended from an ancient noble family. Her father was a colonel in the Russian Army and her uncle, Prince Alexei Lvov, was a noted composer. Although she was brought up in army camps, she received an excellent education. Besides being the pet of her father’s regiment, she read extensively and became proficient in four languages...

When Nadezhda was thirty, she married Ivan Vasilovitch Turchaninov, her father’s Colonel of Staff in the Russian Guards. Ivan Turchaninov was born into a Cossack family in Russia and attended the Imperial Military School in St. Petersburg. Ivan fought in Hungary and in the Crimean War. Nadezhda and Ivan were married on May 10, 1856, in Krakow, Poland, three months after the Crimean War ended. Later that year, they immigrated to the United States and eventually settled in Mattoon, Illinois, where Ivan worked for the Illinois Central Railroad. They also anglicized their names to John Basil and Nadine Turchin...

John was greatly inspired by this new world: "I thank America for one thing, it helped me get rid of my aristocratic prejudices, and it reduced me to the rank of a mere mortal. I have been reborn. I fear no work; no sphere of business scares me away, and no social position will put me down; it makes no difference whether I plow and cart manure or sit in a richly decorated room and discuss astronomy with the great scholars of the New World. I want to earn the right to call myself a citizen of the United States of America”...

The Illinois Central Railroad hired John Turchin as an assistant to George McClellan, chief engineer and vice president of the Railroad. John Turchin had met George McClellan in Russia during the Crimean War when McClellan served there as a military observer for the United States. John Turchin worked for the Illinois Central Railroad until 1861, when he resigned to accept a commission as the colonel of the 19th Illinois Infantry. When the regiment went into training at Quincy, Nadine went with her husband, despite orders against wives travelling with campaigns...

During the march into Tennessee in the spring of 1862, Colonel Turchin was taken seriously ill, and for some days was carried in an ambulance on the route. Nadine Turchin nursed her husband during his illness, and also filled his place as commander of the regiment. She led with such an even hand that there were no complaints or mutinies against being commanded by a woman. In the battles that followed, Nadine was constantly under fire, encouraging, nursing, and rescuing the men. Initially the soldiers in the field called her Madam Turchin...

Princess of the Cumberland - Nadine Turchin before her immigration to the United States​

Madame Turchin remained in the field with her husband, in all of the campaigns of the West. She usually cared for the wounded, but if need be she led the troops into action, showing no fear of shot, shell, or whizzing mini balls falling around her. Although she constantly faced enemy fire, she didn’t receive a scratch...

The Chicago Tribune praised Turchin, stating that he “has had, from the beginning, the wisest and clearest ideas of any man in the field about the way in which the war should be conducted” and that he is one “who comprehends the malignant character of the rebellion and who is ready and willing to use all means at his command to put it down” after sponsoring his promotion to General at Chicago’s Bryan Hall. Colonel Turchin was given command of a new brigade and again, Nadine Turchin went with him. In 1863, she began to keep a diary. She considered her diary a discrete safety valve or as she termed it, “I think that it is an excellent idea to write a diary in the present situation. These pages, in which I speak frankly as I think, are a true safety valve for anyone who is neither patient nor discreet.”

She included her opinions of her husband’s fellow officers in her dairy as well as accounts of battles that she participated in, including Elk River fought on May 1, 1863. During the Battle of Elk River she stayed with the brigade camp and division wagons parked on the north eastern edge of the battlefield."

Chaos erupts as Forrest's Division raids the Union flank and rear​

From "Death of the Devil in Gray" and article by James Hearst in Illinois History Quarterly

"Breckinridge ordered Forrest's cavalry over the fords on the extreme right and into Thomas' rear. Joseph J. Reynolds' Division was the most exposed and Forrest, with Davidson's brigade, was soon in their rear. The division's tents were still pitched in camp; the supply trains just beginning to organize themselves...

Davidson's brigade stampeded first Miller's and then Wilder's wagons, gathering huge quantities of captured supplies and prisoners in the process. It was a wild rush through the Union rear...

Two miles from Bethpage Church, Forrest spied a more organised camp, where the Union wagons were already making for the rear and relative safety beyond the railroad line. Captain Henry Pointer takes up the narrative:

"The General detached two companies and we quickly caught up with the wagons. We rode up the line to cut off the leading wagon, and were nearly run down for our trouble. We over took the wagon again: I believe the General had every intention of shooting the driver, though it was peculiar to find one with any gumption...

We were all lost for words. There, with a negro orderly, was a woman, reigns in hand. A very fine handsome woman. The General was as about as gallant as he could muster. He said the damn Yankees on his part of the battlefield were whipped and she ought to surrender.

She didn't say a word. She just made a sound like harrumph! Pulled out a pistol and shot the General square in the chest. It was the only time I ever saw the General look surprised. She cracked the reigns and the wagon was off. I will admit that even with my experience I was simply shocked to my boots. We were a few moments longer before pursuing her than we should otherwise have been. But with the press of wagons, and with Stanley's Yankee troopers finally putting in an appearance from the direction of the Cummings farm we pursued her no distance, and well she got clean away. It was damn shame all round.

One of the preliminary sketches for Weldon's masterpiece of 1911, Angel of Elk River, showing the death of General Forrest​

From "Madame Turchin" by Mary Able Speight
Illinois State Press 1934

"She described herself in her diary as "a silent and angry witness to this miserable confusion...wagons and suttlers in full flight...they wretchedly frightened at the nearness of danger". She wrote of "galloping for two or three hours in all directions, on every road" in search of her husband until she found the division quartermaster and a handful of his wagons which he was trying to salvage...

She did as she had done before and took a hand in organizing the wagons as the sound of rebel fire increased and approached. She was more "frightened that she had anticipated". Her skin was windburned, her eyes burning, her lips chapped, and her throat parched - "near overcome" when the rebels approached...

Cutting her off and not having the courtesy even "to draw a gun on me who had but a moment ago tried to run them down", they demanded her surrender in "the crudest terms". "I did not go armed lightly and had no intention of being parted from my husband. President Lincoln could not part us, and neither would I let Jeff Davis". She shot at the nearest rebel and put the horses to flight as best she could...

Several hours latter "tired, covered with dust, and talking hoarsely" Madam Turchin found her husband safe and well. It was some time before General Turchin put the story of his wife's escape and the death of General Forrest together. It was only when the negro orderly, Abraham, identified the body of General Forrest before Generals Turchin, Thomas, Jackson and Rousseau (and some gentlemen of the press) that Madam Turchin's bravery was recognized by the whole army...

It lead to General Rousseau's famous observation "that the wives of this army with Madam Turchin at their head, would whip the rebels in a month"..."

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter Forty-Eight​

A New Crowned King​

From “The War Between the States” by Otis R. Mayhew
Sword & Musket 1992

“The Summer of 1863 became known as the Summer of Victories. The telegram from Kearny to the President “The Army of the Potomac has this morning returned Richmond to the Union” caused an explosion of celebration in the North. This news was promptly followed by the news Petersburg had been abandoned to the Army of the James. Then the news Grant had taken Vicksburg and Johnson had been repelled from Port Hudson arrived. The newspapers even began to revisit their disappointment with the Army of the Cumberland – the Battle of Elk River was no longer a stalemate but a “repulse of the rebel army” and the Union Army “now stood at the doors of Chattanooga and Rebel State of Georgia”. Gideon Welles noted in his diary that for weeks "every day seemed like the 4th July".

From “Kearny the Magnificent” by Roger Galton
NorthWestern

“Kearny now faced a number of challenges: the occupation of northern and eastern Virginia including two cities; a wave of irregular warfare that was already raising its ugly face in the occupied elements of Virginia as it spread from the Valley; and the now unanchored Army of Northern Virginia. Above all Kearny was concerned with the sense in the north that the war was almost won. “We have taken the rebel capitol and split the rebel section, but they still maintain three armed hosts in the field. I see no prospect of the rebels’ defeat until we have humbled all three in battle” and thus “the nation must not falter at the last for want of resolve. We must fight this rebellion to the finish with all our might” (Kearny to Governor Parker of New Jersey)…

Lincoln read Kearny’s missive to the cabinet. “I would be grateful if I could be permitted to use my discretion in forming the garrison of Virginia and reorganising our forces here”. “Gentlemen, I think we can do General Kearny more honor than that” was Lincoln’s response…

Lincoln addresses the cabinet before approving Kearny's promotion​

An Order was promulgated to all the elements of the Union Army: Major General Philip Kearny Jr was appointed Commander of the United States Army effective from 30th July 1863…

In his few public statements and in all his public correspondence (correspondence he knew would be passed to newspapers for publication) Kearny maintained his surprise at the appointment “I am neither a West Point man nor have I much interest among our representatives in Washington… I am surprised that an unworthy such as I should be appointed to a position of such responsibility”. His private correspondence and the testimony of those who knew him best contradict these public expressions of humility by Kearny. “He was fiercely ambitious” according to his cousin John Watts dePeyster, “and considered himself a better soldier in every way that many a West Pointer appointed to high rank and commands early in the war”.

As to his political connections, his relationship with President went back to a backwoods lawyer who helped an ambitious cavalry officer recruit a picked company in Illinois for the Mexican War. During the Civil War Kearny had corresponded regularly with the Governors of every state which had provided troops, first to his brigade, then to his division, corps and finally his army, praising the performance of that state's officers and men. He was well known both to the Governors of the north and to the newspaper reading public in each state as his letters of praise were invariably published. Joel Parker of New Jersey, Austin Blair of Michigan, and former governor of New York Edwin D. Morgan were particular correspondents of Kearny’s who were on all record as lobbying for his preferment…

His appointment to the command of all the Union armies caused Kearny to scrap his initial plans for the reorganisation of the Armies of the Potomac and the James. He now planned a fundamental reorganisation…

Two new departments were created: the Department of Northern Virginia with its headquarters in Richmond was placed under the command of General John Sedgwick. It was to be garrisoned by the troops of II Corps. II Corps had taken the most casualties over the last year of campaigning and was in dire need of a period of comparative rest and reorganisation. It was therefore placed at Sedgwick’s disposal, while Kearny had another role in mind for its now unemployed commander Gouvenor K. Warren.

The Department of South Eastern Virginia with its headquarters in Petersburg was placed under the command of Kearny’s fellow New Yorker, James Wadsworth. The garrison would be drawn from the Army of the James’ I Corps. The entire first division was placed at Wadsworth’s disposal, along with the existing garrisons of Norfolk and Suffolk…

John J. Peck was raised to command of the Army of the James to which two new divisions made up of negro troops were added. XVIII Corps would therefore remain a two division corps under John G. Foster while VII Corps rose to a three division corps under Horatio Wright…

The changes to the Army of the Potomac were even more wide ranging. John F. Reynolds was transferred from the Army of the James to replace Kearny at the head of the Army of the Potomac. II Corps was withdrawn from the Army. With Hooker’s departure for Washington, Sickles rose to lead III Corps, with Gershom Mott replacing him in command of its II Division. J.J. Barlett would replace Wadsworth at the head of Meade’s IV Corps II Division. A.A. Humphrey would replace Sedgwick at the head of V Corps, with James Barnes replacing Dan Butterfield in command of its I Division and Samuel Crawford replacing Humphrey at the head of its III Division. Finally Mansfield was too infirm to lead XII Corps further, so Alpheus Williams was promoted to command with Thomas Ruger replacing him in command of its I Division…”

[A full order of battle will follow shortly]

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter Forty-Nine​

War to the Hilt​

From “Kearny the Magnificent” by Roger Galton
NorthWestern​

“Kearny was well aware of the risks associated with his appointment in the middle of the campaigning season. “There is a great temptation to meddle in every aspect of our army’s organisation and to make great plans for the remainder of this year, but there is great danger involved. I must be certain not to leave any element of our forces disorganised while I shuffle my cards in the midst of a hand in play”…​

It was essential for Kearny to establish the scope of his new authority. A meeting with the President and Secretary Stanton was required and soon. Thankfully the President had already foreseen such a need, and coupled with his desire to “see free Richmond” he had already laid plans to travel south by sea. Secretary Wells, on hearing of the plans was beside himself with nerves. An escort of three warships was assigned to the President to “sweep the waters before the President’s conveyance for mines and such”. No one wanted to loose the President as General McClellan had been lost...”​

From “The King and his Heir – Lincoln and Kearny in the Civil War” by Robert Todd Lincoln II
Grafton Press 1939​

“It was hard to know who was the more idolised as the President and the First Among His Generals ambled around Richmond. The city’s newly freed negros fell at the feet of their “Father Abraham” while every soldier stood a bit taller at the sight of “the ironplated Kearny”. It was not lost on Kearny’s admirers and detractors alike that he could not pass a limbless grey rags-clad figure without a salute, and a bundle of greenbacks where these would be accepted…​

When General Sedgwick enquired of Kearny’s staff whether more military escorts should be sought to hold back the crowds, General Kearny’s new chaplain, Rev. James Smith Bush (of Orange, New Jersey) responded that both men were “protected by a host no earthly power could overcome”…”

President Lincoln and General Kearny walk through Richmond​

From “Kearny the Magnificent” by Roger Galton
NorthWestern​

“Kearny’s first concern was recruitment. As a fervent believer in esprit de corps he was appalled by the recruitment practices of the northern governors. Instead of providing a steady flow of reinforcements for depleted existing regiments, northern governors insisted on raising new regiments and providing fresh commissions, in many cases granting senior field commissions to men with no previous experience after full two years of war. Regiments with a history, with a proven character, were being whittled away to nothing by illness, battle and by expiring enlistments.​

Kearny considered this method impractical and bad for moral. It denied experienced regimental officers in the field robust commands; it denied recruits a leavening of experienced comrades, NCOs and officers to provide a solid foundation in their transition from civilian to military life; and it was genuinely disturbing to an officer like Kearny to see fine regiments wither on the vine after two and more years of war...​

He was direct in his approach to the President and Secretary Stanton. “I have convinced many to re-enlist in this army upon expiry of their enlistments. I will continue to address each regiment personally where I can to implore the men to remain and serve to see this struggle through. However many do not re-enlist for the simple reason their beloved regiments are dying for want of re-enforcement and recruitment, and they will not serve under any other regiment’s flag…Should fresh regiments continue to be sent I will break them up to reinforce the old. Should fresh commissions be granted I will remove those officers from their regiments and place them wherever I judge they may do most good. I will thus instruct those officers under my command to do likewise. I will have re-enforcements for our existing regiments. I will accept whole companies if necessary. But I deem it in the best interests of our cause that the system be changed…” (Notes according to Secretary Stanton)…​

It would appear, if Stanton’s notes are to believed (no notes, if any were made, from Kearny nor Lincoln survive), that Kearny adopted an aggressive argument expecting Lincoln and Stanton would protect the governors’ right to recruit as they saw fit. Stanton agreed wholeheartedly with Kearny. It was pure inefficient gubernational political patronage. Lincoln was more reserved, offering Kearny his support, but suggesting Kearny correspond with the governors directly on the matter…”​

From “Kearny and the Radicals” by Hugh W. McGrath
New England Press 1992​

“The James Conference was a watershed moment for the Lincoln Administration as Lincoln, Kearny and Stanton discussed their visions for post-war reconstruction for the first time with each other in detail.​

It was a tenet of faith with Kearny that the aristocratic political leadership of the south had led an unsuspecting southern people down the road of treason, and that the south’s military officers had betrayed the most sacred oaths to defend the nation and the constitution. Kearny’s view of the post war South showed a clear dichotomy in his thinking: the southern people, and the Confederate rank and file, should be spared punishment. The Confederate political and military leadership should be subjected to the harshest measures. “If we cut off the head completely the Southern Serpent will die. Whether we impose a new leadership on the South or encourage a new leadership from its infancy, there are no circumstances under which we should allow arch-traitors and oath breakers to resume their places in our society”.​

General Kearny favoured execution of the Confederate ring leaders – The President, some members of the Cabinet, Governors and perhaps former US officers in the Confederate service. The murderers of officers and enlisted men who had laid down their arms should also face the gallows in Kearny’s opinion. "Remember General Hunter for the nation shall". ​

Beyond that Kearny favoured a lifetime ban on any former Confederate officer or officeholder from public office or government employ. Kearny also favoured a permanent disenfranchisement for such men. “Treason, in this case a double treason, against our country and against God’s most precious gift, liberty, is the greatest crime of which a man is capable. Add to that the oath breaking by the very defenders of our country and their treason becomes threefold…” (Kearny in a separate note to Secretary Stanton. It is a sentiment that Kearny expressed and paraphrased in many letters to friends and correspondents in the north)…​

Stanton recorded one phrase in the margins of his notes that is indicative of his own concerns: “Who will say Remember Hunter?” [Stanton’s own emphasis]…​

Lincoln was notably taken aback according to Stanton’s recollection. This was not the re-united Union that Lincoln sought. Lincoln sought to outline his vision of a “liberated” south not a “conquered” one. The enforcement of emancipation and statutory protection for the newly liberated slaves, yes, but also an open door to southern states to fully participate in the political life of the country once a portion of its population had taken an oath of allegiance.​

Stanton records that Kearny was unconvinced by the President’s words. If the southern leadership were spared the full consequences of its treason “the South will rise again and our sons and our grandsons will only have to fight this war again”...​

It is unknown whether the President now harboured any doubts about the man he had raised to command the armies of the Union, but John Hay recalled that the President seemed more downcast and contemplative after the James Conference than at any time since the death of General McClellan…”

President Lincoln was most impressed during his visit to Richmond by General Kearny's bugler 14 year old Gustave A. Schurmann​

 

[TheKnightIrish]

The Leaders of the Army of the James​

Commanding General Army of the James: John J. Peck​

The Army of the James is currently screening Petersburg from Dinwiddie Court House to as far east as the notorious Blackwater River.

XVII Corps Commander: John G. Foster, II Division: Innis N. Palmer, III Division: John W. Phelps​

John Wolcutt Phelps had been outlawed by President Davis along with General David Hunter. However by the time of the issue of this order, condemning the raising of negro troops, Phelps had resigned his commission. After the murder of General Hunter he was offered a Major-General's commission and command of a negro division. (In OTL he refused). The I Division has been detached to form the garrison of Petersburg under James Wadsworth.

VII Corps Commander: Horatio G. Wright, I Division: Quincy A. Gilmore, II Division: Henry M. Naglee, and III Division: William Birney​

William Birney is the brother of General David Birney, and commands a division largely made up of negro regiments. (One brigade of white troops and two of negro troops).

Cavalry Division Commander: Washington Lafayette Elliott​

W.L.Elliott commands an understrength division of two cavalry brigades.

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Leaders of the Army of the Potomac

Commanding General of the Army of the Potomac: John F. Reynolds

The II Corps has been withdrawn from the Army to garrison Richmond and northern Virginia. With it goes John Sedgwick and its three divisional commanders, Willis A. Gorman, John C. Caldwell and William Hays. The Irish Brigade has departed with the Corps, though I trust it will return!

The Army currently guards the line of the Appomattox River from Tower Hill to almost the walls of Petersburg.

I Corps Commander: Winfield Scott Hancock, I Division: Abner Doubleday, II Division: Marsena R. Patrick, and III Division: John C. Robinson

Hancock the Superb was originally a "rival" to Phil Kearny, following McClellan's initial report of the Battle of Williamsburg which forgot almost to mention Kearny. John C. Robinson served in Kearny's Division in the Peninsula and was marked for preferment by Kearny.

III Corps Commander: Daniel Sickles, I Division: David B. Birney, II Division: Gershom Mott and III Division: Amiel W. Whipples

Hooker's reassignment and his recommendation has resulted in the elevation of the controversial Dan Sickles to command of the III Corps. Kearny became a friend of Sickles in the Peninsula. (Kearny is no stranger to public scandal and controversy himself). Birney is also another of Kearny's favored subordinates from the Peninsula.

IV Corps Commander: George Meade, I Division: John Newton, II Division: Joseph J. Barlett, and III Division: Lew Wallace

J.J.Barlett replaces James Wadsworth, the new commander of the Dept. South Eastern Virginia.

V Corps Commander: Andrew A. Humphreys, I Division: James Barnes, II Division: George Sykes and III Division: Samuel W. Crawford

The profane Humphreys replaces "Uncle" John Sedgwick. Kearny has had an eye out for an opening for Humphreys since the Battle of the Rappahannock. James Barnes replaces Dan Butterfield who has left to become Joe Hooker's Chief of Staff, and Samuel W. Crawford replaces Humphreys at the divisional level. George Sykes, who commands the Regular Division, is extremely put out to passed over thus, but "Tardy" George has yet to take any formal action.

VI Corps Commander: Isaac P. Rodman, I Division: Albion P. Howe, II Division: David Alan Russell and III Division: William T.H. Brooks

After the II Corps, VI Corps is known as a corps always in thickest part of the fray. It has therefore been a dangerous appointment for a general. Isaac P. Rodman is one of the most junior corps commanders but has been especially favored by General Kearny in recent campaigns.

IX Corps Commander: Jesse L. Reno, I Division: Isaac Stevens, II Division: Samuel D. Sturgis and III Division: Orlando B. Willcox

IX Corps has come through Kearny's command very lightly, only being heavily engaged in its most recent battle.

XI Corps Commander: Adolph von Steinwehr, I Division: Francis C. Barlow, II Division: Max Webber, and III Division: Alexander Schimmelfennig

A Corps that started out full of German '48s and Pennsylvania "Dutch" troops, it now has a mix of troops, and its commander von Steinwehr has knocked a little of the free thinking democracy out the corps and replaced it with a bit of German military efficiency. Barlow is also regarded as a severe disciplinarian.

XII Corps Commander: Alpheus S. Williams, I Division: Thomas H. Ruger, II Division: George S. Greene, and III Division: John W. Geary

Another corps that has seen relatively little fighting compared with lower numbered corps. General Joseph K. Mansfield has stood down from command because of ill health.

Cavalry Corps Commander: John Buford, Artillery Corps Commander: Henry J. Hunt, and Chief of Engineers: John G. Barnard

General Hunt still commands the combined artillery for the Army of the Potomac and General Barnard has been appointed to command the Army's engineers. General Buford still commands 4 divisions of cavalry (2 brigades each) with a 5th on detached service. The increased Irregular activity as the Union occupies Virginia will see increasing demands on Buford to detach more elements of his command.

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter Fifty​

A Train From The East​

From “Old Rosy - A Biography of General William S. Rosecrans” by Lemuel M. Williams
Old Miss 1961​

“It was one of those mistakes that occur in wartime communications. The warnings sent by telegraph to the Army of the Cumberland had gone awry. General Rosecrans therefore received less than 24 hours notice of the arrival of “the new commanding general” by rail at Tullahoma. ​

The front here had remained static since the Battle of Elk River two months earlier, as Rosecrans made detailed preparations for the next stage of his assault on Hardee and an advance into Georgia…​

General Rosecrans and his staff were accompanied to the station to receive General Kearny by General Thomas. Generals Nelson and Sheridan (now commanding XXI Corps following the death of General Crittenden) remained with the army…​

It was, for Rosecrans, a tragic miscommunication. Major General Joseph Hooker alighted from the train. With him he carried orders from General Kearny, relieving General Rosecrans from command of the Army of the Cumberland, and placing General Hooker at its head. This was “the new commanding general” Rosecrans had hurried to meet. It was a difficult and unexpected moment for both men on that station platform…”​

From “Army of the Heartland” by Col. J.T. Starke
University of Tennessee​

“The Army could be forgiven for thinking that neither Washington nor General Kearny had any faith in its leadership because General Hooker did not arrive alone from the East. A bevy of “eastern” generals were aboard: Generals Dan Butterfield (Hooker’s new chief of staff), William F. Barry (Chief of Artillery), Lawrence P. Graham (Chief of Cavalry), Gouvernor K. Warren (Chief of Engineers), Jacob D. Cox, Hiram Berry and Regis de Trobriand (all three to be appointed to divisional commands – Berry and de Trobriand at General Kearny’s personal recommendation). Finally from a rear carriage, amidst a cloud of oaths and blasphemy, General Israel B. Richardson was assisted onto the platform and onto his crutches. “More fit for duty than a great many whole men they have here” General Butterfield later observed…​

Hooker did not just carry orders relieving Rosecrans. General Nelson was ordered back to a “sub-department” in Kentucky to manage its defences and encourage recruitment. General Alexander McCook was also relieved and ordered back to Ohio to “await further orders”…​

Sheridan was returned to XX Corps but to serve as its commander. Berry and de Trobriand were assigned to command its II and III Divisions. Richardson was to command XXI Corps.​

But it was not all bad news for the Generals of the Cumberland. Hooker carried a number of promotions in his pocket. William B. Hazen was to have I Division and George P. Buell the III Division of XXI Corps. Gordon Granger was promoted to command XXIII Corps, with Jacob D. Cox replacing him as commander of its I Division. A half dozen colonels were also to be promoted to Brigadier General, including Anson George McCook and Hans Heg…”​

From “Fighting Joe Hooker” by Herbert Walter
Buffalo 1999​

“Hooker had feared a hostility to this radical change in command, and the replacement of old Cumberlanders with Eastern veterans. Indeed in some quarters there was resentment. Many staff officers were put out of office by the shake up. Many hopes of promotion had been dashed. Yet the remaining leadership of the Army of Cumberland set an example by staying above any suggestion of “hostility”.​

George Thomas gave no outward indication of any frustration at being passed over for the command that had once been offered to him. It was simply not in his nature. There were few more honorable subordinates.​

Sheridan has not lost out in the reorganisation and indeed now commanded his “own boys” as part of XX Corps. Granger had benefited from his promotion to replace his former “dangerous, incompetent commander” (Dan Butterfield’s assessment of William Nelson’s tenure as commander of XXIII)…​

General Kearny himself is said to have noted “I rely on Hooker’s own spirit to charm those Cumberlanders, and if not his spirit in camp then his example in battle.” General Dan Sickles believed that “Fighting Joe and Dan the Pistol [Daniel Butterfield] will be just to the taste of those rough hewn western boys”..."​

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Leaders of the Army of the Cumberland

Commanding General of the Army of the Cumberland: Joseph Hooker

The Army has sat with its forward outposts on the Sequatchie River between Stevenson and Bridgeport but has not advanced further while Rosecrans built up supplies in Tullahoma and awaited reinforcements.

XIV Corps Commander: George H. Thomas, I Division: Lovell H. Rousseau, II Division: James S. Jackson, and III Division: Joseph J. Reynolds

One wonders if Thomas regrets not relieving Buell when he had the chance. He has now been passed over twice for command of the Army of the Cumberland. Rousseau is considering running for congress from Kentucky. Both Jackson and Reynolds have reason to be concerned about their positions. Neither has performed notably to date.

XX Corps Commander: Philip Sheridan, I Division: William P. Carlin, II Division: Hiram Berry, and III Division: Regis de Trobriand

Philip Sheridan has performed well under Rosecrans command despite his former corps commander's lacklustre performances. William P. Carlin did very well at the Battle of Elk River in his first battle in command of a division. Hiram Berry commanded a brigade with distinction in the Army of the Potomac (in Kearny's Division) before being injured. Regis de Trobriand has benefited from General Kearny's admiration of all things French with quick promotion to brigade command in which role he has performed well in the East.

XXI Corps Commander: Israel Richardson, I Division: William B. Hazen, II Division: John M. Palmer, and III Division: George P. Buell

Israel Richardson, former commander of II Corps Army of the Potomac, has followed Hooker to the West. Richardson is still on crutches following a nasty wound to the thigh during the Battle of Richmond. It has not improved his demeanor. John Palmer's Division has performed very well to date. It is not clear if that was Palmer's influence or his three brigade commanders: Craft, Hazen and Grose. Hooker has instructions from Kearny to promote young officers of proven courage and talent to divisional command. William B. Hazen and George P. Buell would have to have waited some time under Rosecrans regime to occupy these positions but the have benefited from Hooker's review of the most recent battle reports of Army of the Cumberland.

XXIII Corps Commander: Gordon Granger, I Division: Jacob D. Cox, II Division: James B. Steedman, and III Division: Absalom Baird

Granger is considered a very sound level headed officer. Steedman, a printer, politician, militia general and volunteer in the Texan War of Independence is well thought of, "the best sort of volunteer general".

Chief of Artillery: William F. Barry, Chief of Cavalry: Lawrence P. Graham, and Chief of Engineers: Gouverneur K. Warren

Who is the best Union Artillerist? The answer is either Henry Hunt or William Barry. Hooker has made sure he has Barry to reorganize his artillery. Temporarily assigned to train cavalry at Annapolis, Graham has been brought from the East because Hooker believes he needs a teacher to bring his cavalry up to snuff. Kearny has appointed Warren to the Army of the Cumberland but we shall see shortly that he has a wider remit...

 

[TheKnightIrish]

Chapter Fifty-One​

A Steamboat from the North​

From "U.S. Grant - Hero of Three Wars" by John W. Eisenhower
Edison 1953​

“Generals Grant and Sherman were in Vicksburg to meet the steamboat carrying General Kearny’s emissary. General Warren had not stayed long in Tennessee. He was tasked with carrying instructions to General Grant and also to discuss the coming campaign with Grant in a way not possible by telegraph. Kearny had resolved to remain in Virginia for the coming campaign, as he still believed Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia represented the greatest threat…”​

From “Kearny the Magnificent” by Roger Galton
NorthWestern​

“Kearny had initially considered sending his Chief of Staff, Oliver O. Howard, as his representative to Grant, but while Howard was a sound Chief of Staff and would have been a good messenger, he did not have the imagination to discuss and debate Grant’s plans for the coming months, nor did Kearny think Howard had a particularly penetrating insight into personalities and abilities.​

Kearny however had been impressed with Warren’s tactical insight over the last few months. Warren had established a reputation of bringing his engineering traits of deliberation and caution to the role of infantry corps commander. While not perhaps sharing Kearny’s more aggressive tendencies, Warren could trusted to have a meaningful discussion with Grant and to seek a genuine and thorough understanding of his plans. Isaac Rodman described Warren as “a man of fine intelligence, great earnestness, quick perception, and could make his dispositions as quickly as any officer, under difficulties where he was forced to act”.”​

From "U.S.Grant - Hero of Three Wars" by John W. Eisenhower
Edison 1953​

“Without ever having met Grant and Kearny agreed on one thing. The objectives of the Union armies for the remainder of 1863 should not be cities or ports but the rebel field armies. Grant expressed his goal to Warren in simple terms, “I mean to bring Bragg’s army to battle wherever I can, fight it and defeat it”. Grant planned to secure Jackson and from there he could strike into Alabama in any of three directions: towards Decatur/Huntsville, Birmingham or Montgomery. An advance north towards Decatur would be seen to support Hooker while the capture of Montgomery would have significant symbolic benefits. However Grant expressed no preference. “I mean follow Bragg wherever he might go”…​

Warren was concerned about how Grant would maintain his supply lines, away from the Mississippi or any functioning railroad. Grant was unconcerned. He had cast off from his supply lines in his advance on Vicksburg, and he meant to do the same on any advance into Alabama. Alabama was virgin territory as far as the war was concerned. An army on the move should be able to live comfortably off the land. Warren was notably sceptical, as is reflected in his formal report to Kearny, however Sherman reflected to Warren that he had been of a similar cautious mindset before the advance on Vicksburg but was now wholly convinced of the practicality of the plan…​

Grant, relieved that no alteration in his command was to be “forced” upon him by Kearny, sought to establish the extent of his authority under Kearny. Particularly he wanted to confirm he had the power to replace his corps commanders. As matters stood McClernand had XIII Corps, Sherman XV Corps, McPherson XVII Corps, Hurlbut XVI Corps and Fitz-John Porter XIX Corps. Grant particularly wanted to replace McClernand and Hurlbut with “professional soldiers” i.e. Eugene Carr and E.O.C. Ord, though this went unsaid in his discussions with Warren.​

Warren confirmed that Grant had complete authority over divisional appointments and below, but that for “political considerations” the President had asked Kearny to clear any future corps level changes with the War Office. Sherman’s interjection is on record “Doesn’t General Kearny recognise that we need trained professional West point officers in command, not these political appointees...?”. “General Sherman, General Kearny is not a West Point man. To the best of my knowledge he has never set foot inside West Point himself. He values merit earned in the field over an officer’s alma mater”…”​